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ABSTRACT 
The principal substantive aim of this study is that of providing a 
critical account of the relationship of law to language. While studies 
within the philosophy of law have, on occasion, examined the 
presuppositions of legal analysis and legal practice in the terminology of 
the philosophy of language, law and language have in general been treated 
as discrete phenomena - the conjunction "and" has marked a constant 
separation of distinctive areas of expertise. Utilising the linguistic 
methodologies developed within sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and 
critical semiotics,, the specific purpose of this study has been to develop 
an interdisciplinary approach to law and legal texts as language or as 
linguistic practice. It has been argued throughout this work that the 
language of the law is a prominent indicator of the social and historical 
genesis and motivation of the legal text as instrument of social 
regulation and discipline. Legal discourse, like any other of the 
traditional rhetorical genres or language varieties, is an historically 
and rhetorically organised product. It is thus proposed that a critical 
linguistic methodology can read within the structure of legal discourse 
the socio-historical and political affinities and conflicts that led to 
the emergence of the myth of law as a unitary language and as a discrete 
scientific discipline. If the present study has been in any measure 
succesful, it will have contributed to the deconstruction of that myth and 
to its displacement by a more adequate and critical concept of legal 
discourse as a language of power, as the pursuit of control over meaning 
and as instrument and expression of domination. 
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1. INTRODUCTION; LAW AND LANGUAGE 
Despite the glaringly obvious fact that both legal theory and legal 
practice are, and have always been, heavily dependent upon the tools of 
rhetorical and linguistic analysis, no coherent or systematic account of 
the relationship of law to language has ever been achieved. Even worse, 
the occasional exercises that modern jurisprudence has conducted in the 
direction of normative linguistics, in studying the 'grammar' of law, or 
the philosophy of ordinary language, in outlining the semantics of rule 
application, have been exercises aimed at asserting or defending the 
positivistic view that law is an internally defined 'system' of notional 
meanings or of specifically legal values, that it is a technical language 
and is by and large, unproblematically, univocal in its application. 
Despite the linguistically dubious nature of the assumptions regularly 
made by formalistic (deductive) theories of adjudication, lawyers and 
legal theorists have successfully maintained a superb oblivion to the 
historical and social features of legal language, and rather than studying 
the actual development of legal linguistic practice, both spoken and 
written, have asserted deductive models of law application in which 
language is the neutral instrument of purposes peculiar to the internal 
development of legal regulation and legal discipline. What has been 
consistently excluded from the ambit of legal studies, has been the 
possibility of analysing law as a specific stratification or 'register' of 
an actually existent language system, together with the correlative denial 
of the heuristic value of analysing legal texts themselves as historical 
products organised according to rhetorical criteria. Despite the common 
social experience of legal regulation as a profoundly alien linguistic 
practice, as control by means of an archaic, obscure, professional ised and 
impenetrable language, ' no recognition has been provided of the peculiar 
-------------------- 
Ell See, for example, D. Mellinkoff: The Language of the Law (1963) Yale U. P.; 
P. Carlen: Magistrates' Justice (1976) artin Robertson; W. OIBarr: Linguistic 
Evidence (1982) Academic Press. A more sophisticated account is put forward 
in I. Stewart: Sociology in Jurisprudence, in B. Fryer et al. (eds): Law, State 
and Soc iety ( 1981 ) Cr oom Helm 107. 
and distinctive character of law as a specific, soc iolinguistic ally 
defined, speech community and usage. The critical aims of the present 
study will be those of endeavouring to develop an awareness of the 
linguistic problems inherent in viewing law as a system of communication 
and of non-communication, as the rhetoric of a particular group or class, 
and as a specific exercise of power and of power over meaning. In short, 
it will be the principle critical objective of this study to evidence the 
view that legal language,, like any other language usage, is a social 
practice and that its texts will necessarily bear the imprint of such 
practice or organisational background. In attempting to recover the 
social and political dimensions of legal semantics and textual practice by 
means of linguistic analysis, I will be further suggesting that an 
adequate reading of the law should treat legal discourse or the legal 
genre as an accessible and answerable discourse, as a discourse that is 
inevitably responsible for its place and role within the political and 
sexual commitments of its times. 
That there is as yet no sub-division of the legal genre that studies 
law and language in a manner comparable to the jurisprudential and socio- 
legal disciplines devoted to law land' economics, anthropology, sociology, 
psychology and so on 
2 does not, of course, mean that language has been 
wholly ignored. Even within contemporary traditions of legal analysis, 
circumstantial, anecdotal, intuitive and arbitrary observations and 
remarks upon the character of legal language are commonplace. These have 
generally taken the form of comments upon the vocabulary and the syntax of 
text-book and case-book law, and have also, increasingly, noted the 
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peculiar opacity of legislative drafting with distaste. At their most 
extravagant, disaffected lawyers have broadened the scope of these 
perceptions into critiques of the verbal nature of legal disputes and of 
legal culture generally, but the significance of the linguistic element in 
-------------------- 
[21 For a recent conspectus, c. f. D. R. Harris: The Developnent of Socio-legal 
Studies within the United Kingdom (1983) 3 Legal Studies 315. See also, the 
symposium on legal scholarship in (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal. 
131 Generally, see G. Williams: Law and Language (1945) 62 Law Quarterly Review 
385; H. Morris: Verbal Disputes and the Legal Philosophy of John Austin (1960) 
7 Univ. of California Law Review 27; D. Mellinkoff op. cit.; D. Crystal and 
D. Davey: Investigations of English Styl (1969) Indiana U. P. ch. 2; D. Miers 
and A. Page: Legislation (1982) London. For the first major French symposium, 
see, (1974) 19 Archives De Philosophie du Droit (Le Langage du Droit) . 
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this confrontation has been ignored: the historical task of systematically 
relating linguistics to legal theory, and conceptions of language use to 
legal practice, remains almost entirely in the future. For the purpose of 
suggesting that this nascent conjunction of law and language is both an 
obvious and a necessary project, 'I shall outline the interrelations of law 
and language according to a very broad, historical, schema. The point is 
not simply one of style or presentation. At the level of theory it bears a 
certain polemical connotation. Both traditional linguistics and 
conventional jurisprudence have viewed their objects of study as being the 
'systems' or 'codes' that govern, respectively, language usage and law 
application as potentialities rather than empirical actualities. In both 
disciplines, it has been the abstract imperatives of a notional system 
that forms the object of synchronic (static) scientific study; actual 
meaning, actual usage and the diachronic (historical) dimension generally, 
are largely ignored. Even the most superficial of historical surveys, 
however, will clearly indicate that such formalist accounts of language 
and of legal language are historically and geographically specific and 
limited. More particularly, viewed historically as a rhetoric or as a 
discourse - as linguistic practice first and foremost - the analysis of 
law as a unitary, formal, language is but one - tendentious and motivated - 
possible account of legal communication. I shall argue throughout that if 
linguistics is to be of use to legal studies, it will be as a sophisticated 
and to some degree scientific method available for analysing the 
historical semantics of legal texts. Law, as a linguistic register or as a 
literary genre, can be described linguistically or, more importantly, 
discursively, in terms of its systematic appropriation and privileging of 
legally recognised meanings, accents and connotations (modes of 
inclusion), and its simultaneous rejection of alternative and competing 
meanings and accents, forms of utterance and discourse generally, as 
extrinsic, unauthor ised or threatening (modes of exclusion). To 
understand the coherence of this process of linguistic and semantic 
inclusion and exclusion is to introduce the problem of the relationship of 
law to power, and to some extent to explain the characteristic modes of 
legal utterance as social discourse - as a hierarchical (stratified), 
authoritarian (distanced), monologic (uniaccentual) and alien (reified) 
use of language. 
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Par t I. 
The specific division of the present work into two parts, the first 
concerned with linguistics and legal theory, the second with rhetoric, its 
modern equivalent discourse analysis, and the reading of legal texts, 
reflects both the critical and the historical methods and objectives 
outl ined above. my pr inc i pal interest is in the cont. em po r ar y 
interrelations of law and language within jurisprudence and formal legal 
pr ac tic e. It is nonetheless the case that any attempt to develop a 
critical analysis of the linguistic assumptions underlying legal studies 
and its representations and readings of legal texts,, requires that some 
account be given of the complex and extensive traditions to which it 
belongs. Specifically in the context of developing an alternative 
methodology for the analysis and reading of legal texts, it has appeared 
useful to distinguish two antithetical traditions of linguistic and 
jurisprudential analysis, those of exegesis and rhetoric. The former 
tradition, that of textual exegesis, is,, and has long been, the dominant 
paradigm of language study and of legal interpretation, its treatment of 
the text being predicated upon its unity as the expression of a precedent 
intention or will. Broadly, the exegete claims to recover, passively and 
philologically, the true meaning and order of the text by virtue of an 
analytic reconstruction of its source. 
4 In Part I of the instant work, I 
shall endeavour to give an account of the contemporary versions of the 
exegetical analysis implicit within the dual development of the 'sciences' 
of language and of law which emerged towards the end of the 19th century 
and which retain an unhealthy, degree of theoretical and practical 
dominance within their respective disciplines to the present day. 
It is the argument of Part I that linguistics and legal science share 
the time, place and theoretical context of their inception as sciences. 
-------------------- 
[41 On the definition of the exegetical school in jurisprudence, see, W. Twining: 
Some Jobs for Jurisprudence (1974) 1 British Journal of Law and Society 149; 
H. J. Berman; The Origins of Western Legal Science (1977) 90 Harvard Law Review 
894; I. Stewart: Kelsen and the Exegetical School in Jurispruderr-e (1981) 
Proceedings of the U. K. Association for Social and Legal Philosophy, 
Edinburgh. For a French language study, c. f. Ch. Perelman: Logique Juridique 
(1976) Dalloz, Pt. I. See also, P. Legendre: L'Amour du Censeur (1974) Paris; 
J. Lenoble et F. Ost: Droit, Mythe et Raison (1980) Bruxelles, p-p. 219-230. 
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The time was that of the last quarter of the 19th century, and the place, 
and theoretical context, was that of central European neo-Kantianism or 
philosophical positivism. The result was a common development and 
systematisation, of language and law according to a philosophical model of 
normative science in which the object of study was to be the systemic 
determination of ideal rather than actual speech and behaviour. The 
problem, in essence, is that of the birth of structuralism, that of an 
objective idealism whose themes and limitations I take up first in their 
most fundamental, linguistic, manifestation in the work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure. Chapter 2 is concerned to introduce the terminology and 
pr inc i pal concepts of a non-spec ialist account of the birth of 
contemporary linguistics. In the accompanying critical commentary I 
endeavour to formulate certain of the limitations, absences and 
inadequacies of this (now traditional) linguistics, conceived by Saussure 
as the project of defining a science of the form of language at the cost of 
banishing semantics, the analysis of linguistic practice or of realised 
meaning, from linguistics. 
Chapter 3 carries the aporias raised in the context of structural 
linguistics into a precisely analogous account of the development of legal 
science or positivistic formalism. This chapter provides a detailed, 
substantive, account of the modern development of legal science in the 
work of Hans Kelsen and of Herbert Hart. In both cases I have endeavoured 
to characterise and critically analyse the structure, motives and 
practical implications of a common concern to develop an account of the 
syntax of l. egal validity and corresponding- logic o-lingui stic theory of 
the deductive application of legal norms or rules. Despite the fact that 
the theories in question - and the institutional and pedagogic practices 
for which they act as rationalisations - are almost exclusively concerned 
with the analysis of texts,, with the grammar of law conceived as 
predominantly the grammar of written law, neither of the theories in 
question are in any way explicit as to the linguistic methodology which 
their analyses assume and utilise. At best, certain slogans and highly 
eclectic remarks are offered in footnotes dealing with the philosophy of 
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language, 5 but the overall methodology has to be recovered analytically in 
view of the unsystematic character of the occasional comments and 
references which are actually provided. For this reason, chapter 4 is 
devoted to an attempt to bring together the specifically linguistic 
dimension of these contemporary, positivistic, concepts of law. The model 
of language, and the exegetical and semiotic textual discipline to which 
jurisprudence, and legal studies more generally, lead are then briefly 
placed in the context of recent debates within linguistics, and especially 
the critique of Saussurian objectivism implicit within the development of 
sociolinguistics and discourse analysis over the past two decades. The 
purpose of the analysis is that of suggesting, if nothing more, that there 
are obvious and pressing reasons for a thorough reassessment of the role 
of linguistics in legal theory and that of language in legal practice. 
Very broadly, it has been my purpose throughout Part I of this study to 
criticise the dominant view within both linguistics and jurisprudence, 
that would hold that language as well as legal communication are to be 
understood best as structurally determined and ordered activities, as 
specialised normative and philological enterprises that can be studied 
scientifically and exclusively according to the internal laws, or grammar, 
of a static,, governing, code. The relevant objection to any and all such 
structuralist accounts of linguistics or of legal language is that they 
privilege the concept of a system and the desire for order, over and 
against the history of the system and the possibility of accounting for 
the actual relationships and usages that determine its realisation. It 
will further be suggested that from the perspective of the history of 
linguistics and of jurisprudence, the concepts of universal grammar and of 
univocal legal code, have specific political and ideological motives and 
affiliations; they are broadly those of the desire to enclose and protect 
linguistic study and legal practice by presenting them as specialised, 
non-rhetorical, activities removed from the everyday commitments and 
discourses of social and political practice and conflict. 
-------------------- 
151 This is particularly true of H. L. A. Hart: Concept of Law (1961) Clarendon. A 
comparable reading can be given to H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law (1970) 
Univ. of California Press. Further references will be given in the main text. 
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Part 
It is against thi s background of predominantly formalist and 
exegetical accounts of text and language within legal studies that I 
believe it is valuable to reassert the rhetorical, sociolinguistic and 
loosely pragmatic dimensions and contexts of any communicational practice. 
The second and longer part of this study is therefore devoted to the 
analysis and development of a concept of a rhetoric of legal language 
which will endeavour to Provide an account of law as a social and 
political discourse. Insofar as the rhetorical tradition of textual and 
legal analysis is one of the oldest forms of political criticism, the 
project of delineating a concept of legal discourse as the requisite 
method for an account of the rhetoric of legal language has a significant 
historical constituent or dimension. At the same time, however, the 
history of rhetoric is generally one of decline, contraction and 
denigration of a discipline whose overall history has yet to be written. 
In chapter 5 certain features of the classical rhetorical studies, 
those of Aristotle and Cicero, are analysed from the viewpoint of the 
subsequent decay and exclusion of the rhetorical discipline as a whole. 
Rather than attempt to provide anything more than an outline history of 
legally relevant aspects to the rhetorical tradition, however, it has 
appeared more productive to adopt a somewhat more analytic approach. 
Chapter is thus restricted to an analysis of the historical 
circumstances and fundamental methods and concepts of early classical 
rhetoric. Having elicited a somewhat speculative or ideal typical model 
of a possible or potential rhetoric of law and of legal textual practice 
within the early classical studies, the latter portions of chapter 5 
proceed to examine the manner in which modern traditions of linguistic and 
legal analysis have attempted either to wholly repress the rhetorical 
dimensions of discursive practice or, at best, to incorprorate and disarm 
questions of rhetoric and of semantics within the accepted normative and 
philological specification of social and textual practice. 
The classical studies of rhetoric, in other words, raise a wide variety 
of highly relevant and significant questions as to the politics of legal 
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language use, and as to the appropriate methods for the study of the 
semantic and discursive effects of linguistic practice conceived in terms 
of institutional and discursive processes. I shall endeavour to show that 
these questions remain both important and unanswered. It is indeed 
precisely the project of chapters 6 and 7 to evidence, first, that a 
concept of legal discourse necessitates a re-evaluation of the linguistic 
basis of legal studies. In opposition to the conventional assumptions of 
a primarily formal and exegetical kind which underlie the dominant concept 
of the autonomy of the legal text and the univocality of its language, I 
have argued for a critical, interdisciplinary and intertextual approach to 
the legal text. The specifically linguistic basis of such an approach is 
set out in detail in chapter 6, and is placed in the context of recent 
developments in sociolinguistics, communication studies, literary 
criticism and the theory of ideology. In chapter 7 this methodology is 
applied to the analysis of legal discourse. My concern has been in part 
that of providing a formal account or schema of the typical rhetorical and 
semantic organisational forms of legal texts as institutional discursive 
pr ac tic es. It has also been in part substantive. I have endeavoured to 
exemplify the methodology outlined by means of a preliminary or 
introductory discourse analysis of particular legal texts. 
If the latter par. t of the study is successful, it will have provided a 
methodology for the analysis and criticism of legal texts, with numerous 
substantive implications for the manner in which the law as a textual and 
discursive discipline and pedagogy is institutional ised, taught and 
pr ac tic ed. It is my hope to have suggested a means- for an alternative, 
political, reading of the law which is in many respects faithful to the 
major insights of the ancient, exciting and undervalued discipline of 
rhetorical study. I have been concerned, in other words, to challenge, 
from within the legal discipline itself, 
6 the manner in which the legal 
text is constructed or produced upon the pervasive privileging of its 
normative and formal features - features which, in the last instance, are 
-------------------- 
[61 C. f. B. Edelman: Ownership of the Imag (1979) R. K. P. at p. 24, I we have left 
the ownership of their order to the jurists; we have left them unpunished. I 
mean that we have left them their place. This place is also perpetuated in its 
being, that is, perpetuated in its innocence, by our absence. ' For a similar 
argumentq c. f., P. Goodrich: The Antinomies of Legal Theory (1983) 3 Legal 
Studies 1, at pp. 14-20. 
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the product of an obsessive jurisprudential concern with the logical 
validity of a notional system of legal rules and the epistemology of their 
source, ordered and personified in the concept and practice of a sovereign 
or some surrogate thereof. In more practical terms,, I have been intrigued 
by one of the major paradoxes of contemporary legal culture, namely that 
its social practice is founded upon an ideology of consensus and clarity - 
we are all commanded to know the law - and yet legal practice and legal 
language are structured in such a way as- to prevent the acquisition of 
such knowledge by any other than a highly trained elite of specialists in 
the various domains of legal study. To understand this paradox requires a 
critical and interdisciplinary approach to legal texts, the analysis of 
law as a social discourse, as a rhetoric or dialogue between legal speaker, 
legal institution and the various codes, contexts and audiences of the law. 
In short, if linguistics is to be of value to legal studies it will be by 
virtue of an endeavour to come to terms with the study of legal texts as 
communicational processes. It is to be hoped that the development of a 
concept of legal discourse will provide an account not simply of the 
linguistic and stylistic politics of legal meaning, but will also, in 
attempting to recover the before and after of the legal utterance,, analyse 
legal language use in the hierarchical context of its institutional and 
organisational background so as to recapture an essentially social 
discourse from the interstices of a discipline that has all too easily and 
frequently defined itself by means of a near total social amnesia. 
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PART 1: LI'4u-UISTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 
1-3 
2. THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE 
People talk a great deal about language nowadays, as if they had 
suddenly discovered that they had been talking for thousands and 
thousands of years. Now they are trying to discover what talking 
means. E. Ionesco. 1 
2.1 PHILOLOGY, LINGUISTICS, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
In terms of the history of the social sciences, the latter quarter of 
the nineteenth century was characterised in no uncertain manner by neo- 
Kantianism. The revival in question was aimed at rehabilitating the 
Kantian concept of science as a system, unified essentially by the idea of 
a system, rather than by any more realistic or historical classification 
of its subject matter. 
2 The most notable and far-reaching effects of this 
revival were to be the constitution of the sciences of linguistics and of 
law. In both cases, the major portion of the nineteenth century had been 
dominated by attacks upon the received othodoxies of universal grammar and 
of exegetical legal studies, respectively, and their displacement by the 
uncertainties of creationist and historical methodologies. It was only 
towards the beginning of the twentieth century that the fully scientific 
and objective status of the disciplines in question could again be 
proclaimed and the community of the faithful be reassured. The manner of 
such reassurance was strikingly similar within the disciplines of 
language and law, and may be broadly characterised as that of the project 
-------------------- 
[11 E. Ionesco: Fragments of a Journal (1968) Faber, at p. 29. 
[21 The specifically Kantian aspects to the concept of zr-ierre as the study of 
(social) order will be analysed in greater detail in their more explicit 
context, that of Kelsen's xieme of law. For general accounts of the debates 
of the late 19th century with regard to the philosophy and methodology of the 
social xiences, see especially, G. Rose: Hegel contra Sociology (1981) 
Athlone Press, pp. 1-48; see also, A. Giddens: Positivism and Sociology (1974) 
London; B. Hindess: Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Scierr-es (1977) 
Harvester; G. Rose: The Melancholy Science (1978) MacMillan. ch. l. ; R. Bhaskar: 
A Realist Theory of science (1978) Leeds, pp. 12-62; G. Kortian: Metacritique 
(1980 Cambridge, pp-70- 85. 
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of constituting autonomous sciences or axiomatic normative systems, whose 
principal value adherence was to transpire to be the positivistic 
postulate of order and of the logic of its development within a social 
life rationalistically conceived as being governed and regulated by 
imperative linguistic and legal codes. 
In one sense it is thus easy to see that, whatever their historical 
congruence, linguistics and legal science share comparable problems. Both 
are concerned with the relationship of a set of general rules -a grammar, 
or the substantive jurisprudence of the totality of legal norms in force - 
to the circumstances of their application or realisation in speech or 
judgment. Such at least, in its broadest form, has been the manner in 
which both linguistics and legal studies have generally and consistently 
chosen to present the object of their respective disciplines, and while 
history displays numerous different resolutions to the problem as 
specified, its actual specification as a problem or problematic has seldom 
varied. For the moment accepting that grammar and speech, and rule and 
application, are indeed the central problems of linguistics and of legal 
studies, it is logical to view linguistics as the precedent or more 
fundamental science of which jurisprudence would be but one instance, a 
species of the genus language. It is logical, in other words, to view the 
legal code as a variant of a more basic linguistic code, and for this 
reason alone it would appear legitimate to begin the analysis of the 
interrelations of language and law with an account of the inception of 
linguistics as a science in its contemporary form in the context of the 
resurgence of neo-Kantian philosophic positivism towards the end of the 
19th century. 
To the above rather tentative argument may be added an historical one. 
Throughout the second half of the 19th century, and with an increasing 
emphasis from the publication of Saussure's Course in General Linguistics 
to the present day, linguistics has come to be treated as the model for the 
systematisations of social science in general. In one aspect, it is 
possible to discern a tendency, both within philosophy and within the 
various schools of 19th century linguistics, which consistently postulated 
the identity of thought and language, or the inseparablity of the 
consciousness of social processes from the medium of that consciousness 
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and the mode of its expression, namely language as sign. Thus even at the 
beginning of the 19th century, in the course of a basically romantic 
character isation of language, Wilhelm von Humboldt had perceived that it 
is only through words,, 'the characteristic signs of consciousness', that 
things are made 'distinguishable and recognisablel in the ocean of 
sensations. More profoundly, 
speech, which makes the concept a member of the world of thought, adds 
to it meaningfully something of its own, and while it gives 
determinacy to the idea, the idea is within certain limits its 
pr isoner... From the mutual dependence of thought and speech it is 
clear that languages are not so much means of presenting already 
3 known truths as means of discovering truths hitherto unknown. 
In an essentially comparable fashion, in the German Ideolog , Marx and 
Engels start from the premiss that 'for philosophers one of the most 
difficult tasks is to descend from the world of thought to the actual 
world' and they conclude in a critical vein that: 
language is the immediate (concrete) actuality of thought. Just as 
philosophers have given thought an independent existence,, so they had 
to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of 
philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have 
their own content. The problem of descending from the world of 
thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending 
from language to life. 4 
The postulate of identity has received further force through its 
reiteration in some of the most seminal works of 20th century philosophy 
and linguistics. Saussure's Course provides a powerful re-emphasis to the 
insight, in unequivocally asserting that, I psychologically our thought - 
apart from its expression in words - is only a shapeless and indistinct 
mass ... without 
language, our thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There 
are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance 
of language., 
5 A further,, somewhat later example, can be drawn from 
Wittgenstein, and the well known view expressed in the Tractatus that: 'The 
requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that signs be 
-------------------- 
131 W. von Humboldt, quoted in G. della Volpe: Critique of Taste (1978) London, 
P. 100. 
[41 K. Marx and F. Engels: The German Ideolog (1965) London, pp. 503-504. 
[51 F. de Saussure: Course in General Linguistics (1966) K-, Graw-Hill, pp. 111-112. 
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determinate. ' The possibility of linguistic signs is also the possibility 
of determinate reference, the assumption of 'how things are' .6 It is 
finally sufficient to note the remarkable profusion of theories of 
language within the human sciences over the last two decades. 
7 While there 
may be only infrequent coincidence in the substance of these theories 
. - 
they range from the extremes of linguistic phenomenology to the formalism 
of structural semiotics - there is nonetheless an underlying common 
endeavour, the recognition of the prime importance of language to all 
aspects of social and institutional practice. Foucault indeed has gone so 
far as to suggest, in the course of a discussion of the history of 
linguistics in its relation to the human sciences,, that the economic model 
of these sciences was replaced by, 
the reign of the philological (when it is a matter of interpretation 
and the discovery of hidden meanings) and linguistic model (when it 
is a matter of giving a structure to and clarifying signifying 
systems). Thus a vast shift has led the human sciences from a form 
more dense in living models to another more saturated with models 
borrowed from language ... 
(a) shift paralleled by another: that 
which caused the first term in each of the constituent pairs 
(function, conflict,, signification) to recede,, and the second term 
(norm, rule, system) to emerge with a correspondingly greater 
intensity and importance8 
The most interesting implication of Foucault's observation, one which he 
does not himself directly elaborate, is that the peculiarity of this shift 
in the human sciences was primarily the specific linguistic form which it 
took as its model, a model based upon the novel conjunction of philology 
and linguistics. In that linguistics as a science was the new arrival to 
a much older philological tradition, it would seem appropriate to briefly 
examine the tradition within which it had thus placed itself. Despite 
vast differences of cultural and historical context, the philologist is 
-------------------- 
[61 L. Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logic o-Philoso phic us (1961) R. K. P., P-13. 
171 See, for example, the thirteen theories of language and society analysed in 
D. Silverman and B. Torode: The Material Word (1980) R. K. P. For a somewhat 
different overview, see R. Coward and J. Ellis: Language and Materialism (1977) 
R. K. P. More useful, specialist, accounts are to be found in G. Sampson: 
Schools in linguistics (1980) Hutchinson; S. Hervey: Semiotic PersP22tive 
C 1983) Lond n. 
[81 M. Foucault: The Order of Things (1974) Tavistock, PP-358-360; see also, 
S. Timpanaro: On Materialism (1975) London, ch. 5. G. della Volpe op. cit., part 
II and appendix 
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always and everywhere the bearer of tradition, the decipherer and 
transcriber of the written monuments of the past. The philologist is the 
reverent exegete and pedagogue of former textual cultures, the decipherer 
of 'alien, "secret", scripts and words, and a teacher and disseminator of 
that which has been deciphered and handed down by tradition ... The first 
philologists and the first linguists were priests-'9 Their material was 
the precedent unity of dead languages and of foreign classics, that of a 
textual past that was amenable to objective study by virtue of the very 
fact that its languages were dead and by virtue of its distance from the 
present, a distance which was most frequently treated as connoting also 
the hierarchical superiority of that past to the present - of classical 
languages to vernacular languages - and so also the paternal and often 
sacred status of its mythologists and custodians. Thus in discussing the 
development of philology from the Renaissance to the Reformation, 
Nietzsche observes that whereas a 'sincere leaning towards antiquity 
renders one unchristian ... on the whole ... the church succeeded in turning 
classical studies in a harmless direction: the philologist was invented, 
representing a type of learned man who was at the same time a priest or 
something similar. Even in the period of the Reformation people succeeded 
in emasculating scholarship. 110 
While the specific relations and dependencies of Saussure's General 
Course upon philological and objectivist concepts of grammar and text will 
be analysed subsequently, the general context and tradition within which 
the inception of a scientific linguistics is to be placed is that of the 
philological methodologies developed for the preservation of cultural 
textual heritage. Broadly, the modern tradition within which such 
methodologies are to be themselves located is that of philosophical 
rationalism and of the various systems of universal grammar 'which lead 
from the Port-Royal Logic of 1662 to Kant, Leibniz, Husserl and then 
-------------------- 
[91 V. Volosinov: Marxism and the Philosophy of Lanýuage (1973) Academic Press, 
P-73; M. Bakhtin: The Dialogic Imagination (1981) Texas U. P., ch. 4.; W. Ong: 
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Frege. " In each case, the axiomatic basis of the system takes the form of 
variously specified dualisms which are ultimately reducible to the 
fundamental epistemological dualisms of the necessary and the contingent,, 
or, in a more modgrn terminology,, of the objective and the subjective. The 
point is that the dominant conceptualisations of a universal grammar 
within the rationalist tradition, have been consistently forced to select 
a unitary axiomatic basis for their formalist elaborations of the laws or 
normative imperatives governing language as a form. The model of science 
- the Kantian presupposition underlying the depiction of the logical 
necessity of a system - was generally one drawn from the physico- 
mathematical sciences. Language was conventional and arbitrary, it was to 
be analysed as a system of signs comparable to mathematical systems. The 
analogy is a persistent one, especially in the work of Saussure and of the 
early Wittgenstein, and it postulates the object of linguistics as being 
the relationship of sign to sign in a closed system which is always 
already accepted and authorised. The mathematical sign is the rationalist 
ideal of any sign, including verbal signs,, and consequently it is the inner 
logic of the system of signs, conceived as analogous to an independent set 
of alegebraic or logical formulae (conditions of possible application), 
which is the exclusive focus of analytic attention. Correlatively the 
content or meaning of sign and sign system are largely irrelevant because 
arbitrary. 
Historically, the philosophy of language has tended uncritically to 
accept the linguistic truth of this formalist elaboration of sign systems 
as imperative *codes. When it is a question of grammar, then*language is to 
be studied as a particular exemplification of some more universal set or 
'combinatory' of logical relation or functions. Where the philosophy of 
language does reopen and reappraise the questions of meaning and semantics 
as philosophical problems, it has done so within a terrain or problematic 
which has already been comprehensively defined by a thoroughgoing 
-------------------- 
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rationalist formalism. 12 Fully accepting that language is primarily a form 
rather than a content, the question with which the philosophy of language 
has been left is best conceived as the cast-off of rationalism, and is that 
of attempting to resolve the problem of meaning and of communication 
generally, within the context of a concept of the contingent and 
subjective status of language use or speech. For the principal figures 
within the development of the philosophy of language, meaning as use is 
everywhere relative and context bound - to say anything at all of 
significance on the subject of meaning it has inevitably proved necessary 
to retreat from actual meaning and actual usage to potential meaning and 
use; to revert, in short, to a norm-governed context and methodology of 
analysis while, in the guise, for example, of the problems of 'other minds' 
or of lillocutionary force', leaving the questions of meaning as dialogue 
or as actual communication unresolved. 
To the extent that positivist jurisprudence has explicitly faced the 
linguistic questions inherent in the theory of legal interpretation and 
judgment,, it has done so most often by reference to the philosophy of 
language rather than by way of any more direct encounter with the science 
of language. It is nonetheless the case that an adequate assessment of 
the role played by the philosophy of language requires an appraisal of its 
specifically linguistic bases and implications. This, I shall argue, is 
particularly true of contemporary positivist jurisprudence which, perhaps 
more than any other discipline, has underpinned its substantive analyses 
with highly disputable assumptions about the nature of language. It is 
upon the validity and fecundity of these assumptions about the nature of 
language that such jurisprudence has explicitly demanded that it be 
judged. 13 Any attempt to render a full account and intelligible critique 
of contemporary jurisprudence has good reason to treat such an assertion 
as to basic premisses seriously. It should be added, however, that such an 
-------------------- 
[121 Specific references to the philosophy of language will be detailed in chapter 
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exercise is not entirely a negative one. By returning to linguistics and 
to the historical development of linguistics in its relations to 
philosophy and, more particularly, to the philosophy of language, it is 
possible both to render a critique of the extant philosophy of law, and at 
the same time to provide positive proposals for an alternative conception 
of the meaning and operation of law. 
As I would hope has been made fairly apparent, it will be here contended 
that neither the philosophy of language nor that of law has maintained a 
unitary or over time consistent account of language. In what follows, 
however, I shall maintain that there has to a large degree been a common 
development to both disciplines, which development is best scrutinised 
historically in terms of a dominant tendency towards formalism. 
14 As I 
have suggested, the philosophic credentials of the tendency go back as far 
as the 17th century and the Port Royal School, which first proposed a 
universal logic of grammar. The most productive period for this tendency 
was, however, the latter half of the 19th century, when the rise of neo- 
Kantian inspired studies of grammar fundamentally determined the future 
path and 20th century development of linguistics, the philosophy of 
language, and further, had not inconsiderable effects upon the early work 
of Hans Kelsen. In the light of the fact that contemporary jurisprudence 
has somewhat distanced itself from the Pure Theory of law,, it may seem 
curious or largely academic to seek its genesis in the founding moments of 
linguistics at the turn of the 20th century. It is, however, crucial to 
the argument that where more recent jurisprudence has had recourse to the 
philosophy of language and to theories of enunciation or speech acts, it 
has entered a terrain which, from the perspective of the development of 
linguistics, is still dominated and defined by a formalist imperative. 
What are at first sight subjectivist philosophies of language, such as are 
proposed by the later work of Wittgenstein, or by J. L. Austin, in terms of 
-------------------- 
[141 By formalisn I mean the privileging of form over content, generally in the 
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meaning being defined by use, are only comprehensible in terms of the 
antecedent inability of formalist theories to give any account whatsoever 
of the social and historical constitution of meaning. It is further 
almost a truism of jurisprudence that the development of a specifically 
analytic jurisprudence is only comprehensible and accessible in the light 
of the preceeding formalist orthodoxies of Austinian and Kelsenian 
positivism. 15 
2.2 STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS: F. DE SAUSSURE 
While I intend to deal with the formalist tendency within the study of 
language primarily by reference to the seminal work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure, the Course in General Linguistics, 16 certain preliminary 
comments are necessary. It should firstly be noted that the history of 
formalism within linguistic studies is a supremely lengthy one. This 
tendency, which has frequently wholly dominated the discipline, has 
accumulated many celebrated representatives and continues to do so. One 
need only refer to recent developments within the Chomskyan school, to the 
Soviet formalists or to more recent developments within the field of 
structural semiotics,, to be forced to accede to the point that, for good 
reasons, the tendency has a lengthy future ahead of it. That is pot my 
concern here, but it does follow that to select Saussure is to choose one 
of a multitude of arguably equally significant figures. Aside from 
considerations of a pragmatic nature, there are two principal reasons for 
this excision. 
It is first the case that the locus classicus of contemporary 
scientific theories of language must be, as was noted above, the work of 
the Port Royal School. Their 'Grammar' defined the basic categories, and 
in particular the fundamental distinction between determinative and 
explicative grammatical relations, 
17 that were to guide numerous future 
-------------------- 
1151 C. f., for example, H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (1961) Oxford. 
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logicians and philosophers in their attempt to subordinate language to a 
fixed and universal set of logically determinate relations. While the 
extensive work of Gottlob Frege18 provides a more contemporary and highly 
sophisticated account of the logic of grammar, it is nonetheless the case 
that his frequently incisive elaboration of the distinctions between 
object and thought, and between sense and reference, are, in terms of the 
history of linguistics,, extensions of the Port Royal project. It was in 
Arnauld and Lancelot's 'Grammar' that logic, and with it the theory of 
knowledge that corresponds to it, were first taken to be the pre-existent 
foundation of all the seemingly diverse forms in which linguistic 
utterances might appear. Thus 'grammar is not to be taken as the 
prescriptions of a legislator, at last giving the chaos of utterances 
their constitution and laws ... it is a discipline which states the rules 
to which any language must conform for it to be able to exist'19 It was in 
Saussure's Course that such a statement of principle and purpose was first 
used in a systematic way as the foundation of a science of linguistics. 
From that moment on, linguistics set about discovering the rules governing 
the coherence or order of the most fundamental social code: language, 
conceived either as system of signs or as strategy for the transformation 
of logical sequences. Further, this structuralist linguistic methodology 
was also to become the paradigm for much of the rest of social science,, its 
significance thus being extended cosiderably beyond the elaboration of 
the internal constitution of linguistics itself. For much of the 20th 
century the concepts of language system and of social or real process have 
been treated as synonyms within the language of social science. 
A second and perhaps more important reason for selecting Saussure as 
the central figure within the formalist tendency is more complex. As 
against a fairly widespread desire to classify Saussure's theory of 
-------------------- 
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language as straightforwardly and uncompromisingly lobjectivist, '20 one of 
the more interesting and illuminating aspects of his work is his agonising 
awareness of the dangers inherent in formalism. Recent textual studies2l 
have brought to light the dramatic extent to which Saussure equivocated 
before finally proposing the polemically formalist separation of language 
system from language use, and consequently also from any realistic concept 
of semantics. It is precisely at this point, in the formulation of and 
equivocation over, the problem of the proper place of speech (parole), 
rather than in his eventual, partially misconceived, solution to the 
problem, that Saussure has most to offer. To understand how and why this 
is the case it is necessary to recall the highly contentious state of 
linguistic study in the latter half of the 19th century. 
While the 19th century as a whole was dominated by historical 
linguistics, by the the widespread belief that the only scientific study 
of language was to be conducted according to the methods of Indo-European 
comparative grammar,, this was by no means an uncontested development. 
Thus on the one hand, largely under the influence of successful models of 
natural science, especially that of mechanistic physics and latterly 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, the eventually dominant propensity in the 
study, of language, which tendency moved from Rask and Bopp to the neo- 
grammarian school, was concerned to describe the history of language in 
terms of uniform laws analogous to those of sound changes. A set of 
universal, deterministic, laws drawn from the highly successful studies in 
philology, and especially Indo-European phonetics, could provide a set of 
regularities, a proto-language, which naturalistic abstraction could 
explain away all individual variations and irregularities. Volosinov is 
undoubtedly correct to identify the birth of linguistics with what he 
terms an 'abstract objectivist' tendency produced by these philological 
studies. He comments at length upon the concept of language as system, and 
concludes upon the basis of the available historical material, that 'at the 
-------------------- 
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basis of the modes of linguistic thought that lead to the postulation of 
language as a system of normatively identical forms lies a practical and 
theoretical focus of attention on the study of defunct, alien languages 
preserved in written monuments. ' The object of such linguistics are 'dead, 
written, alien language' and the 'isolated, finished, monologic utterance' 
divorced from all verbal and actual contexts. By way of general 
disciplinary character isation, he continues to further state that: 
This philological orientation has determined the whole course of 
linguistic thinking in the European world ... 
(which) thought formed 
and matured over concern with the cadavers of written languages; 
almost all its basic categories, its basic approaches and techniques 
have been worked out in the process of reviving these cadavers ... 
Philological need gave birth to linguistics, rocked its cradle and 
left its philological flute in its swaddling clothes. That flute was 
supposed to be able to awaken the dead. But it lacked the range 
necessary for mastering living speech as actually and continuously 
generated. 
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There is, however, a clearly polemical element in the ever more forceful 
19th century assertion of the unconscious character of phonetic laws and 
their freedom from exceptions. Claims as to the 'blind' and 'necessary' 
workings of these laws were, towards the last quarter of the century, being 
increasingly challenged both within the neo-grammarian school and outside 
it9 by a 'historicist' tendency which desired to return linguistics to the 
historical and anthropological sciences as opposed to the natural 
sc ienc es. The aim of this wide grouping of romantically inspired 
linguistics was not only that of opposing the over-rigid 
classificationism of the neo-grammarians but, more importantly, to provide 
a radically alternative basis for the explanation of sound change in terms 
of individual, subjective, innovations and, more generally, by moving 
towards psychological or anthropological methods of study. Language 
according to this school, must be treated in terms of the psychology of 
individual speakers, rather than in terms of a collective spirit 
(sprachgeist) having some kind of external existence above and beyond 
individuals. 'But the sprachgeist does nothing of itself, separately from 
men, rather all changes in language are brought about by men themselves. 123 
[221 V. Volosinov, op. cit. P. 71-73' 
[231 Rudolf von Raumer (1858), quoted in G-Sampson op. cit. p. 27. 
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It is this polemical character of late 19th century linguistic studies 
which has to be considered in order to understand the highly telling 
antinomies within Saussure's theory, and particularly the form taken by 
the central and celebrated oppositions of langue to parole 
(system/creativity), synchrony to diachrony, form to substance, and indeed 
the overall ambivalence which it displayed as to what were then perceived 
to be the contradictory claims of linguistics as a science of 'social' 
facts and language as a contingent instrument of communication. Thus 
Saussure's determination 'to make distinctions (which are admittedly, 
distinctions between "points of view" and not between "things 
themselves") serves ... a defensive function in relation to those 
tendencies which appeared to be designed to bring about the dissolution of 
124 linguistics as a science . In other words, Saussure's theory is both one 
of the greatest products of formal linguistics and, at the same time and 
quite consistently, a polemical systematisation which is acutely, though 
infrequently explicitly, aware of the weaknesses of such formalism. Both 
facets of the theory provide strong encouragement for examining the text 
itself and for providing a reading of the theory which seeks to emphasise 
its key formulations of the systematicity of langue both as statements of 
a scientific project and as a programme of a more strategic intervention. 
As has already been commented upon, Saussure was writing at a time when 
the scientific status of linguistics was threatened by an increasingly 
dogmatic insistence upon the subjective side to linguistic facts. To save 
the object of linguistics from disintegrating into the hands of a variety 
of disciplines, Saussure proposed the constitutive distinction between the 
language system (collective institution/langue) and the speaking subject 
(the individual embodiment/parole). Such a distinction is at the basis of 
modern linguistics and is elaborated by Saussure in terms of the 
necessity, from the point of view of science, of maintaining an absolute 
separation of two notionally though completely independent realms of 
study. For Saussure it is this distinction which makes the science of 
linguistics possible. It is, in its strongest formulation, a neo-Kantian 
transcendental logical assumption whereby the scope of linguistics can be 
-------------------- 
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defined a priori as that of determining' the forces that are permanently 
and universally at work in all languages, and to deduce the general laws to 
whic h all spec if ic hi sto r ic al phenomena can be r educ ed., 
25 The 
justification for this pregnant assumption is both pragmatic and 
theoretical: 
As I see it there- is only one solution to all the foregoing 
difficulties: we must from the very outset take langue as our point 
of departure and use langue as the norm of all other manifestations 
of language ... Taken as a whole, language 
(langage) is many-sided 
and heter ogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously - 
physical, physiological, and psychological - it belongs both to the 
individual and to society; we cannot put it into any category of 
human facts, for we cannot discover its unity. Langue, on the 
contrary, is a self-contained whole and principle of classification. 
As soon as we give langue first place among the facts of language, we 
introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other 
26 
classification. 
The concept of langue separates what is social in the sense of being 
presupposed or logically given, from what is individual. More 
significantly, the distinction is also deemed to separate what is 




Leaving temporarily to one side the debates as to the philosophical 
derivation and influences upon Saussure's methodological axiom, it is 
sufficient to note that it is strongly anti-materialist and to proceed to 
an examination of its repercussions within the theory of the essentially 
synchronic nature of linguistic science. Having asserted the condition 
for the possibility of linguistic science, namely that langue be conceived 
as a systematic and universal unity, it logically follows that this unity 
is best studied as a static and ahistorical system, as a complex, 
internally defined set of relations. 'Langue is a system whose parts can 
and must all be conceived in their synchronic solidarity', and elsewhere we 
are informed that 'changes never affect the system as a whole but rather 
one or another of its elements. ' Thus while Saussure never attempted to 
[251 F. de Saussure op. cit. p. 6. 
[261 Ibid. P. 9. 
[271 Ibid. P. 9. 
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deny that the system, or synchronic 'state of affairs'. was only ever 
momentary, it was nevertheless the case that for him 'only states matter ', 
indeed Idiachronic facts are blind forces set against the organisation of 
the system of signs'. 28 By way of paraphrase, the formalism of this 
position might be summarised in terms of two related propositions; first, 
langue is not historical precisely to the extent that it is a system; 
second, it is to the extent that langue constitutes a system, a structure, 
that it can be the theoretical object of linguistics. The object of 
linguistics is given in the general form or Kantian 'ideal of langue, whose 
substantive subject matter will thus necessarily be the predominant 
concern with the logical interrelations of elements of the system -a 
concern with syntax or with such lexico-grammatical relations as may be 
studied 'in themselves' or as discrete phenomena. What is also given, of 
course, is the correlative and radical exclusion of all the non-synchronic 
facets of language. These diachronic and semantic aspects of the language 
totality are not denied,, they are rather excluded; they exist unhappily 
outside sc ienc e in the irrationality and subjectivity of history 
conceived as a chaos of individual facts. Again, however, a certain 
caution is necessary, for while Saussure did eventually and rigidly 
exclude the possibility of studying the effects of history and of 
utterances upon the system of langue, he asserted the general principles 
of sue h exclusion far more forcefully than he was pr epar ed to 
unequivocally accept its more specific linguistic implications. In other 
words, the theoretical exigencies of defending the scientific status of 
linguistics rest uneasily beside Saussure's not infrequently encountered, 
residual desire for a realistic linguistics. 
For the purposes of defending or 'saving' the scientific status of 
linguistics, Saussure had perceived the need to isolate and demarcate an 
exclusively 'objective' and unimpugnable field of study. The means he used 
to achieve this end may be reconstructed in terms of a neo-Kantian 
transcendental assumption or, in a strict sense, axiomatic logical 
presupposition as to what language must be like for a science of language 
-------------------- 
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to be possible. 29 At the same time, however, as the synchronic unity of 
langue was to some degree correctly asserted to be the primary object of 
linguistics - the system of signs is undoubtedly amenable to independent 
study (phonology, morphology and syntax) - Saussure also deemed it 
necessary to wholly exclude any concern with the history or the 
realisation of the system of langue from the legitimate domain of study. 
Thus, for example, I langue is not a function of the speaker, it is a 
product that is passively assimilated by the individual ... langue is the 
social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor 
modify it by himself., 30 The objectivity of langue, conceived as a self- 
sufficient and logically coherent system of signs, is thus placed in polar 
opposition to the complete subjectivity of parole. There is, as I shall 
propose below, something rather unfortunate about this antithetical 
relation of system to the subjectivity and unknowability of the utterance 
and of linguistic creativity or practice in general. It suggests, not 
least, an extreme and unnecessary dualism, that of a wholly abstract or 
unmediated relation between system and the individualised locus of its 
realisation, between whole and part, within which both extremes are 
virtual entities. It is an antinomy which is best analysed in the general 
terms of the tendency of formalist conceptions of linguistics to reinforce 
a motivated definition of language system by producing a thoroughly 
ideological and eventually untenable semantic subjectivism. Questions of 
social meaning and process,, questions of the actual existence of the 
language system - its history and general development as a national 
language - can be excluded ab initio from the concern of science, by virtue 
of being defined as purely and simply subjective, and contingent upon 
notional rather than actual individual usage. It is in relation to the 
concept of the 'arbitrariness' of the sign and to the role of signification 
and value within language, that Saussure's theory is most strained. 
-------------------- 
[291 On which, see G. Rose (1981) op. cit. The literature within the philosophy of 
sc ienc e. on the tr an, -r- endental (and ontologic al) assumptions under pinning the 
claim to 'xientificity' is massive. I have found the following especially 
useful. Lakatos and Musgrove: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970) 
Cambridge U. P.; R. Bhaskar: A Realist Theory of Scierr-e (1975) Leeds; 
D. Hillel-Ruben: Marxism and Materialism (1977) Harvester; P. K. Feyerabend: 
Sc ienc e in a Fr ee Soc iety (1982) London. 
1301 Saussure,, op. cit. pp. 14,17. 
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The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign is central to Saussurian 
linguistics and has received a wealth of divergent inter pretations. 31 As 
Saussure himself states it9 I (the) pr inc i pl e dominates all the 
linguistics of language; its consequences are numberless .. ' Simply stated, 
the thesis is to the effect that the sign, the unity of concept (signified) 
and sound-image (signifier), is something which is socially or 
conventionally given and is consequently arbitrary rather than a rational 
or natural relation of the two elements that make up the sign. The bond 
between signified and signifier is arbitrary; the idea of 'sister' is not 
linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds Is-o-rl, and 
it is thus collective behaviour or convention rather than any intrinsic 
value, which rules the use of signs. This arbitrary or unmotivated 
character of the sign does emphasise, on the one hand, the institutional or 
social nature of the system of langue but it is crucial to realise that 
the emphasis upon social or institutional facts is not a reference to any 
actual or empirical features of language use. The social nature of 
language is, for Saussure, a normative assumption - an artistic reference 
to the ultimate basis of the linguistic code, its presupposition of an 
always pregiven agreement or consensus - rather than a recognition of any 
communicative or instrumental linguistic functions. Saussure is not 
concerned to argue that there is a relationship between signs and extra- 
linguistic processes. Quite the contrary, it is the immutability of the 
sign, its internal or self-definition in terms of a fixed and singular 
relation of signifier to signified that commands Saussure's attention. 
'The signifier, though to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the 
idea that it represents, is fixed, not. free, with respect to the linguistic 
community that uses it ... the community itself cannot control so much as 
a single word; it is bound to the existing language., 
32 In other words, the 
definition of the sign as an arbitrary and unique relation between its two 
elements is the sole principle of its rationality. It is by virtue of the 
excision that creates a one to one, fixed, relation between form and 
-------------------- 
1311 Thus, J. Culler : Saussur e (1978) Fontana, Pur por ts to r egar d it favour ably as a 
proposal of the essentially social character of language, while other 
linguists, from E. Benveniste: L'origine de la formation des mots (1935) 
Paris, onwards, have seen it as a regrettable lapse into a conception of 
language as a simple naming process. See, Timpanaro, op. cit.; Pecheizc, 
op. cit.; for dixussions of these debates and developments. 
1321 Saussure, op-cit. p. 71. 
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content, an exact correlation between a given and discrete signified and 
an equally discrete signifier, that the conventional, equational, concept 
of the sign as a simple denotation equalling (precisely) its denoted, is 
possible. 
33 A point which is reinforced when Saussure accredits the 
arbitrary nature of the sign with protecting language from any attempt to 
modify or change it and argues that because the sign itself does not have 
any rational or indeed symbolic basis, and because it is constituted by a 
multiplicity of signs and their interdependence as discrete items 
(differences) within the lexical code,, that it is unamenable to any non- 
normative description or explanation. It is thus, importantly, that the 
arbitrary nature of the sign comprehensively removes the question of 
linguistic value from the realm of language use, effectively substituting 
for the question of meaning the problem of syntax and of signification as 
problems of the logical relations between normatively determined units 
and their rule governed potential application in linguistic practice. 
The question of linguistic value, as posed within synchronic 
linguistics, is that of defining or delimiting the linguistic entity or 
unit, the minimal lexeme within the code. 'The process of delimitation 
involves calling in meanings (functions) to differ*entiate sounds'. While 
one might suppose or hope that the introduction or acquisition of meaning 
might herald at least some examination of a cognitive, rational or real 
principle for the classification of social processes and functions, this 
is not to be the case. Far from seeing linguistic value as fundamentally 
related to or embedded in the communicative or contextual aspect of 
language use as transmission or practice, langue is otherwise defined as a 
system of interdependent terms in which the value of each ierm results 
t34 solely from the simultaneous presence of the others. The idea of value, 
in other words, cannot be separated from the place of the sign as a lexical 
item within the system of langue or code conceived as a simple dictionary 
of meanings. It would, however, do Saussure's theory a disservice if it 
were not to be briefly acknowledged that even here he occasionally 
-------------------- 
1331 C. f. R. Barthes: S/Z(1974) Cape, at p. 9, I denotation is not the first sense, 
but pretends to be; under this illusion, it is ultimately only the last of 
connotations ... the super ior myth by whic 
h the tex t pr etend s to r etur n to the 
n atur eof1 anguage, to 1 anguage as natur e. I 
1341 Saussure, op. cit. pp. 114-115. 
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displays a healthy ambivalence. It is certainly true that for Saussure 
the primary characteristic of linguistic value is its dependence upon the 
language system - the value of the sign is determined by its identity and 
di fference in relation to other signs - but value is not simply 
signification. Making use of an analogy with monetary value, which is 
determined both by exchange with non-monetary items and by the internal 
hierarchy of the monetary system, Saussure notes a paradoxical quality to 
linguistic value as well. The linguistic unit too has an exchange value - 
it can be exchanged for a dissimilar (an idea outside language) - but this 
primarily psychological reference exists unhappily or paradoxically 
beside the fact that value is also determined by comparison of the sign 
with Isimilars' (i. e. other signs): 'the conceptual side of value is made 
up entirely of relations and differences with respect to the other terms 
of langue'. 
35 In short, the implication is that the referential aspects of 
the sign, in so far as they suggest an extra-linguistic process of the 
circulation of actual meanings, are to be excluded from the confines of 
sc ienc e. 
At all events, the paradoxical character of linguistic value is one 
which is noted rather than solved in the theoretical passages of the 
Course. However, the later discussions of syntagmatic and associative 
relations strongly support the view that where the conception of 
linguistic value does involve recognising certain of the contextual or 
extra-linguistic factors which influence the development of langue, these 
are to be excluded as extrinsic to the proper ambit of scientific study as 
aspects of parole and of the chaotic subjectivity of language use. Thus, 
while syntagmatic relations are deemed to be linear and internal to the 
coherence of the system, being in essence predetermined by the syntactic 
rules governing intelligibility, associative (more recently and 
frequently 'paradigmatic') relations, which govern the choice of one of 
several possible terms, occur outside discourse, 'they unite terms "in 
absentia", in the brain of the particular speaker,. 
36 Certainly, from the 
point of view of the organisation of langue, it is 'syntagmatic 
solidarities' which are by far the most 'striking', whereas associative 
--------- ---------- 
1351 Ibid. pp. 117-118. 
1361 Ibid. p. 123. 
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solidarities, while they may occasionally be fixed by langue, are 
generally 'indeterminate' in order and indefinite in number. They are in 
such respect relegated to the concern of the psychology of parole, 
amenable only to diachronic study because, together with 'analogical 
creativityl, 37 such relations are in the last instance subjective and 
fortuitous; by implication, they are a matter of rhetoric or style, of 
actual meaning rather than logical grammar. Saussure, in other words, 
succeeds in avoiding the dangers posed by the indeterminacy of associative 
relations and the more profound irregularities of analogical creativity 
only by excluding such relations from the realms of scientific study. The 
solution is that of offering no solution at all, it is merely asserted that 
such relations cannot be studied scientifically, while it is further added 
that such questions are not worthy of scientific study because they only 
ever affect aspects of the system and never the system itself - for the 
self-evident reason that the system itself has only a virtual, normative, 
existence. The systematicity of langue is preserved, but at the 
relatively high price of creating a radical disjunction or excision 
whereby the lexical code is notionally fixed as a system of univocal 
equivalences purportedly unaffected by and independent of the historical 
contexts and real processes whereby usage and practice produced these 
momentary equivalences, or settled them as dictionary meanings and as a 
system. Suffice it to say that Saussure was certainly aware of the gaps 
or paradoxes existent within the edifice of the system, and opted or felt 
forced to fill these lacunae - through which might pour the seemingly 
'unscientific' legions of language use - in terms of an exclusively 
normative conception of the language system as imperative regulative code. 
Thereby he excluded the vital and interesting questions of parole and of 
social meaning from the domain of linguistics: 
it could even be suggested that the way linguistics was constituted 
as a science (in the forms of phonology, then morphology and syntax) 
was precisely by a constant discussion of the question of meaning and 
of the best way to banish the question of meaning from its domain. 
The 'semantic questions' encountered by linguistics today thus 
constitute what might be called the r eturn of the or igins of a 
-------------------- 
1371 Ibid. p. 161 ff. ' Analogy is grammatical throughout, though its result - 
creation- belongs at first only to speaking. Analogy reaffirms that speaking 
(the chance product of an isolated speaking subject creating analogy) is 
dependent upon langue. I 
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science (of what it had to separate itself from to become what it is) 
within that science itself. 38 
I shall argue later that this formalistic exclusion of semantics was and 
is unsuccessful,, both as a theoretical resolution to the problem of the 
object of linguistics conceived as an order, and even more so as a 
practical or pragmatic device allowing for the syntactic or semiotic 
analysis of textual structure. For a provisional understanding of why 
this is so, it is sufficient to reinsert and dwell upon the undoubted gaps 
within the systemic conception of the internal coherence of langue. 
The exclusion of history, and more specifically in the present context 
the exclusion of any rational or sociological classificatory principle 
contained within the history of langue, is an obvious starting-point. The 
rejection of history is, after all, a primary or defining feature of all 
formalism and is generally to be aligned to the positivist quest for 
science as order. What is at issue here is the point of view or, to use a 
frequently less felicitous term, the ideological motivation adopted by a 
particular science. The synchronic aspect of language is the point of 
departure for linguistics, it is accorded pre-eminence as the 'true and 
only reality' and even Saussure's residual realism can allow language 
change or diachrony only a minimal significance. History is excluded in 
terms of the immutability of the sign based upon the multiple 
interdependence of the value of any particular term. In allowing that 
values do change and in acknowledging that the sign, is also, paradoxically, 
mutable, Saussure is again somewhat strained: 'Time, which insures the 
continuity of language, wields another influence apparently contradictory 
to the first; the more or less rapid change of linguistic signs. ' Having 
recognised the dilemma, however, the proposed solution is less than 
satisfactory: 
Langue is radically powerless to defend itself against the forces 
which from one moment to the next are shifting the relationship 
between the signified and the signifier. This is one of the 
consequences of the arbitrary nature of the sign. Unlike language, 
other human institutions - customs, laws etc - are all based in 
varying degrees on the natural relations of things; all have of 
necessity adapted the means employed to the ends pursued. Language 
-------------------- 




'0 is limited by nothing in the choice of means39 
Being limited by nothing in its choice of means is precisely the theme 
which provides the linguistic sign (as opposed to other semiotic systems) 
with the principle of its a priori rationality; namely that it functions 
solely and simply as an agent of monologic abstraction, a reduction of all 
the potentialities and qualities of meaning to one equivalence - that 
between signifier and signified. 'The rationality of the sign is rooted 
in its exclusion and annihilation of all symbolic ambivalence on behalf of 
a fixed and equational structure'. 40 The sign proffers itself as a full 
value, from which all connotations and virtualities of meaning, from which 
symbolic, rhetorical and polysemic features, have been severed in the 
cause of an imperative concept of structure - the coded control of the 
order of signification. It can only be remarked and noted that having 
defended the scientific status of linguistics in the more obviously 
systematic spheres of phonology, morphology and syntax, Saussure is rather 
surprisingly willing to revert to the opposed camp, to irrationalism and 
subjectivism, in the realm of diachronic linguistics. The diachronic 
dimension is surrendered to the very theory which Saussure so determinedly 
and in some measure successfully combats in relation to synchronic 
linguistics. Two aspects of this strategy or choice deserve emphasis. 
It is first the case, if the proposal is accepted at its face value, 
that the absence of the diachronic or historical dimension ineluctably 
propels linguistics in the direction of a highly restrictive concern with 
form. It is in many respects a return, or at least a step backwards, in the 
direction of the philosophical premisses of the Port Royal Grammar, 
wherein it is determinative linguistic relations and the speculative 
universality of regulative principles which predominate. The interesting 
questions, those of explicative relations, as well as those of implication, 
articulation and meaning effects generally, are treated as contingent, 
accessory and irrational. When Hjelmslev lated coined the phrase that 
-------------------- 
1391 Saussure, op. cit. pp-74,75-76. 
[401 J. Baudrillard, op. cit. p. 149. See also, J. Kristeva op. cit. ch-3. ('The 
notion of sign is a product of scientific abstraction - identity-substance- 
cause-goal as structure of the Indo-European sentence - designating a 
vertically and hierarchically linear division. '). See also, G. P. Baker and 
P. M. S. Hacker , op. cit., pp. 276-286. 
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'language is form' he was merely restating the underlying tendency of 
Saussurian linguistics and, in common with a great deal of the later work 
of that school, was greatly overstating the communicative perfection of 
the system of langue. To use but the briefest of arguments, it is 
precisely because of the imperfections of formally designated 
signification - which after all specifies no more than the minimum 
conditions of intelligibility - that it is frequently, if not always, only 
in the light of a particular context (verbal or situational) that 
statements are comprehensible. I shall return to this crucial lacuna and 
to proposed solutions to it, at a later stage. For the present it is 
sufficient to note that it constitutes the problem of linguistic practice 
as a problem of semiotics and not of semantics. It is not the ambivalence 
or the contingent historical features of meaning that are to form the 
object of future linguistic developments, but simply the organisational 
structures of the code which is taken, in principle, to be determinative of 
the valency and the circulation of linguistic signs as an instance of 
signs in general. The methodology of such study is again derived from 
Saussure, and from a celebrated aside in which he remarked that the 
science of semiology was to be 'a science which will study the life of 
signs in society ... It will teach us what signs consist of, what laws 
govern them. Since it does not yet exist we cannot say what it will be, 
but it has a right to exist; its place is insured in advance-' 
41 As Kristeva 
has observed, the linguistics that has developed within the confines of 
semiotics, is bathed in an 'aura of systematics', and she continues to 
elaborate that: 
as soon as linguistics was established as a science (through Saussure 
for all intents and purposes) its field'of study was hemmed in; the 
problem of truth in linguistic discourse became dissociated from any 
notion of the speaking subject... Any attempt at reinserting the 
"speaking subject", whether under the guise of a Cartesian subject or 
any other subject of enunciation more or less akin to the 
transcendental ego (as linguists make use of it), resolves nothing as 
long as that subject is not posited as the place, not only of 
structure and its regulated transformation, but especially, of its 
-------------------- 
[411 Saussure, op. cit. p. 16. For introductory accounts of the Saussurian basis of 
semiotics, see, amongst others, O. Ducrot and T. Todorov: Encyclopedic 
Dictionary of the Scierr-es of Language (1981) Blackwell, pp. 84-92; 
A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes: Semiotics and LanguaEe (1982) Indiana; S. Hervey, 
op. cit.; J. Culler : In Pursuit of Signs (1981 ) R. K. P. Pt. I. , U. Eco: Semiotics 
and the Philosophy of Language (1984) Macmillan, pp. 14-46. 
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loss, its outlay. 
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The problem, finally, is that of noting the essential circularity of the 
relation of system to creativity. Saussure was aware, as is clear from the 
dual aspect of the conception of linguistic value, that language has both 
a significatory and a communicative function,, that it is both the 
condition of intelligibility and the material of meaning. The 
arbitrariness of the sign, however, relegated the communicative function 
of language to the very weak and ill-defined sphere of parole. The 
assignment of communication, and with it the related concepts of 
creativity,, meaning and idea, to the subjective and unknowable or at least 
inherently unpredictable sphere of parole has deleterious consequences. 
While on the one hand it forces linguistics to abdicate from all concern 
with a major dimension of its object of study, it is also the case that the 
lacuna thereby created has serious effects upon the conception of langue 
itself. It constitutes first a logical circularity: creativity both 
presupposes the existence of a system which it can change or destroy and 
also implies that every system is only the resultant effect of a previous 
creativity. Creativity thus produces the notion of a system as its 
complement, and by virtue of the subjectivist or substantialist character 
of the conception of creativity as parole, it further reacts upon and 
defines the notion of system in a particular, somewhat overstated, way. 
The term parole constrains that of langue, to the effect of forcefully 
overloading the systematicity characteristic of the latter and, as more 
recent developments in the discipline bear out, the linguist is forced 
either towards a residual agnosticism in relation to semantics - language 
is seen to be unfortunately indeterminate (a commonplace assumption in the 
philosophy of language) - or towards attempts to produce a conception of 
pragmatics on the periphery or outside of linguistics itself, wherein 
conceptions of intention have frequently been resurrected or formalised 
to explain meaning as potential usage. 
At all events, these are some of the major difficulties with which 
post-Saussurian linguistics have had to grapple. It will be suggested 
subsequently that they are problems which linguists have partially solved 
-------------------- 
[421 J. Kristeva: Desire in Languag (1980) Columbia U. P. p. 24. 
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in a variety of ways. Furthermore, they are problems which have 
consistently recurred in the domain of the philosophy of language, and 
equally, in a precisely analogous form, in the work of contemporary legal 
philosophers. The convergence of jurisprudence and the philosophy of 
language is, however, a fairly specific affair and deserves to be treated 
with caution. While the meeting point of these disciplines has generally 
been in relation to questions of semantics and of the constitution of 
meaning by context, largely in the terms outlined above, it is nevertheless 
the case that for most of the present century the dominant and consistent 
theme within legal philosophy has been the direct counterpart of the 
Saussurian concern with the concept of language system, namely that of a 
concern with legal form. What has been argued in relation to Saussure's 
scientific linguistics, in essence that formalism and subjectivism are a 
complementary pair, will prove to be equally true of legal philosophy. 
Formalist conceptions of law, theories of law as a 'purely' normative order 
or as primarily a system of rules, inevitably entail an element of 
subjectivism as an ideological complement in relation to questions of 
legal interpretation, judgment and rule usage. While the questions of 
linguistic interest have tended to occur with respect to these issues of 
legal meaning, they nonetheless deserve to be located historically and 
theoretically in relation to an antecedent and still much vaunted legal 
formalism, namely the normative theory of law, and the concept of an 
objective legal science which, in its linguistic turn, is a theory of pure 
legal signs. It is in the interests of fully evidencing the structural 
context of the problem of legal meaning within positivist jurisprudence 
that the central theme of the next chapter will be that of the 
constitution of the object of legal studies as a problem of structure - of 
the form of law as an order. 
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THE LANGUAGE OF LEGAL FAITH 
Just as in religion, so long as there is a religion, there must be a 
dogmatic theology, which cannot be replaced by any religious 
psychology or sociology, so, as lon I as there is a law, there must be a 
normative theory of law. H. Kelsen. 
3.1 THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL SCIENCE 
In discussing the broad historical context of Saussure's peculiarly 
explicit formulation of an autonomous science of language, I placed 
considerable emphasis upon the extensive philological tradition to which 
this science belongs. While Saussure's formulation of the object of 
linguistics as the language system is most normally, and quite accurately, 
examined in the more modern terms of its dependence upon the neo-Kantian 
conception of scientific methodology which to varying degrees pervaded 
all the social sciences during the second half of the 19th century'2 the 
wider context and history of linguistic study deserve recollection. In 
common wi th the entir e spectrum of medieval European humanistic 
scholarship, it is the rediscovery and reception of the works of the 
classics of Hellenic and Roman civilization within the confines of the 
monastery and of the university which originally demarcated and defined 
the scholarly d isciplines. 
3 If philology was the methodology of such 
Ill H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law,, Its Methods and Fundamental Corr-epts (1934) 
50 Law Quarterly Review 474, at 490. 
[21 The most wide-ranging and frequently incisive discussion is to be found in 
Nietzsc he Is shor t book I We Philologists I, r epr inted in F. Nietzsc he: The Case 
of Wagner (1911) Foulis pp. 109-190. Of the philological tradition, Nietzsche 
comments, 'it is a sad story, the history of philology. The disgusting 
erudition, the lazy, inactive passivity, the timid submission. ' (p. 140). The 
philologists - the historians, the philosophers, the jurists - rely upon 
belief and not upon any critical faculty. 
131 On the humanist curriculum, see, D. Knowles: The Evolution of Medieval Thought 
(1962) Yale; R. W. Southern: The Making of the Middle Ages (19673--Hutchinson, 
ch. 4; R. W. Southern: Medieval Humanism (1984) Blackwells; L. D. Reynolds and 
W. G. Wilson: Scribes and Scholars (1978) Oxford, ch. 5 and 6; J. J. Murphy: Three 
Medieval Rhetorical Arts (1971) University of California Press; W. 
brug (1958) op. c it. 
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recovery and transmission in general, and exegesis of the written monument 
or of the petrified written form was the characteristic mode of 
dissemination, then it is not hard to see that the later developments of an 
objective grammar or of language studied as a code are broadly consistent, 
if secularised, representations of earlier textual traditions. Thus if 
Indo-European linguistics could take the classical languages as their 
fully formed and autonomous object of investigation, the more modern 
project of a scientific linguistics merely extends the philological 
methodology to the concept of grammatical str uc tur e, and further 
rationalises and universalises, the normative consistency of the classical 
texts into a set of rules that are now to be taken as the laws governing 
language as such. 
The analogue to the philological textual basis of linguistics takes an 
almost exemplary form within legal studies. The concepts of legal 
tradition as continuity, and of law as based upon custom or upon practice 
derived from 'time immemorial' are established themes of legal history. 
4 
For legal scholarship the past has a pre-eminent role as the source of 
legal authority. More specifically, the origins of the discipline of 
legal science are to be sought in a textual past and most particularly in 
the methodology and substantive curriculum of the medieval reception of 
the textual monuments of the second Roman Empire, the Justinian Code and 
5 the Digest. Although the inception of legal science as a science, that is 
as the study of law as an independent or autonomous subject matter, is more 
6 
usually referred to its modern rationalist context, the principal 
characteristics of the later discipline were already present in the 
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medieval curriculum and the scholastic exegesis of the classical texts. 
The medieval glossators were exemplary philologists: 
To say that law was taught and studied in the West as a distinct 
science at a time when the prevailing legal orders were only 
beginning to be clearly differentiated from politics and religion, 
raises a number of questions. What did the first law teachers teach? 
The answer surely sounds curious to modern ears. The law that was 
first taught and studied systematically in the West was not the 
prevailing law; it was the law contained in an ancient manuscript 
which had come to light in an Italian library toward the end of the 
11th century. The manuscript reproduced the enormous collection of 
legal materials which had been compiled under the Roman Emperor 
7 Justinian in about 534 A. D. - over five centuries earlier. 
The first law schools were established specifically for the purposes of 
studying ancient manuscripts, and 'for the doctors of the new study the 
books of Justinian were sacred books, the sources of authority from which 
all deductions were to be made. 18 The absolute and canonic authority of the 
text, the presupposition, common to both jurisprudence and theology, that 
certain texts were to be comprehended as containing a complete and 
integrated body of doctrine, was central to the scholastic method of the 
glossators: 'As in the case of theology, the written text as a whole, the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, like the Bible and the writings of the Church 
Fathers, was accepted as sacred, the embodiment of reason. 19 The jurists 
task was that of making sense of a series of texts which were objectively 
given and authoritatively laid down. No attempt was to be made to 
question the rationality, the utility or the historical and social 
conditioning of those legal or scriptural authorities. From its very 
beginnings in the 12th century, the science of law was to treat its object 
as an autonomous body of written doctrine which was to be philologically 
reconstructed and handed down by an elite group of juristic exegetes, the 
-------------------- 
171 H. J. Berman, op. cit. 898. 
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first lawyers of post-classical Europe. 
If the conceptual language of Western legal faith has changed 
considerably since its earliest r epr esentation in the sc holastic 
reception of Roman law, the change of terminology should not be taken as 
evidencing any corresponding revision of substance. While the 19th and 
20th centuries have witnessed several attacks upon the orthodoxies of 
legal exegesis, and while historical and realistic tendencies within legal 
studies have to some extent challenged the formalistic assumptions 
resident within the dominant pedagogy of legal science, the greatest 
successes of modern jurisprudence have been precisely characterised by 
the re-assertion of the autonomy of law. The specific context of 
contemporary legal science which is to form the subject of the present 
chapter, is coextensive with that of linguistics itself. It too was to 
take the form of a restatement of a challenged faith in the object of its 
discipline, and it too was to return to Kant for the purposes of recovering 
the order or structure that rightly underlies and determines the practice, 
in this case that of law. Indeed the influence of Kant upon Kelsen cannot 
be doubted. What is peculiarly striking, however, is the manner in which 
Kelsen's definition of the object of legal studies, his formalist 
conception of a science of the logical hierarchy of legal norms and 
correlative thesis of the autonomy of legal signs, have dominated and 
continue to dominate the jurisprudential study of law. The statement of a 
weltanshauung quoted at the outset of this chapter was by no means 
uncharacteristic of Kelsen's work. Just as Kant's philosophy of reason was 
in one of its aspects a rigid defence of protestant faith, so Kelsen too 
was concerned to protect 'the intellectual needs of those who deal with 
the law' and to provide a 'dogmatic jurisprudence' 
10 
which would ever and 
consistently serve such a function. In what follows, it will be argued 
that the influence and success of Kelsen's reaffirmation of the science of 
law has travelled largely unacknowledged into the methodology and 
practice of contemporary legal positivism. In the words of a recent 
critique of positivist theories of law application: 
Formalism is not an antiquated theory of merely historical interest. 
-------------------- 
[101 Kelsen, op. cit. 490. 
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The claims of contemporary theorists are not isolated instances of an 
impoverished legal education. Formalism survives because it is, 
prima facie, the theory of adjudication required by our ideals about 
the rule of law. " 
Utilising the work of H. L. A. Hart, it will further be argued that it is 
precisely the residual formalism of positivist methodology that best 
illustrates the incoherence of the doctrine as a whole, and most 
specifically undermines those conceptions of legal language and 
communication that have frequently been used to justify both the 
methodology and the substantive analyses of legal positivism and its 
pr ac tic e. In the ensuing discussion, however, I shall concentrate 
pr inc i pal ly upon the jurisprudential context of the linguistic 
assumptions of legal science and will reserve for the following chapter 
the analysis of the specifically linguistic arguments which can be 
elicited from the positivistic tradition. 
3.2 ON PURITY AND MORAL DANGER: HANS KELSEN AND LEGAL FORMALISM 
The generic development of contemporary legal formalism is a 
12 
reasonably well documented phenomenon. Of central concern was the idea 
of analysing law as a self-contained system of norms, which system was to 
be independently identifiable or internally guaranteed, without reference 
to any content, usage or history of the rules that comprised the system. 
It was, in other words, a science of the form of law and significantly 
enough it shared many features in common with its historical contemporary, 
the Saussurian science of linguistics. That there should be elements of 
similarity between the two sciences is not, of course, surprising. They 
were both though to variant degrees, the product of the polemical concerns 
of late 19th century European philosophy and both inevitably bore the 
-------------------- 
[111 M. S. Moore: The Semantics of Judging (1981) Southern California Law Review 
151,166. 
[121 Generally, J. Shklar: Legalism (1964) Harvard U. P.; J. Cohen: The Political 
Element in Legal Theory ý1978) Yale Law Journal 1; Ch. Perelman: Logique 
Juridique (1976) Dalloz; H. Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State-71-9767 
Harvard 409--44b, H. Kelsen: Essays in Legal and Moral Philosoph (1973) 
Reidel. More critical accounts can be found in J. Lenoble et F. Ost, op. cit. 
467-553; E. Balibar: Positivism and Irrational Thought (1978) 107 New Left 
Review 3. 
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imprint of contemporary debates as to the nature of the social sciences. 
If anything, Kelsen's supremely rigorous and acute theory of the grammar 
and hierarchy of the legal order was even more explicitly a product of its 
philosophical context than was the Saussurian conception of linguistics. 
The Pure Theory of Law,, however, made its own claim to scientific status. 
It was to be: 
... objectivist and universalistic. It aims at the totality of law in 
its objective validity and seeks to conceive each individual 
phenomenon in its systematic context with all others - to conceive in 
each part of the law the function of the total law... The law is an 
order, and therefore all legal problems must be set and solved as 
problems of order. In this way legal theory becomes an exact 
structural analysis of positive law, free of all ethic al-pol itic al 
value judgments. 
13 
The apparent implication is not unfamiliar and may be immediately noted: 
in the name or cause of the unity of the system of law, the object of this 
science was to be specifically constfucted so as to exclude the elements 
of subjectivity inherent in historical and particular f ac ts. The 
questions to be posed are those of how and to what effect in terms of 
content and substantive practice th is aim was to be achieved. 
The former question, that of how this science was to be constructed, is 
the one most amenable to a swift and schematic resolution. Kelsen's major 
methodological innovation was that of the introduction of a Kantian 
methodology to the study of law. A more detailed explication of this 
invention will be undertaken below. Generally, however, it may be observed 
that the formalist orthodoxies of legal philosO-phy and particularly of the 
exegetical study of adjudication, were being increasingly challenged 
in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century by the rise of historical 
jurisprudence. 14 While evolutionary studies of legal development enjoyed 
-------------------- 
1131 H. Kelsen: Pure Theory of Law (1970) Univ. of California Press, pp. 191- 192. 
[141 The most obvious comparison to be made is that concerning the use of the 
concept of 'Volksgeist' within both linguistics and jurisprudence. As regards 
the former, see, G. Sampson: Schools in Linguistics (1980) Hutchinson, ch. l. 
In legal studies, see, Von Savigny: On the Vocation of our Age for Legislation 
and Jurisprudence (1831); H. U. Kantorowicze. Savigny and the Historical School 
1937T53 Law Quarterly Review 326, at 334-5: 'Even language, with which the 
historical school constantly compared law, ... (is) used by the school in a 
purely romantic sense, and is strongly influenced by the romantic conception 
of volkslied which was also believed to be the unconscious product of the 
anonymous people. 1 
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considerable success, substantial inroads had also been made by the 
Hegelian 'Philosophy of Right' and by the Marxian conception of historical 
materialism and of the historicity of legal ideology. Although these 
theories all constituted separate and distinctive challenges, they did 
combine, in the name of very different conceptions of historical 
development and indeed of political practice, in opposing the positivist 
thesis of the autonomy of the legal object. The centrality of history was 
deemed to preclude the possibility of any social science based upon a 
physic o-mathematic al model, and worse still, these historical studies 
generally adhered to an unrepentant conflation of fact and value. The 
scientific status of legal philosophy was in obvious danger of succumbing 
to the rising tide of historically orientated studies. Legal science 
urgently required a champion, and such was the role which Kelsen, 
throughout a lengthy and productive life, considered to be his own. 
A threatening situation was always likely to produce an extreme 
reaction, and Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, was no exception. Throughout 
his literary life Kelsen consistently maintained a polemical attitude 
towards any and all competing conceptions of legal theory. As he himself 
phrased it, 'a glance at the traditional science of law, in its nineteenth 
and twentieth century developments shows plainly how far removed from the 
requirement of purity the science was. ' The traditional science had lost 
its faith in the possibility of a purely logical analysis of law, it had 
forgotten the methodological axiom which separates the pure from the 
alien, the normative from the causal or empirical, it had been permissive 
and undiscriminating . 
in its contact with other discipline-s, the 'real 
science of law'15 had been lost in direct proportion to the extent of 
jurisprudence's conjunction with other disciplines. It would indeed be no 
exaggeration to say that for Kelsen the history of legal philosophy in its 
entirety, was a virtually uninterrupted narrative of a single simple, 
though gargantuan, error. It was that of the failure to distinguish the 
question of the formal validity of the normative order, a properly logical 
question, from that of the content of particular laws ,a question of a 
-------------------- 
1151 H. Kel sen: (1934) 50 Law Quar ter ly Review 474, at 477,486. 
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theological, ethical or political nature. 16 The former question alone was 
to be the subject matter of legal science, a discipline which for Kelsen 
should be wholly given over to the study of the systemic characteristics 
of the legal order conceived as a grammar and hierarchy of norms. It was, 
as stated, to be a structural theory of law and, as will be detailed below, 
it goes hand in hand with an emotivist theory of ethics and the axiomatic 
rejection of the possibility of any causally based historical science of 
law. Indeed the first step along the Kelsenian road to legal science was 
precisely that of moving away from history in the direction of a Kantian, 
transcendental epistemology, or Ineo-criticall dualism. 
The basic premiss of Kelsen's 'epistemology of the scientific outlook' 
is the rejection of the transcendental entities of antecedent metaphysics 
and their replacement by the theory that: 
Cognition cannot be merely passive in relation to its objects; it 
cannot be confined to reflecting things that are somehow given in 
themselves ... Cognition itself creates its objects, out of materials 
provided by the senses and in accordance with its immanent laws. It 
is their conformity to laws which guarantees the objedtive validity 
of the results of the process of cognition ... The ideal of 
objectivity emerges as dominant. Therefore we also find the 
prevalence of logic and the tendency to relativism. 17 
The process of cognition was thus to produce the object of legal science, 
by means of the now celebrated presupposition of what law must be like for 
the science of law to be possible, namely the transcendental-logical 
presupposition of any legal system, the basic norm. 'Just as the chaos of 
sensual perceptions becomes. a cosmos, that is, "nature" as a unified 
system, through the cognition of natural science, so the multitude of 
general and individual legal norms, created by the legal organs, becomes a 
[161 See the very useful essays collected in H. Kelsen: What is Justice ? (1957) 
Univ. of California Press. Kelsen's theme in these essays is that of an 
unstinting attac k upon any and all attempts to intr oduc e any c onsider ations of 
morality, politics or history into legal science. I cannot refrain from 
quoting his extraordinary conclusion to the essay 'Natural Law before the 
Tribunal of Science': 'From the pointof viewof science, (natural law) method 
is entirely worthless. In the Laws Plato distinguishes lies which are, and 
those which are not permissible. Lies are permissible if they are useful to 
the State. That the natural lawdoctrine, asit pretends, is able to determine 
in an objective way what is just is a lie; but those who consider it useful may 
make use of it as a useful lie. I (P. 173) - 
1171 H. Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State, op. cit. 434-5. 
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unitary system, a legal order, through the science of law. 118 The basic norm 
of the legal hierarchy was thus to be created or produced so as to fulfil 
the requirements or logical conditions necessary for an objective 
interpretation of the legal order. For science to be possible, in other 
words, it was necessary to presuppose that the world, and here the legal 
world, be consituted in a particular form. The presupposition is not, 
however, an . epistemological prescription alone. It is,, of course, 
per fec tl y tr ue that Kelsen was consciously carrying forward an 
essentially Kantian objective idealism by utilising fully the concept of 
'architectonic', which Kant had defined as the 'art of constructing a 
system'. Most briefly, Kant's argument had been that 'without systematic 
unity, our knowledge cannot become scientific, it will be an aggregate and 
not a system. ' As regards the system itself, it is subsequently defined by 
Kant as 'the unity of various cognitions under one idea. The idea is the 
conception - given by reason - of the form of the whole, insofar as the 
conception determines a priori not only the limits of its content, but the 
place which each of its parts is to occupy. 119 In less guarded moments, 
however, Kelsen was to suggest a more pragmatic and ideological character 
to the presupposition which was to determine law as system: its paramount 
value as dogma to the 'jurist concerned with the particular legal order, 
the lawyer, the legislator or the law teacher., 
20 Elsewhere, Kelsen's role 
as defender of the legal faith (by fiat) is even more explicit; in answer 
to the question of why law should be obeyed, Kelsen replies: 
the norm that we ought to obey the provisions of the historically 
first constitution must be presupposed as a hypothesis if the 
coercive order established on its basis and actually obeyed and 
applied by those whose behaviour it regulates is to be considered as 
a valid order binding upon those individuals; if the regulations 
among these individuals are to interpreted as legal duties, legal 
21 
rights, and legal responsibilities, and not as power relations ... 
In short, the epistemological precondition for a science of law, and with 
it the legitimation of the binding validity of legal norms was contained 
in the axiomatic postulate of the logic and unity of the system of norms. 
-------------------- 
181 Pure Theory of Law, op. c it. 72. 
19 1 I. Kant: Cr itique of Pur e Reason (1887) London, at 504. 
[201 General Theory of Law and State, op. c it. x iii. 
[211 What is Justice? at 262. 
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Such was presented as a formal construction, it claimed to privilege both 
system and objectivity as a function of system, without, in Kelsen's view, 
importing any considerations of value: 'even an anarchist, if he were a 
professor of law, could describe positive law as a system of valid norms, 
without having to approve of this law. 122 To fully grasp the force of this 
formal requirement, and to further elaborate the nature and difficulty of 
the system of norms conceived as a grammar of legal validity, it is as well 
to turn to its substantive implications. 
The condition of the existence of legal science was that it studied 
only the interrelationship of legal norms within a closed, hierarchic and 
essentially textual system. It was by virtue of this condition that the 
question of the binding validity of legal norms could be posed as a 
question internal to the form of written law, and might, for Kelsen, be 
solved in terms of the logical or systemic interdependence of norms. The 
question of the validity of a norm would thus be established objectively, 
it was a matter of necessary 'imputation' - when 'A' is, then IBI ought to be 
- and in no way incorporated any of the purportedly subjective questions 
of either history or volition. It should here be noted parenthetically 
that Kelsen is conforming to a tradition of philosophic doctrine that 
returns ultimately to Aristotle's rigid distinction and opposition of the 
necessary and the contingent or, in a linguistic form, between the analytic 
(demonstr able) and the rhetorical. ' Kant in turn had reworked the 
opposition in the form of the corresponding distinction between analytic 
and synthetic judgments. 
23 It is precisely the assumption of the 
scientificity of the normative order and the necessary interrelation of 
its elements, the status of the system itself as a series of necessary 
(analytic) entailments, that precludes consideration both of questions of 
-------------------- 
[221 Pure Theory of Law, op. cit. at 218. The point is one which is repeated ad 
infinitum by the later proponents of legal positivism. See, for example, 
D. N. MacCormick: Law, Morality and Positivism (1981) 2 Legal Studies 131; 
compare, D. N. MacCormick: Legal Right and Social Democracy 
(1983) Oxford, 
ch. 1. 
[231 Critiqu of Pure Reason, op. cit. P-7: 'In all judgments wherein the relation 
of a subject to the predicate is cogitated ... this relation 
is possible in 
two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as 
something which is contained (covertly) in the conception 
A; or the predicate 
B lies completely outside of the conception A, although it stands in connex ion 
with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytic, 
in the second, 
synthetic. ' 
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causality and also of substantive adjudication. Both the latter problems 
are relegated to the realm of the contingent or synthetic: 
By defining law as a norm and by limiting the science of law to the 
cognition and description of legal norms and to the norm-determined 
relations between norm-determined facts, the law is delimited against 
nature, and the science of law as a science of norms is delimited 
against all other sciences that are directed toward causal cognition 
of actual happenings. 24 
To his indubitable credit Kelsen enumerated fully and unequivocally the 
implications of this position in the major body of his work. The ideal of 
objectivity and the correlative concern with logic as the priveleged mode 
of legal statements must necessarily produce a behaviouristic account of 
law, a description of the system of norms as an ideality, concerned only 
with the externalities of legal institutions and of legal meaning. 
It may first be noted that the concept of legal meaning as produced 
within the science of law refers exclusively to such meaning as is 
externally created by the process of cognition itself. The objective 
meaning of an act or behaviour, a legal norm, is quite independent of the 
subjective meaning of the act; 'from the point of view of cognition 
directed toward the law, relations between individuals are not at issue, 
but only relations between legal norms or between facts determined by the 
legal norms, among which human behaviour represents only one special 
case ... 12 
5A legal relation is not an actual relation existent in reality, 
it is a relation objectively constituted by the system of norms; 'that the 
human being is a legal subject means nothing else but that human behaviour 
is the content of legal obligations and legal rights., 
26 There is, in other 
words, an objectivity to legal meaning within the theory of pure law, whiý--h 
objectivity, or necessity of a specific logical form, excludes the 
possibility of any subjective, social or historical, constituents. Kelsen, 
most significantly,, designates any such subjective content to norms as 
wholly arbitrary, the particular origin and content of a norm being 
entirely distinct from the description of its logical validity within a 
[241 Pure Theory of Law, op. c it. p. 75. 
[251 Ibid. 165. 
[261 Ibid. 173. 
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system, or more precisely,, within the idea of a system. Thus, 'inasmuch as 
(the) norms... are enacted by human will, the values constituted by them 
are arbitrary. 127 Norms posited by human acts of will posses - in the true 
meaning of the word - an arbitrary character. Any behaviour we please, 
that is,, can be decreed in them to be obligatory. As Joseph Raz 28 has 
commented, such a conclusion is ultimately a product of the presupposition 
of the basic norm as the principle of origin and the criterion of validity 
for legal norms. Fidelity to Kant entails referring the unity of the 
normative system to the basic norm and not to any law-creating act on the 
part of either the legislature or the courts. The question of the form of 
law is thus preserved as a question of science and such questions of 
science within the Pure Theory also inevitably entail the thesis of the 
arbitrariness or accidental quality, of the content of law. Kelsen is at 
his best, as regards self-consistency, in describing the 'static' aspect of 
law in terms of the supposed political indifference of science to any and 
all questions of legal content. Certainly more recent legal positivists 
have not been prepared to continue Kelsen's unrestrained attacks upon 
anthropomorphic metaphors of corporate personality, legislative acts, or 
of repre. sentation. 
2 9 Nor have they generally had the clarity to see that 
the common liberal claim that law is essentially related to freedom and to 
the self-determination of the legal subject is ideological because it 
necessarily implies a certain content to law and is 'essentially formed 
with regard to the concept of property right. 13o The intransigent 
formalism of the Kelsenian theory of norms emphatically denies the 
possibility of the liberal authorisation of the capitalist legal order, in 
precisely the same terms as those used elsewhere to impugn the socialist 
critique of legality. 
31 Any system of law is a coercive order of human 
[271 Ibid. 18. See also, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosoph , p. 218: 
[281 J. Raz: The Concept of a Legal Syst (1980) Clarendon, P-95 ff. 
[291 For commentary on this aspect of Kelsen's work, see, G. Della Volpe: Rousseau 
and Marx (1978) London, ch. 2 and Appendix. 
1301 Pure Theory of Law, op. cit. P-170. In view of more recent debates as to the 
ideological character and significance of the legal subject, it is 
interesting to note Kelsen's conclusion that, 'It is easy to understand why 
the ideology of legal subjectivity seeks to establish a link with the ethical 
value of freedom. An order that refused to recognise man as a free personality 
in this respect, that is, an order that does not guarantee the subjective 
right of property, is rejected by this ideology as not being a legal order at 
all. 1 
1311 H. Kelsen: The Communist Theory of Law (1976) Aalen. 
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behaviour and is amenable to any content whatsoever. To paraphrase 
Kelsen's own words, a science which genuinely removes the veil of 
metaphysics and does not close its eyes, faces squarely the Gorgon head of 
power unalloyed. 
Such consistency or reductive systematicity does not, however, come 
cheap. It has already been observed that it entails a conception of the 
r ad ic al arbitrariness of all questions of value. The realm of value, and 
with it that of volition, is quite simply excluded, as contingency, from 
the ambit of science; history and the socio-historical generation of the 
individual norm - or content and meaning of the normative system - is not 
a question open to valid study. Precisely because history is conceived as 
a domain of irrational subjectivity the problem of history has to be 
collapsed into the presupposition of a valid source of law, and the 
difficulties that such irrationality had posed may now be avoided by 
reducing all questions of the historical basis of actual legal norms to 
the purely formal question of legal dogmatics, that of the 'internal' 
validity of norms, their lineage in logic, their source. In short, reality 
is displaced by thought, a position which helps explain the excessive 
rigidity and objectivism of the Pure Theory when it comes to examine the 
questions of 'legal dynamics', of law creation and law interpretation. 
There is indeed a self-reinforcing circularity to the relation of content 
to form, whereby emphasis upon the form of law in the account of legal 
statics, forces the study of law creation and its correlative, the 
application and so also content of norms, in the direction of an unworthy 
subjectivism. Whereas other structuralists, and in particular Saussure, 
had been prepared to abandon the study of the diachronic or Inomo-dynamic' 
and to reiegate such subject-matter in its entirety to non-science, the 
position of the Pure Theory is presented as being more complex. Suc h 
complexity is, however, more apparent than real. 
32 
-------------------- 
1321 C. f. O. Weinberger, introdwation, in H. Kelsen: Essays in Legal and Moral 
Philosophy, op. cit. at p. xviii: 'The theory of legal dynamics and the 
hierarchicai strLnture of law ... represents nn integral constituent of the 
Pure Theory of Law. The whole of legal life, legislation, legal transactions, 
the judicial or administrative decision, official w-tion and execution, are 
similarly explained and defined as the creation and fulfilment of norms. ' 
5 1'/., " 
It is a peculiarity of the legal order that it is not simply a system of 
norms co-ordinated to each other, 'standing, so to speak, side by side on 
the same level, but a hierarchy of different levels of norms. ' It is the 
hierarchical character of the legal order that forms the object of the 
theory of legal dynamics, which theory studies the creation and 
application of law and so also analyses the changing content of legal 
norms. 'Law regulates its own creation inasmuch as one legal norm 
determines the way in which another norm is created, and also, to some 
extent, the contents of that norm., 33 The process whereby legal norms are 
created and applied in consistency with the criteria provided by higher or 
superior norms of the order, is not, however, considered by legal cognition 
beyond the extent to which higher legal norms regulate the creation and 
application of lower norms. It is, in other words, the fact that, from the 
systematic viewpoint, legal dynamics are norm-determined processes that 
captures the exclusive attention of the science of law. The requirements 
of law creation and law application are purely formal, they concern solely 
the conformity of lower norms to higher norms - principally the 
relationships of subsumption and of delegation - and thereby enable Kelsen 
to reassert the unity of the legal order. A structural logic can thus be 
reintroduced to the study of legal dynamics to the end of denying the 
possibility of lacunae in the law - even where the legal order does not 
contain a general norm positively reeulating a particular behaviour, it is 
nonetheless the case that such behaviour is still regulated negatively - 
and it is equally the case that 'no conflict is possible between a higher 
and a lower norm of a legal system' - both unlawful judicial and 
administrative decisions and also unconstitutional statutes are analytic 
contradictions which would destroy the unity of the system of norms by 
making it impossible to describe it in non-contradictory rules of law. 34 
It is consequently first the case that the introduction of a discussion 
of legal dynamics strongly reinforces the conception of the objectivity of 
the logical system of law. The question of the substantive, socio- 
historical, production of legal norms is further distanced from the ambit 
of scientific study. The formalism of the conception of legal dynamics 
-------------------- 
1331 General Theory of Law and State, op. c it. p. 124 
1341 Pure Theory of Law, op. c it. p. 276,245. 
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indeed refurbishes the tendency towards an extreme subjectivism in 
relation to legal substance. The one implies the other, and Kelsen's 
originality resides in his having determinedly opted in favour of a 
formalism which could only be exacerbated when the science of law finally 
and hesitantly commented upon the problem of legal interpretation. Kelsen 
here opens up, albeit in a peculiarly unsatisfactory way, the problems of 
legal language and legal meaning which have most captivated and troubled 
the future development of legal positivism. If nothing else, a certain 
equivocal realism leads Kelsen to acknowledge that 'every law-applying act 
is onl y partly determined by 1 aw and par tl y undetermined. The 
indefiniteness may concern either the conditioning fact or the 
conditioned consequences., 35 Proceeding to castigate the ambiguity of 
linguistic expression as a frequent cause of uncertainty, Kelsen concludes 
pre-emptively that: 
There is simply no method ... by which one of several meanings of a 
norm may gain the distinction of being the only correct one ... 
Despite all the efforts Of traditional jurisprudence it has not been 
possible so far to solve in an objectively valid fashion the conflict 
between will and expression in favour of the one or the other. 36 
It is not only impossible but further, it is futile or fictitious even to 
attempt to specify any single, correct, interpretation or application of a 
general norm. The reason for this agnostic semantic subjectivism is most 
simply stated as the default of legal science in the face of its own 
conception of the relativity or arbitrariness of legal content; 'for the 
process of creating an individual norm within the framework of a general 
norm in the process of applying the law, is a function of will. ' The 
exercise of will, or the domain of language use entails the entry into the 
legal process of other norms: 'such as the norms of morals (and) of 
justice, constituting social values ... from the viewpoint of positive 
law 
nothing can be said about their validity ... except to characterise them 
-------------------- 
1351 Ibid - 319. 
1361 Ibid - 352. 
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negatively; they are norms which are not of positive law., 37 It transpires, 
in other words, that at the end of the day the Pure Theory of Law is unable 
to provide either guidance or comment upon a question of critical 
practical and theoretical significance, namely that of the interpretation 
and consequent application and justification of specific rules of law. 
The difficulty is one which is peculiar to formalism. On the one hand, it 
necessarily admits that values,, and so also substantive questions of 
meaning, intrude upon and play a role in the history and realisation of the 
legal order. On the other hand, the methodological exigencies of a 
unified legal science virtually preclude the possibility of any rational 
examination of the actual manner in which such values and meanings affect 
the realisation of the system and so also, in a substantive sense, 
constitute that system as a practice. An uncodified system of legal norms 
is, after all, nothing other than the resultant effect of previous legal 
pr ac tic e. Such a paradox is,, in essence, the unresolved problem which 
Kelsen bequeathed to the future generations of legal positivists. 
There are, as should be apparent, several facets to the problem of the 
intrusion of questions of value and of meaning, of history generally, into 
the study of the system of norms. There is firstly what may be termed a 
problem of a lesser order. It is that of the attempt to provide a 
satisfactory account of legal semantics from within a formalist 
conception of the role of legal science. The issue here is that of 
accepting the general terms in which the Pure Theory designates the 
problem of interpretation as a problem of volition or subjectivity, and of 
endeavouring to supplement it with a more positive approach to substantive 
questions. It is, in effect,, a laudatory form of criticism: the lacunae in 
the theory may be remedied; and it is also, for obvious reasons, the most 
frequent mode of procedure on the part of those who would term themselves 
positivists. It is to the effects of this largely unacknowledged position 
-------------------- 
1371 Ibid. 352-4.. For discussion of this aspect of Kelsen's work and the 
pariodisation of his various changes in position with regard to the theory of 
adjudication, see, S. Paulson: Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen's 
Pure Theory (1980) 39 Cambridge Law Journal 172; S. Paulson: Subsumption, 
Derogation and Non-Contradiction in 'Legal Science' (1981) Univ. of Chicago 
Law Review 802; I. Stewart: Kelsen and the Exegetical Tradition in 
jurisprudence (1981) Proceedings of the U. K. Association for Social and Legal 
philosophy, Edinburgh; S. Paulson: On the Status of the Lex Posterior 
Derogating Rule (1983) V Liverpool Law Review 5. 
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within contemporary legal positivism that I shall direct my attention in 
the ensuing section. I shall further argue that the apparent shift of 
emphasis from the systemic unity of the form of law and the correlative 
thesis of the objective meaning of the normative order, to a concern with 
substantive issues of legal meaning and language use, significantly 
illuminates flaws within the positivist position as a whole. A serious 
examination of the contemporary use of arguments haphazardly drawn from 
the philosophy of ordinary language to defer or deny the collapse of legal 
science in the face of the demand that it account for its specifically 
social and historical role and rhetoric, fully evidences its theor. etical 
inability to escape from the complementary pitfalls of formalism and 
subjectivism. 
3.3 ADVENTURES OF LEGAL MEANING: HERBERT HART AND LEGAL SUBJECTIVISM 
Numerous criticisms of the Kelsenian conception of legal science are 
possible and have been essayed. An extreme though arguably somewhat too 
simple mode of attack is that of denying the relevance of the entire 
edifice of the normative theory. It has thus been claimed by 
E. B. Pashukanis,, 38 that the Pure Theory of a normative science is a logical 
absurdity. From a very different position within philosophic 
existentialism, the sometimes admirable Georg Cohn39 similarly extended a 
critique of legal science to include any form of conceptual jurisprudence 
as a flagrant denial of what Sartre had termed 'lived experience'. Both.. 
such frontal attacks have their merits but, from the viewpoint of legal 
philosophy as traditionally conceived and established, are overextensive. 
It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to impugn abstractly a particular 
conception of legal science for not being, respectively, a materialism or a 
phenomenology. Such thorough-going criticisms, however, remove 
the debate 
from the domain of substantive jurisprudence to that of philosophic 
method. As Finnis 
40 has observed in a slightly different context, such 
debates are largely pre-emptive and allow of a simple analytic 
defence, 
1381 E. B. Fashukanis: Law and Marxisn (1978) London. 
1391 G. Cohn: Existentialisn and Legal Science (1967) New York. 
[401 J. Finnis: Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) Clarendon, p. 21. 
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namely that of distinguishing the very different objects of the disputant 
theories. It is thus possible to argue that a more appropriate and 
certainly less well tried mode of approach is that of seriously 
considering the disputes and emendations generated by the Pure Theory 
within the loosely defined boundaries of legal positivism. It is 
certainly only within the context of such a mode of criticism that it is 
possible to fully appreciate the extent to which the formalism of the Pure 
Theory has lived on and continues to dominate the apparently more 
substantively and semantically orientated contr ibutions of later 
positivists. The persisting conception of a unified, systemically 
defined, legal order has continued to produce the pernicious exclusion of 
both historical and sociological considerations, such, even yet, being 
stigmatised as realms of irrational volition or of contingency pure and 
simple. Recalling the earlier discussion of linguistics, it was suggested 
there that an overstated formalism with regard to the conception of a 
unified, regulative,, system of langue generated a rather false problematic 
for the future development of semantics. For the present, I shall 
restrict myself to endeavouring to show that where legal positivism has 
had recourse to the philosophy of language, it has remained wholly within 
the confines of that false problematic. 
With regard to both of the above concerns, a signal and in many facets 
exemplary contribution has been made by the jurist H. L. A. Hart. 
41 From a 
background both in legal philosophy and in legal practice, he was well 
placed and to his credit fully aware of the pivotal need for jurisprudence 
to account for and to contribute to substantive problems of the 
interpretation and application of legal rules. His concerns were, in 
other words, both practical and theoretical, and the bulk of his work may 
in many respects be seen as an extended endeavour to draw a middle way 
between the extreme and rigid positions of mid-twentieth century 
jurisprudence. The exigencies to be avoided were Comprised on the one 
side by the overarching formalism of imperative or 
'command' theories of 
law, including the Kelsenian Pure Theory -a theory which was almost 
wholly inarticulate on matters of 
legal practice - and on the other side 
-------------------- 
[411 Particularly, H. L. A. Hart: Definition and Theor 
oxford; Comept of Law (1961 )-Clarendon. 
in Jurispruderre (1953) 
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by reductionist theories of law, represented for Hart by some of the 
cruder slogans of the American realists. 
42 It is at all events to Hart that 
legal philosophy owes the explicit introduction, albeit in a highly 
eclectic form,, of methods drawn from the philosophy of language; methods 
which Hart was to use as the means whereby to respond to the sterile 
seeming orthodoxies and wilder polemics of the antecedent jurisprudence. 
It may be noted, however, that in principle any attempt to chart a course 
between antinomian tendencies or extremes is as likely as not to bear 
certain of the marks, both positive and negative, of the theses that it 
wishes to avoid. It is by no means clear that Hart's concept of law is an 
exception to such a principle. 
If the above brief character isation of one aspect of the historical and 
theoretical context of Hart's work is correct, then it is for present 
purposes permissible to deal with his substantive theory relatively 
suce ine tly. This may- be done by concentrating upon a particular 
theoretical moment of his overall schema, namely that of a residual 
tendency throughout his work to rely upon subjectivist or psychologistic 
resolutions to the inherent rigidity and impracticability of the 
formalist or monist theory of law, with which theory he is otherwise in 
substantial agreement. Such an analysis is, indeed, valid both for the 
conception of law as primarily a social fact 
43 
and for the methodological 
incorporation of linguistic analysis to resolve the problems of rule 
application. It is in fact the case that both of these aspects of Hart's 
concept of law are equally influenced by contemporary developments within 
the philosophy of language, developments associated with the later work of 
44 
Wittgenstein and with that of Hart's colleague J. L. Austin. I shall move 
from the general - and purportedly sociological - to the particular - and 
specifically linguistic; a movement from the formalist presuppositions of 
Hartian positivism to the subjectivist solution proposed to the problems 
-------------------- 
[421 See, H. L. A. Hart: Analytic Jurisprudence in the Mid-20th Century (1957) 105 
Univ. of Pennsylvania Law Review 953. 
[431 The concept of law as social fact or as institutional convention is identical 
to the concept of the sociality of language to be found in F. de Saussure: 
Course in General Linguistics (1966) 14, -Graw-Hill, wherein the social nature 6-f--1a-n`g-uag`e---1r`sequally deemed to be dependent upon pr e-ex istent conventions or 
is I given I as a normative fact. 
[441 Particularly, J. L. Austin: How to do Things with Words (1962) Clarendon, 
L. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations (1963) Blackwell. 
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that such a formalism produces. In both cases the requisite starting 
point is Hart's distinctive contribution to the analysis of law as a 
system of rules. 
Thus, in very general terms, Hart conceives of law, as is by now well 
known, as a combination of primary and secondary rules. The leap into the 
legal state is deemed to occur when primary ru les of moral obligation are 
supplemented by secondary rules and, most importantly, by a rule of 
recognition. 
45 The notion of recognition is probably more familiar to 
psychologists and to linguists - being, respectively, a facet of 
perception or of linguistic competence - than to legal philosophers, but 
it has a specific and substantial role to play within the Hart ian 
conception of legal system. In opposition first and foremost to the 
formalist criterion of legal validity based upon a unitary essence to 
legality - either as imperation or logical presupposition - Hart is 
concerned to emphasise the character of law a s social fact. The rule of 
recognition, 'a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of 
obligation' will operate by specifying 'some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive 
affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by 
the serious social pressure it exerts. 146 While Hart does in general fully 
support the formalist analysis of legal validity as exclusively concerned 
with the manner in which specific laws are themselves norm-deter mined, the 
rule of recognition itself falls outside the normative unity of the 
system: 
a rule of recognition is unlike other rules of the system ... 
whereas a subordinate rule of a system may be valid and in that sense 
exist even if it is generally disregarded, the rule of recognition 
exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the 
courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by 
reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact. 
47 
As Hart refers to this single addition to the normative theory as a 
fundamental point of difference between his own and the Austinian and 
----------- -------- 
[451 op. cit. p. 89-90. 
[461 Ibid. 92. 
[471 Ibid. 107. 
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Kelsenian theories, the nature and content of this 'social' fact is ripe 
for closer examination. 
Even on its face value it is hard to conceive of the rule of 
recognition as a very momentous advance upon Austin's requirement of a 
'habit of obedience' or Kelsen's stipulation that the basic norm be by and 
large 'efficacious'. At the same time, however, it is worth observing that 
the reference to the specifically social characteristics of the rule of 
recognition are also fashioned to meet the criteria of Hart's critical 
comments upon the imperative or command theories of Austin and Kelsen. 
Aligned to his use of the Wittgensteinian distinction between the internal 
and external aspect of rule usage, 
48 Hart is concerned to argue that legal 
systems are more cempl-ex social entities than their description as being 
merely coercive or imperative might suggest. Borrowing from Peter Winch's 
work on the methodology of the social sciences, Hart perceives the legal 
rule to be a variant form of social rule. 'In terms of methodological 
principle, he can then argue that as a social 'thing', the legal rule is to 
be defined by reference to internal criteria - it must be not merely 
observed but also understood: 'for their being intellectual or social, as 
opposed to physical, in character depends entirely on their belonging in a 
certain way to a system of ideas or mode of living. t49 Suffice it to say at 
this point, that in adopting such a position Hart is undoubtedly correct 
in principle, the legal system certainly involves complex mechanisms of 
consent and an adequate theory of law should have recourse to some 
criterion of acceptance. How else, in other words, can a theory of law 
explain what might plausibly be termed the single most complex ideological 
phenomenon of western political systems? If the proposal of a criterion 
of acceptance is clearly apposite, what is considerably less clear is 
whether Hart has succeeded in practice, in the context of his avowed 
opposition to the formalist theories, in providing an adequate account of 
acceptance, or in significantly contributing to the 'descriptive 
sociology' of the substantive legal order. 
-------------------- 
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Returning to the criterion of acceptance as it is set out by Hart, it is 
soon apparent that it is effectively a very minor amendment to an 
essentially formalist account of legal validity. The much vaunted 
internal aspect of rules or hermeneutic viewpoint is of little import as 
regards the question of the validity of a system of legal rules. The 
basic premiss of Hart's position is contained in the familiar proposition 
that 'if the question is raised whether some suggested rule is legally 
valid, we must, in order to answer the question, use a criterion of 
validity provided by some other rule. 
50 It is in full consonance with such 
a premiss that Hart severely limits the degree and scope of acceptance or 
linter nalisation' necessary for the existence of a legal system as a social 
f ac t. The entire populace of 'ordinary citizens' are, indeed, deemed to 
manifest their acceptance of laws by 'acquiescence in the results of .. 
official operations"51 and it is largely in ignorance of the dark 
machinations of the mysterious legal machinery that the 'ordinary' citizen 
passively keeps the law: 
eeo the reality of the situation is that a great proportion of 
ordinary citizens have no general conception of the legal structure 
or of its criteria of validity. So long as the laws which are valid 
by the systems' tests of validity are obeyed by the bulk of the 
population this surely is all the evidence that we need in order to 
establish that a given legal system exists. 
52 
To this somewhat curious and hardly sophisticated foray into 'descriptive 
sociology', Hart merely adds the rather unconvincing caveat that the above 
platitudinous and external description be supplemented by a further 
description of the "relevant relationship of the officials of the system 
to the secondary rules which concern them as officials. ' There follows an 
even more bizarre piece of prescriptive psychology: 'here what is crucial 
is that there should be a unified or shared official acceptance of the 
rule of recognition containing the systems' criteria of validity. ' At least 
insofar as he straightforwardly assumes the justification of legal 
----------- -------- 
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authority, Hart follows squarely in the Austinian tradition of legal 
analysis and consequentl y endeavours both to steer the questions of 
existence and acceptance away from the mirky clutches of the ignorant 
plebian and simultaneously to reassert, without argument, the unity or 
hegemony of a governing or official elite, in the form of the legal 
personification of state power. Nonetheless, even if it be a sorry and 
predetermined contest, the officials of the system are accredited with 
such intellectual status or psychological percipience as may be accorded 
to a stipulatively given 'unified' or shared internal viewpoint. It is 
interesting to note that Kelsen had already considered and rejected as 
fundamentally ideological just such a theory of recognition according to 
wh ic h: 
positive law is valid only if it is recognised by the individuals 
subject to it, which means: if those individuals agree that one ought 
to behave according to the norms of positive law. This recognition, 
it is said, actually takes place, and if it cannot be proved, it is 
assumed, fictitiously, as a tacit recognition. The theory of 
recognition, consciously or unconsciously, presupposes the ideal of 
individual liberty as self-determination, that is, the norm that the 
individual ought to do only what he wants to do. 
53 
In the last instance, in other words, Hart's reworking of the Kelsenian 
presupposition fails to produce more than an apparent reformulation of 
questions of logical entailment into the terminology of the psychological 
requirements of a normative system. The assumption of recognition (a 
presupposed social fact) in no way resolves the problem of acceptance, it 
is rather the systemic requirement that renders the concept of law 
possible. It is precisely as such, as a structural precondition of legal 
analysis and as a pre-given 'social fact' (as a necessary convention) that 
the rule of recognition is best represented. Questions of acceptance, and 
indeed of the role of law as the legitimation of power, are again, as in 
all formalism, collapsed into or reduced to the problem of the internal or 
logical validity of the 'source' of law, which for Hart merely takes a 
surrogate psychological form. 
-------------------- 
1531 pure Theory of Law, op. cit., p. 218. 
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It would be quite wrong, however, to suppose that Hart's brief affair 
with the psychology or subjectivity of acceptance was a gratuitous or 
momentary aberration. On the contrary, it stems fully consistently, 
though perhaps circuitously, from his innovative adoption of methods drawn 
from the philosophy of language, and aimed at resolving the problems of 
law application or adjudication. Here too the very logic of formalism 
determines that Hart, in common with the whole tendency of ordinary 
language philosophy, moves towards a subjectivist conception of semantics 
and so too of law applying acts, while nonetheless remaining fundamentally 
within an overall schema of philosophic formalism. At all events, the 
distinctive conception of rule usage which Hart employs is taken 
indirectly from Wittgenstein's work on the rule governed nature of 
language use, and also clearly benefits from J. L. Austin's salutary comments 
upon the philosophy of meaning, comments which in many respects accord 
wi th Bentham' s ear 1 ier proposals with regard to par aphr ase and 
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ex empl if ic ation. Loosely speaking there are two related questions to be 
answered, neither of them, from a linguistic viewpoint, being particularly 
profound. The first, more general question, concerns the nature of 
language and more particularly the role of definitions in legal theory. 
The second is a correlative of the first, and is specifically concerned 
with providing a semantics of law application: how is the meaning of a 
general term to be ascertained in a situation in which its lexical or 
factual application is imprecise? 
The former of the two questions set out above was the principal 
subject-matter of Wittgenstein's doctoral thesis, the Tractatus 
Logico- 
Philosophic us. 
55 It was the realisation that he had signally failed, in 
that work, to answer the second question that persuaded 
him to return from 
his semi-retirement as a teacher and to take up again 
the unresolved 
questions of semantics left over from the earlier work. 
The outcome was 
his brilliant if somewhat vague Philosophical Investigations,, which work 
elaborated a philosophy of meaning as constituted 
in language use, to 
remedy the wholly referential or 
denotative conception of essentially 
-------------------- 
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Propositional languages expressed in his earliest work. If the crudest of 
sketches is permissible, the Tractatus may be characterised as a severe 
critique of psychologism which bases itself upon an ostensive or 
determinative conception of language. Words name objects and in 
combination describe states of affairs (states of things). States of 
affairs form elementary propositions ( 'the totality of propositions is 
language' ) which propositions either do or do not correspond to reality 
(the totality of facts). 56 
While the truth of propositions may be tested against reality, the 
philosophy of language is more concerned with the propositional form Of 
language, the fact that the sense of propositions is wholly governed by or 
reducible to logical formulae, the logic o-lingui stic rules which govern 
what it is and is not possible to express. While the Philosophical 
Investigations share many of the formal tenets of the Tractatus, there is 
a profound change in emphasis as regards the importance of propositional 
languages. Wittgenstein rejects the notion of words as exclusively naming 
objects and moves dramatically towards a conception of language as context 
bound. The change of emphasis is a most significant advance; the uses of 
language (language-games) are numerous and complex, and the Investigations 
begin by allowing that the ostensive teaching of words by which an 
association is established 'between the word and the thing157 is but one 
such use of language. The multiplicity of language-games or usages must 
be kept in constant view, 'the speaking of language is part of an activity, 
or a form of life' and such forms of life are multiple; 'naming is something 
like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to 
the use of a word ... nothing has so far been 
done when a thing has been 
named. It has not even got a name except in the language-game., 
58 It is 
the study of the game, the fond metaphor of liberal theories' desire to 
trivialise the social and political,, that is to replace the denotative 
conception of language, I... to imagine a language means to imagine a form 
of life'59 and the use of language or language-game which appertains to it. 
-------------------- 
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While it is clearly the case that the notions of 'form of life' and indeed 
of 'language-game' are thoroughly indeterminate 60 - they are neither 
anthropological nor sociological entities, but would rather appear to 
vaguely connote the pragmatic functions of language or what J. L. Austin was 
to term 'speech acts, - it is nonetheless the case that what may be 
soc iol ingui stic ally crude may also bear an important philosophical 
message. 
Using an inelegant and general terminology, it might be said that the 
philosophy of language was moving towards a logical empiricism in relation 
to semantics. The form that such an empiricism takes may be explicated by 
examining the conception of a game, and more particularly the manner in 
which the game is stated to be rule governed. Words do not have a single 
'given' or ostensive meaning, they have a meaning rather by virtue of the 
role which they play within a particular language-game, 
61 'just as a move 
in chess doesn't consist simply in moving a piece in such-and-such a way on 
a board - nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move: but 
in the circumstances that we call "playing the game of chess". "solving a 
, 62 chess problem" and so on. Two aspects of the game are therefore crucial. 
It is firstly the case that the game is in general rule governed in the 
sense that the terms used must accord with a pre-determined set of rules 
(customs, uses, institutions). To say that a term of a language-game is 
rule governed does not, however, provide us with its meaning. The meaning 
is also a question of practice (hermeneutics), the 'mastery of a technique' 
which entails 'understanding' of the rules so as to allow what we call 
'obeying the rule' and 'going against the rule' in actual cases. 
63 The 
conception of meaning thus requires not only that the utterance be 
intelligible but that the rule governing it be comprehended. To 
comprehend the rule, the linguist must refer to the context and manner in 
which language is used, to the internal aspect of rule observance which is 
to be ascertained by means of a method which J. L. Austin was later to term 
[601 See, e. g., Ibid. para. 23. C. f. also, E. Gellner, op. cit., 'the terrible 
thing about Wittgenstein was the supposition that the fact that a concept was 
a part of a form of life settles or solves anything. I It is rather, Ia problem, 
never a solution. 1 (185 f f) - 
[611 Philosophical Investigations, op. cit. para-50 75. 
[621 Ibid. para. 33. 
[631 Ibid. para. 199,200. 
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'linguistic phenomenology'. 64 
The semantics thus produced by the understanding of rule usage, as 
shall become apparent in relation to Hart's jurisprudence, leads either 
back towards an essentially lexical analytic of linguistic functions, or 
towards a psychology or subjectivism of language use. Both propensities 
are clearly related, they inhere to the ideological coupling of system to 
creativity which has already been noted, and they receive further 
substance in the work of J. L. Austin, the most proximate source of Hart's 
linguistic methodology. The problems which Austin was concerned to solve 
were largely coextensive with those which Wittgenstein's later work had 
brought to light but had left in large measure unanswered. It is 
certainly helpful to assess Austin's work in such a context. Having moved 
fr om a rigidly denotative and consequently largely propositional 
conception of language, Wittgenstein had proceeded, as has been briefly 
suggested, towards a more instrumental conception of language: language 
acquires meaning or is meaningful by virtue of being a tool that can be 
used or a technique that is mastered. Its meaning thus appertains to the 
activity and context in relation to which it is used, a proposition which 
gained favour amongst philosophers of language in general. It is 
interesting to note that Wittgenstein never took the matter much further 
than this, no definition of linguistic contexts nor classification of 
specific instrumentalities was forthcoming. Wittgenstein's contribution 
was here restricted to that of stating an undoubtedly correct, though 
unoriginal,, general principle. It is unequivocally the case that one 
facet of language is to be located in the fact that usage, or linguistic 
practice as historical activity, powerfully affects meaning. Some 
considerable time before Wittgenstein arrived at this conclusion, the 
London school of linguistics, headed by J. R. Firth, had already argued the 
point at length. ' They had made substantial use of the linguistic ideas of 
Malinowski who had already, in 1923 
65 
written of language functioning 'as a 
link in concerted human activity ... It is a mode of action and not an 
instrument of reflection. ' Elsewhere we find examples which are virtually 
-------------------- 
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identical to Wittgenstein's discussion of words as tools. Thus, for 
example, Malinowski relates that: 'a small fleet of canoes moving in 
concerted action is constantly directed and its movements co-ordinated by 
verbal utterances The meaning of a cry announcing a shoal of fish 
, 66 consists in the complete resetting of all the movements of the fleet . 
Both Malinowski, the precursor of sociolingui stics, 
67 
and Wittgenstein, 
whose work prefigures Austin's theory of utterances as speech acts, 
started from a similar, seemingly anthropological, basic premiss - that of 
language as an activity, as a 'performance' within a context or form of 
life. 
Both the performative and the contextual facets of meaning were 
stressed by Austin to novel effect, namely that of producing a typology of 
linguistically constituted activities or speech acts. While Austin 
rigorously stressed the importance of the context to the understanding of 
utterances - he even went so far as to suggest that to ask what the meaning 
of a word was in isolation from a context was non-sensical - he was most 
concerned with the classification of that which utterances accomplish. 
The notion of a speech act encompasses the actual performance of several 
different activities68 : thus in the appropriate context, by asking the 
question 'what were you doing on Friday the 13th of this month? ' an 
interrogation is commenced. Similarly, when Finney stated 'I made a 
mistake in the tap' an excuse is pleaded. 
69 In both cases the nature of the 
illocutionary act is conventionally constituted, the actualisation of the 
performative is consequent upon the existence of a particular social 
ceremony or context, the police station or the trial. So far, the nature 
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of the illocutionary act as a function of language might be summarised by 
reference to the institutional nature of certain ceremonies: a contract or 
will is made, a company is set up, a trust fund is established, a marriage 
is entered into and so forth, these are legal acts and are only possible as 
such by virtue of the rules of the particular institutions concerned. 70 At 
the same time, however, Austin recognised that the arbitrary or 
conventional nature of language does not fully exhaust its semantic 
possibilities. The social functions of utterances are multiple, as 
nume'rous indeed as the contexts in which language is used, and for this 
reason Austin introduces the conception of lillocutionary force'. While 
it may be possible to some extent to decode the meaning of an utterance by 
reference to its context it is nonetheless admitted to be the case that an 
utterance can only be understood if the listener can ascertain the 
intention or force behind it. 71 We are eventually referred, in other words, 
to the purpose or intention of the agent making the utterance: a piece of 
advice, for example, may be proferred humorously, cynically or by way of 
hyperbole, and the only way in which such illocutionary force may be 
ascertained is by intruding upon the mind of the speaker or author. If 
such is the case then it will frequently be impossible to fully determine 
what is meant by any specific utterance; the 'other mind' remains in many 
instances opaque - intentions are frequently vague, multiple or in the 
context of a larger discourse changing, even worse, the dead no longer have 
intentions. In short, to reduce understanding, in the last analysis, to a 
matter of subjectivity or of access to an individual psychology, is an 
unfortunate conclusion and all too easily dismissive of the need to 
furth. er analyse the actual context and social determination of meaning and 
of understanding. 
-------------------- 
1701 Additional material may be found in M. Adler and S. Asquith (eds. ): Discretion 
and Welfare (1980) London, pp. 247-268; Z. K. Bankowski and G. Maher: Ordinary 
Language and Judicial Discretion (1981) 12 Rechtstheorie 1; D. N. MacCormick: 
Contemporary Legal Philosophy (1983) 10 Journal of Law and Society 1. 
1711 J. L. Austin: Philosophical Papers, op. cit., p. 99 ff. C. f also, P. Grice: 
Meaning (1957) 66 Philosophical Quar ter ly 377; P. Gr ice: Utterer Is Meaning and 
Intentions (1969) 78 Philosophical Quarterly 147. For commentary, see, 
B. Harrison, op. cit.; P. Ricoeur : The Rule of Metaphor (1978) R. K. P., study 3', 
J. Habermas: Communication and. the Evolution of Society (1979) Heinemann, 
ch. 1; J. Israel: The Language of Dialectics and the Dialectics of Language 
(1979) Harvester, ch. 4. 
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Returning to the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart, the influence of the 
philosophy of language is writ large upon his early work. In the 
remainder of this chapter I shall examine and critically comment upon 
Hart's substantive proposals for jurisprudence, while reserving for the 
next chapter the further task of reformulating the problem of linguistics 
and especially of a critical linguistics in its relation to legal theory. 
If his earliest work on 'ascription' is excluded (Hart explicitly 
disavowed that work) the subject-matter of the first topic for 
consideration is Hart's general conception of the role of language in 
analytic jurisprudence. He conceived of the analytic discipline in a 
somewhat restricted way as a method of clarifying the use of legal 
language and the meaning of specific legal terms. At its most general, 
legal theory is concerned with the specific characteristics of the legal 
normative order and particularly with the specific and distinctive 
features of legal language: a sharpened awareness of words will refine and 
clarify our appreciation of that for which they stand. In a curio6sly 
positivistic reprise we then learn, however, that legal words do not in 
point of fact correspond to real entities or processes at all: 'the great 
anomaly of legal language is our inability to define its crucial words in 
terms of ordinary factual counter par ts. 172 The reasons for this inability 
take one once again into the realm of the systemic characteristics of the 
legal order. When it comes to matters of definition and theory in 
jurisprudence, it must firstly be realised that legal language is 
'peculiar' and 'distinctive', that the logical structure of rules is 
'puzzling' and not amenable to 'common' modes of definition. The reason 
given for this opacity is formulated generically: 'the language involved 
in the enunciation and application of rules constitutes a special segment 
of human discourse with special features which lead to confusion 
if 
neglected., 
73 The evil hand of formalism and with it the denial of the 
theoretical relevance of historical and social processes is already 
clearly visible, law and life are logically distinct - 
by implication the 
non-referential and impenetrable character of legal 
discourse is simply a 
facet of its normative character, a feature of linguistic generality and 
-------------------- 
1721 Definition and Theor , op. cit., p. 7-8. 
1731 Ibid. 8. 
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not a product of the rhetorical or political-administrative goals of legal 
practice. For Hart, rules refer to other rules, the system of rules 
determines the 'value' or normative meaning of any specific term. The 
legal order and legal terminology are no exception, they are self- 
referential in the sense that the legal dictionary is semantically 
determined by the interdependency of its terms (lexical units) within the 
legal code or unity of jurisprudence. Where Wittgenstein had spoken of 
the 'picture of the world' that verifies the logic of any specific rule 
usage; 
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where Austin talked of the truth conditions, the presuppositions 
and implications, of particular statements; 75 Hart proceeds to an analysis 
of the implications and logical presuppositions of legal utterance. The 
favoured mode of such an analysis is the analogy of the rules governing a 
game - cricket - with the rules of a legal system - arguably a more 
frightening sport though certainly not without equivalent social 
reference groups. The logico-linguistic pointg however, is that the 
characteristic usages of legal terms such as right, duty or obligation do 
not correspond to any determinate set of facts or processes, but rather 
bear a meaning or value by virtue of the complex normative institutions 
and systemic rules of an effective and hermetically sealed legal system. 
It is thus the case that at the general level of definition and theory it 
is the interdependence of rules that must be looked to for the definition 
of any particular term. Definitions are subject to the requirement of 
systemic 1consistency19 'the primary function of legal words is not to 
stand for or to describe anything but a distinct function ... 
76 which is 
the correlative of their role within their 'form of life'. What is 
presupposed, in the last instanceg is the unity of jurisprudence - law is 
assumed to be a coherent system of meanings and texts, a coded unity 
accessible to legal experts though to no-one else. In the course of a 
notable debate with Lon Fuller, Hart may be observed moving even more 
clearly towards a wholly formalistg intrinsic, conception and self- 
justification of legal meaning. Anticipating somewhat certain later 
arguments9 the following short statement is illuminatingly unequivocal: 
-------------------- 
174] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, op. cit., pp-5 - 10. 
1751 Philosophical Papers, op. cit., pp. 47 - 53. 
1761 Definition and Iheory, op. cit., p-8. 
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$00 ins ead of saying that the recurrence of penumbral questions 
shows us that legal rules are essentially incomplete ... we shall say that the social policies which guide the judges choice are in a sense 
there for them to discover; the judges are only drawing out of the 
rule what, if it is properly understood, is latent within it. 77 
The truth contained within the legal rule is, in other words, an analytic 
or syntac tic one, and the role of the legal philosopher is that of 
passively describing the analytic wonders - the complexities and 
implications - of the legal system as a strictly coherent normative order. 
It might be said that the supine philosophic nose has been smeared in 
norms and the legal world is consequently deemed to be an entirely 
normative vapour. At each point where uncertainty or polysemy (ambiguity, 
vagueness, metaphor and so on) are admitted to encroach upon the system of 
rules, the dogma of analytic method forces the reassertion of the unity of 
the code as the legal paradigm governing even those instances where, in 
principle, the application of the rule is not dependent upon its legal or 
systemic context. The challenge to legal faith in the unity of 
jurisprudence, is nowhere more clearly and desperately evaded than in the 
exclusion of empirical and properly semantic questions as they affect the 
application - the actual meaning - of the legal rule. 
If such is the case at the level of high abstraction constitutive of 
definitions, the promise of a descriptive sociology of law in the preface 
to the Concept of Law might have raised hopes of a more profane kind with 
respect to the description and rationalisation of legal practice or of law 
application. Such hopes are not wholly disappointed but nor are they 
greatly satisfi'ed when the philosophy of language is again called into 
service in the discussion of substantive rule application. Hart begins 
indeed with a discussion of Waismann's conception of the 'open texture' of 
rules. 
78 We are quickly informed that there is 'a limit, inherent in the 
nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. 179 
In the face of 'particular fact-situations' the application of 'verbally 
formulated general rules' will lead to uncertainties, but to our relief we 
1771 H. L. A. Hart: Flositivisn and the Separation of Law and ýbrals (1958) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 606. See also, B. S. Jackson: SoLrces du Droit (1982) Archives De 
Philosophie Bu Droit 147; M S. Moore, op. cit., pp. 273 - 292. 
[781 F. Waisnann: Verifiability (1945) Proc. of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 19. 
[791 ýýnncept of Law, op. cit., p. 123 ff 
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learn that such uncertainties are infrequent. Despite the indeterminate 
and polysemic nature of 'general language', despite the fiendish and 
unpredictable inventiveness of future facts, despite certain ambiguities 
that are part of the 'human predicament', it is usually the case that the 
meaning of any particular term is 'clear' or indisputable. The problem is 
solved; in most cases the legal lexicon is fully determinate, there is a 
'paradigm' meaning which clearly states the scope and conditions of rule 
application. There is only a slight doubt remaining, that appertaining to 
the infrequent occasion of 'hard' cases concerning 'grey areas' or 
penumbral, as yet uncertain contexts of rule application. Here matters 
are less satisfactory and discretion emerges as vagueness increases. It 
is a question,, apparently, of a twilight area and has given rise to many 
not altogether flatulent jurisprudential debates over the relevance and 
legality of 'policies', 'principles', canons of interpretation and the like. 
Hart however is satisfied to conclude in terms of the abdication of the 
analytic enterprise in the face of discretion, in terms with which Kelsen 
would certainly have concurred: 'In these cases it is clear that the rule- 
making authority must exercise discretion, and there is no possibility of 
treating the question raised by the various cases as if there was one 
uniquely correct answer to be found .. t8o This discretion is by no means 
wholly unfettered, but it is nonetheless a choice or compromise between 
'conflicting interests'. We are not, however, told what these interests 
are, nor why it is legitimate to assume that they only ever ' affect 
penumbral cases. From the viewpoint of Hart's legal theory, the problems 
raised by the semantics of rule application are raised merely to be 
summarily dismissed by means of a linguistically naive asserti-on of a 
thoroughly artificial distinction between the univocality of the legal 
lexicon and the occasional indeterminacy of its application. The logic or 
purity of the normative analysis of law may be tainted by slightly fuzzy 
or polysemic edges, it may be unavoidable that in hard cases resort has to 
be made to a subjective (intentional) or discretionary semantics, but 
generally or 'paradigmatically' the system of norms is self-referential 
and internally defined. The law speaks only to its own; or more formally, 
the unity of the object language is reinstated as the necessary 
-------------------- 
[801 Ibid. 128. 
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consequence and also, presumably, as the most attractive ideological 
benefit, of a determinedly positivistic and formalist metalanguage. 
Hart's overall conclusion is thus that a strongly subjective element of 
discretion in a limited number of cases is the necessary complement to the 
general determinacy of the system of norms. The requirement of any 
positivism that theory be descriptive - and so purport to be neutral and 
in some sense scientific - of a logically derived, unified, object, again 
leaves no room for the analysis of the actual 'social facts' or historical 
and particular 'forms of life' that determine the substantive meaning of 
legal rules. Even leaving to one side the wider questions to be raised in 
any analysis of the possible and probable ideological motive, affinities 
and effects of such a concept of law application, it is extremely 
difficult to comprehend the substantive use of the distinction between 
paradigm and periphery meanings of legal terms. Even within the context 
of normative jurisprudence difficulties abound. R. M. Dworkin has plausibly 
suggested that even in clear cases extrinsic considerations may alter the 
apparently obvious or predetermined application of ar ul e; 
81 
while 
D. N. MacCormick, in the course of a defence of Hart's position, has commented 
upon the fact that the very notion of clear cases and hard cases is 
logically an ex post facto judgment, for the very classification would 
otherwise pre-empt the substantive decision. 
82 The problem in terms of 
substantive rule application, is that once it has been admitted that 
extrinsic - political, social and historical - forces play a part in the 
semantic determination of at least some aspects of the normative order, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to explain the stipulative exclusion of 
these unwanted characters from other areas. The category of clear cases 
comes to seem curiously unrealistic even as ideology; the problem of 
language itself threatens to become something more than a mere matter of 
occasional vagueness. An example may usefully clarify the issue. 
While I am not at this point concerned to attempt any exhaustive proof 
of the necessary semantic indeterminacy of many if not all key legal terms 
or categories of law, it is I believe the case that the self-asserted 
-------------------- 
[811 R. Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously (1978) Duckworth, ch. 2-4. 
[82] D. N. MacCormick: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) Clarendon, ch-8 
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certainty of the law in its paradigm instances is palpably more rhetorical 
than actual. The reasons are partly sociological and partly historical, 
they are also in some measure the product of the general nature of 
language and of the exigencies of communication which have more recently 
been elaborated in terms of the dialogic and intertextual structure of 
discourse in general. I shall return to these issues and to contemporary 
developments within linguistics at a later stage. For the present, the 
difficulty to be alluded to concerns the manner in which the distinction 
between paradigm and penumbra confuses two separate orders of linguistic 
problem. On the one hand, Hart's definition of paradigm meanings as 
'settled' and as 'standard instances', 83 refers to the dictionary meaning or 
denotation of a word. It will be recalled that within traditional 
linguistics the sign is constituted as a meaning within the lexicon by 
virtue of its interdependence with other terms in the code. It will 
further be recalled that the language system or code is not a real entity, 
but the notional system or unity which underlies and governs the basic 
(lexical and syntactic) units and potentialities of the language totality. 
In short, what the analysis of the lexical structure of the code does not 
and cannot accomodate or comment upon is the application or usage of the 
code as linguistic practice. While it might be possible to argue that the 
problem of polysemy - the problem of meaning as practice - also affects 
the code, it is a basic category mistake to suppose that it is primarily a 
prob'lem of lexicon and syntax. The problem of polysemy connotes a 
different order of linguistic difficulty, the order of semantic problems 
inherent in language use - the combination of lexical items at or above 
the' level of the sentence. Thus when Hart comes to admit the problems of 
penumbral instances of law application, problems which he discusses in 
terms of examples of indeterminate reference and of unforseen factual 
situations, the order of difficulty which they raise is primarily semantic 
- questions of legal linguistic practice - and not lexical. To attempt, as 
Hart does, to collapse the problems of linguistic practice into a 
discussion of the determinacy of the legal lexicon is to conflate the 
order of the language system with that of the semantics of actual 
utterances, semiotics with discourse. 
-------------------- 
[831 H. L. A. Hart: ProblEms of the Philosophy of Law (1967) 6 Encyclopedia of 
phil oso phy 264 'a t 271 ff- 
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Finally, in terms of a superb if slightly idiosyncratic example from 
the earlier part of the twentieth century, it might well be supposed that 
the lexical meaning of the word 'disqualification' in section 1 of the 1919 
Sex Disqualification Removal Act was generally unproblematic or settled. 
The section states that: 'A person shall not be disqualified by sex or 
marriage from the exercise of any public function. ' It might further have 
been supposed that the semantics of the section so stated would clearly 
have enabled the Viscountess Rhondda, a peeress in her own right, to 
receive, as would any peer, a writ of summons to Parliament. Th e 
commonsensical linguistic argument that but for her sex she would have 
been so entitled, was treated as legal philistinism by all but four of 
twenty six Law Lords. The then Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, explained 
wh y. The right to a writ had never attached to peerages held by a peeress: 
It is not a question of a suspension of a right or abeyance of an 
activity ... a minor may grow up, a felon may receive a pardon and a 
bankrupt his discharge. These things are possible in nature and 
permissible in law; but a person who is born a female must remain a 
female till she dies. 
It would be idle to quibble, on technical grounds, with the biological 
diagnosis of the permanence of gender classification, but its legal 
effects were more disturbing: 
She is not disqualified by her sex from the exercise of this right ... 
she is a subject of rights which ex vi termini cannot include this 
right ... a peeress in her own right 
is not a person who has an 
incident of peerage but is disqualified from exercising it by her 
sex. She is a person who for her life holds a dignity which does not 84 
include the right of a female to exercise that function at all. 
The example may be somewhat dated, but the contorted logic is of undoubted 
interest. What is lexically clear may become semantically opaque, facts 
which in all probability were foreseen by those who drafted the Act may 
transpire to be penumbral and to evade the application of the rule. 
85 
Whatever analysis positivist jurisprudence (pure or hermeneutic) might 
care to provide, it is neither the case that the decision (the meaning of 
-------------------- 
[841 Viscountess Rhonddal s Claim (1922) 2 A. C. 389, at 463 - 464. 
[851 On the historical context of the decision, see, A. Sachs and J. H. Wilson: Sexian 
and the Law (1978) Martin Robertson, ch. 1. 
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the term disqualification) is (semantically) exceptional in this instance 
- and so a matter of easy dismissal as a question of subjectivity or 
discretion - nor is the decision (lexically) clear and hence merely a 
matter of legal language being special and distinctive by contrast to 
ordinary meaning. For all the stridency of Lord Birkenhead's argument, it 
is not, after all, the lexical (or semiotic) reference of the term 
'disqualification' which determines the non-application of the rule, but 
rather the legal construction of the meaning and capacity of the feminine 
gender which is deemed to preclude access to the House of Lords. Th e 
issues raised are, in other words, semantic and to even the most generous 
or naive of readers, the concept of semantics being reducible to the 
opposition of central and peripheral meanings at the level of the lexicon 
must appear inadequate. The problem of polysemy rather invades and 
permeates all aspects of rule usage. Whereas Hart suggests a purely stop- 
gap notion of a benign vagueness hovering largely outside the law, the 
linguistic truth is that of a fundamental and, for the positivist, 
malignant polysemy evident, for those prepared to look, throughout the 
legal process. 
That Hart was not prepared to acknowledge the full scope of the problem 
of polysemy is not, of course, especially surprising. In the context of 
the tradition of legal science, the dominant method of textual analysis 
has always been philological and has equally consistently insisted upon 
the overall coherence and unity of legal meaning as it is to be found in 
the textual corpus 
-of 
jurisprudence (ratio scripta). Aside from the 
specific use which Hart made of the philosophy of language, his work as a 
whole falls clearly within the general, dogmatic, motivation of the legal 
discipline - that of the privileging of the formal, written, law conceived 
as a unitary code over any analysis of its application or practice. In 
the broad terms of the history of the study of text and language, the 
choice which Hart makes in favour of the general (grammatical) determinacy 
of legal meaning recalls, as will be elaborated in the second part of this 
study, the Aristotelian distinction between logic and rhetoric, in which 
rhetoric is much the lesser art. In many respects indeed the history of 
philosophical reflection upon language may be reduced to the distinction 
between logic and rhetoric, and the introduction thereby produced in the 
linguistic domain of much broader considerations as to the variously 
-. 1 
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defined relationships between objects and the properties of objects, 
between necessity and contingency or, within the Kantian tradition, the 
opposition of the analytic and the synthetic, between objectivity and 
subjectivity. In Aristotelian terms the relevant opposition is that 
between 'substance' and 'accident' wherein the properties of the substance 
are necessary whereas the properties of the accidental are capable of 
being or not being indifferently. For the purposes of linguistic 
philosophy the Aristotelian schema overlaps with the distinction between 
determinative and explicative linguistic relations, first mentioned 
earlier in connection with the Port Royal Grammar. In terms of the 17th 
century ontology of the General Grammar, the relation of determination - 
the relation whereby words designate things (substantives) - is of a much 
greater status, concerned as it is with the order of being, the world of 
essences, than the explicative relation - the attribution of properties 
(adjectival) - incidental or accessory to determination. The explicative 
relation belongs to the 'art of speaking' which has no other aim than that 
of conforming to the rules and logic of the order of essences. The 
historical and contingent is, in effect, governed by the rules immanent 
within the linguistics of determination. 
The ontology in question has not of course gone unchallenged or 
unchanged since the 17th century, but it is nonetheless the case that the 
linguistics which began with Saussure still utilises a strongly formalist 
conception of the systemic unity of Ilanguel and couples this conception of 
system to a notion of the accessory and contingent place of the history of 
speech. Neither did Wittgenstein nor Austin fully escape the parameters 
of the opposition. While they very creditably opposed the structuralism 
or metaphysics inherent in the proposal of a wholly systemic conception of 
the logic or 'immanent laws' of linguistic determination, they do not 
entirely free the philosophy of language from its grasp. The emphasis 
which, at certain junctures, they both place upon the instrumentality of 
language and the importance they give to the role of enunciation and 
utterance, must be seen in the more general context of a logically 
precedent concern with, respectively, the logic of propositional 
languages, and the truth conditions of statements (their presuppositions 
and implications). The concern with problems of pr esupposition 
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constitutes a 'contradictory bond, 86 with the formalist tendency in 
linguistics, the concern with context and use mitigates in an opposite 
direction. It does so, I will argue, to an insufficient degree and in an 
oversimplified way. 
By way of a general character isation, it has been argued that both in 
the case of linguistics and in that of comparable developments in the 
philosophy of law, the constitution of a scientific project took place by 
means of excluding history. In linguistics this initially meant an 
emphasis on the form of language and the rules which govern it to the 
exclusion of semantics and speech. The reintroduction of semantic 
problems, when it eventually came in the anthropology and philosophy of 
language, still lived in the shadow of science and in many respects it has 
been insufficiently emphasised to this day in its relation to, and effects 
upon, the conception of language and text. The outcome has been that the 
problems of history and semantics have been, and continue to be, treated 
within the oppositional framework of the necessary and the contingent, the 
objective and the subjective, with the analysis of the context and usage 
of language in terms of their eventual subjective unknowability being 
really little more than a palliative. In a similar fashion, the 
positivist construction of the object of legal studies as the systemic 
unity of the legal code evinces, more than anything else, the embeddedness 
of contemporary jurisprudence in the formalist confines of a lengthy 
tradition of legal faith. In brief, it is necessary to reject the 
epistemology of legal positivism and with it to jettison the assumed 
ontology of legal sources. Together they constitute a thoroughgoing 
obfuscation of the real nature of legal power, its specifically historical 
and real contours. 
-------------------- 
[861 M. Pecheux: Language, Semantics and Ideolog (1982) MacMillan, p. 6. 
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THE ROLE OF LINGUISTICS IN LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Antiquity was acquainted only with theories of oratory and poetry 
which facilitated production ... that formed real orators and poets, 
while at the present day we shall soon have theories upon which it 
would be as impossible to build up a speech or a poem as it would be 
to form a thunderstorm from a brontological treatise. F. Nietzschel 
Legal theory has traditionally made a fairly extensive use of the 
philosophy of language. At a very general level it has frequently been 
argued that linguistic philosophy is a valuable heuristic tool for the 
elaboration of general questions concerning the institutional nature of 
law and the meaning of key legal terms. At a more substantive level it has 
also been claimed that linguistic methodology and the various exegetical 
and hermeneutic traditions of textual analysis may aid in the practical 
endeavour of explaining the intricacies of rule interpretation and rule 
application. Despite such claims, however, the role of linguistics - both 
historical and potential - in legal analysis has never been an object of 
systematic study. It is indeed something of a paradox that while problems 
of definition, of interpretation and of vagueness, ambiguity and polysemy 
generally are constantly referred to by the major theories of law, no 
attempt has been made to analyse the specifically linguistic basis of such 
problems. If one concedes that the major schools of legal thought are 
differentiated, as much as anything else, by the divergence of their 
approaches to the theory of adjudication and of law application, the 
absence of any encounter with linguistics might well be taken to indicate 
the subordination of the will to truth to the need to conceal; the 
privileging of ideological concerns over the pursuit of knowledge. 
While it is not the purpose of the present chapter either to account 
for or to fully explain the traditional jurisprudential tendency to 
-------------------- 
Ell F. Nietzsche: We Philologists(1911) Foulis, p. 144. (BTontology is that part of 
meter eology whic-F-st-ucTi-es thiýnder) . 
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exclude linguistic questions from the central concerns of legal theory, 
considerable clarification of the issues at stake may be achieved by 
examining the models of language, communication and meaning implicit 
within the various schools of positivistic legal analysis. The preceding 
two chapters have indeed already to some degree evidenced the common 
historical and theoretical basis and context of contemporary linguistics 
and legal science and have further suggested that one result of this 
convergence was a common development and systematisation of language and 
law according to a shared philological model of normative science. The 
two disciplines have made use of a common conceptual structure which, in 
its most basic substratum, separates and opposes a scientific object of 
study,, that of an underlying system or grammar (real/necessary), to the 
manifestation or realisation of that system in an individual or particular 
instance of its usage (apparent/contingent). To the Saussurian 
opposition of langue and parole may be juxtaposed the essentially ana 
logous legal elaborations of distinctions between legal validity and the 
volitional content of legal norms or between positive law and the judicial 
application of legal norms: legal theory has always faced a problem 
analogous to that of the distinction between language system and actual 
utterance and it has been variously formulated as the opposition between 
legal system and adjudication, between legal validity and legal meaning, 
between the propositional content of a norm and its volitional or 
discretionary application in legal judgment or practice. A comparison at 
the level of the necessary circularity of structuralist theories of 
language and law as such, constituted by the circularity of the 
complementary poles of system and creativity, does not, however, take the 
2 issue very far. Having observed the measure of identity in the 
theoretical context of the two aisciplines it is of an altogether greater 
significance to endeavour to assess the degree of analytic convergence to 
be found in the plethora of shared concepts utilised within the respective 
-------------------- 
[21 Although I shall deal with this problem in greater detail in Part II of this 
study (S-7.1), it may here be observed that several of those studies which do 
raise the issue of the relationship of struc-turalist linguistics to legal 
theory: B. Edelman: Ownership of the Image (1979) R. K. P.; M. Pecheux: Language, 
Semantics and Ideo o (1982) MacMillan; in particular, have been drawn in 
the somewhat irrelevant elaboration of this level of comparison. It will be 
argued in Chapter 7 that the evaluation of the epistemological status of the 
legal subject is of less import than the analysis of the manner in which such a 
category actually operates within substantive legal discourse. 
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domains of study. Analysing first the linguistic, or more precisely 
semiotic, implications of the legal use of the concepts of code, norm/rule, 
convention and utterance, I shall move subsequently to suggest that recent 
developments in linguistics - and most particularly within 
sociolinguistics - indicate both that the traditional linguistic 
assumptions of legal analysis are inadequate to the task of analysing the 
semantics of legal discourse and also that an alternative approach to the 
study of legal language and communication is available and desirable. 
4.1 THE DOMINANT PARADIGM: LINGUISTICS LEGAL SCIENCE, LEGAL SEMIOTICS 
In discussing the increasingly contested issue of the referent of the 
term positivism as applied to legal theory, H. L. A. Hart includes the 
'contention that a legal system is a "closed logical system" in which 
correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined 
legal rules wi thout reference to social aims, policies or moral 
standards. 
6 In examining the structural features of two versions of legal 
positivism in the preceding chapter, I emphasised that a tenet such as the 
above - generally activated in the concept of the unity, coherence or 
systemic quality of jurisprudence - was one pole to the positivist 
systematisation of law, whose alternate extreme took the form of the 
arbitrary, volitional or discretionary content of legal judgment. 
Objectivism as regards the form of law, it was argued, implies subjectivism 
with respect to law application or legal meaning in certain limiting 
instances or contexts. In the ensuing analysis I shall shift emphasis 
away from the systematisation of law to a consideration of the system of 
communication or theory of language that positivism implies. I will 
do so 
by means of distinguishing two different - though complementary - 




131 H. L. A. Hart: Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1958) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 601-602. C. f. also, R. S. Summers: The New Analytic Jurists 
(1966) 4 
New York University Law Review 861; R. S. Summers (ed. ): Essays in Legal 
Philosoph (1968) Oxford, ch. l.; D. N. MacCormick: Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Lega_ Theorl (1978) Clarendon, ch. 2; P. Milton: Reason and Criticism in Legal 
Theor y( 1980) 2 Li ver pool Law Revi ew 75. 
80 
Law as Code 
i). One of the most obvious features common to linguistics and legal 
science is the utilisation of the concept of the code. The parallel is 
not, of course, unique to the contemporary elaboration of the disciplines: 
the Latin word codex had an original paleographic meaning - it referred to 
a particular form of writing tablet (caudex) - and only secondarily to the 
later, legal, codifications - the 'tables' of the law being one species of a 
more general term designating parchment (papyrus) or paper books. Even in 
its earliest forms, the term code referred in specific ways to particular 
modes of communication, graphic, theological and legal. The connection 
between writing and law is still an important one and although 
contemporary uses of the term are considerably more specific and technical 
than its earliest meanings, the connection is one whic h bears 
4 
recollection. 
Within a more contemporary context the usage of the term code derives 
from linguistics and specifically from the work of Saussure for whom the 
language system as lexicon and grammar constituted a synchronic code of 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic equivalences. 
5 The code, for Saussure, refers 
to language as a system, as a combination of elements or units in a syntax 
which constrains the potential uses of the units of the code. In its 
strictest sense the code is a set of correlations or equivalences, a 
dictionary of which Morse code or elementary ciphers would be clear 
ex am pl e s. Saussure did not, however, greatly elaborate either upon the 
scope of semiotics or upon the senses in which language was a code or was 
coded. It was the work of later structuralists and especially Levi- 
Strauss6 which produced something of a landslide in the development of the 
study of codes and gave birth to the substantive discipline of semiotics: 
-------------------- 
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the popularity of the new category (code) had all the characteristics 
of an exorcism; it constituted an attempt to force order upon 
movement, structure upon events, organisation upon earth tremors. 
Speaking of codes meant for many to identify "scripts" where, 
previously, only random, blind impulses, unspeakable creativity, 
dialectic contradictions were recognised. It was perhaps a short 7 rationalistic season .. 
Of the plethora of concepts of code produced within the last three 
decades, two in particular are of relevance to the elaboration of the 
linguistic assumptions underlying positivist legal theory: correlational 
and institutional codes. Both connote 'systems' and there is considerable 
overlap between the two categories although only the former is properly 
speaking a 'closed system'. In its linguistic usage the correlational code 
is a dictionary of correlations or equivalences: a set of synonyms, of 
expressions for expressions or of expressions for content. The 
correlational code is arbitrary and synchronic; in a strict sense it 
constitutes a lexicon, of which the laws governing linguistic value in 
Saussure's Course provide a complex example. The institutional code, on 
the other hand, is canonically defined as a system of rules or grammar of 
norms which, while it may include correlations, is differentiated by 
virtue firstly of the inferential or functional status of the rules, which 
inferences or functions produce the consistency or coherence of the system 
as code. The institutional code is of course broader than a mere set of 
correlations and inferences, the institutional code - morality, etiquette 
and so on - is a set of social conventions governing and instructing 
behaviour, issuing imperatives or offering generalised instructions as to 
how to act. Following Saussure, language, alone amongst the institutional 
codes, is arbitrary and so amenable to scientific study as a closed 
synchronic system. Saussure consistently differentiated language from 
other social institutions and concentrated upon its singularity: 'we are 
convinced that whoever sets foot on the ground of language is bereft of 
all the analogies of heaven and earth'; he later explains that 'the other 
institutions are all founded, in varying degrees, on the natural 
relationship of things ... For example, a nation's legislation, or its 
political system,, or even the whimsical fashion which sets our mode of 
-------------------- 
171 u. Eco (1984) at p. 168. 
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dress: the latter cannot for a moment overlook the given proportions of 
the human body., 8 Reserving for the moment the argument that Saussure was 
incorrect to differentiate language from the more general and realistic 
description of the other social institutions, it is sufficient to observe 
that the motivated character of institutional codes in general 
constitutes their diachronic and essentially open character. The 
institutional code, in semiotic terms, is a pragmatic code, open to 
circumstantial and contextual variation. Thus, in one formulation, 'a 
system of behavioural instructions, such as a moral or etiquette code, 
involves acceptations and rejections, considers the possibilitv of 
violations, introduces imperatives, law reinforcements, and concessions, is 
open to possibility: it is a calculus of a modal order. 19 More importantly, 
obedience to the rules of an institutional code indica tes a decision to 
appear faithful to the institution, an act of acceptance whose 
significance resides b oth in the general justificatory grounding of the 
institution and in the more specific interpretation of its rules in the 
context of their openne ss, their motivation. 
Although the above distinction is a somewhat artificial one, it does, I 
believe, contribute to clarifying certain of the linguistic issues raised 
by the theories of law so far analysed as exemplars of the genre of legal 
positivism. It may also be added that there is a certain polemical value 
to the distinction made insofar as the basis of the institutional code is 
in the last instance justificatory rather than logical, ontological rather 
than epistemological. Which is to say that the sense in which the 
institutional code is a system is secondary to the sense in which it 
constitutes an open set of general rules, a point whose elaboration must 
be postponed until the traditional assumptions of positivist theory have 
been analysed and commented upon. 
ii). Leaving to one side the problem of the peculiar character of 
language as an institutional code, it seems clear that Saussure, in 
positing the object of linguistics as a purely epistemological or 
theoretical construction of the language system, opted to view language as 
-------------------- 
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a semiotic code in the strictest of senses. Linguistics studies only the 
normative aspects of language: the fixed meanings of the lexicon and the 
invariant syntactic order governing grammaticality though not meaning as 
usage. Insofar as Saussure acknowledged the social nature of the language 
totality, he did so only to the extent of recognising the conventional 
status of the rules governing grammaticality: the' structural context of 
language use was the product of agreement or convention, which 
conventions, as an aggregate,, constituted the normative precondition of 
language use. In terms of the distinction made above, the language code is 
comprised of a set of correlations and inferences; the sense in which the 
institutional code actually governs usage and behaviour is ignored as 
being an aspect of speech rather than system. If we move to examine the 
linguistic assumptions of legal theory we may observe the adoption - in 
spite of Saussure's salutary warnings as to the motivated character of 
non-linguistic institutional codes - of a pr ec i sely analogous 
construction of the theoretical object of legal science. 
Although exegetes of the vast corpus of Kelsen's writings upon the 
theory of law have pointed to various, relatively peripheral, changes in 
his position as regards the meaning of the legal normlo and have also 
elicited various ambiguities in his formulations of the grammar of law, " 
it is important to stress that the overwhelmingly predominant tendency of 
the pure theory is that of the epistemological construction of the grammar 
or code of written law. For the vast bulk of his lifetime Kelsen was 
concerned to argue, time and again, that law could only be comprehended 
scientifically as a unified normative system. Whateyer his changes of 
position, indeed,, Kelsen never jettisoned his belief in the utility of the 
legal system as the object of scientific study, a belief founded upon the 
constructive presupposition of a basic norm which lies at the basis of the 
heor [101 See, S. Paulson: Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen's Pure T
(1980) -39 Cambridge Law Journal 172; M. Troper: Kelsen, La Theorie de 
1 'Interpretation et la Structure de 110rdre Juridique (1981) 35 Revue 
internationale de philosophie, 518; O. Weinberger: Logic and the Pure Theory 
of Law (1981) ASLP conference, Edinburgh; S. Paulson: On the Status of the Lex 
Posterior Derogating Rule (1983) V Liverpool Law Review 5. As to Kelsen's 
later position, see, H. Kelsen: Essay's in Legal and Moral Philosoph (1973) 
D. Reidel . introduction and ch. 
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11 J. W. Harris: Kelsen's Concept of Authority (1977) 36 Cambridge Law Journal 
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logic al validity of the legal or der. In general ter ms, what 
differentiates the legal norm from other norms, for Kelsen, is its 
objectivity - its formal authorisation within a syntax of legal validity 
which is presupposed in the 'thought process' which constitutes the 
hierarchy of legal norms as an object of logical as opposed to empirical 
cognition: 
The external fact whose objective meaning is a legal or illegal act 
is always an event that can be perceived by the senses .. and therefore a natural phenomenon determined by causality. However, 
this event as such, as an element of nature, is not an object of legal 
cognition. What turns this event into a legal or illegal act is not 
its physical ex i stenc e, determined by the laws of causality 
prevailing in nature, but the objective meaning resulting from its 
interpretation. The specifically legal meaning of this act is 
derived from a "norm" whose content refers to the act; this norm 
confers legal meaning to the act, so that it may be interpreted 
according to this norm. 12 
The objective dimension attributed to the legal norm deserves to be 
emphasised. It has several aspects. At the level of greatest generality 
the norm has a Kantian, categorial, existence - it is an 'ought' statement 
which exists independently of any possibility of verification or 
falsification. The mode of being of the ought statement is notional 
rather than empirical, it is a member of a lexicon of legal rules which 
exist as correlational elements or units - as imputations - within a 
system of legal validity or logical inference. It is against this 
background that it is possible to comprehend that the norm is also a 
'schema of interpretation' or the objective framework qualifying human 
behaviour in its various subjective or social manifestat-ions: 
The norm functions as a scheme of interpretation ... the 
qualification of a certain act as the execution of the death penalty 
rather than as murder -a qualification that cannot be perceived by 
the senses - results from a thinking process: from the confrontation 
of this act with the criminal code and the code of criminal 
procedure... That a document is objectively as well as subjectively a 
valid testament results from the fact that it conforms with 
conditions stipulated by (the civil) code. That an assembly of 
people is a parliament, and that the meaning of their act is a 
statute, results from the conformity of all these facts with the 
norms laid down in the constitution. That means, that the contents 
-------------------- 
[121 H. Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law (1967) California U. P. at p. 5. 
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of actual happenings agree with a norm accepted as valid. 13 
Finally and importantly it is necessary to stress that the norm, by virtue 
of its place within the hierarchy of legal norms, is the precondition for 
the logical regulation and production of other norms. Law regulates and 
creates more law. The point is an important one because it adds a new 
dimension to the semiotic framework of legal objectivity. Whereas the 
previous two senses of norm are primarily correlational, the legal code 
states imputational equivalences between acts and their legal 
qualification, the formal authorisation of legal validity in its nomo- 
dynamic sense is referential; the unity of the legal system is based upon 
norms of competence: 'determining the organ is the minimum that must be 
accomplished in the relation between the higher and lower norm'14 or, 
somewhat later, 'the act by which the individual norm of judicial decision 
is created is usually predetermined .. by general norms of formal and 
material law. 115 The relationship between higher and lower norms, however 
Kelsen equivocated over the precise nature of the propositional content or 
broad semantic implications of the normative hierarchy, is principally one 
of correlation and inference internal to the system of norms; the 
relationship is one of subsumption or derogation and only secondarily, 'to 
a certain extent'. 
16 material in the sense of predicating the content of 
the lower norm. 
In short, the preponderant thrust of the Kelsenian theory of norms is 
that of representing a grammar of legal structure in both its static and 
dynamic aspects. It proposes a code or semiotic of legal communication 
conceived as the objective direction of human behaviour - principally the 
behaviour of actors within the legal institution - according to a syntax 
of specifically legal and univocal meanings, or pure legal signs. The 
problem of the grammaticality of an utterance propounded by Saussure 
1131 Ibid. 4. 
[141 Ibid. 235. 
[151 Ibid. 242. See also, H. Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State (1945) Harvard 
U. P. p. 216 ff. In its strongest form Keisen proposes the syllogistic basis 
of law creation, that of an interpretation leading from a major premiss - the 
objective validity of a norm - to a conclusion, the legitimation of the actual 
command, utterance or decision. See, H. Kelsen 
(1967) pp. 198-199; (1973) 
pp. 240-242; Harris (1977) P-356 ff. 
[161 Kelsen (1967) p. 22. 
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becomes, for Kelsen, that of the validity of the legal statement analysed 
according to a purely formal syntax of 'concretisation' or Inomo-dynamics' 
While it carries with it the attractions of clarity and of abstract 
verifiability in terms of presupposition or propositional logic it does 
not and cannot go beyond the specification of the minimum normative 
r equir ements whereby legal communication as intelligibility, 
signification or syntax - is possible. It states, as a metalanguage, the 
normative context within which legal meanings are realised or created, as 
opposed to providing any analysis of those meanings which are actually 
manifested. It is only if one forgets this extreme limitation to the pure 
theory that it is possible to see it as in any way substantiating the 
concept of legal rationality or univocality which so comforts those within 
the legal institution who have a professional interest in the belief or 
mythology of legal determinacy, or as accurately validating what has been 
described as 'the common sense position prevalent amongst most lawyers, 
judges and legal scholars today. 117 
4.1.2 Legal Meaning Revisited 
The convergence of Kelsenian sc ienc e of law with str uc tur al 
linguistics is situated at the level of epistemology. In more practical 
terms there are important differences between the theories. It is 
precisely at the point where Kelsen and later theorists have moved to 
consider the specific institutional character of law that the openness of 
the legal order to norm interpretation, conflict and change has imposed 
the need to develop a linguistics of legal meaning. Prior to summarily 
examining the manner in which H. L. A. Har. t and his followers have endeavoured 
to salvage the objectivity of legal meaning by means of the theory of 
speech acts, Kelsen's own account or non-account of the institutional 
character of law will be briefly rehearsed. 
Kelsen always recognised and acknowledged the sense in which law was a 
set of imperatives directing human behaviour. Law, for Kelsen, was power, 
and his definition of the legal norm fully recognised its coercive aspect: 
-------------------- 
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"Norm" is the meaning of an act by which a certain behaviour is 
commanded, permitted or authorised. The norm, as the specific 
meaning of an act directed toward the behavior of someone else, is to 
be carefully differentiated from the act of will whose meaning the 
norm is ... 
18 
The legal norm as an act of will commands, permits and authorises forms of 
human behaviour : 'a norm is the meaning of an act of will intentionally 
directed to the behaviour of another (or many others) ... to say that a 
norm 'refers' to actual behaviour is to say that the norm can be applied to 
actual behaviour, that actual behaviour can be confronted with it. 19 As has 
been cogently emphasised by B. S. Jackson 20 the norm constitutes legal 
meaning in the form of a speech act communicating to an addressee the 
requirement of behavioural conformity. The character of this speech act, 
however, whereby 'these norms.. which have the character of legal norms .. 
make certain acts legal or illegall2l is formal rather than material: the 
speech act has the character of a legal norm purely by virtue of being 
created in conformity with a higher norm22 _ the legal norm itself is the 
meaning of an act which has a propositional content. The act, in other 
words, creates a norm and constitutes an 'ought' statement which may be 
used to qualify behaviour but it is the norm as an object of cognition and 
not the intentional act of volition which is the object of legal science. 
In short,, Kelsen returns the legal meaning of the norm to the sphere of 
validity and (largely consistently) opposes validity to the intentional 
semantics and 'extra-legal' factors which bear upon the volitional act 
itself: 'the norm is an ought, but the act of will is an is. 123 The resultant 
position might be formulated in the claim that the relationship of 
subsumption determines the legal validity . 
(competence) of the normative 
qualification of behaviour in a generic, semiotic, sense, but that the 
actual content of the qualification, the judgmental act which links norm 
to behaviour, is contingent and non-cognitive. 
1181 Kelsen (1967) 5. 
[191 H. Kelsen: On the basis of legal validity (1981) 26 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 178. 
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For Kelsen, the institutional character of law would appear to mean 
little more than that legal norms have an imperative character and exist 
within a system of norms which, as institutional rules, state potential or 
prospective qualifications of human behaviour and are amenable to 
abstract, objective, description and cognitive systematisation. Legal 
meaning is no more than a logical property of the interrelation of legal 
rules or a cognitive attribute of the process of subsumption. The 
'thinking process' as cognition, is for Kelsen separate from the act of 
interpretation; the one is normative,, the other empirical. For later 
positivists the dualism to be upheld between determinate (notional) legal 
meanings and problems of institutional semantics was every bit as rigid as 
that proposed by Kelsen. I shall again take as my example the work of 
H. L. A. Har t. 
The background to Hart's somewhat tentative and unsystematised remarks 
upon the language of the law may be taken to be the considerable stress 
which he lays upon law as an institutional code, as the direction of human 
behaviour by means of general norms: 
In any large group general rules, standards and principles must be 
the main instrument of social control, and not particular directions 
given to each individual separately. If it were not possible to 
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of 
individuals could understand, without further direction, as requiring 
from them certain conduct when occasion 'arose, nothing that we now 
recognise as lawcould exist. 
24 
Although the formulation does not suffer from any great originality it is 
useful in that it provides a model of communication against which to 
tabulate Hart's various remarks and positions with regard to the 
philosophy of language. 
Despite frequent remarks as to the indeterminacy of general 
expressionS25 and as to the open texture of rules, the major thrust of 
-------------------- 
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Hart's observations upon the peculiar status of legal language is, as was 
noted earlier, to the effect that this special instance of language use is 
c har ac ter i sed by determinacy rather than polysemy. The semiotic 
perspective of the major portion of Hart's work would appear to be one that 
views legal meaning as objective, coded and largely unproblematic. Thus, 
in 1958, he remarks: 
If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the 
most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a 
certain type of behaviour be regulated by rules, then the general 
words we use ... must have some standard instance in which no doubts 
are felt about their application. There must be a core of settled 
meaning ... 
26 
The point is made even more forcefully in the Concept of Law: 
00 in the vast majority of cases there is very little doubt .. the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance 
both of officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, 
unlike the applications of variable standards, do not require from 
them a fresh judgment from case to case. This salient fact of social 
life remains true, even though uncertainties may break out as to the 
applicability of any rule .. to a concrete case. Here at the margin 
of rules and in the fields left open by the theory of precedents, the 
courts perform a rule-producing function. 27 
There seems to be little doubt that the primary sense of legal meaning is 
normative and constitutes a code in the correlational and inferential 
senses defined above, the clear meaning is fully determinate. 
Resting with the systemic pole of Hart's linguistics it may be briefly 
observed that his definition of legal language as essentially determinate 
may be elaborated in two different ways. The first such elaboration would 
make use of a semantic distinction between 'extension' and 'intension', a 
modern variant of the logico-linguistic opposition of sense and 
reference. 
28 An extensional definition of a word defines it in terms of 
its reference to the external world, while an intensional definition 
identifies the meaning of words in terms of their linguistic context, 
-------------------- 
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their relation to other words within a language system. Hart's early 
comments upon the specificity of legal words would clearly seem to 
indicate an intensional view of the meaning of legal words: 'The first 
efforts to define words like 'corporation' 'right' or duty reveal that 
these words do not have the straightforward connexion with counterparts in 
the world of fact which most ordinary words have and to which we appeal in 
our definition of ordinary words. There is nothing which simply 
corresponds to these legal words. 129 It should be noted then that when Hart 
borrows the concept of 'meaning equalling usel or the comparable view that 
the meaning of a word is to be discovered by reference to the role or 
function which the word plays in a form of life he is generally to be taken 
as invoking the role or function which the word plays within the system of 
legal language or legal rules. What is invoked therefore is not the 
social or discursive semantics of legal language use conceived in terms of 
an empirical context,, but rather the coded properties of legal meaning as 
dictionary or lexicon of conventional uses. 
The latter observation raises a further point of interest. Both Austin 
and Wittgenstein 'recognised that every utterance was a performance, that 
in uttering, the utterer is in the 'full normal sense' doing something. 30 
Ignoring the various distinctions which may be introduced into the concept 
of the speech act, it is sufficient to observe that 'to do something' is 
taken to be the equivalent of intending something. To intend something, 
however, transpires to have two separate senses. On the one hand, all 
normative propositions or rules are intended to affect behaviour. 
Irrespective of whether or not these intentions are achieved in any 
empirically verifiable way, they may nonetheless be expressed objectively 
in terms of an institutional code or system of rules. In this sense, 
according to Hart and more particularly according to D. N. MacCormick, 
31 law 
prescribes behaviour by manner of a generic set of conventional meanings. 
In this sense law is comprised of 'regulative' and 'constitutive' 
-------------------- 
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conventions, respectively controlling the manner in which a particular 
activity is performed, or imposed upon an independently existing activity 
which, in the absence of the appropriate conventiong would cease to exist. 
On the other hand, however, to ascribe intentions to the author of the 
utterance or rule is to indicate that in the last instance it is the idea 
or motive, the subjective intention underlying or external to the language 
of the rule itself which defines its meaning. It was in this sense of 
intention, in 1952, that Hart argued that: 
Before we speak of a person meaning something by a statement, it must 
be true not merely (i) that he utters noises and those were in fact 
interpreted as signs, and not merely (ii) that he intended the noises 
to be interpreted as signs,, but that he should intend a listener not 
merely to believe or to do something but to recognise from the 
utterance that he intended the listener to believe or do something. 
Thus two notions are essential to an analysis of the meaning and 
understanding of words though irrelevant to a similar analysis of 
signs. The first is that of the listener recognising from the 
speaker's utterance the speaker's intention that he should respond 
(e. g. believe or do something) in certain ways, but recognising it 
without necessarily responding in these ways; the second is that of 
the speaker intending when he uses words that the listener should 
thus recognise his intention. 
32 
Although this early definition of communication should not be taken as 
canonical, it does reflect a subjectivist pole to Hart's thought which may 
be traced to his later work and particularly to his various elaborations 
of the distinction between core and penumbral meanings specified in terms 
of degrees of determinacy of authorial intention (singular or 
c oil ec tive). 33 
The problems raised by the introduction of a conception of meaning as 
intention or as illocutionary force are numerous. The positivistic 
argument separates intentions according to a quantitative axis of 
distribution to which there are two poles - the one being that of 'general 
agreement' forming a coded context, the other being the context of the 
singular intention represented for Hart in the discretionary application 
of a rule. The difficulty with such an analysis is not simply 
the 
-------------------- 
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fictional status of the lintention, 34 as applied to collective contexts, 
but rather the confusion which the concept of intention introduces in the 
form of an extraodinary oversimplification of the empirical, social and 
Political, determinations of legal meaning as the active product of legal 
textuality and decision making. In terms of the speech act theories 
closest to Har t' s account of legal communication, the linguistic 
difficulty faced by the postivist account of legal language may be 
formulated as the exclusion or resistance to semantics. The theor y 
postulates a binary oppostion between performance and illocution. The 
privileged domain is that of legal logic and grammar, the code or system of 
normative propositions, which take the linguistic form of a set of 
performatives understood as sheer convention and thus reducible to a 
grammatical code amongst others. Recognising, however, that all texts 
contain certain elements that are by no means ungrammatical, but whose 
semantic function is not grammatically definable, Hart admits to a residue 
or outlay of meanings which are to be characterised in terms of 
illocutionary power. These latter meanings are to be referred to the 
psychology of intentions, to the realm of the subjective and affective, to 
a dreary and banal pragmatics which, in privileging the logic of the code, 
bypasses and excludes the semantic and rhetorical functions at work in all 
texts. It is not a psychology of individual meanings or intentions, 
however, which the theory of legal language requires, but rather a socio- 
historical account of legal argument as a rhetoric of proof. 
4.2 THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
It is the substantive aim of the second part of this study to elaborate 
in detail the linguistic basis of an alternative approach to language as 
social action and law as social discourse. For that reason I shall not 
here embark upon any extensive analytic- criticisms of the positivist 
-------------------- 
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account of legal language. I shall instead adopt a strategy of 
description and will provide an overview of the manner in which 
contemporary developments within linguistics approach the problem of 
meaning as linguistic practice, to the end of evidencing the inadequacy of 
the simple opposition of formal system to intentional utterance. 
Positivism lives in the past. It lives by the law of the excluded middle. 
In providing an account of legal language in terms of the unity of law and 
the consensual status of legal meaning it wholly fails to consider the 
character of law as social action, it ignores the mediation of all meaning 
in practice. If nothing else, I would hope that the reassertion of the 
social and rhetorical character of linguistic practice raises the 
question of the need to reconsider the role of linguistics in legal 
analysis. 
By way of a general character isation it must be stressed that the 
development of post-Saussurian linguistics has been extremely diverse. 
There is no longer any single, generally recognised, definition of the 
method and scope of a science of language and accuracy also requires the 
admission that the formalist tendency of Saussurianism has frequently 
continued to predominate. Widely received advances have been associated 
with Hjelmslev's glossematics, with Jakobson's func tional i sm, with 
Chomskyan generative grammar and with Greimasian structural semantics. 
35 
Such theories, which may be loosely grouped under the heading of 
linguistic structuralism, continue to stress stipulative conceptions of 
the universality of the language system. At the same time, however, as the 
more traditional, formalist, concerns of linguistics have continued to 
thrive, a growing body of linguistic research interest has also come to 
focus upon the precise character and implications of the boundaries that 
circumscribe the concept and methodological utility of the language 
system. It has increasingly been suggested that significant heuristic 
advantages may be gained by re-examining in greater detail the fact that 
the system of language is limited by non-systemic determinations which, on 
-------------------- 
1351 For ease of reference, see, G. Lepschy: A Survey of Structural Linguistics 
(1982) Deutsch, and the extensive bibliographical essay contained therein. 
Also, O. Ducrot and T. Todorov: Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Sciences of 
Language (1981) Blackwell; A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes: Semiotics and Language 
Fjj-g8-2T-Indiana U. P. 
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the fringes of the system, both oppose and affect it. The initial 
consideration here is that the system of language is equally the basis and 
also the recipient of wider discursive, social and ideological processes. 
In one terminology, language is bound to discourse and this single fact 
alone renders any attempt to wholly isolate the system from all 
consideration of its insertion in discursive processes liable to the 
accusation of being a motivated methodological assumption. That language 
is primarily a social fact or institution here means that it is inherently 
historical and material and not simply that it is arbitrary and 
conventional. Certainly it is this last consideration which has aroused a 
lively and contentious research output focussed upon the possible 
applications of a critical linguistics. Such interest has attended not 
only to the relevance of a critically conceived linguistics as a model of 
a scientific methodology to be utilised in other social sciences, 
36 it is 
also a concern with linguistics as the appropriate means whereby to gauge 
or elucidate the general dependence (and also interdependence) of all 
social institutions and processes upon the medium of language. 
37 The 
latter point deserves especial emphasis. Starting from the postulate that 
meaning is socially determined, a semantic analysis of any particular 
language 'variety' or discursive 'formation' is primarily concerned with 
the manner in which social processes, purposes and ideologies determine 
-------------------- 
1361 The first general studies were, R. Coward and J. Ellis: Language and 
Materialism (1977) R. K. P.; D. Silverman and B. Torode: The Material Word (1980) 
R. K. P. Of greater interest are the various applications of linguistics to 
other social sciences. These are too numerous to be listed here - references 
will be given, where relevant, in Chapter 6. As regards the application of 
such methodologies to legal analysis, the most consistent output has been on 
the continent. French developments are usefully summarised in J. Kalinowski et 
E. Landowski: La Recherche en Sciences Humaines (1981) Edition de CRNS, Paris, 
p. 125 ff. See also the bibliography to P. Goodrich: Law and Language, An 
Historical and Critical Introduction (1984) 12 Journal of Law and Society 173, 
200-6. For English language applications of sociolinguistic models, c. f. 
P. Carlen: Magistrates Justice (1976) Martin Robertson; F. Burton and P. Carlen: 
Official Discourse 71979) R. K. P.; W. O'Barr: Linguistic Evidence (1982) 
Te-ademic Press; X. Dingwall and P. Lewis (eds. ): The Sociology of the 
Professions (1983) MacMillan, ch. 5. 
1371 My particular concern here relates to the advance of linguisitics as it has 
developed from the early work of the London School of linguistics. See, 
G. Sampson: Schools in Linguistics (1980) Hutchinson; R. Fowler (ed. ) Language 
and Control T-19-7-9T-R. K. P.; R. Fowler: Literature as Social Discourse 
(19817 
gatsford; M. A. K. Halliday: Language as Social Semiotic (1980) Arnold. The 
other line of development of relevance is related to the elaboration of a 
theory of discursive processes begun in the work of M. Foucault: The 
Archaeology o Knowledge (1972) Tavistock, and variously continued, though in 
my opinion most effectively in the work of M. 
Pecheux: Language, Semantics and 
Ideology (1982) MacMillan. See also, P. Goodrich: Materialism and Linguistics 
(1982ý72 Radical Philosophy 34. 
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the 'paradigmatic' or transparent, 'evident'. meanings of any specific 
discourse. At a more fundamental level such semantic analysis suggests a 
profound reorientation of traditional linguistic methodology, insofar as 
the socially determinate, discursive, conception of meaning reacts upon 
and undermines the conception of a strictly autonomous linguistic system. 
The socio-linguistic studies of discursive processes suggest most 
forcefully that the traditional conceptions of the autonomy of lexicon, 
syntax and value are more prescriptive than descriptive of their 
linguistic basis. In short, they reiterate, but do not explain or advance, 
the mythology of language as a fixed code of meanings or determinate set 
of equivalences. 38 
Turning to what I have broadly termed the development of a critical 
linguistics it may thus be characterised first as an analysis of the 
failure of traditional linguistics to provide any adequate account of the 
social determination of meaning: 'beyond a few natural meanings which are 
encoded in most languages (e. g. basic colour terms), the majority of 
meanings in languages, and in different varieties of a language, are 
crystallised in response to the social, economic, technological and 
theoretical needs of the cultures concerned. 139 While it remains true that 
language may for many purposes be usefully studied as a system - as 
internally defined, and as a relatively autonomous basis - it is also the 
case that language is, in all aspects of its usage, an instrument of 
communication and of non-communication related to and frequently 
determined by the institutional and ideological processes in which it 
functions. The linguistic system is the common basis of numerous and 
ideologically divergent discursive processes: 
If the same word, the same expression and the same proposition can 
have different meanings - all equally evident - depending upon which 
discursive formation they are referred to, it is because a word, 
expression or proposition does not have a meaning attached to its 




1381 See, Harris: The Language Myth (1981) Duckworth; P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker: 
Languagel Sense and Non-Sense (1984) Blackwell, ch. 8. 
1391 R. Fowler (1981) 21. See also, M. A. K. Halliday (1980) 165 ff. 
[401 M. Pecheux (1982) 112. 
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It should of course be noted that while the concept of discursive 
formation raises immediate questions of the social and ideological 
determination of meaning, it is also a linguistically determinate concept 
insofar as it is also defined by 'the system of relationships of 
substitution, paraphrases, synonymies etc-,, which operate between the 
linguistic elements - signifiers - in a given. discursive formation . 14 
1 Any 
specific discursive formation may thus be defined in terms of its meaning 
effects - loosely, its paraphrastic unity - and these in turn may be 
analytically related to the role or function which a particular discourse 
is to play in relation to other discourses and the social formation. The 
key to meaning, it is argued, resides primarily in the institutional basis 
of specific linguistic 'registers' or codes, of which legal meaning would 
be but one extreme example, 'legality would be nothing if it were not 
supported by a network of institutions, a tradition of ideas which always 
encloses and delineates the domain within which legal discourse can 
exercise its textual power., 
42 
To summarise this first point, the highly suspect Igiveness' of meanings 
within a particular discursive formation is neither, as Wittgenstein 
claimed, a solution to the problem of meaning, nor is it referrable to any 
strictly systemic conception of linguistic value, it is rather a problem 
to be critically analysed in terms of the relation of such meanings to 
institutional and ideological practices. As Foucault has extensively 
argued in terms of the archaeology of knowledge, the problem may 
ultimately only be answerable in terms of the political organisation of 
linguistic and discursive processes, seen as the exercise of power. 
43 It 
has, indeed, become a truism of much recent communicational research that 
the most interesting end illuminating aspect of the study of discursive 
-------------------- 
[411 Ibid. 112. 
[421 J. Lenoble et F. Ost (1980) 83. 
[431 See, 'The Discourse on Language' , translated as an appendix to M. Foucault: The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1981 ) New York; also, M. Foucault: Power /Knowle-d-ge 
7719-ý-O) Harvester; M. Foucault: 
, 
The History of Sexuality (1978)Tl-len Lane. For 
critical accounts of the specifically linguistic issues raised see, 
T. Pateman: Linguistics as a brarr-h of Critical Theory (1981) 14/ 15 UEA Papers 
in Linguistics 1; M. Pecheux (1982). For interesting discussion of related 
issues with regard to gender specific linguistic practices see, A. Assiter: 
Did Man Make Language ? (1983) 34 Radical Philosophy 25; D. Cameron: Sexism and 
Semantics (1984) 36 Radical Philosophy 14; also, L. Mr-Kluskie: Women's 
Language and Li ter atur e( 1983) 14 Femini st Review 51 . 
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processes is to be concentrated upon the manner in which power defines 
meaning and non-meaning within discourse. The processes in which such 
determination occur s may be analysed objectively (as opposed to 
anthropologically or psychologically) through the critical use of 
linguistic methodologies. 
Such an analysis of the manner in which power organises and determines 
meaning is not, however, merely an abstract enterprise in theoretical 
soc iology. The second fundamental concern of critical linguistics is to 
relate the essentially semantic analysis of discursive processes to the 
specific syntax and grammatical transformations of the particular text, or 
lintradiscursivel level. Ver y generally, it is argued that the 
1preconstructed' patterns of meaning operative variously within discursive 
processes react upon the linguistic structure. Language use inevitably 
bears the impress of social ideologies: 'there are social meanings in a 
natural language which are precisely distinguished in its lexical and 
syntactic structure and which are articulated when we write or speak. 
There is no discourse which does not embody such meanings., 44 The problem 
of meaning,, in other words, re-emerges within the linguistic system and 
belies its unity; social structure determines linguistic variety and 
significantly affects the availability and potential expression of 
c onc e pt s. Linguistic structure itself encodes inequalities of power and 
is also instrumental in enforcing them. The linguistic structures of a 
text or of a particular institutional practice are thus a matter for 
critical interpretation. Insofar as the text reflects and expresses the 
roles, purposes and- ideologies of its participants or subjects, these 
implicit or unconsciously regqlated operative meanings are accessible to 
study through their expression in the lexicon, syntax and semantics of the 
text. 
If the principles of critical textual analysis are reasonably clear, 
the linguistic tools used to effectuate such analysis are more diverse. 
The reason for such diversity - Fowler, for example, lists five broad 
-------------------- 
[441 R. Fowler (1979) 185. See also, G. Kress and R. Hodge: Language as Ideolog 
(1979) R. K. P.; H. Davis and P. Walton: Language, Image, Media (19F3) Blackwell. 
The most original material is to be found in V. Volosinov: Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language (1973) Academic Press; M. Bakhtin: The Dialogic 
(1982) Texas U. P. and will be analysed in detail in CFia--pE-37-67. 
98 
categories of critically/ideologically interesting linguistic 
structures, 45 with roughly thirty sub-divisions - is broadly speaking a 
product of the very different roles that linguistic processes are to play 
within wider social processes. Any particular text, genre or variation is 
a complex combination of linguistic constructions, functions and codes 
correlated to variable socio-political and ideological contexts. 
Research does, however, suggest that certain cautious generalisations are 
appropriate. Turning to the work of the French linguist M. Pecheux, it may 
be noted that his analysis of the textual effects of discursive processes 
- processes which are themselves materially and ideologically determinate 
- makes use of the categories of 'syntactic embedding' and of 
farticulation'. The phenomenon of syntactic embedding is indeed accorded 
the status of 'one of the fundamental points of articulation between the 
theory of discourse and linguistic s., 
46 If we reiterate the general thesis 
that the preconstructed meanings of discursive processes determine the 
lexicon and syntax of the text, it may be added more specifically that the 
term 'preconstructed' is used to designate 'what relates to a previous, 
external or at any rate independent construction in opposition to what is 
"constructed" by the utterance. ' Using the example of a sentence such as 
'he who discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in 
misery', it may be observed that traditional linguistic analysis would 
provide a formal designation of the meaning of such a sentence. The 
meaning of the utterance, according to Frege from whom the example is 
drawn, is the effect of the syntactic phenomenon of the determinative 
relative clause - reference being to Johannes Kepler, the German 
astronomer who died in 1630. For the purposes of discourse analysis, 
however, the determinative relative clause is no more than a formal 
precondition of the meaning effect. What are also concerned are the 
material conditions in which Kepler died, a reality which has little or 
nothing to do with the discovery of the laws of planetary motion except in 
a religious or moral perspective for which misery is the counterpart of 
genius, and a punishment for knowledge seen as transgression. Thus for 
Pecheux, the meaning is eventually more complex than might be formally 
-------------------- 
[451 R. Fowler (1981) ch. 2 appendix B. 
[461 M. Pecheux (1982) 64. 
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apparent, 'its material cause really resides in the asymmetrically 
discrepant relationship between two domains of thought, such that one 
element from one irrupts in an element of the other in the form of what we 
have already called the preconstructed, i. e. as if that element were 
already there. 47 
Other linguists have suggested that what Pecheux has termed syntactic 
embedding, the discrepant relationship between different domains of 
thought, is a necessary phenomenon of intertextual itY48 and may be studied 
syntactically both in terms of linguistic relations of implication and 
also in terms of the articulation or internally asserted narrative 
structure of the text. Thus, following Fowler's more detailed elaboration, 
the vocabulary - especially lexicalisation and relexicalisation; the 
syntax - especially the transformations, nominalisations and 
thematisations; the variant interpersonal modalities; the cohesion and 
finally the transitivity of the text may all be usefully studied to 
elue idate the preconstructed or soc io-cultur al determination and 
extension of the text and its meaning. Examples and linguistic checklists 
may be multiplied, it is sufficient that the purpose and methodology of 
such analysis is clarified. By way of summarising and concluding, I would 
suggest that the jurisprudential implications of these recent 
developments in linguistics are fairly clear. 
The primary implication concerns the positivistic conception of the 
unity of law and of the determinate language of the normative order, a 
proposition first arrived at in its contemporary form by Kelsen and, with 
minor emendations, still adhered to by Hart and by MacCormick. It will be 
-------------------- 
[471 Ibid. 62. 
[481 The definition of intertextuality is a matter of some controversy, not least 
because of gross disparities between the theoretical elaboration of the term 
and its use in substantive criticism. I would suggest that its meaning may 
best be clarified by consideration of its basis in a linguistics of 
communication or dialogue, on which, c. f. M. Bakhtin (1982): 'no living word 
relates to its object in a singular way: between the word and its object, 
between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment 
of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme ... 1 (276 ff. ) the 
subsequent development of the concept of intertextuality by, amongst others, 
J. Kristeva: La Revolution du Langage Poetiqu (1974) Seuil, is derivative of 
Bakhtin's work and utilises the concept of dialogue or dialogism in the more 
specific context of textual criticism: 'whatever the semantic content of a 
text, its condition of existence as a signifying practice presupposes the 
existence of other discourses' 
(388-9). 
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recalled that the linguistic basis of Hart's analysis of paradigm and 
penumbral meanings relies heavily upon a conception of the systemic 
determination of key legal words. Such rule governed determination of 
legal meaning was deemed to be the distinctive characteristic of legal 
language, and thereby was proposed a conception of the autonomy of law 
which denies, save in certain restricted categories of exceptions, that 
political, moral or other references are considerations that play any role 
within the semantics of legal validity. It is clear that the linguistic 
principles reviewed above lead to a position almost in direct antithesis 
to Hart's more traditional use of linguistics. I should like, finally, to 
take the argument one step further. To argue that a theoretically 
informed analysis of the legal code must take account of the socio- 
cultural extensions of legal language has profound empirical implications 
for the study of legal texts. It is moreover the case that a critical 
linguistic orientation also suggests that the separation or isolation of 
questions of law and legality from wider considerations of the 
organisation of discursive processes as a modality of power and of inter- 
group or class relations is hollowly ideological. The idea of a special 
and separate legal language remote from common speech is the product of a 
society in which only a very limited class of 'legally competent' people 
can read the texts of that language. What is in effect the 
relexicalisation of the law, its archaic terminological obscurity and its 
pedagogic specialisatiom, are all geared to the reproduction of an 
economic elite and the discriminatory values that such an elite serves. 
It is already a privilege to read the law, and the very idea of the 
objectivity and specialisation of legal language functions consciously or 
unconsciously to exclude participation in the legal process. I would 
argue finally that any legal philosophy worthy of the name should fast 
begin to concentrate its attention upon a precise analysis of the social 
and political values existent throughout the syntactic and discursive 
processes of the law. It is my hope that part two of this study 
constitutes a substantive step in such a direction. 
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PART 2: LEGAL DISCOURSE 
102 
RHETORIC AS JURISPRUDENCE 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS OF LEGAL LANGUAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
It is altogether appropriate that the term rhetoric, which in one of 
its aspects refers to the study of grammatical ambiguities, ' should itself 
bear a diversity of meanings. In its most ancient definition it was quite 
simply and diffusely the study of all forms of public speech. The 
subsequent history of rhetoric, however, to which I will return below, was 
one of reduction, restriction and quite frequently disparagement. The 
most common modern acceptations of the term are pejorative or poetic and 
bear little trace of the discipline which was originally to have charted 
the interrelations of language and power. Ordinary usage now defines 
rhetoric as the specious, bombastic or deceitful use of language; rhetoric, 
in other words, is the abuse of language; while within the scholarly 
division of disciplines it generally fares little better as the study of 
linguistic forms or devices, located at the level of the word and divorced 
from any serious consideration of their content or use. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, rhetoric may plausibly be referred either to a pre- 
scientific theory of ideology or to a formalistic aesthetics. 
It takes little origi, nality, however, to observe that even as latterly 
vulgarised, the conjunction of rhetoric and jurisprudence creates a number 
of analytic possibilities. Two in particular deserve attention. It may 
first be noted that criticism and satire of the obscurity and opacity of 
legal language, together with attacks upon the casuistic and manipulative 
nature of legal argument, have formed time-honoured and characteristic 
themes of literature, drama, and more recently, sociology and indeed 
realistic jurisprudence. To the understandably 
frequent claim that 
-------------------- 
The definition is that of P. de Mann: Allegories of Reading (1979) Yale U. P. at 
P. 10. 
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lawyers are thieves and rogues, and that the law itself is a linguistic 
confidence trick, one may add the marginally more sophisticated arguments 
of Jeremy Bentham's endearing yet little known project of establishing a 
triplicate or neutral vocabulary in his Table of the Sorings of Action2 
His proposal was for a dictionary of neutral lappellatives' , wherein each 
neutral term would be accompanied by both a eulogistic and a dyslogistic, 
equivalent. If such an endeavour appears, as surely it must, to be both 
implausible and naive, it is as well to remember that it was predicated 
upon the best of motives. These had already been analysed and elaborated 
in his earlier work, in the Theory of Fictions and in the Book of 
Fallacies, which had vigorously attacked the covert imagery latent within 
legal fictions and legalistic abstractions, and had also displayed a 
healthy abhorrence for the logical fallacies lurking behind rhetorical 
devices such as the use of I question begging appellatives' (the fallacy of 
confusion) or of 'vague generalities' (a covering device) Thus, for 
instance, Bentham had argued that since the word order is of wider 
application than the term for any particular order, it may include both 
good order and bad, and thus a call for order can mask or conceal a call 
for tyranny, tyranny itself being a species of order. In a similarly 
demistifying vein he wrote of the vague generality British Constitution: 
'Rally round the constitution: that is, rally round waste, rally round 
depredation, rally round oppression, rally round imposture - imposture at 
the hustings, imposture in the 
Bentham's argument was that, by virtue of the power invested in it, the 
vague linguistic generality constitution was used rhetorically to cloak 
the sectarian interests and inequalities of its actual practice. It was 
thus that it could lay claim to being an object of veneration and respect 
rather than becoming the butt of the vilification which he believed it 
often deserved. More generally, it may be stated that in this respect 
Bentham's project was that of inaugurating a critical rhetoric based upon 
a theory of language as communication; a communication structured 
by an 
extra-linguistic reality which 
it might either express or obscure. 
-------------------- 
[21 The only extended discussion of this aspect of Bentham's work of which 
I am 
aware is to be found in K. Burke: 
A Rhetoric of Motives (1969) California U. P. 
pp. 90 ff. 
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Bentham's theme is, of course, an exemplary one. To take but one 
further example, a recent, somewhat less felicitous, theory of law as 
ideology comments at length upon the magical form of legal discourse, 
namely that of a series of 'sacred texts: the canons of social order. ' The 
profane basis of this sacrosanct legality is partly bureaucratic and 
partly linguistic. Of the latter aspect we are informed that: I legal 
discourse in modern societies is ... bureaucratised magic expressed in 
legalese. It is therefore not only a discrete phenomenon but downright 
3 impenetrable. The magical form of law - to which one might counterpose 
Bentham's notion of 'allegorical idols' - is arguably rhetorical in a 
variety of related senses. In a broad and tendentious linguistic sense, 
the impenetrability of legal language may be viewed as a function of its 
non-referential character. In this perspective the obscure terminology, 
as well as the figurative and metaphorical devices of legal expression, 
which both Bentham and Sumner are concerned to unmask, are operative upon 
a symbolic or connotative axis of language which is effectively maintained 
at one remove from4 the 'real' linguistic realm of denotation or reference. 
Loosely, the rhetorical use of language is seen as inducing, by symbolic or 
figurative means, the co-operation and accomodation of social and 
institutional forces whose real affinities are antagonistic and 
conflictual. In another terminology, legal rhetoric functions as an 
elaborated and elitist linguistic code or speech variant. 
5 That it is 
frequently impenetrable should ideally alert the theorist to the socio- 
linguistic features of a code which simultaneously serves the functions 
both of communication and of non-communication; of precision and of 
impenetrability. Rather than further anticipating the extensions and 
qualifications that such theses necessitate, I shall instead assert that 
it is my intention in the ensuing analysis to introduce into the domain of 
legal studies, the concept of a critical rhetoric; namely that of a 
rhetoric capable of indicating and specifying the political dimensions of 
-------------------- 
131 C. Sumner: Reading Ideologies (1979) Academic Press p. 270. 
[41 The concept of distance properly belongs to structural linguistics, which 
generally refers to the rhetorical as a second order of signification which 
overlays and possibly also overrides - catachresis (the arm of a chair) being 
the obvious example -a primary signification. C. f. G. Genette: Figures of 
Literar Disc urse (1982) Blackwell ch. 2.; also R. Barthes: Elements of 
Semio-LogY k "JO I) Cape iv. 2. 
151 c. f. B. Bernstein: Class, Codes and Control (1974) R. K. P. p-77 ff. Also, 
A. Gouldner: The Dial6c7ic of Ideoiogy anTT'5Fhnolog (1976) Macmillan ch. 2. 
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legal language and further capable of explaining its apparently non- 
communicative qualities by reference to the relations of power within 
which the legal text (as scripture) is inscribed. 
The second, more specialist,, contemporary meaning of the term rhetoric, 
is that of the discipline which studies the linguistic form of discourse 
and more particularly the word-based figures of literary and poetic 
genres, primarily those of metaphor and metonymy. In this acceptation, 
rhetoric may no longer bear a pejorative connotation, but is nonetheless a 
somewhat confined and pedantic discipline, serving as little more than an 
aesthetic appendage to lexicology and etymology, a particular subset of 
syntactic relations. 
6 To proceed to a statement of the obvious, the 
relevance of this latter sense of rhetoric as the study of figures or as 
tropology, lies precisely in the history rather than the product of its 
confinement. The historical question to be raised; one which applies with 
equal force both to the present context and to the preceding, pejorative, 
sense of rhetoric; is that of the relation of philosophy, and more 
particularly logic (as the study of 'necessary truths'), to the domains of 
a rhetoric which had originally sought to demarcate the political and 
socio-historical contours of discourse. The history in question is that 
of the repression and exclusion of rhetorical and 'topical' contingencies, 
largely coincident with the rise of the empiricist and rationalist 
philosophies of the 17th century. It is in the reading of the history of 
the excluded discipline and in the delineation of the terms of its 
repression, that it is possible to reconstruct the rise of the formalist 




[61 These remarks are necessarily somewhat generalised. They are based upon the 
historical studies of G. Genette op-cit.; R. Barthes: L'arr-ienne Rhetorique 
(1970) 16 Communications 1; C. Metz: Psychoanalysis and Cinema (1982) 
MacMillan Part IV. On the place of Rhetoric in the medieval trivium, see, 
W. Ong: Ramus, Method and the decay of Dialogue (1958) Harvard U. P.; P. de 
Mann: Resistance--to Theory (1983) 63 Yale French Studies 3. 
171 For want of a better definition of patriarchal authority, I shall follow 
Weber's, I The person or persons exercising authority are designated 
according to traditionally transmitted rules. The object of obedience 
is the 
personal authority of the individual 
(or organised group) which it enjoys by 
virtue of it's traditional status. I Quoted in T. Mathieson: 
Law, Society and 
political Action (1980) Academic Press pp. 110-111 . 
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An understanding of the past is also the possibility of an alternative 
future. The discipline which has traditionally purported to explicitly 
chart the structural, semantic and, crucially, political facets of legal 
texts, is jurisprudence. It has, of course, long abandoned any substantive 
engagement with the politics of legal interpretation, and in so far as it 
has remembered the linguistic form of legal enunciation it has generally 
been in terms of a determinate logic of legal signification, conceived in 
terms of systemic rather than communicative functions. Which is to say, 
that the dominant tendency within jurisprudence has been that of the 
formalist project of applying the categories of logical philosophy to the 
linguistic produce of the law, for the purposes of inserting the newly 
born norms of legal judgment into the sterility and safety of a systemic 
normative justificatory framework. 8 Even when recourse has been made to 
the terminology of pr ac tic al reasoning' or to the theory of 
argumentation, 9 the message has been that of the reiteration of the 
specificity of the legal, in terms of the powerful logical constraints 
within which legal decision making must ever operate. If the high culture 
of the law is cautiously pointed towards a semiotics of legal logic, 
10 
th, ere is nonetheless implicit within the apparently anti-formalist 
concepts of practical reasoning and of a New Rhetoric (within continental 
jurisprudence), the recognition of the political and ethical dimensions of 
all law applying acts. In arguing that the strikingly vague (and 
overdetermined) concept of 'consequential ism' , or that the similarly 
generic notion of 'topics of legal argument' , are both predicated upon a 
profound belief in the patriarchal authority of the legal judgement, I 
hope to provide the basis for the introduction of a concept of legal 
discourse as pre-eminently the discourse of power. 
-------------------- 
[81 For a useful analysis of correlative arguments concerning legal rationality, 
c. f. J. Lenoble et F. Ost: Droit, Mythe et Raison 
(1980) Bruxelles pp. 169- 
217; A similar theme is implicit in F. Burton and P. Carlen: Official Discourse 
(1979) R. K. P. ch. 5 & 6. 
[91 Respectively, D. N. MacCormick: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theor 
(1978) 
Clarendon, Ch. Perelman: Logique Juridiqu (197) Dalloz. 




5.1 RHETORIC IS REPUBLICAN 
To begin by means of an example I shall offer some polemically 
descriptive remarks, from the perspective of a hypothetical classical 
rhetoric, upon certain of the arguments used by Lord Diplock in a recent 
decision of the House of Lords, namely Home Office v Harman. " The case 
turned upon a variety of intriguing arguments concerning the production, 
reading, re-reading and reporting of legal documents; a series of properly 
textual issues. In the course of an earlier action. 12 a civil rights 
organisation (N. C. C. L. ) had obtained discovery of a number of Home Office 
documents which documents were subsequently read aloud (and recorded) in 
open Court. With a view, presumably, to ease of access or speed of 
availability, the solicitor for N. C. C. L. had permitted an 'investigative' 
journalist to read the discovered documents in her possession - thereby 
saving the journalist concerned the trouble and expense of recourse to the 
official transcripts - with a view to his writing a feature article on the 
subject of the control unit at Hull prison. The article which resulted 
from this reading was highly critical of Home Office prison policy. In 
the instant case, the solicitor was found guilty of contempt of court. 
Very briefly, I there are two kinds of' (legitimate)' reporters of 
proceedings in courts of justice'13 and the investigative journalist; by 
virtue of bad motive, ill-intent and the failure to privilege the legal 
self-definition of its own terrain, purposes, documentation and language; 
falls outwith the categories of bona fide reporting. The solicitor who, 
by dint of dual loyalties to the legal profession and to a civil rights 
organisation, facilitates the misreading of legal documents, is held to be 
in contempt of court. 
The primary rhetorical question to be raised, concerns the techniques 
employed by the judge to discover (inventio) 
14 
appropriate arguments upon 
-------------------- 
'[111 Home office v 
Harman (1982) 1 AER 532. 
[121 Williams v Home office (1981 )1 AER 1151; Williams v Home Office (no. 2) (1981) 
T AER 1211. 
1131 Home of f ice v Harman op. c it. at p. 539 f-i 
[141 This and the subsequent bracketed figures of argument are purely 
illustrative. Annotated lists of figures can be found in K. Burke op. cit. 
pp. 65-69; Ch. Per elman and L. 01 br ec hts-Tytec a: The New 
Rhetor ic ( 1971 ) Notr e 
Dame U. P- pp. 167-174. 
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which to base the subsequent deliberation or proof of the outcome 
described. Lord Diplock begins his judgment with an interestingly 
explicit exposition of a possible, false, major premiss: 
My Lords, in a case which has attracted a good deal of publicity, it 
may assist in clearing up misconceptions (correctio/rectification) 
if I start by saying (prolepsis/anticipation) what the case is not 
about (contrarium/antithesis) . It is not about freedom of speech, freedom of the press, openness of justice or documents coming into 
the 'public domain' (auxesis/amplification), 15 nor with all respect 
to those of your lordships who think the contrary, does it in my 
opinion call for consideration of any of those human rights and 
fundamental frdedoms (contained in) the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... What this case is about is an aspect of the law of discovery of 
documents in civil actions in the High Court 
(allusion/identification) 
.... The case in my view, turns on its own 
particular f ac ts, 
16 
which are very special 
(distributio/arrangement). 
Without embarking upon any detailed examination of the ensuing judgment, a 
few further observations are of relevance to the statements cited. Lor d 
Diplock's initial assertion, or dissociative definition, for which neither 
argument nor explanation were proferred, apparently excludes the issues of 
'freedom'. 'openness' and 'publicity' from judicial consideration as 
extrinsic to the legal contextualisation of the case. The negative 
assertion should, of course, be read in conjunction with Lord Diplock's 
positive proposals as to the subject matter of the dispute, but even then 
the intrinsic issues are somewhat ungraspable. Without further evidence 
of the criteria of demarcation of the extrinsic and the intrinsic, it has 
to be accepted (on authority simpliciter) that when the judge does 
discuss: the rule that trials be conducted in open court, the anomaly that 
a transcript of the documents is available to be read but that the 
documents themselves are not, and finally the characteristics of the bona 
fide press reporter as opposed to those of 'collateral' or 'ulterior' 
motive, the issues of 'freedom', 'openness' and 'publicity' are not raised. 
The answer to this apparent paradox, however, lies precisely 
in the 
rhetorical or oratorical character of the 
initial, negative, definition: it 
-------------------- 
[151 The amplification concerned is generally designated 'aggregation' 
[161 unm,:,. nffice v Harman op. cit. at p-534 d-j. 
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serves an explicitly argumentative or persuasive function in relation to 
the wider audience which the case has attracted; it identifies the correct 
readership for the ensuing text, and thereby also reasserts the autonomy 
or privilege of legal language, legal method and more generally of the 
legal form. The substance' of the decision, after all, is a forceful 
reminder of the fact that those' who do not respect the 'peculiar character' 
of legal procedure in civil litigation and who fail to perceive the 
distinction between the formal normative character of the legal process 
and the substantive content of the documentation of a dispute, are in 
contempt of court and so also, more generally, of the authority of the law. 
It is precisely the latter considerations, namely those of the 
persuasive function of particular rhetorical techniques and of their 
appropriateness to the character of the audience or addressee, that form 
the object of the classical studies. The bracketed rhetorical figures 
provided in the quotation from Lord Diplock's judgment are not of interest 
for their taxonomic or aesthetic properties, but are of profound 
significance as indicators of argumentative intention and of 
argumentative effect; the linguistic form of the judgment, in other words, 
is to be viewed in this respect in terms of its communicative, socially 
orientated, functions. As one recent study has phrased it: 
A political criticism is not the invention of Marxists ... The most 
widespread early criticism on historical record was ... a mode of 
what we would now call 'discourse theory', devoted to analysing the 
material effects of particular uses of language in particular 
social conjunctures. It was a highly elaborate theory of specific 
signifying practices - above all those of the juridical, political 
and religious apparatuses of the state. Its interest was ... 
systematically to theorise the articulations of discourse and 17 
power, and to do so in the name of political practice. 
There is, of course, a heavy burden of historical responsibility attendant 
upon such a broad and homogeneous formulation of 
the motives underlying 
the earliest rhetorical treatises. There 
is, however, a coherent sense in 
which a major portion of classical rhetoric was 
indeed concerned with 
-------------------- 
[171 T. Eagleton: Walter Benjamin (1981 
) Verso p. 101 . For similar 
discussions, c. f. 
U. Eco: A Theory of Semiotics (1979) Indianna U. P. pp. 
277 ff; E. Grassi: 
jhLetorL c aý=OSLOPhY (1 ennsylvannia State U. P. ch. 1&2. 
. 
ý1ýa-s--Philoso 980) P 
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persuasion as the primary function of language use or public speech 
understood in terms of its social, and hence also political, orientation. 
It is fortunately no part of my intention to provide anything approaching 
a comprehensive schema or account of classical rhetorical categories; the 
remarks which follow are aimed solely at eliciting the method and 
categories of one particular interpretation or species of classical 
rhetoric, an account which relies heavily upon the great works of 
synthesis, those of Aristotle and of Cicero. The 'ideal typical' model of 
rhetorical nethod which ensues is intended to be suggestive and, more 
pragmatically, will provide the historical background to a discussion of 
the subsequent decline of rhetoric. 
5.1.1 Per suasion 
For Aristotle, then, 'rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of 
discovering all the 
I 
possible means of persuasion in any subject; ... and 
accordingly we hold that the rules of the rhetorical art are not limited 
in their application to any certain special definite class of subjects. 118 
The division of rhetoric into subjects or genres is thus secondary to the 
universality of its method, and will be examined below. For the moment, it 
is the conjunction of rhetoric with 'means of persuasion' that is of 
interest. Rhetoric studies persuasion, but in the absence of an analysis 
of the rhetorical history of the term persuasion itself, little has so far 
been gained. Whereas logic dealt with 'instruction' - demonstrative proof 
by means of necessary truths - the study of persuasion (which Aristotle 
defines in opposition to flattery, seduction or threat) was concerned with 
the marshalling*of the means 6f contingent or 'topical' communication, and 
with the elimination of differences or conflicts of value or perspective 
as between speaker and audience: 
19 
It is evident that rhetoric ... 
is useful. It is evident also that 
its function is not to persuade but to discover the available means 
of persuasion such as the circumstances of each particular case 
allow. And in this respect Rhetoric is like 
the other arts. For 
example, it is not the function of Medicine 
to restore a person to 
[181 The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. J. Welldon, (1886) MacMillan P. 10. Aristotle 
(W. D. Ross ea. ) kOxford) Bk. 1.2.1355b. 
[19] See, e. 9.9 A. Blum: Theorizing (1974) Heinemann pp. 170-3. 
ill 
perfect health but only to bring him to as high a point of health 
as possible; for even people who can never possibly recover their 
20 health may still be scientifically treated. 
As the metaphor of medical practice suggests, the study of persuasion is 
subject to a concept of the use of language determined by the relation of 
means to ends. 21 Rhetoric thus studies the linguistic means that allow a 
chosen end to be achieved; its object thus includes eloquence conceived as 
effective speech, language conceived as action and speech itself defined 
in terms of its functions and not as a manifestation of structure or 
necessity. Thus, in a metaphor traditionally attributed to Cicero, 
rhetoric 'this arrangement of topics in speaking, like the arraying of 
soldiers in battle,, can readily bring victory. ' 
Certainly, the structure of Aristotle's Rhetoric would appear to be 
strongly influenced,, if not determined, by a concept of active strategies 
of discursive persuasion. Book I of the Rhetoric deals both with the 
theory of argumentation in general (its relation to Dialectics, Politics, 
Ethics and so on), and also with the acquisition or invention (inventio) 
of argumentative starting points. Book II outlines a classification and 
arrangement (dispositio) of concrete arguments with a view simultaneously 
to the purposes and formal circumstances of the speaker, and also to the 
character of the audience. The final Book briefly reconsiders the concept 
of appropriateness or proportionality of the linguistic forms or 
rhetorical devices (primarily those of metaphor and simile) and outlines 
the virtues of style (elocutio) in terms of the appropriate forms of 
clarity. From start to finish the goals of the study are those of 
specifying the means of persuasion, conviction and, in so far as is 
possible, proof. To the tripartite division of the subject (inventio - 
dispositio - elocutio) correspond, respectively, the goals of probability 
or verisimilitude, understanding, and pleasure, viewed as the correlative 
of clarity or proportion. To which it should be added that such goals are 
conceived actively rather than passively; the audience should 
identify 
with the terms, character, motives and values underpinning 
the speech; its 
-------------------- 
[201 Aristotle, OP-cit-, p. 9 (Bk. I. 1.1355b). 
[211 For a very concise analysis of this aspect of persuasion, c. f. T. Todorov: 
, rinimnries of the Symbol (1982) Blackwell ch. 2. 
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understanding will be altered and, ideally, it will be persuaded to action. 
A most explicit and concise formulation of this principle of rhetoric both 
as persuasion and as inducement to action, is given in the 4th century work 
of St. Augustine's On Christian Doctrine. The addressee is persuaded if: 
1 
00 he likes what you promise, fears what you say is imminent, 
hates what you censure, embraces what you command, rejects 
whats oever you built up as regrettable, sympathises with those 
whose wretchedness your words bring before his very eyes, shuns 
those whom you admonish him to shun .. and in whatever other ways 
your high eloquence can affect the minds of your hearers, bringing 
them not merely to know what should be done, but to do that they 
know should be done. 122 
It was only much later in the history of the rhetorical discipline that 
persuasion became divorced from argument, along with content from form, 
and style or eloquence from truth. To summarise, in its earliest phases, 
the rhetorical conceptions of eloquence and of Persuasion were functional 
and pragmatic, they were, in brief, firmly tied to a conception of the 
argumentative and communicative role and context of public speech; they 
were, finally, concerned with all three aspects of the tripartite division 
of rhetoric, and not merely, as was to occur later, with style alone. 
5.1.2 Aud i enc e 
The concept of rhetoric as the study of the manifold means of 
persuasion, is necessarily predicated upon a conception of communication 
or, classically, dialectic. Obviously enough, persuasion is dependent upon 
both the. presentation and the reception of messages. The means or mode of 
such semantic and instrumental transmission is, however, a matter of 
considerable complexity. The key to this problem, for the rhetoricians, 
lay in the concept of the concrete situation. The concept may plausibly 
be subdivided; it bears both a philosophical and also a more specific, 
pragmatic, connotation; in Aristotle's terminology23 the rhetorician must 
study both the common or general topics of argumentation, as well as 
analysing the special topics of the particular rhetorical genres - the 
deliberative (political), the forensic (legal) and the epideictic 
[221 St. Augustine: On Christian Doctrine (1956) NewYork, p. 216. 
[231 C. f. Rhetoric op. cit. p. 20 (BkI. 2.1358a). 
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(panegyric/ceremonial). 
The Aristotelian distinction, however, between the common and the 
special topics is highly normative, not to say properly metaphysical. 
Indeed it implies a distinction between mind and action. 24 which I am not 
here concerned either to elaborate or to criticise. Very briefly, 
rhetoric as a sub-branch of the general theory of argumentation 
(dialectic), may profitably also make use of the theoretical analyses of 
universally applicable theses provided elsewhere in Aristotle's 
philosophy; to be precise, the general topics are 'equally suitable to 
questions of justice, physics or politics, and to many questions of many 
different kinds., 25 The TopicS26 thus classifies generally available 
arguments according to a schema of arguments relating to accident, 
species, property, definition and sameness. The latter portion of Book II 
of the Rhetoric similarly analyses arguments relating to possibility, 
temporality, degree and analogy. The common topics thus apparently 
appertain, for Aristotle, to a universal audience, an ideological and 
idealist conception which will be re-encountered elsewhere. A more 
amenable position is to found in the work of Cicero. 27 Mind, for Cicero, 
can only be known through its works; and I believe it plausible28 to 
interpret Cicero's several discussions of the invention of arguments as 
dependent upon the view that all thought and argument are revealed through 
human social activity, labour and need. His conception of the topic is 
closer to the contemporary notion of the 'topical': both philosophy 
(reason) and rhetoric, respond to, and take their arguments from, the 
concrete social situation. History determines the content (res, and 
generally, res publica) of theory; theory, to be meaningful, must be 
related to the social and political community, to practice. In this sense 
all topics or loci are special; although their generality may vary, such is 
not an essential difference but merely a further characteristic of 
-------------------- 
[24] On this, see Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca op. cit. at pp. 47 & 84, and 
E. Grassi op. cit. pp. 24-27,41-46, P. Ricoeur: The Rule of Metaphor (1978) 
R. K. P. pp. 27-35. 
[251 Rhetoric P-31. 
[261 Cicero: L0_Pics (1952) Chicago III. 116-119a 
[271 Particularly, The Orator 2.36-52; Topic 2-7. 
[281 My view here depends heavily upon E. Grassi op. cit. , G. Kennedy: The Art of 
ov,, -tor ic in the Roman Wor ld -Q 972) Pr inc eton, A. Blum op. c 
it. 
144 
contingency or situation: all knowledge is to be viewed as a product of 
labour upon the real with essential reference to the needs of the actual 
historical community. 
At least when it comes to the discussion of the special or particular 
topics, both Aristotle and Cicero are agreed that it is the notion of 
suitability or of appropriateness of the argument to its context which 
should form the object of rhetorical analysis: 
This indeed is the form of wisdom that the orator must especially 
employ - to adapt- himself to occasions and persons. In my opinion 
one must not speak in the same style at all times, nor before all 
people, nor against all opponents, nor in defence of all clients, 
nor in partnership with all advocates. He, therefore, will be 
eloquent who can adapt his speech to fit all conceivable 
c ircumstances. 29 
If we turn to Book I of the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains the tripartite 
classification of rhetoric into the deliberative, forensic and panegyric 
genres, precisely by reference to the audiences to which such speeches are 
directed: 'the end or object of the speech is determined ... by the 
audience. ' The deliberative or political audience is concerned with 
expediency, the forensic with justice and the panegyric with honour. It 
is not, however, the somewhat dogmatic division of rhetoric into genres - 
elements of the* panegyric, for instance, will frequently saturate the 
other two genres - but rather the specification of the special topics 
pertinent to these audiences, which lays claim to attention. Wi th 
characteristic mindfulness to detail, Aristotle embarks upon the analysis 
of special topics by observing; significantly enough, in the context of a 
comment on legal decision making; that I it must necessarily be our object 
not only to render our speech demonstrative and credible, but also to 
produce a particular impression of ourselves and a particular disposition 
in our judges'. The justification for such a remark is that our 'estimate 
(of a speech) is not the same, but either wholly different or different in 
degree, according as we regard a person with feelings of affection or 
dislike, and are angrily or charitably disposed towards him. t3o Avoiding 
-------------------- 
[291 Orator op. cit. p. 123. 
1301 Rhetoric op. cit. pp. 112-113 (Bk. II. 1). 
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unnecessary detail, the analysis which ensues may be paraphrased as 
follows. It is a surprisingly lengthy and detailed account of the various 
'ideal types' of listener or audience. Just as the rhetorician must 
observe the generic features of the audience - it is hard to praise 
Athenians when you are talking to Lacedaemonians - so too the specific 
opinions, beliefs, values and general psychology of the audience must be 
taken into account in analysing the persuasive contours and effectivity of 
the rhetorical or public speech. What follows, is thus a detailed survey 
of popular beliefs, attitudes or values, an exegesis of the commonplace 
assumptions of likely audiences on questions of morality, politics and 
psychology. This speculative inventory of the popular is not of interest 
for its content, but rather for its emphasis upon the form of 
communication as dialogue. While the other Books of the Rhetoric are 
normative and frequently dogmatic in their method and intention, the 
discussion of the special topics does at least retain the conjunction, 
albeit momentary, of the cognitive and the affective, the abstract and the 
concrete, the form and the content, so essential to the broadest meaning of 
rhetorical analysis, that of charting the interrelations of language and 
power. While it can certainly be argued that this aspect of the Rhetoric 
is flawed or unsuccessful, its burgeoning subject-matter always being 
likely to explode the boundaries of the available method, such is not here 
at issue. The significance of this expedition into a thoroughly I popular' 
social psychology, resides in its potential and its implications. The 
perspective which is introduced in the study of the special topics is one 
of inter subjectivity, a nascent theory of communication as based upon the 
social determination of meaning. 
5.1.3 Public speech 
In the course of a discussion of style, a domain of rhetoric to which 
Aristotle brings little enthusiasm, we find the following comment: 
Strict justice ... if applicable 
to Rhetoric, would confine itself 
to seeking such delivery as would cause neither pleasure nor pain. 
For the right condition is that the battle should be fought out on 
the facts of the case alone; and therefore everything outside the 
proof is merely superfluous, although extraneous matters are 
highly 
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effective ... owing to the depraved character of the audience. 31 
The upright audience, of course, would be composed purely of philosophers, 
it would be the universal audience of self-evidence and right reason, 
everyone and no-one. What is interesting about the remark in the present 
context, however, is not so much its arrogantly reluctant acceptance of the 
non- philosophical, but rather its recognition of the social orientation of 
language use. However much philosophy might wish to rid itself of 
rhetoric, it could never, of itself, abrogate the concrete situations and 
republican institutions upon which rhetoric was based. The political 
assembly, the tribunal and the market place of the city state would 
constantly bear witness to the restraint of speech by its hearers; 
discourse is always discourse in the presence - at least implicit - of 
another. 
There is always, however, a danger of romanticising the past upon the 
basis of contemporary affinities. A society predicated upon slavery as 
the mode of production can hardly lay claim to serve as a political or 
ethical ideal. That is no reason, however, for ignoring the indisputable 
achievements of an elitist culture and its limited republicanism. Within 
its sphere32 rhetoric was tied to an eloquence imbued with power, to a 
speech with purpose and to a politics which was pre-eminently of the 
public domain. For Cicero, at least,, both speech and meaning were to be 
understood as the product of a determinate historical sociality; rhetoric 
was indissociable from rhetorical practice, it was the study of power or 
res publica as dialogue rather than monologue, it was the politics of the 
phonocentric rather than the s. criptural, 
33 of the face to face as opposed 
to that of the monarchic or bureaucratic dispersion. The rhetorical 
domain, then, was that of a community of speech in which eloquence was the 
highest quality of the individual as citizen and as inseperable from the 
collective actions of the polis, the political whole. The material 
-------------------- 
1311 Ibid. p. 226 (Bk. III. 1. ) 
1321 On which, c. f. J. B. Elshtain: Public Man, Private Woman (1981) Prirr-eton U. P. 
pp. 19-55; and, more generally, on the subject of inclusion and exclusion, 
J. Elshtain: Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language, Power and 
Meaning (1982) 7 Signs 603. 
1331 The distinction is that of J. Derrida: Of Grammatolog (1976) John Hopkins U. P. 
p. 138. 
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precondition of an engaged rhetoric, in other words, was that of the city 
state, the democracy, now utopian,, of proximity and of dialectics, in which 
speech as persuasion, as opposed to coercion and to manipulation, played 
the role of public force. Rhetoric was necessary precisely because power 
was not yet conceived as detached from the public control of language and 
meaning. 
The enduring value or applicability of rhetoric as a discipline is to 
be guaged, I would suggest,, in exact proportion to its ability to analyse 
and codify the public and political dimensions of institutional 
discursive practice. It would be the study of the institutional and 
administrative determination of social meaning, a study, for instance, of 
the frequently obscured persuasive, argumentative and coercive levels 
inherent in the writing of legal texts, and equally a critical evaluation 
of a contemporary legal culture and practice predominantly based upon the 
exclusion of dialogue in favour of an authoritarian monologue of 
initiation. A culture confined within the parameters of a 
professionalised and esoteric language, in turn supported by a 
jurisprudence of legal univocality within which the institutional meaning 
of the law is always already given and merely remains to be said. 
Certainly it can do no harm to recall that rhetoric is born of social 
practice and that its predominant object of study was that of legal 
argument viewed as persuasion indissociable from the substantive issues 
and audiences involved. Its object was thus, in the last instance, 
external to it, its method (technique) was functional and its outcome was 
the analysis and codification of discursive practice, viewed precisely as 
practice rather than truth (stasis). So, at least, I have argued, while 
remaining fully aware that even in classical Greece, rhetoric was also 
viewed as a danger and a threat to the imperialistic philosophial motive 
which has only later to fully eclipse rhetoric by wholly subordinating 
it 
to logic and to the concept of necessity. The subsequent 
history of the 
rhetorical discipline, in other words, was 
largely that of a retreat, 'from 
market pl ac e to study, politics 
to philology, social practice to 
semioticst34 and indeed, in its most abject moment, 
from social discourse 
-------------------- 
1341 T. Eagletoni, op-cit. p. 108. 
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to the supposed ontological uniqueness of the language of poetry. 
F 
5.2 RHETORIC AS METHOD 
The republican spirit of rhetoric is probably best captured in the 
image of an immediate community of speech, within which power, and power 
over meaning, were dispersed rather than hierarchical, changing and 
essentially fluid rather than static and determinate. Thus if the 
discicipline of rhetoric bore a philosophical and political meaning, it 
was that of the historical and practical-human character of reason and of 
knowledge. Rhetoric, as the study of contingency, was implicitly (and 
frequently explicitly) opposed to any elaboration of knowledge which was 
dependent upon the use of absolutised categories of reason or necessity. 
Rhetoric was both radical and to a degree theoretically innocent; it pre- 
existed the division and separation of the political and the social and, 
in the terms of Rousseau's somewhat romantic account of the historical 
relationship of language to government, it may well have claimed that: 'any 
tongue with which one cannot make oneself understood to the people 
assembled is a slavish tongue. It is impossible for a people to remain 
free and speak the tongue. Y35 Which is to say, that to understand rhetoric 
is to imagine a history prior to, or other than, that of the division of 
labour, be it in an economic, legal and political or theoretic and semantic 
form. To which it might, finally, be added that, with regard to the concept 
of language, the rhetorician was inherently concerned with the descriptive 
and critical identification of semantics with and in the social, in 
opposition again to any analytic or prescriptive, formal, concept of 
language and semantics as constitutive of the social, or as 'naming, an 
identity which it would otherwise lack. 
5.2.1 The necessary and the probable 
It should be reasonably clear from the foregoing discussion that the 
precondition of the decline or 
demise of rhetoric should, in the last 
instance,, be explained in terms of the initial elitism and subsequent 
-------------------- 
1351 J. J. Rousseau: Essai sur llorigine des langues (1761) Paris PP-72-73 
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decay of the institutions to which it was tied. 36 Without entering any of 
the disputes as to the precise periodisation of the various mutations and 
indeed mutilations of the rhetorical domain, it does at least seem clear 
that the status of rhetoric had always been the subject of philosophical 
attack. Before it became futile, rhetoric was dangerous. Such at least 
was Plato's view of the subject. 
In one sense rhetoric was a great leveller of discourse; all discursive 
activity was to be analysed in terms of its fundamental equality, based 
upon its relation to and pertinence for, a particular practice, be it a 
collective decision, a judgment or an action. If all language use was 
subject to a concept of historical becoming, it would seem logical that no 
particular discourse should be able to claim any radical privilege. 
Philosophical discourse , for instance, would thus be but one discourse 
amongst others; legal discourse would be subject to the same criteria of 
evaluation, criticism and contestation as any other. 'But is not this a 
great comfort, Socrates, to be able without learning any other art but this 
one, to prove in no way inferior to the specialists? t37 Gorgias' unwitting 
question opens the way for Socrates to elaborate a primordial distinction 
between an idealised concept of knowledge and the concepts of belief and 
probability, denigrated as mere subjectivity and whim. The distinction 
leads to the conclusion that rhetoric is 'the semblance of a part of 
politics, that it is in sum and substance... flatteryt, 
38 
used by those 
skilled in their dealings with people. The rhetoricians, it transpires, 
exist in a world of lies,, 'their mistake being that of having realised that 
probability deserves more respect than truth' and who 'could make trifles 
seem important and important matters trifles by the force of their 
language, who dressed up novelties as antiques and vice versa, and find out 
how to argue concisely or at interminable length about anything and 
everything., 
39 The charge, at least, is fairly straightforward. Rhetoric 
is immoral; to which Socrates elsewhere adds that it is further to be 
-------------------- 
1361 See Eagleton, op. cit. See also, W. Kunkel: An Introduction to Roman Legal and 
Constitutional Law (2nd. ed., 1973) Harvard U. P., PP-93-108; J. Dawson: The 
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distrusted as being emotive, a matter of opinion and of persuasion rather 
than conviction. To use the proper philosophical metaphor, rhetoric 
belongs to the shadowy and twilight sphere of the cave, to the realm of 
appearance and of the probable as yet unilluminated by the real or 
tr uth. 
40 It is the derided concept of the probable which is crucial and to 
which Aristotle adds a considerable depth of negative connotations. Prior 
to examining the developments which Aristotle sought to introduce, 
however, it might be briefly observed that Plato's defence of philosophy is 
not without its own difficulties and inconsistencies. Rhetoric, he has 
admitted, studies 'the kind of persuasion employed in the law courts and 
other gatherings.... and concerned with right and wrong., 
41 In other words, 
it shares its subject matter with philosophy, but errs in its method. Its 
error transpires to be principally that of appealing to the emotive or 
affective rather than to the rational and demonstrable. But if the latter 
categories of the philosophical are analysed closely, it appears that they 
too are based upon the emotive, at least in so far as Socrates associates 
42 philosophy with eros and with its own Muse. There seems, at least, no 
other way of interpreting Socrates' subsequent remarks upon the concept of 
a 'true' rhetoric, which is defined as the dialectic itself; as philosophy 
in turn making use of language. Only the 'Ideal of the real itself remains, 
presumably, to differentiate the emotive and philosophical, from the 
emotive and merely probable. 
It is to Aristotle, however, rather than to Plato, that the rejection of 
rhetoric is usually traced. Pecheux, for instance, boldy refers to: 
an immensely long trajectory, throughout whose length, from the 
philosophy of Aristotle to the 'scientific' discipline that today 
goes by the name of se. mantics, two threads have constantly 
intersected: that of analytics (the rules of demonstrative 
reasoning which give access to knowledge) and that of rhetoric (the 
art enabling one to convince by use of the verisimilitudinous); a 
trajectory which, in its very development, seems condemned to 
retrace its own steps. 
43 
-------------------- 
[401 On which metaphors, c-f-J. Derr ida: The White Mythology: 
Metaphor in the text 
of Philosophy (1974) VII. New Literary 
History PP. 5-74. 
[411 Lorgias 454 b. 
[421 Phaedrus 259d. See also H. Kelsen: What is Justice? 
(1957) California U. P. 
Th -. 2 -. 
[431 M. Pecheux: Language, Semantics and Ideolog 
(1982) MacMillan p. 45. 
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The Proposition is an interesting one, not least on account of its 
perception of the history of the concepts concerned being ineluctably 
bound to a specific ideological 'problematic, 44 within the history of 
knowledge; that of logical empiricism (analytics) face to face with and 
complemented by metaphysical realism (rhetoric). Which is to say, in the 
last analysis, that philosophers and linguists, so long as they remain 
within this ideological problematic, are doomed constantly to repeat the 
same questions - those raised by the opposition of the necessary to the 
contingent in its various manifestations - and to live haunted by the 
absence of any scientific solution to their repetition of the wrong 
questions. Without daring as yet to enter the domain of Pecheux's devout 
and unreconstructed scientific materialism, his reading is certainly 
suggestive of some of the key problems and inconsistencies to be found in 
Aristotle's analysis of the 'probable'. 
Any account of the concept of the probable requires a return, already 
much delayed, to Book I of the Rhetoric. Granted that Book II was 
concerned to examine at some length the intersubjective and dialogical or 
communicative facets of public speech, it must be unequivocally admitted 
that this analysis of I opinions I (as 'given' in the audience) is prefaced, 
in Book I, by a largely disparaging treatment of rhetoric as a lesser or 
inadequate variant of the philosophical. For Aristotle was only too aware 
of the dangers of rhetoric; its inclination to break away from philosophy 
(as analytics), if not to replace it, necessitated the elaboration of the 
theoretical subordination of rhetoric to logic. Rhetoric, the counterpart 
of dialectic, is to study argumentation in terms of proof, and of.. 
persuasion understood ideally I as a sort of demonstration. Thus at the 
outset of Book I we read that: I it is the proofs alone which form the 
proper subjects of artistic treatment, and anything except the proofs is a 
mere accessory. I Referring to the earlier rhetorical handbooks I they 
omit all mention of enthymemes, which are the soul of proof, and occupy 
-------------------- 
[441 The concept of problematic is derived from L. Althusser: Pour Marx (1965) Paris 
p. 70 and claims to articulate the unity of an ideology in terms of its 
underlying structure. The elements of an ideology are interdependent and it is 
therefore impossible to extract an individual element without altering its 
meaning. 1. A problematic comprises the objective internal reference system of 
a body of thought: the system of questions, or problems, which determines the 
answers an ideology can offer. ' M. Kelly: Modern French Marxism (1982) 
Blackwell P. 124. 
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themselves almost exclusively with such things as lie outside the actual 
issue 1, such as prejudice, compassion, anger and other emotions. To which 
it is added that, 
there ought to be a provision in the laws by which a veto is set 
upon travelling out of record ... for it is improper to warp the 
judgment of a juror by exciting him to anger or compassion as this 
is like making the rule, which one is going to use, crooked. 
45 
Aristotle is, of course, here asserting that rhetoric must be ethical in 
the sense of being appropriate to its audience - its subject matter and 
genr e. More than that, however, Aristotle is also preparing the ground for 
a ser ies of propositions concerning rhetorical method and, most 
especially, the requisite form of all argumentation. 
Very briefly, the import of chapters 1 and 2 of Book I is that of 
constituting and classifying rhetoric as a branch of the philosophical. 
It requires firstly a method or lart, 46 in the strict sense, conceived as 
the formal criteria or techniques for producing persuasive discourses. 
Most explicitly: 
It is clear that the proper subjects of artistic treatment are 
proofs. But proof is a species of demonstration, and a rhetorical 
demonstration takes the form of an enthymeme, wh ich may be broady 
described as the most powerful form of rhetorical proof. Again the 
enthymeme is a species of syllogism, and it falls within the 
province of Dialectics, either in whole or in some one of its 
branches, to make a complete examination of the syllogism in all 
its forms. 47 
Even rhetoric then can be brought to heel within the empire of the 
syllogism; it is to be differentiated from dialectics only in so far as its 
object is the probable or contingent as opposed to the necessary or true. 
Rhetoric is thus to study persuasion as a 'relative conception', and is to 
investigate the general character of probable arguments; to provide a 
normative scheme of deliberations applied to 'such things as are in 
general indeterminate'. We are informed that I it is human action which is 
[451 Rhetoric OP-cit. p. 2-3, (Bk. I. 1 .). 
[461 Defined in the Nicomechean Ethics 1140 a 6-16. 
471 Rhetor ic p. 5-6 (Bk. I. 1. ). 
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the sphere of deliberation and inquiry; I and then, with remarkable 
honesty, Aristotle admits that I all such action is of an indeterminate 
character, it may be said to be practically never necessary. 48 
Openness to the scope of indeterminacy is, however, rapidly qualified. 
The definition of probability itself is as follows. It is something 
'which usually happens in ... such matters as are indeterminate; and it 
stands to the thing which is to be proved in the relation of the universal 
to the particular. 
49 It may thus be stated that the genuine form of the 
rhetorical argument is, for Aristotle, the development of a general rule 
(or common topic) by means of the enthymeme. It is a species of syllogism, 
but one which has as its major premiss a statement of the probable -a 
starting point provided or literally 'given' by the audience to be 
addressed. Which last point raises the central dilemma within the 
Aristotelian conception of the rhetorical domain, 'or, to use a more 
critical idiom, problematic. The desire to locate the proper form of the 
rhetorical method as an 'art' or as a technique leads eventually in Book I 
to a rhetoric conceived as being in the thrall of logic. Where then is its 
content, or its substantive recognition of indeterminacy? To remain a 
species of proof or demonstration, rhetoric must accept a starting point, a 
probability, which is given prior to proof - it must draw upon that series 
of accepted truisms, moral platitudes and everyday wisdoms of folk 
psychology enumerated in the characteristic opinions of the depraved or 
recalcitrant audience of Book II of the Rhetoric. There is nothing, in 
other words, to suggest that the probable, the normal or the ordinary are 
in any sense desirable or critically acceptable as the content or 
substance of the schema of argumentation. In more modern contexts there 
is indeed nothing to guarantee that the rhetoric of a consensus amongst 
the audience as to the probable - or in legal contexts the visions of the 
ordinary men of the common law - actually represent anything more than an 
eminently contestable interpretative legislation or prescription as to 
what, in the ideal moral order of reaction, the normal audience ought 
to 
[481 Ibid p. 16-17 (Bk. I. 2. ). 
[491 Ibid p. 18. 
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think, believe or otherwise adhere to. 50 What is interesting about the 
probable in this respect, I would surmise, is not the subsequent role which 
it is to play in a formal proof, but rather the process whereby it is 
ascertained or selected. It is the process of the discovery of the 'given' 
probability which is likely to serve as the most accurate indicator of the 
structure and semantic motivation of a discursive practice. 
Such, however, is not in essence Aristotle's problem. His demarcation 
of the rhetorical form was his contribution - albeit of a potentially 
malignant kind - to the subsequent development of the discipline. The 
association of rhetoric with logic and with the various methods of the 
demonstrable may have opened the way for the decline of rhetoric into 
taxonomy or tropology but, as to his own purposes, it safeguarded 
philosophy and the proper appreciation of the necessary. Rhetoric as the 
dialectic of the probable, then, was Aristotle's achievement and, in a 
rather delightful aside, he comments of those who would introduce either 
ethics or politics into such a discipline that they have assumed I the mask 
of politics; whether from ignorance or imposture or any other human 
infirmity, t5l he cannot say. 
5.2.2 Figure and Metaphor 
The decline of rhetoric is generally associated with the tendency from 
Quintilian onwards, to reduce the discipline from a domain of three equal 
divisions - argument, composition and style - to the greatly restricted, 
monistic and largely formal study of style (elocutio) alone. With only 
the occasional exception, rhetoric was to be irrevocably severed from the 
more general considerations of the theory of argumentation and of 
argumentative functions. It was to become, in the post classical era, an 
incremental, didactic and largely empty form of study, focussed almost 
-------------------- 
1501 It might be noted, parenthetically, that it is no great distance from the 
tprobablel to the more contemporary, positivist, prescriptions of the 'form 
of life' , contained 
in H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (1962) Oxford p. 99 ff. 
which elaborates the acceptance of 
law in terms of an I internal aspect' ,a 
notion which has recently gained considerable currency, and which might 
lead 
one to suspect that the 
interpretative schema offered by M. Pecheux op. cit., of 
the sense in which this problematic will- indefinitely repeat itself, contains 
a certain daunting truth. 
[511 Rhetoric p. 12 (Bk. I. 2. ). 
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obsessively upon the word and its multifarious role in the figures of 
speech. It is not, however, my intention to attempt a survey or adequate 
explanation of the historical process whereby the discipline became 
hollowed out - various accounts are available to evidence the extreme 
difficulty of such a task - but rather to exemplify certain of the themes 
and motives which were to become more closely associated with the modern 
conception of rhetoric. 
In many respects, as I have suggested, the Aristotelian conception of 
rhetoric was already a reduction of its previous domain and potential. 
More significantly, it demarcated an opposition between instruction 
(strict demonstration) and persuasion, or more generally, between the 
necessary and the contingent forms of proof, which opposition specifically 
subordinated the rhetorical to the logical. However unequal the weighting 
of the different parts of the discipline may have been, it must 
nevertheless be allowed that the Aristotelian conception of the 
rhetorical did allow for some species of equilibrium between the various 
parts or divisions of the subject; the dialogical, intersubjective and 
contingent (historical) facets of rhetoric may have been diminished in 
their actual import,, but they were nonetheless retained. Aristotle's 
influence upon the subsequent development of rhetoric is, thus, best 
understood not in terms of its explicit classification and ordering of the 
discipline but rather in terms of its implicit restriction of the choices 
structurally available to the rhetoricians who were later faced with the 
decline of all forms of democracy and the extreme contraction of the 
public domain of politically significant speech. The schema presented in 
the Rhetoric effectively limited the discipline to but two avenues of 
future extension. The one, which was never to be consistently explored, 
would have been that of a prolonged elaboration and classification of the 
received opinions and accepted truths of the various possible rhetorical 
audiences. The motive for such a putatively enlarged classification would 
have been, as with Aristotle and Cicero, that of clarifying the available 
topics or starting points of argumentation. That such an investigation 
did not, at least after Cicero's Topica, fully materialise as the 
stubstantive content of rhetoric can doubtless be explained in a variety 
of ways. In terms of the intellectual 
division of labour, for instance, 
such an endeavour might well 
have repeated the subject matter of other 
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disciplines. More significantly and more plausibly, the elaboration of 
the moral truths of Book II of the Rhetoric presupposes a unity or 
consensus as to political values and social justice which could neither be 
readily affirmed outside of the teleological certainty of the 
Aristotelian system nor long be plausibly maintained in the face of the 
ideological divisions which were ever emergent after the death of the 
hegemonic city state of classical Greece and the first Roman Empire. The 
field of study would have been too vast, too chaotic and too contentious to 
be adequately or credibly propounded. Rhetoric itself, yielding perhaps 
to the probable rather than pursuing the possible, chose the less 
dramatistic and more limited of the options available to it, that of the 
theory of style and of the classification of figures. Coincident with 
this choice, rhetoric was to move from the study of argument to the 
appreciation of ornament, from dialectics to aesthetics, from semantics to 
a species of grammar, and, finally, implicit throughout, from the study of 
effective speech to acquiescence in a useless discourse - 
paradigmatic ally that of poetics. 
The model of the verbal figure which was to dominate rhetoric right up 
until the twentieth century, may be found nascent, in Aristotle's theory of 
metaphor, analysed at length in the Poetics and also in Book III of the 
Rhetoric. As regards the latter text, the context of the discussion of 
metaphor is that of a series of considerations upon the history and uses 
of style. Aristotle is evidently wary of his subject; style should be 
invisible, it should be I neither mean nor exaggerated, but appropriate, I 
it should render the meaning of the language used with clarity, it should 
avoid artificiality and ornament, and, in general, it should support the 
common life and usage of speech. We are reminded, in other words, that the 
overriding concerns of the rhetorical speech are to inform and also to 
persuade. Thus the style of the speech should not disguise or confine or 
deceive, though it may on occasion be appropriate that the style gives 
rise to pleasure, we are told, by displaying surprising resemblances - 
those which may be generally grouped under the heading of metaphor. It 
will suffice to single out two, with 
hindsight crucial, features of the 
role of metaphor, a double aspect well captured, 
in the definition provided 
in the Poetics: I Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs 
to something else, the transference 
being either from genus to species, or 
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from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of 
analogy. ' Therewith we learn that metaphor is both a peculiar or aberrant 
form of naming things and is also a potentially logical act of predication 
attributing a resemblance, or analogical relation, between two (non- 
linguistic) entities. 
(i). Firstly, metaphor is a 'foreign' or 'strange' use of words. 
Metaphor, while being for Aristotle the most general form of the figures 
of speech - it includes (metonymy, synechdoche) , abridges ( simile) or 
exemplifies (analogy) all the others - is nonetheless strictly limited in 
its semantic scope. 52 Metaphor is to be studied primarily in the lexical 
terms of the noun and of the verb, precisely for the reason that they have 
in common the facility of being intelligible in themselves, they refer to 
an object or to a unity of sense, they bear a 'proper' or denotative meaning 
and incorporate the essence or telos of language, that of univocality53. 
There is a distinction, in other words, which is fundamental both to an 
accurate comprehension of the Aristotelian concept of metaphor and indeed 
to the much later theory of figures (which in effect broadened the scope 
of metaphor from noun and verb to words generally). It is that which 
separates two orders of language, two series of meanings and subsequently 
opposes them to each other. There is, for Aristotle, the 'ordinary' word 
and the 'strange' word, the latter existing to be compared to the former; 
there is the transfer of meaning of a 'borrowed' word to a thing to be 
named; there is the substitution of one word for another that could have 
been used in the same place; there is the possibility, ever present, of 
'restoring' the original word for the substituted word; there is, in the 
last analysis, an order of 'proper' or 'original' meanings whereby we 
recognise the ornate or metaphorical order of meaning as being strange, 
incidental, extraordinary and redeemable. To which it merely needs to be 
added that proper meanings are viewed as superior to metaphorical 
meanings; the one is primary, the other secondary; the former transports 
the speech into the teleological mythology of a purely logical lucidity 
-------------------- 
[521 C. f. Rhetoric Bk. III. 2. and also J. Derrida op. cit. pp. 29-46. 
1531 1. .. 
for it is impossible to think anything if we do not think one thing; but 
if this is possible, one name might be assigned to this thing. Let it be 
assumed that the name has a meaning and has one meaning. ' Aristotle: 
Metaphysics 4 1006 bl 3 
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and grammar of necessary relations, the latter merely embroils the speech 
in the realm of contingent communication, it is an affectation which may 
be creative of pleasure or surprise, but never of anything in excess of the 
inferior or inchoate logic of analogy. 
(ii). Metaphor, like rhetoric in general, is potentially menacing 
and cetainly foreign to the eyes of the Aristotelian philosophy. It has 
its uses - truth, after all, should not be unnecessarily disadvantaged by 
being forced to enter the world unarmed - but it is more likely, if not 
strictly controlled, to lead to the abuse of language, to the improper use 
of names and to mystification in general: I The metaphor must be 
appropriate, and the appropriateness will arise from proportion or 
analogy. 154 The nominalisation of metaphor - the requirement that it be 
governed by the theory of proper names - transpires to bear restrictive 
implications for its use in discourse. Here too it must be shown to be 
subordinate to logic, to be inconsequential and alien to a truth perceived 
as the guarantee of the singular reference of proper names. The 
appropriate use of metaphors will perceive resemblances and predicate 
likenesses in terms of the general and the probable, but precisely by 
virtue of being appropriate the metaphor must be restrained. Its status 
is intermediate or ancillary, it is not philosophical although it may on 
occassion, when properly controlled, be used in the service of truth: 
'Metaphor must be drawn ... from things 
that are related to the original 
thing, and yet not obviously so related - just as in philosophy also an 
acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart. 155 Just as 
rhetoric is less than philosophy, so too metaphor is less than truth; it 
may be persuasive, pleasurable or pleonastic but it will seldom be 
necessary; for even the proportional or analogical metaphor displays only 
the properties of objects and never their essence, it may predicate 
but 
never fully name, it may relate to each other the properties abstracted 
from the essence of different things upon the basis of their resemblance 
but it cannot fully or directly state the essence. 
-------------------- 
1541 Rhetoric pp. 231-2 (Bk. III. 2. ). 
1551 Ibid p. 233 (Bk. III. 2. ). 
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5.2.3 Rationalism and, and against rhetoric 
Even the briefest and most superficial of surveys of the general themes 
of the rhetorical discipline throughout the centuries of its 
stultification and decay, right up to the theories of Du Marsais and 
Fontanier in the 18th and 19th centuries respectively, and conventionally 
regarded as the end of rhetoric, cannot help but observe the recurrence of 
the Aristotelian dualistic oppositions in ever more extreme and 
inappropriate forms. The problematic did not so much change as harden or 
ossify. Despite the universality of the discipline - figurative stylistic 
devices and verbal tropes are a feature of all discourse - and despite its 
increasingly precarious claim to also be the study of 'speaking well in 
civil matters', it never disabused itself of its lack of any claim to a 
truth value. It was marked, indeed, by an absence of content. Behind the 
pedagogy of tropology and of the lists of figures; behind the formal 
classification of devices and the accounts of ambiguity; concealed beneath 
the essentially epideictic appreciation of the ornamental and the merely 
persuasive or pleasing, resided a 'proper', grammatical, language and the 
order of a philosophical univocality which was untouched by rhetoric and 
which would ever condemn its domain to the triviality of the purely 
verbal. 
In the work of Du Marsais, for example, rhetoric was no more than the 
study of words which 'dwell in a borrowed home', of figures defined solely 
as forms of wording which deviate from the common expression. It was to 
become, in short, an inauthentic discipline which would play with the 
paradigmatic ally poetic deviations from the proper rules of language and 
was irrevocably linked, according to Fontanier, to the immorality of the 
figurative: I the utterance of what grammar and logic would seem to regard 
as superfluous, the omission of what they would seem to demand as 
necessar Y., 
56 From being the study of the historicity of discourse, 
rhetoric was here to become the shadow of a discipline, one which was quite 
unable to contest the dramatically exaggerated claims of the empiricist 
and rationalist philosophies which were, in their 
turn, to wholly discount 
-------------------- 
moth cited in T. Todorov op. cit. at pp. 89 & 103; see as well G. Genette, op. cit. [561 DO 
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the rhetorical. Rhetoric was, indeed, to become the other of philosophy, 
it was to become synonymous with the discursive errors and deceits which 
the rise of European rationalism - in the works of Descartes, Locke and 
Kant particularly - was specifically concerned to exclude. As to the mode 
of this exclusion, it is largely predictable, in view of the goals of the 
ascendant philosophies, those of a demonstrable discourse, a discourse of 
'certitude' and of a methodic description detailing the universal or 
necessary relations to which the human understanding 'ought', as a matter 
of prescription or of an 'a priori' logic, to yield. Such enterprises are, 
of course, concerned with 'laws of thought' and with statements of that 
which is necessarily true; their abstraction, formality and neglect of 
history would inevitably lead to the perception of rhetoric as an 
oppositional category, as a non-science, as illogical and eventually as 
f oul play. Locke, for example, is peculiarly damning of the professors of 
rhetoric and of their motives: 
But if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all 
the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the 
artificial and figurative applications of words eloquence has 
invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move 
the passions and thereby mislead the judgment, and so are perfect 
cheats ... 
57 
The purpose of the philosophical discourse, Locke maintains, is solely 
that of informing and instructing, and rhetoric is therefore designated 
erroneous, deceitful and dangerous. Even in its proper sphere, that of the 
appreciation of ornamental and non-didactic discourses, one suspects that 
the philosopher would find little of value in what is essentially, from 
this viewpoint, an immoral hedonism of language; language for the sake of 
language, a species of decorative art. 
Similar sentiments are propounded by Kant: 
Oratory (ars oratoria), being the art of playing for one's own 
purposes upon the weaknesses of men (let this purpose be ever so 
good in intention or even in fact) merits no respect whatsoever. 
Besides, both at Athens and at Rome, it only attained its greatest 
heights at a time when the State was hastening to its decay, and 
1571 J. Locke: An Essa 
(Bk. III -X-. 347. 
-- 
Concerning Human Understanding (1979) Oxford at P-508 
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genuine patriotic sentiment was a thing of the past. 58 
The decaying of the Athenian and Roman city state was to be compared 
unfavourably, it seems, in the eyes of rationalism, to the growing national 
autonomy and nationalism or patriotism of the bourgeois world. It may 
also be observed that the opposition constituted by the Critique of 
Judgment closely parallels the opinions of Locke already cited. Ther e 
are, for both authors, two series of speech, which may be distinguished, in 
the last instance, by their motives. As regarding the second order of 
discourse, that of the oratorical, it may be admired only so long as it is 
useless. The moment, however, that it adopts a purpose external to the 
purely linguistic, it rapidly b ecomes threatening and diabolical. The use 
of rhetoric to persuade is a seemingly satanic challenge to the 
philosophical: it Isubjugates' , it Ibrainwashes', it 'deceives', it 'wins 
minds'; ultimately its error i s that of the failure to distinguish, and 
respect, the rational and convincing from the irrational and merely 
persuasive, human strength from human weakness. The distinction is 
elaborated more fully in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason: 
If a judgment is valid for every rational being, then its ground is 
objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the 
other hand it has its ground in the particular character of the 
subject, it is termed persuasion. Persuasion is a mere illusion ... 
it has only private validity ... Persuasion I may keep 
for myself 
. 00 but I cannot and ought not 
to attempt to impose it as binding 
upon other s. 
59 
It only remains, in other words, for the last extended rhetorical treatises 
of the 19th century to spell out the severe limitations of a now taxonomic 
enterprise, an analysis of discourses which cannot bind, cannot be true or 
state the real, but which might from time to time be a source of idle 
delight. 
Rhetoric, of course, is banished at the same time that history is 
decried in the name of an absolute reason; the science, no less, of the 
faculty of understanding. Rationalism, be it philosophical, linguistic or 
indeed legal, is grounded in and also serves to perpetuate the belief 
(the 
-------------------- 
[581 I. Kant: The Pt-I- (1952) Oxford at P. 53. 
(59] I. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason (1887) London pp. xvii-xxiv. 
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mythology) in an order of proof, of grammar and of determinacy paralleling 
and reflecting the order of the necessary. Its most logical antithesis is 
nihilism - correspondingly theological, rhetorical and anarchistic - as 
lucidly portrayed in the work of the great classicist and philologist, 
Nietzsche. It was the nihilistic philosophy, after all, that first sought 
to deny the God that lived on in grammar, as well as in knowledge and in 
the Christian justificatory doctrine of natural law. It was Nietzsche 
indeed who first inquired as to the status and value assumptions 
underlying the order of truth which had so long and so vigorously denied 
the role of rhetoric in the analysis of discourse and its relation to 
power: 
What therefore is truth ?A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which become 
poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, 
and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; 
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions; worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect 
the senses. 
60 
The attack upon false literalism and the re-affirmation of the symbolic 
quality of all language, however admirable the philosophic sentiments it 
espouses, is unfortunately lodged at the same level as the doctrine of 
truth which it seeks to invert. It repeats, in reverse, the abstraction of 
the system it opposes; nihilism is, however, different in one respect. 
Nietzsche's philosophy was careful to treat nihilism as a preliminary, 
negative, strategy, preparatory to the production of new values, the 
transvaluation of values into the context of what Nietzsche termed the 
Dionysian mode of thought. Nihilism is then, arguably, profoundly 
historical in its sources and in its evaluation of the dominant 
rationalist Christian philosophies; it is a moment in the history of ideas 
and equally only a beginning or, better, a precondition for a later 
positivity. So much, at all events, in anticipation of misunderstandings 
of a frequently maligned but deeply philosophical doctrine. As regards 
language and rhetoric, the import of the attack upon truth and upon logic 
is to be traced to some of Nietzsche's earliest lectures on rhetoric, 
delivered during his tenure at the University of Basle. Firstly: 
-------------------- 
[601 F. Nietzsche: Early Greek Philosophy and other Essays (1908) Foulis p. 180. 
133 
. 00 it is not difficult to demonstrate that what is called 
rhetorical, as the devices of a conscious art, is present as a 
device of unconscious art in language and its development. We c an 
90 so far as to say that rhetoric is an extension of the devices 
embedded in language ... No such thing as an unrhetorical, 'natural' 
language exists that could be used as a point of reference 
Tropes are not something which can be added or suýtracted from 
language at will, they are its truest nature. There, is no such 
thing as a proper meaning that can be communicated only in certain 
particular cases. 
61 
Rhetoric, in other words, takes its revenge upon rationalism, not by 
reasserting any intrinsic merit or value to the rhetorical discipline but 
by claiming that rationalism too is ill of a figurative virus. Mor e 
important, however, than the claim that all discourse is rhetorical or that 
the sign is effectively always a metaphor for the signified, is the 
related claim that the differentiation of discourses or uses of language 
is to be based not upon the self-asserted degree of determinacy which the 
particular discourse claims, but rather upon the basis of the values it 
espouses and the ends its serves. Reverting to the context of legal 
analysis, it might be noted that social morality and institutional 
functions are the determining features of legal language and that claims 
to the authority, determinacy or logic of legal judgment, from the 
rhetorical viewpoint, are of no greater value than the purposes or ends 
that they frequently conceal. Which suppositions, however, mean little 
and are unsurprising until such time as rhetoric is capable of specifying 
and elaborating the interrelations of language and power. To a limited 
degree, and in what I shall argue is a misguided direction, the New 
Rhetoric has undertaken just such. an analysis in relation. to law. 
5.3 THE NEW RHETORIC AND ITS APPLICATION TO LAW 
The term 'New Rhetoric' is something of a misnomer; its now conventional 
referent being the work of Chaim Perelman; 
62 the theory of argumentation 
[611 Quoted in De Mann op. cit. at PP-105-106; c. f. also, F. Nietzsche: Homer and 
Classical Philology (1909) Foulis. 
[621 1 shall refer principally to Ch. Perelman & L. Obrechts-Tyteca op. cit. 
(hereafter cited as Treatise) and Ch. Perelman: Logique Juridque (1976) Dalloz 
(hereafter cited as Logic). For a translation of a recent precis of his work, 
see Ch. Per elman: The Empi re of Rhetor ic 
( 1978) Notr e Dame U. P. 
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and of practical philosophy; the theory of the old rhetoric partially 
revived, partially rewritten. Certainly there is little to be gleaned 
from it by way of positive theoretical novelty; its contribution in this 
respect is no greater than that of reiterating, with certain 
reformulations, the familiar problematic and categories of classical 
Aristotelian rhetoric. Little appreciation of history, or indeed of 
diachronic semantics, however, is needed to observe that it would be 
inappropriate to assume that the passage of the discipline of rhetoric 
over virtually two millenia had left it immaculate and in all essential 
respects unchanged. The context and implications of the New Rhetoric are, 
indeed, in that sense new. The interest of this resurrected system of 
analysis, however, lies elsewhere. Its interest lies in its practice and, 
more specifically, in its application to law and to the analysis of legal 
judgment. Without wishing to anticipate the arguments that follow, it may 
be noted that even in this facet, and somewhat paradoxically, the New 
Rhetoric is far from being substantively innoVatory. In many of its 
aspects it is positively conventional and politically conservative in the 
extreme in its invocation of the traditional categories of legal reason 
and of legal inter pretation. 
63 It is not, in other words, a critical or 
radical project. It assumes the specificity and efficacy of the legal to 
be self-evident. It is concerned not with the political and institutional 
power that underpins and guarantees the authority of legal discourse, but 
rather with abstracting idealistically from the normative justificatory 
techniques of legal judgment and of the legislative process generally, the 
self-image or self-presentation of the law, to enumerate a generic list of 
the rhetorical, persuasive and argumentative mechanisms that, permit the 
law to postulate that it is based upon and adequately reflects a consensus 
as to values and as to social justice. Thus the primary question to be 
posed by the New Rhetoric is that of whether or not it is possible to 
analyse with some degree of rhetorical rigour the argumentative 
techniques that allow a loosely defined legal discourse which is 
necessarily, so it is claimed, embedded in opinions and 
'plausible' 
[631 The parallels between the New Rhetoric and the canons of orthodox legal 
hermeneutics are striking and strikingly obvious. For this reason I shall 
advert (by way of footnotes) by way also of comparison, to the summary of such 
principles of legal method as proposed in the work of 
D. N. MacCormick, op. cit., 
a work no less pol i shed and no less vague 
than that of the New Rhetoric 
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arguments, to appear justified, convincing, agreeable and frequently 
inevitable to the various audiences to which it is directly and indirectly 
addressed. It is certainly indicative of the general character and 
motivation of the New Rhetoric, and it may be suspected in advance to be a 
central contradiction in this body of work, that while it devotes several 
thousand pages to the analysis of social values, the construction of world 
views, the strength of widely held opinions or to the persuasive effects 
of argumentative techniques and forms, it will only ever make use of the 
word ideology three times64 and even then taking it in its most generic 
and abstracted sense, as a synonym for perspective or orientation. In 
short, the New Rhetoric, by virtue of its lack of critical concepts and 
consequent descriptive and heuristic uncertainties and indeed 
inadequacies, provides, I shall argue, the strongest possible available 
motive for the introduction of a concept of legal discourse as the 
analysis of the politics of legal language. 
5.3.1 A Logic of Values 
It would seem both inaccurate and ungenerous in the extreme, not to 
acknowledge the virulent polemical value and the impeccable motivational 
good taste of the New Rhetoric's attack upon formalist conceptions of 
logic. It may safely be stated that the major premiss of the New Rhetoric 
is precisely that of an anti-formalist view of all argumentative 
institutions, and so also of legal argument and of law applying acts. If a 
brief historical character isation is permissible in terms of the outline 
account already provided, it may be said that Perelman implicitly takes up, 
although in the form of a considerably less extreme position, and attempts 
to build upon, the negative insights of the Nietzschean critique of 
rationalist philosophy. 
65 At all events, Perelman's project may be 
-------------------- 
[641 Logic paras. 15,62,71. 
[651 Nietmhe's position was, of course, somewhat thoroughgoing. Commenting, for 
instance, upon the fundamental logical law of non-contradiction, he states 
the following: 'We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: 
this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any necessity but 
only of an inability. I The Will to Power 11 (1913) Foulis no-516. at P-31 ff - 
In terms of the comparison mentioned earlier (n. 62), D. N. MacCormick's 
position is not greatly different; the perspective of his enquiry is also that 
of practical reason or practical philosophy, although his mentor is Hume, and 
his approach is also less polemical by far in its anti-formalism. C. f. op. cit. 
pp. 1-8,265-278. 
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characterised at this level, in terms of two propositions. On the one 
hand, that of the denunciation of all attempts - be they Cartes ian, Kantian 
or Saussurian - to reduce logic to formal logic66 and on the other hand, 
correlatively, the attempt to open up a domain of non-formal logic which 
will answer to the categories of the theory of argumentation. The form if 
not the content, of this project may be dealt with succinctly. 
At the level of methodology, the Treatise on argumentation is very 
explicit in attacking, as a matter of principle, all forms of what it terms 
dogmatism - particularly those which assert irreducible oppositions 
beween objectivity and subjectivity, rationality and irrationality, fact 
and value - but is somewhat less than precise in its specification of the 
actual parameters of its object of attack: I we will stay clear of that 
exorbitant pretension which would enthrone certain elements of knowledge 
as definitely clear and solid data ... independently of social and 
historical contingencies, the foundation of necessary and eternal 
truths., 67 The motive and the modesty of these sentiments is clearly 
appealing, their generality will prove to be slightly less so. From the 
arguments that are provided, it appears that all the modern variants of 
formal, axiomatic or apodictic logical proof are equally to be avoided, 
their origin and exemplar being the concept of reason and reasoning 
introduced into Western philosophy by Descartes and basing itself upon an 
idealised mathematical model of proof. The later work on juridical logic 
confirms the point; the logic objected to is a formal logic which, if 
applied in an instrumental fashion to the juristic order, can provide no 
greater degree of heuristic benefit than that of the I rather puerile 
satisfaction of showing that there is a method of fitting into the same 
syllogistic schema every possible argument whatsoever., 
68 
I would suggest, very briefly, that an important qualifying 
clarification is needed. What constitutes the irrelevance of formal logic 
-------------------- 
[661 The work of Kalinowski op. cit. which makes use of a deontic logic and argues 
for a legal semiotics, is the exemplary antagonist; C. f. Logic at P-3. For a 
useful summary and overview of the various positions see G. Kalinowski: 
Logique et methodologie juridiques (1978) 23 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 
59. 
[671 Treatise at p. 510. 
Lgic at P-3. [681 Lo 
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to the study of law is its treatment as an independent discipline with its 
own homogeneous and separate criteria of proof, which are maintained in 
dualistic oppositon to all other forms of linguistic and extra-linguistic 
validation. While it is of the utmost significance to argue that the 
instrumental and external application of formal logic is of little 
significance and frequently harmful to legal studies, that is certainly 
not to be taken as meaning that one cannot identify and formalise a 
structural logic implicit within the law, one which might provisionally be 
defined as that series of axiomatic or assumed meanings and connotations 
that provide the legal statement with its authenticity and power, its 
apparently autonomous ability to define and to exclude in the cause of 
maintaining the specificity or privilege of the legal. Rather than 
elaborate such a possible definition here, I shall observe instead that 
neither in the Treatise nor in the Logic does Perelman actually face the 
problem either of the theoretical status of the New Rhetoric or that of 
its relation to the rationalist tradition of logic which it seeks to 
denounce, although presumably it would not claim that it had no heuristic 
value whatsoever. 69 The claim rather appears to be that all forms of 
argument - be they formal or practical - are embedded within the system of 
their adaptation to a context or audience. On the one hand, the value 
logic of argumentation may be summarised negatively in terms of its 
relativity - rhetoric is the study of the probable not the necessary, the 
temporal rather than the universal, and generally, the use of non- 
compelling modes of proof. On the other hand, it is further argued that no 
argumentati-on can escape from a background of assumptions as to values and 
adherence to values, in which light, ' the renunciation of all practical 
philosophy is unsatisfactory because it simultaneously abandons to 
emotion, interest and ultimately to violence, the regulation of all 
problems of human action and especially collective action - all those 
problems which traditionally relate to politics, morals and law. 170 What 
is needed, is the liberation of logic from its reduction to formal, 
mathematical logic and the simultaneous inauguration of what is rather 
enigmatically termed a' logic of value judgments 
(whose) inspiration is 
-------------------- 
[691 L20gilc at P. 5. 
[701 Ibid at P. 101 - 
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the method used by the celebrated German logician Gottlob Frege to renew 
formal logic. t7l The analogy is a purely methodological one and refers to 
the fashion in which the broader logic would analyse the techniques and 
procedures of proof used in demonstrating the logic of arguments with 
value implications. It would be a logic or rhetoric that analysed the 
multiple value judgments inherent in the law and most particularly in the 
entire process of law application, a logic that would attempt to answer 
the question of why the particular decision can be made to appear as 
equitable, reasonable or acceptable. Which latter question, that of the 
rhetorical legitimacy 'of the law and the acceptability of legal value 
judgments, raises, crucially, a series of questions both as to the 
theoretical nature and critical status of this (assumed) acceptance, and 
also as to the specific context, subject matter or values which are in fact 
accepted or deemed reasonable. Such questions are intrinsic to the 
conception of a logic of values and the theory of argumentation formulates 
them half-heartedly in terms firstly of the techniques or forms of 
argument and secondly, to make a distinction for the purposes of 
exposition, in terms of the general and particular topics or discursive 
contexts of the argumentative practice. 
5.3.2 Techniques of Argument 
Anti-formalist criticisms of mathematically based conceptions of logic 
have tended to argue that strictly determinate concepts of logic are 
irrelevant if not erroneous to the description and explanation of the 
actual reasoning process of substantive decisions. Indeterminacies of 
context, ambiguities of language and of institutional assumptions as to 
values are but some of the factors which combine to preclude the 
manifestation or realisation of the categories of formal logic in any 
given instance of a decision-making process. It is by no means 
immediately clear, as a matter of principle, why a logic of values which 
bases itself upon an analogy with the methodological goals of formal logic 
should itself be free from or immune to a similar order of criticism to 
that levelled at the precedent formalism. It is certainly possible that 
analogous problems of abstraction and of idealisation will reappear in the 
-------------------- 
1711 Ibid at p. 10 1- 
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broader, putatively non-formal logic, if its end product is to be no more 
than the substitution of generic categories of argumentative device and of 
argumentative technique, in place of their formal logical equivalents. 
The rhetorical syllogism and the proofs of the probable were for Aristotle 
inferior forms of logical demonstration. If the New Rhetoric is to 
transcend the limitations of the old rhetoric it must clearly define 
itself in terms of a substantive analysis of argumentation which is 
mediated by, but not subordinate to, the formal schemata of techniques that 
the term logic implies. 
In one important sense at least the New Rhetoric wholly embodies the 
substantive concerns of a non-formalist conception of argumentation. Its 
primary object is the classification of the techniques and procedures of 
argumentative proof, a project which, as the development of contemporary 
semiotics clearly evinces, may rapidly become a formalist enterprise, 
72 
but which is radically differentiated from other recent generalised and 
Saussurian rhetorlcs, 
73 by virtue of its concept of the audience. The 
audience, in the perspective of the Treatise, is both a structural category 
- the precondition of any language use - and also a specific aggregation 
of addressees. In its most general elaboration, I the object of the theory 
of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to 
induce or to increase the minds' adherence to the theses presented for its 
assent. 174 Further, adherence is not a matter of truth but is rather 
explained in terms of subjectivity: it is a feature of the individual mind, 
and is an aspect of the notion of agreement and of communion or 
identification between speaker and audience. 
75 Where Aristotle had dealt 
in Book II of the Rhetoric with the audience in terms of its likely 
composition and its political and moral affectations, 
Perelman is 
concerned to add a series of propositions, 
both as to the discursive 
category of the audience as such, and also as 
to the requisite mode of 
studying the audience. Argumentation 
is discourse defined in terms of its 
persuasive effects, the primary goal of such reasoning 
being the 
-------------------- 
1721 See e. g. A. J. Greimas: Semi0tique et Sciences 
Sociales (1976) Paris. 
1731 See e. g. Gr oup U: Rhetor ique Gener alise 
(1970) Par is 
[741 Treatise p. 4. 
E751 Ibid at pp. 14,20,51. Logic at pp. 102-105. 
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constitution of an agreement or accord as to values or as to the 
desirability of a choice or course of action. All such considerations 
necessarily imply a determinate, or homogeneous audience or audiences. 
While the concept of audience itself is broadened, by Perelman, to include 
at one extreme the universal (and utopian) audience of the 'given, and at 
the other extreme the unique audience of introspection, it is the speaker 
and the intention of the speech that defines and circumscribes the actual 
audience. 
The last point exemplifies with considerable clarity an ambiguity 
which may be traced throughout the entire ambit of the New Rhetoric's 
project. Communication, the substantive subject matter of the theory, is 
to be characterised in terms of a number of apparently self-evident facts. 
The discourse with which Perelman is concerned is a discourse premised 
upon consensus. This assumption is both crucial and erroneous. As with 
so much jurisprudence the presupposition of the substantive analysis is 
that of the self-evidence of an arguably fatuous and idealised discursive 
domain wherein order triumphs over conflict or contradiction, and pedagogy 
over coercion or constraint. Thus in the Treatise, argumentation- 
'intellectual contact' - comes after the self-evidence of a community of 
minds; 76 speech in general 'establishes a sense of communion centred 
around particular values recognised by the audience', and held in common by 
them. In terms of legal speech, it becomes the benign project of the 
speaker turned educator and exhorting increased adherence to values which 
are always already accepted. 
77 There is, finally, a moral duty to dialogue 
as the means of recreating what the speaker has already presupposed as the 
subjective affinities or predilections of the hearers, their sense of the 
'normal', which argumentation will reinforce and clarify. 
78 As the Treatise 
proceeds, it becomes ever clearer that the array of discursive techniques, 
devices and patterns so exhaustively elaborated, are concerned entirely 
with a concept of persuasion whose referent is not simply 
the psychology 
of individual and collective adherence to values 
but the exorbitant 
project of quantifying the 
degree of adherence, the quality of acceptance 
-------------------- 
1761 Treatise p. 14. 
[771 Treatise p. 53- 
1781 Treatise pp. 68,72,74. C. f also, B. Ackerman: Social 
Justice in the Liberal 
ýSta Te-M80) Yale U. P. PP-349-378- 
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and the extent and intensity of approval. Those hitherto ineluctable 
facets of value commitment are not however the object of any empirical 
survey, nor are they analysed as the implicit, covert or 'deep' semantic 
structure of the text; they are rather to be read as the explicit and 
intentional act of the speaker; they are self-evident in the figures and 
devices of the discourse, each figure - those of amplification, repetition, 
allusion, analogy and oratorical definition being highlighted - bearing 
within themselves a generic argumentative significance. The intentional 
subject, the speaker, the author or indeed the Book of the law all control 
and state their own meaning; meaning is a self-articulated, authorial 
entity, of which the New Rhetoric will in the end tell us no more than that 
the techniques of argument used to communicate this meaning were more or 
less appropriate to or transparent of its intention: I the discourse itself 
is to be considered as the act of the orator (and) for which the orator is 
responsible. v79 Elsewhere, the perspective is summarised in terms of an 
argumentative process constituted by a reciprocal desire relayed between 
the cranium of the orator and the heads of the hearers, Ia desire to 
realise and maintain a contact of minds; a desire, in the head (chef) of 
the orator to persuade, and in that of the audience, a willingness to 
listen 1.80 Discourse, in other words, is communicative or dialogic, but 
suc h dialogue is overdetermined by the peculiarly unidirectional 
character of the communication; however multiple the sources of the 
discourse are taken to be, the speech itself will formulate their final 
form and these it will give or hand down to a more or less willing audience 
and with a greater or lesser degree of persuasive skill and credibility. 
5.3.3 Legal Ar gument -- 
When it comes to legal authorship, the same principles and techniques 
appear to hold tr ue although legal 
discourse is to be strictly 
differentiated as a genre of discourse by virtue of its predominantly 
textual character and also by virtue of 
the highly restricted 
institutional isation of its authorship, a restriction mirrored 
in the 
-------------------- 
1791 Logic at P-132. See also, M. Foucault: Languaget Counter-Memory, 
Practice 
7TJ977) Cornell U. P. PP-113-139; R. Barthes: Image - Music -Text (1-M77) Fontana 
pp. 142-149. 
[801 Logic at p. 108. 
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specialised character of the legal audience. The New Rhetoric does, of 
course, recognise that the law has more than one audience: three to be 
precise,, the legal profession, the litigants and the public, 81listed in 
what appears to be the descending order of their importance. Certainly, 
the primary feature of legal rhetoric, for Perelman, is its eventual 
formulation or reformulation and application by the judiciary. 82 The 
project of a rhetorical analysis of law may thus be summarised in the dual 
terms of the need to provide an account, on the one hand, of the role of the 
judicial author as orator or as psychological cause of a particular law 
applying act, and on the other hand, an account and classification of the 
argumentative techniques and value logic that will best serve the 
credibility or acceptability of the exercise of judicial will. The 
rhetorician, in other words, is again in pursuit of the agreements as to 
value, the consensus and the identifications which will allow the law to 
be portrayed as non-arbitrary, persuasive and indeed as desirable. 
83 The 
legitimacy of the law, in short,, is a presumption which merely needs an 
explanation. 
To grasp the key features, and indeed the underlying ambivalence of 
legal rhetoric from the perspective of the Logic, it is firstly necessary 
to briefly outline the general argumentative context of legal discourse. 
Just as the Treatise had contrasted argumentation - speech directed at an 
audience - to formal systems of proof - bereft of any context - so too 
legal argument is to be defined at its most abstract, and laudably enough 
in opposition to formalist accounts, as speech which I necessarily 
inscribes itself in a psycho-social context which cannot be entirely 
separated from underlying military, economic, institutional or ideological 
force S., 
84 Ironically enough, however, a close examination of the 
substantive techniques of legal argumentation as presented in the Logic, 
would appear to suggest that the judiciary, and the legal audience 
generally, are to be defined precisely by their distance from and 
opposition to the forces listed. In the abstract, Perelman is quite happy 
-------------------- 
[811 Ibid at pp. 162-163,173. 
[821 Logic at p. 8. 
[831 Ibid at p. 162. 
[841 Ibid at p. 163. 
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to allow the existence of vague generalities of a socio-political nature; 
we are even told that 'legal logic is guided by the ideological 
orientation of the judges, by the manner in which they conceive of their 
role and their missiont85 but this admission is rapidly circumscribed not 
only by the likely homogeneity of its reference group but also by the 
strictly legal nature of this judicial self-conception. The problem is 
well illustrated by the formulation of the central issue of legal judgment 
and is worth citing at some length: 
judgment,, being a decision, and not an impersonal and 
compelling conclusion from uncontested premises, presupposes the 
intervention of a will. How can one demonstrate that such an act 
of will is not arbitrary "? *00 It is quite possible that 
processes of a psychological nature have led the judge to take up a 
position which can perhaps be explained by interests of a social, 
moral or political order and, in the last instance, by the sympathy 
which, for reasons that are admissable or otherwise,, he feels for 
one or other of the parties. 
86 
No explanation of this paradox is attempted. Proposed in such a manner it 
is of course unlikely that the latter set of motives listed would ever be 
stated in a judgment, and Perelman indeed continues with the view that 
'such interests can never form the basis or the explanation of a reasoned 
judgment ... the role of the judge is to render the decision acceptable to 
jurists and, more particularly, to the higher courts. '87 
Wi th echoes of Hart's secondary rules and, more specifically, 
MacCormick's requirements, of 'consistency' and 'coherence'88 in the readers 
ears it remains to detail the precise characteristics of the most 
immediate and important of legal audiences, that of lawyers themselves. 
To fulfil its role in relation to its own specialist institutional 
audience, the judgment must be inscribed or inserted into the collective 
body or loeuvrel of jurisprudence, and must equally 'conform' to the law in 
f orc e. A close examination of these jurisprudential and normative 
constraints upon the rhetoric of legal judgment evinces a variety of 
-------------------- 
[851 Ibid at p. 124. 
[861 Ibid at P. 19. 
[871 Ibid at p. 19. 
[881 H. L. A. Hart op. cit. pp. 92-94; D. N. MacCormick op. cit. pp. 119-128. 
144 
interesting if not wholly surprising institutional boundaries to legal 
reasoning or to the logic of legal values. Despite the volitional 
character of legal judgment; despite the psychological definition of legal 
argument as the act of a judicial orator; despite the passing 
acknowledgement of the various strategic, institutional and ideological 
forces or interests that play a role in the formulation of judicial 
sympathies, and include the desire to do particular justice to the actual 
litigants of the case; the overwhelmingly preponderant subject matter for 
rhetorical analysis transpires to be a series of legally stated normative 
imperatives or presumptions. These are variously treated under the 
headings of general and particular legal topics, systemic rules, and more 
familiarly, conventions, principles and maxims. Collectively, these 
probabilities or topics of legal tradition and argument, constitute the 
logic of legal values; it is these figures that the rhetorician will 
ideally catologue and that the legal judgment will utilise to maintain its 
legitimacy in the face of the legal audience. 
Beneath the camouflage of general assertions as to the psychological 
and sociological determinations of law application, we find cited a series 
of general legal principles - for example, those of natural justice, of 
non-retroactivity, the exclusion of arbitrariness - as well as common 
maxims and adages - notions of 'good morals', legal predictability, as well 
as the generic standards of various legal domains - all of which 
represent, for Perelman, the fusion of the normative constraints of the 
legal audience with the latitude necessary for paticular justice. The 
topics of legal argument transpire to be marvellously vague: I normative 
concepts function as Igivens' (donees) which can only be understood I in 
relation both to their systemic role and to their ever changing social 
context; to which Perelman adds the perhaps unintentional paradox that, I 
in fact ... the specificity of such normative concepts 
is that they vary 
from one society to another and from one epoch to another., 
89 It may thus 
be safely added that the generality of the legal arguments (topics and 
probabilities) is such that in any given instance it is never clear 
whether or not a particular topic will apply. The New Rhetoric is merely 
-------------------- 
[89] L2ogic at P. 165. 
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prepared to allow the law its I given I or accepted figures of argument, and 
further, it will offer no greater explanatory insight than that of 
accepting that the selection and application of these figures is to be 
subsumed hazily under the concept of the 'dictates of judicial psychology 
or interest. ' Worse still, that final category of legal judgment cannot be 
opened to analysis or to criticism, it is rather to be summarised and 
precluded or foreclosed in the conception, ever present in the notion of 
Igivens' . of judicial authority, in the judge as patriarch. All that can 
eventually be said is that any future decision will mysteriously combine 
the attributes of indeterminacy resolved by authority. There is indeed 
little pretence at rationality here - positivism (here the concept of 
legal Igivens'), one might say, is always faced by the danger, from the 
heuristic viewpoint, of saying nothing at all. At all events, we are asked 
to accept that it is analyticaly sufficient to assert that the legal 
audience is best satisfied by the invocation, refinement and argumentative 
reinterpretation of pre-existent legal topics; presumptions, conventions, 
principles and norms; rather than by their transformation. Authority and 
radicalism, to state the obvious , do not go hand in hand. 
90 
Towards the conclusion of the Logic, Perelman again observes that 'law, 
having a social function to fulfil, cannot be conceived realistically, 
without reference to the society it regulates. I Insofar, however, as 
social functions of the legal system appear in the New Rhetoric, they do so 
in the form of an inexorable indeterminacy which serves the purpose of 
reinforcing the description of legal argument as being, in the final 
analysis, an inexplicable combination of individual volition and judicial 
authority, based upon a series of agreed or legally accepted topics of 
argument. Not only is the law an elaborated code or specialised 
lexicon 
and grammar, but the eventual application of the law can only 
be described 
- no real attempt 
is made to explain it - upon the basis of its 
hierarchical status and the authority of its orators: 'disagreements, both 
in legal doctrine and in case law, make it necessary, after the elimination 
of totally unreasonable solutions, 
to resort to authority for the 
imposition of a solution, 191 which is in turn 
described as the personal 
-------------------- 
[90] Jbid at pp. 174-175. 
[91 ] Jbid at p. 6.; see also J. Lenoble et F. Ost op. cit. pp. 
205-206. 
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responsibility of the judge. Therewith, in one aspect at least, the New 
Rhetoric has turned full circle; from the psychological and dialogical 
starting point which asserted the centrality of the orator to the speech, 
it has arrived, via discussions and listings of argumentative techniques 
and topics, via general statements as to the social and political context 
of the law, at an end-point which is that of the *judicial imposition of an 
authoritative solution directed at the looking glass audience of the 
law. 92 As regards the latter point, that of the specialised nature and 
composition of the legal audience generally, and the depiction of its 
rhetorical role within the field of legal argumentation, such descriptions 
and partial explanations as the New Rhetoric proposes, provide, more than 
anything else I would suggest, an admirable set of data for an analysis of 
the form,, or structural features, of legal ideology. The point is a 
complex one and a preliminary analysis of it will serve as a conclusion to 
the present consideration of the various traditional senses of the term 
rhetoric, both old and new. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Despite the apparently trenchant anti-formalism of the New Rhetoric 
and despite its frequent insights into the social psychology of legal 
discourse, it must nevertheless be concluded that its most lasting merit 
consists in its having sympathetically elaborated the restriction, 
obscurity and eventual closure (or circularity) of what has traditionally 
gone by the name of legal reason. From the perspective of the history of 
ideas, the New Rhetoric crucially embodies a large measure of the 
normative classificatory motive and methodology of the Aristotelian 
rhetoric, outlined earlier in terms of the privileging of those modes of 
rhetorical proof which come closest to demonstration. In full agreement 
with Aristotle, Perelman stresses the metaphorical and analogical figures 
of argumentation as constitutive of the genuinely argumentative, and 
-------------------- 
[921 The metaphor is that of K. Llewellyn and E. Hoebel: The Cheyenne Wa (1941) 
Oaklahoma U. P. p. 41, well discussed in I. A. Stewart: Sociology in 
jurispruderr-e: B. Fryer et al (eds. ): Law, State and Societ (1981) Croom Helm 
107. See also the useful information provided in A. Paterson: The Law Lords 
(1982) MacMillan pp. 9-11,32-34. 
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equally resorts to a predominantly normative description of the topics and 
probabilities of the discursive field or domain of the law. Legal 
discourse, in short, is to be rendered ' rational' or 'logical' at the price, 
in this account, of broadening or generalising (though not transforming) 
the semantic and pragmatic reference of the term logic. 
The methodology of formal logic is extended, in the New Rhetoric, to 
include the logic of values , but this exercise is very far from being 
conducted in the name of any substantive or indeed extra-legal set of 
considerations or func ti on s. The logic of legal values assumes a 
consensus as to its own value, that of a series of generic probabilities, 
which are ideally typified in the self-perception of the legal audience 
itself. It is thus no coincidence that the New Rhetoric lays its greatest 
stress upon the Igiveness' of legal topics and upon the authority of legal 
judgment. These are precisely the assumptions that ground the claim to 
legal logic or rationality in a manner exactly and necessarily analogous 
to the assumption of the major premiss within the logical syllogism 
itself. Thus for example, when Perelman portentously claims that the law 
develops 'by balancing a double exigency', the duality is explicated in 
terms of one exigency I of a systematic order - the elaboration of a 
coherent legal order - the other the search for acceptable solutions ... 
requiring conformity to what appears just and reasonable in the particular 
case. 193 The exigency of a systematic order is primarily that of excluding 
impossible or absurd innovations to the legal code, but granted that the 
norms of this code are described as a series of generic, open textured and 
frequently ambiguous proposition. s, the problem is better formulated as 
that of reasserting a normative proposition which will adequately 
legitimate or otherwise satisfy the essentially traditional and pedagogic 
belief in the determinacy and rationality of legal method and legal 
reason. The discursive specificity of the legal must be maintained and 
indeed can also usefully function to obscure the pragmatic or 
ideologically motivated or structured choice of outcome that is actually 
realised. 
-------------------- 
[931 4ogic at p. 173. 
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The second aspect to the double exigency is that of particular justice, 
or the need to provide a decision. Here again, however, the privileged 
concern of the legal rhetorician is normative and prescriptive rather than 
substantive or specific. The decision must be made acceptable, but to 
those who would dare inquire as to how and to whom, the answer is 
straightforwardly that it must be made acceptable to the legal audience in 
the novel guise of the principles of equity, or at least of a series of 
more pragmatically orientated legal norms. To which it must be added that 
it is in relation to the categories of the 'case' and of the 'litigants' 
that the systematicity of legal rhetoric is momentarily punctured; even if 
such systematicity is eventually to be reasserted in the reasoning of the 
decision, it is nevertheless recognised that the process of decision 
making itself incorporates features of a psychological and social order. 
We are reminded that the legal order, in the abstract schema of the 
rhetoric at least, is but one of the audiences of the law, and that even 
the most legalistic of rhetoricians would allow that Problems of policy 
and of an administrative or political order are, however vaguely, related 
to the legal. It is here then that the New Rhetoric makes a fatal choice; 
in momentarily allowing that the particular decision brings the law into 
direct confrontation with the social, it opens the way for a rhetorical 
consideration of the material determination of legal argument by the as 
yet excluded audiences of the public, non-legal, domain. Despite their 
theoretical presence, however, the non-legal audiences are not made the 
object of any extended discussion or analysis. The extra-legal audience 
is precisely assumed by the New Rhetoric: it is implicitly homogeneous; at 
any one given moment in -time it exists in a state of equilibrium and 
consensus as to values or moral order; it not only accepts the law but even 
regards it as desirable and authoratitive, and it views its argumentation 
as convincing. In presenting the rhetoric of the law, in other words, the 
New Rhetoric also legitimates and prescribes it in large doses for the 
social body as a whole. The assumptions underpinning the probabilities of 
legal argument, both normative and pragmatic, are projected onto 
the 
economic and social relations of a society which 
is also conceived in 
terms of consensus: it too must 
have its probabilities and topics, although 
we are never informed as 
to what they are or to whom they belong, save that 
at the level of rhetorical 
analysis they in no way conflict with the logic 
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of values that underpin the law itself. 
It requires, I would suggest, but an inkling of critical thought to view 
the above assumptions as unacceptable. Classical rhetoric, while it was 
certainly deficient in critical concepts, could at least claim with some 
plausibility that the city states of the Hellenic era and of the early 
Roman Empire were united in their unitary understanding of the virtues of 
political citizenship. As regards those whom the political system 
actually included, it might well be fair to perceive citizen and state, 
individual and collectivity, as complementary rather than opposed. To 
base a modern rhetoric upon a comparable assumption is manifestly absurd, 
or better, in terms of legal discourse, it is a highly effective political 
decision or strategy; the product of a very modern form of idealism, and of 
a jurisprudence determined, at any cost, to articulate and repeat an order 
and language of normative propositions whose extreme ideological power 
resides in the very fact that their reference to materiality is at best 
partial and obscure. In many senses the legal is thus a paradigm for the 
ideological; its very methodology, as we have seen, is that of an 
argumentation and normative rhetoric that is ever concerned to generalise 
beyond its pragmatic and material context; while appearing to describe a 
real object it leads us inexorably into the hermetic and circular play of 
legal norms; while the law is undoubtedly invested with a peculiarly 
'concrete' force or function, its argumentative method and justificatory 
rhetoric encode a relation to the social in a manner that can never be 
either verified or falsified. We may conclude that insofar as the 
traditional rhetorics do encompass a logic of legal values, they also 
raise,, in the clearest fashion, a choice of value: is the study of 
law 
primarily to accept legal relations as 'given' and consensual, or 
is it to 
treat the rhetoric of law as a primary datum to be evaluated and appraised 
against the background of the institutional power and social relations 
of 
inequality, of superordination and subordination, that underpin 
that 
rhetoric and determine its semantic content? 
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LAW AS SOCIAL DISCOURSE I: A TOPOLOGY OF DISCOURSE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The project of delineating and presenting a concept of legal discourse 
or materialist rhetoric of law, as an alternative form, or political 
instrument for the analysis of legal relations, raises a series of 
problems. Not least the concept of discourse itself, and the various 
contemporary interdisciplinary uses of a method of discourse analysis as 
the appropriate tool of critical theory, have lent the term a certain 
fashionable if diffuse currency. The invocation of, or recourse to, the 
terminology of - discourse or of discourse analysis, however, is 
unfortunately considerably more frequent than any systematic or indeed 
coherent examination of the requisite methodology or critical limitation 
of the concept itself. In the broadest and loosest of terms, the concept 
of discourse can be applied to any sequence of utterances at the level of 
the sentence or above. 
' In potential it thus ranges in scope from the 
seemingly universal problems of the structural features of culture, 
communication and ideology as the intrinsic problems of the theory of 
discourse, right the way down to the minute questions of the syntactic and 
semantic analysis of the spec if ic 9 historically singular, text or 
utterance, studied in discourse analysis. 
-------------------- 
Thus,, for instance, the very broad definition in Z. Harris: Discourse Analysi 
. 
Eýints (1963) The Hague at p. 7 I Discourse analysis is a method of seeking in 
any connected discrete linear material, whether language or 
language-like, 
which contains more than one elementary sentence, some global structure 
characterising the whole 
discourse (the linear material) or large sections of 
it. The structure is a pattern of occurrence (i. e. a recurrence) of segments 
of a discourse relative 
to each other. I For more recent definitions of the 
discipline in terms of pragmatics, see, M. Stubbs: Discourse Analysis (1983) 
Blackwell; G. Brown and G. Yule: Discourse Analysis 
(1983) Caml-ri'-Tge U. P. 
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The most immediate and obvious of difficulties to be raised by the term 
discourse itself, are thus not only those of the multiplicity of its 
differing levels of usage, but, more ambitiously, are those of attempting 
to formulate and substantiate the complex relationship of the structural 
features, or regularities, of systems of communication as discursive 
formations, to their agency or manifestation in the specific, empirical 
pr ac tic e. In terms of the state of the art, I shall indicate that the most 
pressing need facing the theories of discourse is precisely that of 
locating the specific linguistic and semantic tools which will enable the 
generation of as yet absent empirical and particular analyses of text and 
reception, of utterance and audience. Similarly, the putative concept of 
legal discourse must endeavour to provide some account or systematisation 
of a coherent relation between the problems of the analysis of legal 
communication as a cultural form and practice, problems occasionally 
hinted at in theories of legal semiotics, and the more traditional (though 
inadequate) concentration upon the minutiae of the legal text or judgment. 
It is in an endeavour to respond to these problems, that I shall devote the 
first part of this study of law as social discourse, to the presentation of 
a topology of discourse drawn from the context of the development of 
contemporary linguistics and will subsequently analyse legal discourse 
according to the topology outlined. By way of introduction, however, I 
shall offer a few general comments upon the peculiarities of legal 
discourse and the broad historical context and motivation of its analysis. 
It is a familiar and consistent feature of all the major historical 
legal systems that, in their ascendancy, they have resorted increasingly 
to the written text. As the history of rhetoric, both general and 
forensic, amply evidences, the study of language as discourse, as social 
utterance or practice, or as the systematisation of the political contours 
and effects of a primarily spoken discourse, was 
both historically and 
geographically short lived. In terms of the 
history of the study of 
language, indeed, the democratic republican ethos of early classical 
rhetoric was thoroughly exceptional 
to the dominant, centripetal or 
unifying tendencies within 
the development of the European languages as a 
whole, and the corresponding centralisation 
or unification of the official 
discourses of an essentially 
hierarchical development of European 
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2 linguistic culture. The predominant linguistic mode within the latter 
context was the study of language as 'given', as static and written; 
language and meaning were always already produced or 'there'. and merely 
awaiting the patient and passive understanding of the philologist or 
exegete. 
Law and in its earlier form religion, were no exception to such a 
tendency. Both relied exorbitantly, though clearly not c- ontinuously, upon 
writing, and upon the interpretation and control of their social practice 
in relation to a series of texts. While noting that periods of dogmatic 
crisis or of radical legal change, have frequently been accompanied by the 
increasing irrelevance or, in legal terms, desuetude, of the written law - 
by virtue of contrary informal practices the code becomes a relic - it is 
nevertheless interesting to observe the continuity of the problem of 
textual interpretation. The code, or more informally, the written law, has 
invariably though with a greater or lesser degree of practical or actual 
relevance been the object of an elitist, revelatory or hierophantic, 
culture of interpretation. An intricate and exclusive system of 
disciplinary or dogmatic tools, the various forms of traditional exegesis 
and indeed of traditional and contemporary hermeneutics, were developed 
early and precisely to the effect of safeguarding and preserving the 
sanctity and general impenetrability of the written word as a system of 
social control, religious or legal. 
Un sur pr isi ngl y, the features of the code; both interp retative 
(hermeneutic) and substantive (the actual norms); and the processes of 
what is currently termed 'encoding 
and decoding which constitute the 
communicational practice of religious and legal institutions, had been the 
object of venerable traditions of both the theological and 
jurisprudential analysis. It is not only or merely that the traditions 
-------------------- 
[21 These issues will be discussed in greater detail subsequently. For a broad and 
highly stimulating account, there is the incomparable work of M. Bakhtin: The 
Dialogic Imagination (1981) University of Texas Press, passim. SpecificaMy 
on rriting and power c. f. J. Derrida: Of Grammatology 
(1976) John Hopkins U. P. 
Part I; W. Ong: Orality and Literacy M982) Methuen; G. Gillan: From Sign To 
ambol (1982) Harvester ch. 2 & 4; V. Volosinov: Marxism and the Philosophy of 
ýýnguage (1973) Academic Press pp. 65-82; J. Derrida: Scribble (writing- po 
19 797 58 Yale French Studies 116; and finally J. Kristeva, in S. Heath and 
C. Prendergast (eds. ): Signs of the Times (1971 ) Cambridge. 
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and institutions concerned had spawned their own justificatory literature; 
it was also the case that the predominantly elitist culture of scholarship 
itself, has historically been very much tied up with and dependent upon 
the systems and institutions of power that originally formed the practical 
object of historical, philosophical and, most pertinently, rhetorical, 
analysis. Such is to say that the concept of knowledge itself was 
traditionally, and is still, inextricably linked to the culture, and 
sociologically very restricted, community of power. The order of 
knowledge, secular, legal and religious, has a lengthy history of material 
dependence upon, and has largely been produced within, institutions either 
directly or indirectly financed and controlled by the hierarchy of 
religious and secular power. Secondly, and more specifically, the 
relation of dependency or of frustration between power and knowledge can 
do much to explain the nature and characteristic methods of such 
disciplinary traditions as are available for.. and have concerned 
themselves with, the exegesis or hermeneutics upon which the exercise of 
legal power has, at least nominally, been based and justified. 3 Such, at 
least, I will argue, is the general framework of dependency from within 
which the question of legal knowledge as social discourse is best 
approached. 
6.1.1 Linguistics, Ethics and Method 
At the level of legal theory or metalanguage, it is at least clear that, 
in terms of formal principle, there is nothing especially novel attendant 
upon the endeavour to characterise law in terms of its textual, discursive 
and indeed, on occasion, communicative and dialogic characteristics. As I 
have argued earlier, 
4 the substantive positivistic jurisprudence of the 
-------------------- 
131 The image of knowledge, religious, philosophical or legal, and the self- 
evidence of its power, is amply and consistently expressed in the self- 
conception of the intellectual as social grouping and role. Knowledge is 
hidden, distant and isolated, it is the unhappy consciousness of the universal 
as yet unfulfilled, as yet inaccessible to all but the few. Its most dramatic 
representations are to be found in Nietzsche's awesomely solitary 
Zarathustraq in Schopenhauer Is 'lonely star' whose light only becomes visible 
to the inhabitants of this earth many decades later . It is the truth value of 
the text that makes the written word sacred and removed as the ultimate 
justification of political will from Plato: Collected Works (1963) Princeton 
U. P. . Republic 
VI 493 et seq., onwards. 
[41 C. f. ante ch-3-5, or for a synoptic account P. Goodrich: Linguistics and Legal 
Analysis (forthcomingg 1984) 47 Modern Law Review. 
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late 19th, and of the 20th centuries, has in many ways been defined as a 
distinctive tradition or genre, precisely by its increasingly frequent and 
comprehensive resort to the normative methodology and terminology of 
linguistics, and to a lesser degree, by the reinvocation of the traditional 
Aristotelian rhetoric. In each case, both in relation to linguistics and 
to rhetoric, I have also argued that the use made of these 'external' 
disciplines has been methodologically and substantively inadequate, not 
least by virtue of being profoundly uncritical and ahistorical. In 
reliance, it may be suspected, upon a tradition that returns eventually to 
the classics and to the historical proximity of law to religion and to 
conceptions of the sacred text and writing (stasis), the more contemporary 
use made of the disciplines in question has been that of fostering an 
immanent analysis of the legal text, both as normative system and as 
substantive judgment. To put it more forcefully, the practice of legal 
analysis, and of textbook and casebook law, has been that of treating legal 
language as a self-sufficient object of study, and so effectively 
maintaining a descriptive concept of the legal text as the monologic and 
alien progression of an internal rationality peculiar to law. 
Curiously enough, the self-same jurisprudential tradition has also 
increasingly acknowledged the conventional, institutional and social 
dimensions of legal doctrine and norms. For the whole range of 
positivistic jurisprudence, however, these terms have a specific 'artistic' 
or technical meaning. Even within a reformed positivism prepared to 
acknowledge law as a social fact, and equally prepared to elaborate 
theories of a New Rhetoric and of a practical reasoning, the conventions, 
institutions and sociality to which the theories refer, are purely 
normative and, soc ioll. ogic ally, wholly non-empirical. The societal 
categories invoked are indeed of no greater empirical standing than 
that 
of passing references to the unqrgued assumption or presupposition 
that 
law, as form or as norm, and legal relations generally, both represent an 
agreed moral order and are exercised within a static or synchronically 
conceived social structureg itself 
based upon a consensus or, to use the 
entirely appropriate 17th century 
terminology, a social contract. Phrased 
in stronger terms; far from raising questions as 
to the actual social and 
historical form of life which law represents and 
in a measure perpetuates, 
the theories in question act as rationalisations of a conception 
of 'man' 
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and of a social and moral code, embedded in the ideals of classical liberal 
philosophy. The ethical foundations for such a project belong to the 
past. Certainly the concepts of 'proprietorial individualism' and of 
'social contract' or consensual order, act as defences or bulwarks against 
certain forms of irrationalism, arbitrariness and wanton destruction, but 
they are nonetheless helplessly dogmatic and anachronistic when faced 
with the contemporary sociological complexity and diversity of the actual 
relation of individual to society - the problems of agency, role, group, 
class and structure. In short, it is at least arguable that in the context 
of the growing crises, both national and global, of the capitalist economy, 
and the correlative breakdown of traditional patterns of legal order in 
the face of rising unemployment, crime epidemics and generalised and 
continuing inequalities of access, opportunity and distributed wealth, the 
reiteration of the normative coherence of legal rules and of the ideal 
cohesion of the society upon which they are based, becomes ever more 
explicitly an act of repression in itself. It is not the past which 
should be restored, it is the stark and terrible potentiality of what is to 
come which should impinge upon the theorising of even the lawyers of an 
5 increasingly militarised nuclear age. 
Provided that the concept of methodology is understood to be 
sufficiently broad to include, over and above questions of verification 
and quantification, the questions of the motivation of social inquiry, 
then the problems raised above may be formulated in terms of methodology. 
6 
The problem is essentially that of what forms of sociological data and 
what species or aspects of conventional and institutional facts are to be 
deemed relevant to, and implicated in, the study of legal texts. Reserving 
for the subsequent sections, the development of the specifically 
linguistic and semantic arguments - inherent in the elaboration of the 
concept of discourse itself -- upon which it 
is possible to argue 
forcefully against the notion of the autonomy or isolation of the 
legal 
text,, the question raised may be seen initially, precisely as one of motive 
-------------------- 
151 For a useful discussion of conceptions of methodology, c. 
f. P. McHugh et al. 
(eds. ): On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (1974) R. K. P. pp. 21-47. Comparable 
argumenf-smay be found in T. 
Eagleton: Literary Theory (1983) Blackwell 
pp. 194-217; J. Kr isteva: Desire 
in Language (1980) Blackwell ch. 1. 
[61 See footnote 5. See also, M. Riffaterre 
(ed. ): Languages of Knowledge and of 




and choice, or of an ethics of social, political, and historical 
responsibility. What is needed, from this viewpoint, is some kind of moral 
perspective or motivation, upon which to base the possibility of a 
critical evaluation of the textual and empiricalt formal and informal, 
contours and limits to legal discourse in its relation to (and as) social 
pr ac tic e. 
If I have so far argued that the legal discipline as a whole is bathed 
in an aura of systematics which finds its most coherent expression in 
positivist jurisprudence and its correlative, linguistically based, theory 
of the immanent analysis of the legal text, then the ethical motive for 
proposing an alternative methodology for the analysis of legal discourse, 
may usefully be drawn from a text of Engels in 1893: 
It is above all this semblance of an independent history of state 
constitutions, of systems of law, of ideological conceptions in every 
separate domain that dazzles most people. If Luther and Calvin 
"overcome" the official catholic religion, or Hegel "overcomes" 
Fichte and Kant, Rousseau with his republican Social Contract 
indirectly "overcomes" the constitutional Montesquieu, this process, 
which remains within theology, philosophy, or political science, 
represents a stage in the history of these particular spheres of 
7 thought, and never passes beyond the sphere of thought. 
It seems clear that Engel's objection is primarily and healthily directed 
to those forms of historical analysis which represent the development of 
ideas and of disciplines wholly in terms of their internal dynamics; their 
'reaction to' or 'overcoming of' the preceding ideas. More interestingly, 
the motive for such a protest implicitly raises two sets of unmet 
methodological requirements, of specific relevance to the contemporary 
study of legal discourse. 
It is first the case that the attack upon idealism raises the general 
requirement of a critical evaluation of the concept of a discipline and of 
its subject-matter. In this aspect, it seems to me to be extremely clear 
that what is involved is not merely a recognition that particular 
disciplines may and should be defined in terms of the material 
circumstances - economic, historical and 
institutional - of their 
171 Marx and Engels: Selected Correspondenc (1964) Mo-%--ow pp-541-2. 
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production. It is also and further the case, that analysis is primarily 
concerned in this respect, to challenge the internal order and formal 
self-representation of the discipline in question, in terms of its actual 
discursive products and practices. 'S To illustrate this point 
ýy 
reference 
to the discipline of law, it is necessary to raise a series of broad 
questions as to the internal structure, or self-articulatiom, of legal 
discourse itself, questions with which I will be later concerned in terms 
of legal lintradiscoursel. The point to be made initially, concerns, in its 
most simple formulation, the relationship between the facts and outcome of 
a case, and the substantive legal categories invoked and elaborated in the 
actual formulation of the decision itself. At this stage, it is hopefully 
sufficient to point merely to the possibility of a systematic discrepancy 
or disjunction between what I would term the content and the justification 
of legal decisions. While remaining entirely within the ambit of the 
interpretative politics of the legal text, it is nonetheless possible to 
argue that the broad principles in which the substantive and procedural 
norms and rights of judicial reasoning are contained, bear no necessary or 
no direct relation to their substantive decision making practices, viewed 
as active interventions into material social relations. What the court 
says, is not necessarily the most accurate of descriptions of what it does; 
probing the content of case law is likely to provide a far deeper critique 
of the law of democratic states than does the analysis of the rules or 
norms regularly, though frequently only symbolically, invoked by way of 
legal justificatory argument. 
9 
The second, less contentious, point implicit within the critique of 
conceptions of the internal development of disciplinary 
traditions, is 
that it ignores the effects of a discourse upon the institutional and 
social practices which the discourse either serves or regulates. 
Thus, 
for instance, the legal curriculum has tended, both explicitly 
(in terms of 
the ideals of freedom, equality and non-arbitrariness of the rule of 
law) 
-------------------- 
[8] Such I take to be one of the few points well made in D. Silverman 
& B. Torode: 
The Material Word (1980) R. K. P. pp. 
6-8. C. f. P. Goodrich: Linguistic 
ý'18, -e-T1--97-f7--R-a--dical Philosophy 50. 
[9] C. f. D. McBarnet: Legal Form and Legal Mystification 
(1982) 10 Int. Journal of 
the Sociology of Law 409, at p. 
415; a similar point is made in terms of the 
'inadequacy? of the categories of judicial justificatory argument 
in 
W. T. MUrPhY & R. W. Rawlings: After the 
Ancien Regime (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 
617, pp. 617-623, and (1982) 45 M. L. R. 34, at pp. 
57-61. 
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and implicitly (by omission), to teach that the legal regulation of human 
affairs is natural, efficient and just. Based almost exclusively upon the 
systematisation of the formal normative aspects of the legal system and 
decision making processes, legal education is unconcerned - save in cases 
of the obvious breakdown of legal regulation - with any analysis of the 
actual extent or manner in which the norms of the system are realised. of 
the sociological data available, both with regard to the legal 
institutions and personnel, and with regard to the legal regulation of 
socio-economic development generally, 10 a significant proportion would 
tend to confirm the view that law both represents and serves to perpetuate 
the patterns of hierarchy and domination constitutive of a profoundly 
inegalitarian social system. Irrespective of whether or not such patterns 
of inequality are justifiable or eradicable, it is obviously a 
precondition for any account of law as both a form and a content, or as 
both a theoretical system and a use or practice of that system, that such 
social data as is available be at least deemed relevant to and implicated 
in the study of the normative discursive order itself. It is not only 
that norms, in the last instance, only bear a meaning by virtue of 
practice" but equally that any remotely critical account of legal 
regulation should be sufficiently acute to read behind the symbols or 
rhetoric of legal regulation and to analyse, to borrow a very broad 
formulation of R. M. Unger's : 
*** a background plan of social division and hierarchy. Such a plan 
provides (legal) dealings with a prewritten script. It makes the 
opportunities of practical exchange or passionate attachment respect 
the limits imposed by some established order. It assigns fixed roles 
to people according to the position that they hold within a 
-------------------- 
[101 Aside from general character isations such as J. G. Griffith: The Politics of 
the Judiciary (1981 ) Fontana ch. 1 and passim, or F. Burton & P. Carlen: OfTITC-71al 
Discourse (1979) R. K. P. ch. 3; the most interesting work is historic-a-[T-. The 
classic udy is D. Hay et al (eds): Albion's Fatal Tree (1975) Allen Lane. See 
also, T. Mathieson: Law, Society and Political Action (1980) Academic Press, 
M. Foucault: Discipilin-eand Punish (1979) Peregrine Books, or, for a recent 
study, summarising a considerable amount of empirical work, P. Cameron & T. S. 
Midgley: Contract, the Rule of Law and the Liberal-Democratic State (1982) 10 
Int. Journal of the Sociology of Law 239. More detailed references will be 
provided subsequently and as relevant. 
[111 A point which is accepted, although only momentarily and in a very abstract or 
restricted form, by Kelsen, in terms of the requirement that the system of 
norms be 'by and large efficacious' , and by Hart in terms of the requirement 
that the rule of recognition reflect official practice. C. f. ch. 3. 
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predetermined set of social or gender contrasts. 12 
Walter Benjamin is more succinct, I there is no cultural document that is 
not also a record of barbarism . 
13 
6.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
I have so far made a somewhat unhappy or as yet ill-defined use of the 
term discourse to loosely refer, both to the processes that intervene and 
determine the relationship of a language to the formulation of utterances 
(discursive processes), and also to refer more generally to the relation 
of bodies of knowledge to social practice and structure (discursive 
formation). At both levels, those of process and of formation, the motive 
underlying recourse to what is still a very ill-formulated discipline, has 
been that of the desire to challenge the hermetic security of both legal 
language and its metalanguage, legal theory. The argument may usefully be 
restated in terms cross-cutting the distinction made, as that of an 
attempt to analyse law from outside legal culture and its privileging of 
the normative and conventional features of law, in terms, most simply, of 
its semantic functioning (regularities) and of its history, its relation 
to and representation of, power. Of the many levels of reasoning involved, 
the modern history of legal theory itself would seem to indicate clearly 
that there has at least been a strongly negative awareness within 
jurisprudence of the existence of these semantic and historical issues. 
Such, at all events, would appear to be the most credible explanation of 
the- introduction into positivist methodology of tools drawn from 
linguistics and from rhetoric or practical reason, respectively utilised 
precisely to exclude the discursive and social issues or problems, whose 
grounding has nonetheless been implicitly recognised. It would seem 
appropriate then, to commence an analytic elaboration of the concept of 
legal discourse in terms of these two excluded or marginalised categories, 
those of semantics and of history. 
-------------------- 
[121 R. M. Unger: The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 
561, at P. 587. 
1131 13. W. Benjamin: One Way Street (1979) London PP-349-361 
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6.2.1 Di se our se 
The development of discourse analysis as a discipline and the 
correlative definition of its object, discursive processes and discursive 
formations, has been consistently impeded by over -gener alisation. It is 
one of the peculiarities of the theory of discourse that it has, as a 
whole, more frequently been studied in terms of logic and epistemology 
14 (within the English language tradition) 
, or of literary theory and 
psychoanalysis (within the continental tradition), 15 than it has been 
studied in terms of linguistics. 16 To avoid the dangers of reiterating 
already numerous and laudable statements of intention, it is as well to 
resort to a negative strategy and to define discourse initially in 
relation to linguistics, and only later in relation to the particular 
social practices and ideologies which are the more usual contemporary 
terrain of its study. 
One of the earliqst and most accessible analyses of the term discourse 
to be found in post-Saussurian linguistics is that provided by the French 
linguist Emile Benveniste. 17 To understand the crucial distinction which 
he makes between the units of language as conceived by linguistics - as 
signs - and the units of discourse - sentences - it is necessary to 
briefly recall the formal contours of Saussurian linguistics. The key 
feature of what has gone under the title of the 'science' of language, has 
been the invariable recourse to some variant of the opposition between 
language as a system (langue) and language as speech (parole). 
18 Equally 
consistent has been the need felt to privilege the former term of the 
distinct ion over the latter. "The system of language is a normative ideal, 
the pre'supposition of a synchronic systematicity which alone renders 
language available to scientific study; whereas language as speech is 
-------------------- 
[141 C. f., e. g., M. C. Beardsley: Metaphor, in EncyclOPedia of Philosophy (1967) 5 
at p. 284, M. Black: Models and Metaphors (19b2)-I'EFa-ca, or P. Strawson: 
Individuals (1959) Methuen. 
[151 C. f., e. g., R. Barthes: S/Z (1970) Paris, J. Lacan: Ecrits (1977) Tavistock, 
C. Metz: Psychoanalysis anFCinema (1982) MacMillan. 
[161 C. f., generally, the remarks made in P. Ricoeur: The Rule of Metaphor (1978) 
R. K. P. pp. 66 et seq. 
1171 E. Benveniste: Problems of General Linguistics (1971 ) Univ. of Miami Press. 
[181 C-f- particularly, M. Pecheux: Language, Semantics and Ideology (1982) 
Macmillan at pp. 5-7,37-8,174-5. C. f. also J. Derrida: Positions (1981) 
Athlone ch. 2., as well as the earlier discussion and references in 3TT. 'ý. 
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indeterminate, to a degree irrational, and available only to the 
psychological study of subjective intentions. In terms of the units of 
language (signs/words) with which linguistics generally operates, the 
distinction reappears with a vengeance in the form of the opposition 
between signifier and signified, which categories together comprise the 
sign. Again, it is the former term of the distinction which is privileged. 
The sign is arbitrary or unmotivated, it exists notionally as a difference 
within a system of differences; it signifies, but what it signifies (the 
signified) is a matter of complete indifference. It is merely sufficient 
that the signifier has a signified, that it bears a value and only one 
value within the system of its differentiation. In short, the sign is a 
form not a content; in terms of the economic metaphor beloved of linguists 
generally, it can be argued that it is an exchange value (an equivalent) 
and not a use value, or, more technically, that it is a commodity in a 
system of circulation, set free of the process whereby it was produced. 19 
In a somewhat restricted sense, Benveniste could be said to have 
inverted the foregoing distinctions. Rejecting the term speech (parole) 
and replacing it with the term discourse - to indicate the consistency of 
the object of study - he introduces the distinction between the units of 
language and those of discourse. The distinction to be made is that 
between the sign, which remains arbitrary with regard to its referent 
though not its signified, and the sentence, which for Benveniste, 
constitutes a different level in the architecture of language. 
2 0 The 
concept of levels of language is integral to Benveniste's analysis. It is 
specifically intended to indicate that any linguistic unit whatsoever can 
only be accepted as such if it can be identified with some higher level 
unit - the phoneme in the word, the word in the sentence. Language is 
constituted not by the word alone, but by the hierarchy of levels within 
which the word, the sign par excellence; 
occurs in an intermediary functional position that arises from its 
double nature. On the one hand it breaks down into phonemic units, 
-------------------- 
[191 For a fuller discussion of such a theme and its implications, see 
J. Baudrillard: For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981) 
Telos Press, ch. 8. See also, U. Eco: Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language 
(1984) MacMillan. 
[201 Benveniste op. cit. p. 104. 
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which are from a lower level; on the other, it is a unit of meaning 
and together with other units of meaning, it enters into a unit of the 21 level above. 
Further, the higher level or unit is to be distinguished qualitatively 
from the lower level, this unit I is not a longer or more complex word - it 
belongs to another class of notions; it is a sentence ... A sentence 
constitutes a whole which is not reducible to the sum of its parts., 22 To 
put it differently there is, for Benveniste,, a duality to the word. As a 
form, that is, as a signifier or lexeme - an isolated item in the lexical 
code - the word is not a constituent of the sentence. It is only as a 
meaning that the word is related to the sentence as Ia syntagmatic 
element, a constituent of empirical utterances 1, in turn defined by its 
capacity precisely as a meaning, to integrate the higher level unit. 
23 
The point which I wish to draw from this analysis concerns its 
potential, rather than its substantive elaboration in Benveniste's later 
wor k. 
24 It is important, however, to be clear as to the status of this 
reformulation and reorientation of the earlier Saussurian oppositions 
between Ilanguel and 'parole', and between signifier and signified. On the 
positive side, Benveniste certainly provides a profound insight into the 
weaknesses of the foregoing concept of the systematicity of language, its 
inbuilt inability, as a semiotics, to deal with the problem of meaning and 
the semantics of utterances. He then formulates the latter problem, that 
of semantics, in terms of the sentence which, he stresses, must be viewed 
as the life of speech in action: I It is in discourse, realised in 
sentences, that language is formed and takes shape. There language begins. 
One could say, in imitation of a classical formula: nihil est in lingua 
quod non prius fuerit in oratione. I (There is nothing in language which 
will not previously have existed in speech). 
25 Discourse, in other words, 
is an object of study in its own right and is of an equal, or perhaps 
1211 Ibid at p. 104. 
[221 Ibid. 105. 
[231 Ibid. 105,107. 
[241 The most notable later work being, E. Benveniste: La forme et le sens dans le 
langage. In Le Langage (1967) Neuchatel 27-40, where he develops the useful 
distinction between Tsemiotics'. as the , r-ience of signs, and 'semantics' , as 
the analysis of discourse as an independent unity. 
[251 problemsop. cit. p. 111. 
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greater, status than the preceding concentration upon language as system, 
and sign as form. Furthermore, and to complicate matters slightly, 
discourse, as empirical utterance, is historical and is, in principle at 
least, to be understood diachronically. Discourse always occurs as an 
event, and as an 'instance of discourse', as 'the discrete and always unique 
acts by which the language is actualised in speech by a speaker. t26 
On the negative side, Benveniste does not dwell upon the historical 
character of discourse events, but rather, distinguishes the instance of 
discourse from its meaning, in the broadest sense of the term, its identity 
and repeatability, its 'auto-referential' character. While such a 
distinction may be analytically justifiable in that it maintains the 
separation of language system from discourse, it is also suggestive of the 
limitations and restricted theoretical scope of the concept of discourse 
in Benveniste's work as a whole. Such becomes apparent upon a closer 
examination of the concept of meaning itself. According to Benveniste, 
two features of meaning are of especial importance. Very briefly, the 
most basic unit of discursive meaning is the word understood as a content. 
Such a content is conventional or institutional, in that the word 'refers', 
or is referential to, a reality outside the sign. The word is depicted as 
an arbitrary denotative potential to be integrated into a higher level, 
that of the sentence as the unit of discourse, wherein it will obtain an 
? actual' meaning based upon its combination or use. Combination, and the 
essentially propositional meaning appertaining to it, are the product of 
the speaker's intention in combining. Thus, 'in the sign we have reached 
the intrinsic reality of language, while with the sentence we connect up 
with things outside language ... the sense of the sentence 
implies 
reference to the discourse situation and the speaker's attitude. ' 
27 Without 
taking the matter further, it is hopefully apparent from the opposition of 
arbitrary reference to (transcendental) intention28 that 
far from moving 
outside the ambit (problematic) of the 
Saussurian opposition of system to 
-------------------- 
[261 Ibid. pp. 217-222. 
[271 La 
- 
formeop. cit. P- 36* 
word [281 C. f. Ibid. P-37: I The meaning of a sentence is its idea, the meaning of a 
is its use (always in the semantic acceptation) . Based upon the idea, which is 
: )articular in every case, 
the speaker assembles words which, in this 
employmen , have aI particular meaning'. 
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realisation or speech, the theory of discourse has so far attempted no 
more than that of performing for the category of 'parole' (as discourse), 
what Saussure achieved in relation to Ilanguel (as system). The orders of 
language as system, and of discourse as utterance, stand opposed and 
separate; the order of discourse viewed as meaning is systematised 
psychologistic ally, as a unity of discrete propositions whose ordering 
principle is that of the subjective idea, or of the speaker's intention. 
Finally, the extra-discursive reality to which the content of words 
themselves refer, is distributed accross the sentence and is subject to 
the intentionality of meaning, its self-articulation, within the limit of 
the sentence conceived as a higher level semantic syntagm. 29 
It is precisely because Benveniste, and those who have followed him on 
this point, 
30 have accepted the Saussurian distinction itself, that they 
have been forced to attempt to develop and invert it in terms of what may 
be referred to as a 'linguistics' of parole, variously defined by later 
linguists in terms of 'enunciation', 'performance', 'message', 'text' and so 
on. At its root lies the inability to view the historical character of 
utterances historically, the failure to develop any non-normative concepts 
of the relationship between language system and language use -a failure 
best evidenced in Benveniste's conception of the arbitrariness of the 
word's reference to the extra-linguistic realm, a fundamentally idealist 
notion which continually threatens to define the extra-linguistic reality 
as a product of language itself. Rather than prolong the criticism of 
this early formulation of a theory of discourse, however, it is preferable 
to utilise its positive elements and its linguistic specificity to develop 
a concept of discursive processes, as a means, in turn, to formulating a 
genuinely socio-historical theory of language use as necessarily embedded 
in ideological processes and conflicts. 
----- -------------- 
[291 To use Jakobson's terminology, the arbitrary reference of words to reality, is 
a paradigmatic (semiotic) function of language. One may thus note, that the 
problem of polysemy is located at the level of the system of language, of the 
lexical code, and does not enter the terrain of semantics. C. f. La Forme p. 
37; and R. Jakobson and M. Halle: Fundamentals of Language (1956) Mouton pp. 
72-77. 
1301 Especially, Jakobson and Halle op. cit.; R. Jakobson: Linguistics and Poetics, 
in R. and F. De George: The Structuralists (1972) Anchor 89; R. Barthes: 
ri Aments of Semiology (1967) Cape; J. Kristeva op. cit. ch. I. 
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6.2.2 Discursive processes 
The theory of discourse, as so far elaborated, has moved towards 
perfecting a properly structuralist, binary, opposition between language 
as system (as sign and code), and the elaboration of a descriptive concept 
of the semantic laws (or functions)31 which independently explain the 
meaning of the utterance itself. Both the forms of language are conceived 
as being, in the last analysis, autonomou 
-s- 
or, in one terminology, the sign 
is subjugated to the axis and functions of selection, discourse to the 
axis and functions of combination. As the same author, 
32 however, 
comments, language, viewed as a totality, is neither systematic nor non- 
systematic precisely because speech implies both system and use, code and 
message. The question to be raised then, is that of the relationship 
between the two orders of linguistics and discourse; and rather than 
viewing the issue in terms of two analytically distinct levels or 
hierarchies, those of form and function, it will be posed in terms of the 
interdependence of different levels. More specifically, the problem is 
that of analysing the manner in which discursive processes, as practices 
of language, appertain to and cross-cut, the distinction between the 
levels of language. 
The concept of meaning developed by the structural theories of 
discourse is both a useful starting point and an over-simplification. it 
is useful in so far as it indicates a duality to meaning which it relates 
both to the word and to the sentence, respectively viewed in terms of 
reference and of context or event. If we are to take Benveniste's claim 
seriously, both aspects to meaning have a socio-historical dimension. 
Thus, the referential content of a word (its meaning potential) is both 
conventional and also temporal, in that its store of socially 'given' 
potential references changes over time. More obviously still, the 
utterance itself is an empirical and historical unit of meaning. Even 
-------------------- 
1311 C. f. Benveniste: Problems op. cit. p. 110 where he depicts the three modalities 
of which the sentence is capable - assertive, interrogative, 
imperative 
propositions. Jakobson: Linguistics and 
Poetics op. cit. Pp-85-96, provides a 
more complex chart of the two axes of 
language and their corresponding 
vertical and horizontal 
functions. As regards discourse, the functions are 
those of the emotive (addressor) , poetic 
/referential (message) , and conative 
(addressee) . 
Lstics (1970) The Hague 458. 1321 Jakobson: LiLngui 
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though the systematisation of this latter meaning has tended to be in 
terms of its universalisable, paraphrastic, unities of function, it is 
nonetheless the case that the instance of discourse itself implies 
speaker, society and tem por al i ty, as the necessary dimensions of 
linguistic practice. Such a general recognition, however, in no way 
answers the question of precisely what the socio-historical specificity 
of discourse is; nor in terms of the analytic distinctions made, does it 
provide any tools for the definition or analysis of the processes whereby 
the dimensions recognised actually produce changes in meaning. We are 
offered, in other words, little more than an analysis of end states or, in 
Wittgenstein's terminology, 'states of affairs', localised in the 
consciousness - the skull - of the speaker. 
While it is certainly true that the intelligibility and the meaning of 
an utterance may be usefully depicted as being, by and large, dependent 
upon and governed by certain very general linguistic and discursive laws, 
the description of the utterance as a process is neither exhausted by, nor 
reducible to, such formal schemata. They provide no more than the set of 
minimum normative requirements (generally maintained and developed by a 
national system of primary and secondary education) whereby communication 
(intelligibility) is possible. Upon the basis of such requirements, or 
within the very broad parameters of a shared national language, 
communication as process and as practice, is marked precisely by its 
diversity. Furthermore, this variety of different possibilities contained 
within the very concept of linguistic practice, is logically the starting- 
point for any analysis of the socio-historical dimensions of discourse - 
it is fundamentally insufficient to merely acknowledge the existence of 
such a feature of language; it requires analysis and systematisation. 
Such, in essenceg is the place ascribed to the concept of discursive 
processes: it refers to the manner in which 
diverse linguistic practices 
produce divergent meanings within and according 
to the (historical) 
context and (social) purposes, of group and class 
interaction within a 
society which is itself organised according 
to specific patterns of 
linguistic and political hierarchy. 
33 The abstract unity of the common 
-------------------- 
1331 C. f. M. Pecheux op-cit. pp. 10,58-60; V. Volosinov op. cit. pp. 
17-25; M. Bakhtin 
op. c it. pp. 262 - 264. 
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linguistic basis (system) must be juxtaposed with a more concrete concept 
of discursive division - viewed as the necessary features of the actual 
role of language in social life. 34 
Utilising certain of the distinctions made in the earlier discussion, 
it is possible to argue that the interdependence of the two orders of 
language and discourse, is highly specific. Both concepts require a 
substantial reformulation, which may best be exemplified in the initial 
terms of the distinction between word/code and utter ance/meaning. From 
the perspective of linguistic practice as discursive process, the issue 
is, first and most simply, that of the extent and manner in which access to 
and use of the lexical and syntactic code is, in any given instance of 
discourse, governed by and only explicable in terms of, the extrinsic 
features of the social, institutional and ideological relations within 
which language becomes a 'form of life'. The linguistic code, as a 
practice, is always already embedded in its own historicity, it cannot be 
read as neutral ('given') or as an entity in itself. 35 Similarly, at the 
level of utterance and meaning, it is hopefully more obviously the case 
that the same extrinsic considerations largely determine the actual 
meaning the historically available synonyms, paraphrases and 
substitutions - of the utterance conceived as event and as process. To 
which it must be added that in terms of lembeddedness', that of both code 
and meaning within the complex network of socially recognised contexts, 
purposes, functions and equivalences generally, it would be quite false to 
view the social and ideological implications of code or meaning as being 
in any real sense autonomous of each other. 
In order to render the analysis of the issues raised more concrete, it 
is helpful, I believe, to recast the distinction between language system 
and linguistic practice in terms of a shared material and social base. 
The concept of discursive processes itself, to a degree refers to the 
-------------------- 
134] M. Pecheux op. cit. at p. 112. 
1351 A point made dramatistically by L. Althusser: Lenin and Philo (1971) 
N. L. B. p. 24, I Why does philosophy fight over words ? The realities of the 
class struggle are "represpnted" by "ideas" which are "represented" by words. 
In scientific and philosophical reasoning, words (concepts, categories) are 
"instruments" of knowledge. But in Political, ideological and philosophical 
struggle, the words are also weapons, the explosives or tranquillisers and 
poisons. I 
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unity of the orders of language and discourse and it is therefore 
primarily concerned to elaborate the 'regularities' of meaning, of function 
and of effect which subsist within and are implied by any realistic 
concept of language as totality. The regularities it seeks are, moreover, 
historical and conflicting rather than abstract and normative. Such is 
not, of course, to deny the relative value of the general concept of a 
linguistic system as a notional object of study. What it does do, however, 
is to shift emphasis away from studies of the structural laws (primarily 
lexical, syntactic and phonemic), and of meaning potential, towards the 
study of the crucial question of what processes actually ccndition and 
socially control the intelligibility and meaning of word, utterance and 
discourse, as realised in a specific linguistic practice. It is here, in 
the context of the relationship of power, or hierarchies of institutional 
control, to meaning,, that the reformulation of the concepts of language and 
discourse is to be inscribed. 
While there are a number of recent studies, primarily within the field 
of sociolinguistics, 36 that have more or less directly concerned 
themselves with the relationship of variously conceived concepts of 
'power', 'control' and 'class' to language and meaning, the salient points 
and general themes of such work were admirably and succinctly anticipated 
in the work of the Russian linguist and critic, V. N. Volosinov as early as 
the 19201S. 37 I shall proceed by eliciting, first, two very broad themes 
regarding the interrelation of language and social life, and will 
subsequently develop these themes in the more contemporary linguistic 
terminology of the categories of lintradiscoursel and linterdiscoursel, in 
I 
-------------------- 
1361 C. f. B. Bernstein: -Class, 
Codes and Control Vol. 1. (1971 ) R. K. P. Parts I& II; 
P. Gigliopoli: Language and Social Conte t (1972) Penguin; M. A. K. Halliday: 
ill -Sem-io, ýEic (1978) Arnold; R. Fowler et al (eds) : Language and 
Control (19'(9) EK. P.; R. Fowler: Literature as Social Discourse (1981) 
Ba s? o-rd; M. Gurevitch et al (eds. )-. CulEure, Society ana the Media (1982) 
Methuen; D. Morley: The Nationwide Audience (1982) B. F. I.; H. Davis and 
P. Walton: Language, Inage, Media (1983) Blý-Fk-well. 
1371 v. Volosinov op. cit. Part I; also, under the pseudonym M. Bakhtin, op. cit. , pp. 
258-442. One might well suspect that Volosinov's use of a pseudonym (and in 
all probability three, P. N. Medvedev being the third) was a 
joke at the expense 
of formalist conceptions of determinate feference. I shall follow 
c ontempor ar yc onvention, and use the names 
interc hangeably. 
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the wider context of the definition of discursive formations. 38 
The most general theme, at all events, is probably also the simplest. 
If, in its broadest purview the theory of discourse takes as its object of 
study the analysis and explanation of the semantic regularities governing 
and sub-dividing any existent language system, then it necessarily implies 
the sociality of its object of study. Such is the case in two senses. 
Most abstractly, the language system itself presupposes language use. Any 
account of language use, in turn, must understand the language system as a 
social phenomenon, and as an empirically and historically existent 
practice or matrix of practices, because: 
be* form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that 
verbal discourse is a social phenomenon - social throughout its 
entire range and in each and every of its features, from the sound 
image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning. 
39 
In such a context, it is precisely the diversity of differing usages or 
practices which must be the immediate focus of attention, and it is upon 
this basis that Bakhtin introduces his own, very broad, concept of 
discourse in terms of the internal stratification of language, viewed, in 
this instance,, in terms of the contradictory linguistic unity of a 
national language. Accepting that a national language is a primary 
species of existent language system,, Bakhtin's concentration upon the 
diversity of actually existent linguistic practice is as obvious as is it 
crucial: 
The internal stratification of any single national language into 
soc i al di al ec ts, c har ac ter i stic group behaviour, professional 
jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, 
tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various 
circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific 
socio-political purposes of the day, even of the hour (each day has 
its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases) - this internal 
stratification present in every language at any given moment of its 
---- --------------- 
1381 As I shall observe later, these two categories - drawn from M. Pecheux - are 
already available in Bakhtin's work in terms of the 
distinction between 
I intr a-language' and I internal dialogism' . Tt is something of a mystery why 
Pecheux should resolutely ignore all previous attempts to formulate a 
materialist semantics, cf. P. Goodrich: Materialism and 
Linguistics (1982) 32 
Radical Philosophy 34. 
1391 M. Bakhtin op. cit. p. 259. 
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historical existence ... is indispensable. 
40 
It is helpful, in the present context, to draw out the stated strafication 
of language in terms of the distinction made implicitly above, between the 
linguistic and the socio-political or ideological features of the 
multiplicity of social languages (heteroglossia). 
a) The primary point is linguistic and generic. Any existent 
language system is first and foremost a heteroglot entity, stratified 
according to the actually existent social diversity of speech types 
(dialects, jargons, generic languages and so on). It is stratified or 
divided again according to the historical demarcation of divergent 
discourses, the requirements of communication and of dialogue generally. 
Within such a multiplicity of differing linguistic practices, the unitary 
concepts of language system and of code and sign are merely references to 
one aspect of any instance of discourse, and are to be located among the 
many forces which actually diffuse or subjugate meaning to its heterglot 
context. Language and meaning are the products of a complex process of 
production, and while it may be admitted that the concept of a common 
unitary language implies a system of linguistic norms, 
these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather 
the generative forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to 
overcome the heteroglossia of language, forces that uniýe and 
centralize verbal-ideological thought, creating within a heteroglot 
national language the firm and stable linguistic nucleus of an 
officially recognised language, or else defending an already formed 
language from the pressure of growing heteroglossia. 1 
41 
To be more specific, the notion of heteroglossia captures and extends the 
sense in which formalist concepts of discourse had recognised that the 
abstract categories of sign, code and system represent a set of linguistic 
and semantic potentialities, rather than actualities. The point 
is made 
with considerable force in the earlier work of Volosinov. 
Attacking the 
formalist conception of the sign as arbitrarily and unequivocally 
referential to a signified 
(Saussure) or to an extra-linguistic chunk of 
reality (Benveniste)9 Volosinov argues 
that the sign necessarily bears a 
[401 Ibid. 262-263. 
[411 Ibid. 270-271. 
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multiple referentiality, governed by its potential, or the possibility of 
its bearing different 'accents' and divergent ideological connotations 
within the various contexts of its actual use; 'existence reflected in the 
sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of 
existence in the sign possible ? By an intersection of differently 
oriented social interests within one and the same sign communi ty .1 
42 The 
sense in which sign, code and system are the same for everyone is thus 
secondary to the sense in which its usage will, according to its context, 
give rise to divergent meanings and equally form the basis of differently 
oriented ideological discursive processes. Ideology indeed, for 
Volosinov, is the life force of the sign, and it is to be seen as the 
emergence of conflicting group affinities, or class struggles, within 
language itself: 
Class does not coincide with the sign community, i. e., with the 
community which is the totality of the users of the same set of signs 
for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will 
use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented 
accents intersect in every ideological sign ... This soc ial 
multiaccentuality of the ideological sign is a very crucial aspect ... 
A sign that has been withdrawn from the pressures of the social 
struggle which, so to speak, crosses beyond the whole of the class 
struggle inevitably loses force, degenerates into allegory, 
becoming the object not of a live social intelligibility but of a 
philological comprehension. 
43 
What is at issue, in other words, is not a question of the functional or 
straight-forwardly instrumental reproduction of the world in language, but 
a question of a more complex and diffuse interaction or struggle, a 
struggle for mastery over discourse - over which kind of social accenting 
is to prevail and to win credibility. 
-------------------- 
[421 V. Volosinov op. cit. p. 23. 
[431 Ibid. 23. To avoid misinterpretation, it should be stressed that in the 
passage cited and elsewhere, Volosinov consistently views 
the relation 
between class and language as complex and mediated. Class ideologies are not, 
therefore, born with an ideological language ready formed in their mouths; 
E. Laclau: Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory 
(1977) London p. 99, 
usefully emphasises: 
T.. ideological 'elements' 'taken in isolation have no 
necessary class connotation, .. 
that connotation is only the result of the 
articulation of these elements 
in a concrete ideological discourse. This 
means that the precondition 
for analysing the class nature of an ideology is 
to conduct the inquiry through that which constitutes 
the distirr-tive unity of 
an ideological discourse. 
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b) The secondary point concerning the stratification of a language, 
already fully implied above, is historical and socio-ideological. 
Reverting to the crucial critique of the dualism of unitary system and 
individual speaking subject, the central issue, for Bakhtin, is, quite 
correctly, that of viewing these centralising and unifying linguistic 
forces in terms of their historical and ideological contexts. Very 
broadly, the context of such categories: 
is conditioned by the specific socio-historical destinies of the 
European languages and by the destinies of ideological discourse, and 
by those particular historical tasks that ideological discourse has 
fulfilled in specific social spheres and at specific stages in its 
own historical development ... These categories arose from and were 
shaped by the historically aktuell forces at work in the verbal- 
ideological evolution of specific social groups, they comprised the 
theoretical expression of actualising forces that were in the 
process of creating a life for language. 44 
A unitary language; be it, for instance, the Latin of medieval European 
intellectual culture, the language of a science, or the more dubious 
rhetoric of law and authority; is always to be be understood not as 
something 'given' but as something 'posited' and specifically and 
functionally motivated. While the form, content and effects of such 
motivation are the material categories which specifically define the 
concept of discursive formations, the general point may be interpreted 
linguistically and semantically. 
The problem - and it is one of some complexity - is in essence that of 
analysing how actual existence determines both sign and code, and in turn, 
how sign and code reflect and refract that existence in the process of the 
generation of utterances. Volosinov poses the problem in terms of the 
word as: 
implicated in literally each and every act or contact between people 
- in collaboration on 
the job, in ideological exchanges, in the Chance 
contacts of ordinary life, in political relationships and so on. 
Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social 
intercourse register effect in the word. It stands to reason, then, 
that the word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what 
is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without 
[441 Bakhtin op. cit. p. 270. 
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definitive sha pe and not as yet accommodated into already 
regularised and fully defined ideological systems, 45 
Word and social life generally are clearly conceived as being inextricably 
linked. The concrete nature of their intersection has already been 
adverted to; it is to be delineated in terms of the economic and socio- 
political orders which shape and govern the full range of verbal contacts 
between individuals, groups-and classes. In short, the material forces and 
corresponding affinities which determine the organisation of social life 
create the settings or typic al contexts in which (ideological) 
communication occurs: 'each period and each social group has had and has 
its own repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication in human 
behaviour. Each set of cognate forms, i. e., each behavioural speech genre, 
has its own corresponding set of theme S, 
46 
or connotative field. Each 
discourse proposes its own set of preferred meanings. 
6.2.3 Discursive formations 
While it would certainly be interesting to pursue Bakhtin's more 
detailed treatment of the discourses, discursive processes and 
heteroglossia generally, to be found within literary language and the 
novel as a specific genre, it would undoubtedly raise as many problems as 
it solved. In terms of the development of a methodology of discourse 
analysis appropriate to the study of law, the seminal character of 
Bakhtin's extensive lifework lay primarily in the broad categories of 
linguistic stratification, dialogue and heteroglossia whereby he opened 
the possibility of a rigorous discipline of general application. Clearly, 
the currently fashionable aspects of his work - the concepts of the 
polyphonic novel, of language as carnival, of indirect discourse or of the 
image of a language - are of a broader significance than that of literary 
criticism alone, but they are nonetheless marginal to the more recent 
developments of the theory of discourse. In concentrating upon what I 
take to be the key feature of the recent work in discourse analysis - the 
concept of discursive formations -I shall rely extensively upon 
Bakhtin's 
-------------------- 
(451 Volosinov op. cit. p. 20. 
[461 Ibid. 19. 
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broader formulations while simultaneously adopting the more specific 
terminology of the later studies. 
To recapitulate somewhat, Bakhtin's general perspective upon discursive 
processes may be formulated in terms of two principles. On the one hand, 
he regards it as essential that the language system be viewed from the 
perspective of its historicity. The entire ambit of the concept of 
heteroglossia may usefully be reduced in this respect to the proposition 
that the language has always already been the object of diverse social 
usages or linguistic practices. It bears with it the weight of its own 
past as a feature of social life and the 'accents' that such a history has 
constructed. The words we use are already imbued - both in their 
singularity and in their combination - with multiple meanings or 
ideological accents. At the same time as this material of linguistic 
practice is ideologically saturated, the instance of discourse, the 
utterance, is also to be explained sociologically. The word is dialogic, 
'its specificity consists precisely in its being located between organised 
individuals, in its being the medium of their communication ., 
47 Meaning is 
thus to be understood actively as an effect of the social and hierarchal 
organisation of communication, and to be explained in terms of the 
constraints and conditions of that interaction itself. 
Obviously enough, the move from the principles to their application 
necessitates an attempt to specify linguistically precisely how, 
respectively, the stratification of language manifests itself in the 
division and subdivisions of the existent language system - as order of 
discourse - and similarly, how the hierarchical context and organisation 
of communication is realised in the unities of meaning that define and 
determine specific discourses. What is needed, to adopt a slightly 
different idiom, is an account of the appropriation of meaning and its 
restriction to specific institutional and discursive sites and modalities. 
It is here that we encounter the concept of discursive formations as the 
tool or means of such specification. Synthesising what 
I take to be of 
-------------------- 
[471 Ibid. 12. 
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value in the available studies'48 I would suggest that the discursive 
formation is best defined in terms of three aspects or levels; those of its 
material basis, or institutional isation, its self-articulation or internal 
ordering, intradiscourse,, and its relation to other discourses and 
discursive formations, its interdiscourse. 
a) A primary and relatively obvious point to be made about the division 
of discourse in general into the plurality of actually existent discourses 
is a material one. It has already been argued that there is a close, if as 
yet unsystematised, correlation between institutional and social 
practices and their typical forms of utterance and discourse. Even 
classical rhetoric acknowledged such a point, in so far as it defined the 
concept of 'genre' not only in terms of a given subject-matter 
(deliberative, forensic or panegyric) but also in terms of the character, 
status and procedural forms of the institutions within which the genre was 
located. Thus, for instance, politics as a rhetorical genre was to be 
understood not merely as a concern with the 'deliberative' but was equally 
to be related to the republican assemblies within which such deliberation 
could have effect. Recent theories of discourse have rightly attempted to 
elaborate the point in response to the greater complexities of 
contemporary socio-political relations. 
The most interesting issue to be raised, is one which Volosinov had 
already formulated in terms of the relation of meaning to communicative 
function. As was noted earlier, the forms and themes of verbal 
communication are to be interpreted as dependent, in the last analysis, 
upon the collective relations and interactions of groups or classes, 
'determined by production relations and the socio-political order' .49A 
more detailed analysis examines the institutionalisation of suc h 
relations in terms of the hierarchical organisation of economic, social 
and communicative exchange generally. From the perspective of 
discursive 
processes, it can thus be argued, with some subtlety, that a material and 
immediate feature of the subdivision of discourse into discursive 
-------------------- 
[481 primipally, M. Pecheux op. cit; M. Foucault: The Archaeology of 
Knowledge 
(1972) Tavistock; G. Therborn: The Ideology of Power and Eye Power o-f-I[7eology 
(1980) Verso; D. Lecourt: Marxism and Epistemology (1972) London PP-187-21 
[491 Volosinov op. cit. p. 21. 
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formations is to be located in the affinity which particular discourses 
bear to particular institutions. 
50 Those institutions, in turn, can then be 
analysed in the multiple terms of their role within the hierarchy of the 
social organisation of communication, and their ability to appropriate 
specific unities or regularities of ideological meaning for the purposes 
of particular socio-political and ideological interactions, functions and 
effects. Thus in broad terms, Pecheux defines the discursive formation in 
terms of its institutional form, as that which determines 'what can and 
should be said - in the form of a speech, a sermon, a pamphlet, a report, a 
programme, etct5l to which might be added, a lecture, a claim, a plea, a 
judgment, or a Phd thesis. 
More concretely, the material institutional site of a discourse may be 
outlined in relatively simple sociological terms. In opposition to the 
familiar, traditional, question of the subjective authorship of a 
discourse, it raises instead the question of the social authorship of 
specific linguistic practices. The distinction is a significant one, and 
it is usefully subdivided by Foucault. First, 
Who is speaking? Who,, among the totality of speaking individuals, is 
accorded the right to use this sort of language ? Who is qualified 
to do so ? Who derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, 
and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at 
least the presumption that what he says is true ? What is the status 
of the individuals who - alone - have the right,, sanctioned by law or 
tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer 
such a discourse? 
52 
Second, and in a somewhat less laboured form, it is necessary to describe 
the specific institutional site and interrelationships from which 
the 
authorised subject or speaker makes its discourse, and 
from which the 
discourse derives its 'legitimate source and point of application 
(its 
specific objects and instruments of verification)9.53 
To summarise in 
slightly broader terms, the right to a 
discourse (serious speech) is 
-------------------- 
1501 1 It is as though each text has entered a secret pact with 
the social 
institution in whose name it speaks I J. Lenoble et F. 
Ost: Droit, Mythe et 
on Raison (1980) Bruxelles p. 83 
[51] M. Pecheux op. cit. P-111. 
[521 M. Foucault OP-cit. p. 50-51. 
1531 Ibid. 51. 
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organised and restricted by a wide variety of means, to particular roles, 
statuses, professions and so on. Similarly the institutionalisation of a 
discourse is limited in terms of its legitimate appropriation, and the 
restrictive situations of its reception - church, court, school, hustings 
and so forth. Together, these two facets of the material location of 
discourses are to be subsumed under the general principle of the social 
organisation of discourse, which, in turn, is aligned to the 'order' of 
discourse,, or the hierarchy of discursive formations. 
b) Linguistically, the self-articulation or internal structure of a 
discourse is more pivotal and more contentious. Obviously enough, the 
institutional isation and social regulation of a discursive formation is 
closely, if not unambiguously, related to its self-definition - its 
internal ordering and development of concepts. Very broadly, the social 
authorisation of a discourse has its counterpart, or is replicated, in the 
self-authorisation of the discourse itself; characteristically, its 
delimitation of its objects, its elaboration of the rules and procedures 
appropriate to recognition or knowledge of such objects, and its 
privileging of specific terminologies, values and meanings in its 
systematisation. Fundamentally, discourse is always a production within 
the space of possible discourses or discourse as a notional whole. It is 
a continuous and generally consistent choice or selection whose coherence, 
54 in the abstract schema of the Archaeology of Knowledge, lies precisely 
in its manifest regularities - its transparencies of meaning, of accents 
and of modality. While it would clearly be misleading to view these 
transparencies of articulated meaning - the self-evidence or self- 
reference of a discourse - as solely the product of its interior logic or 
self-articulation, it is nonetheless helpful, in terms of description or 
exposition, to treat them as a separate or isolable feature of the 
discursive formation. 
Any sequence of utterances, be it at the level of the text or of the 
discursive formation, will typically propose its meaning as its own 
production; that is, as a relatively self contained, 
intended, syntagmatic 
unity. Text and discourse, of course, are 




implying or presupposing little in excess of their subjective authorship. 
What is more, linguistics has traditionally accepted and reinforced such 
an assumption. Saussure, it is true, managed to evade the issue to some 
extent by replacing the problem of meaning with that of linguistic value 
or signification, but the very opposition between unitary system and 
individual speaker of the language, left no room for semantics outside of 
the realm of speech and its subjective authorship. Nor did Benveniste, 
when he subsumed the 'discourse event' under the categories of 
intentionality (the assertive, the interrogative and the imperative) 
escape the underpinning of semantics by a species of psychology. It was, 
for Benveniste, the intended idea which determined the actual combinations 
(syntagms) used in an utterance and, in the last instance, explained its 
meaning, or provided the criteria by which it was possible for the 
utterance or text to be understood or read either correctly or falsely. 
In short, the traditional unities of discourse have largely been conceived 
immanently, that is, as internally defined 'systems' of meaning or, in 
55 Volosinov's terminology, as unmediated, monologic 'wholes'. 
Even in its weakest formulations, as an analytical 'level' of meaning, 
there are two interesting problems inherent in the concepts outlined. The 
first has already been covered - they tend, necessarily, to preclude the 
historical dimension of semantics and ignore the manner in which specific 
meanings and accents are institutional ised and restricted to particular 
groups and to particular discursive formations. A more significant issue, 
however, concerns the sense in which meaning, conceived as a social - 
rather than simply an intentional product, will consistently belie the 
self-articulated unities of discourse. Meaning; defined as the product or 
outcome of communication between socially organised individuals and 
groups; implies other meanings, other texts, other discourses, and will 
constantly exceed the boundaries of any given instance of discourse. 
Pecheux makes the point most forcefully in analysing the level of 
intradiscourse in terms of preconstruction and articulation. 
Intradiscourse refers primarily to the axis of the linearisation (or 
syntagmatisation) of the units of 
discourse. It is, 
-------------------- 
1551 Volosinov op. cit. p. 78-80; M. FoLrault op. cit. p. 23-27. 
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the operation of discourse with respect to itself - what I am saying 
now, in relation to what I have said before, and what I shall say 
afterwards, i. e., the set of 'coreferencel phenomena that secure what 
can be called 'the thread of discourse' as the discourse of a 
sub j ec t. 
5 6 
Two features of this partial definition require elaboration. The initial 
point is to be developed linguistically: intradiscourse refers to what 
have more generally been termed the 'textual surface structure, 57 or 'text 
grammar,, 58 the manifest, overt, aspects of text structure. What is at 
issue is the textual Imicrostructurel, and the endeavour to describe the 
linguistic and textual units releyant to, or determinative of, the wider 
structure and meaning of the text. In the first instance, the linguistic 
structure of the text encodes one level of its potential meaning. It is, 
obviously enough, the primary mode of access to meaning and is generally 
to be described in terms of the author's deployment of the surface 
organisation of language, its linguistic patterning, or arrangement of its 
own coherence. Following the work of Roger Fowler, it is, I believe, 
helpful to generalise the linguistic devices of most obvious significance 
to intradiscourse, in terms of the cohesive and the progressive or 
narrative aspects of surface text structure. 
59 While avoiding too great a 
degree of detail at this stage, it should be admitted that a text may be 
cohesive by virtue of the arrangement of features at any level of 
linguistic structure. In the present context, however, it is in all 
probability easiest to define cohesion in terms of syntactic features of 
cross-sentence reference, traditionally grouped under the headings of 
relations of reference, substitution, ellipsis and conjunction.. The issue 
is that of 'the overall effect by which the stable identity' of the 
'referents' - what is at issue - comes to be guaranteed in the thread of 
di sc our sel 
60 
and the most obvious linguistic mechanism realising such an 
effect, is 
_anaphora, 
61 'the use in one sentence of an item which has the 
-------------------- 
1561 M. Pecheux op. cit. p. 116. 
[571 R. Fowler: Literature as Social Discourse op. cit. ch. 4. espcially pp. 64-76. 
[581 T. A. Van Dijk: Some Aspec ts of Tex t Gr ammar (1972) Mouton pp. 1-12,26-33. 
1591 Additionally, c. f.: R. Hasson: Grammatical Cohesion in Spoken English (1968) 
Longmans; and more generally, M. A. K. Halliaay op. cit. ch. 7- 
[601 M. Pecheux op. cit. p. 117-118. 
[611 C. f. O. Ducrot and T. Todoroz Ency2-lopedic Dictionary of the Sciences of 
Language (1981) Blackwell pp. 281-285; M. Fecheux op. cit. pp . 38-40, llb-120. 
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same referent as, or substitutes for, an item in the preceding sentence - 
or an earlier one if there is no intervening lexical material to which the 
anaphoric term could be taken to refer. t62 More broadly, cohesion refers to 
the sum of syntactic devices which are prerequisites for the cognitive and 
narrative wholeness and fluency of a text. Among the effects of such 
mechanisms is the creation of the impression of the singleness of the 
text, and the image of autonomy, an image greatly reinforced by the 
progressive features of intradiscourse. Remaining again at the level of 
syntax or surface structure, 'progression has to do with the whole stock of 
features which contribute to a text's logical and temporal sequence: 
sequences of tenses and time adverbs, logical and temporal connectives 
(although 
.. nevertheless; when .. then, and etc), order of introduction 
of lexical items, 63 and narrative linearity generally. 
While there is good reason for every caution, the notion of 
intradiscourse as linguistic surface or microstructure, to some degree 
implies its binary counterparts; respectively, interdiscourse, deep 
(semantic) structure (code or underlying system) and macrostructure. The 
logical point need not detain; what is of peculiar interest for the 
analysis of discourse and the concept of discursive formation, is the 
extension of the account of linguistic surface structure to include a 
critical analysis of the semantic problems and evaluations that emerge at 
the very level of intradiscourse itself. I have so far utilised an 
account of intradiscourse which depicts it as an intentionally determined 
form of syntactic organisation. Intradiscourse, however, in Pecheux's 
structuralist vocabulary is always the 'discourse of a subject'. Without 
entangling the analysis too deeply in the intricate and potentially 
confusing vocabulary of 'subject positioning' and of the 'subject-form' of 
all discourse, 
64 it is possible to elaborate the point to be made in a more 
general terminology. Pecheux is concerned to argue that the concept and 
mechanisms of intradiscourse outlined above, are not purely and simply of 
-------------------- 
[621 R. Fowler op. cit. p. 67- 
[631 Ibid. 72. To which should be added reference to a surface feature of great 
importance to legal texts, the absence of progression, or 'localising' 
features to the text. 
[641 Issues in which formalist semiotics, materialist or otherwise intended, 
delight. C. f. the synoptic account and bibliography in R. Coward and J. ElliS: 
rialism (1977) R. K. P. ch. 6 & 7. 
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a syntactic nature. If intradiscourse appears to imply the singularity of 
a text's authorship and an intentional explanation of its cohesive and 
progressive mechanisms of elaboration, it is only because no analysis or 
deliberation has yet been provided of the specifically semantic features 
of such linguistic operations. Even in its own terms, the syntactic 
features of intradiscourse imply the active subjectivity which has chosen 
the specific forms of selection and combination that render the text 
coherent and fluent. Unsurprisingly, the very concept of discursive 
formation implies a further, semantic and socio-historical dimension, to 
the choices or forms of coherence and fluency actually achieved; 
intradiscourse must be placed within its context, that of interdiscourse 
and of the social control and ordering of discourse and meaning (ideology) 
according to a hierarchy of genres, institutions and formations. 
c) The syntactic features of intradiscourse raise a number of 
problems of a semantic nature,, problems which Pecheux analyses according 
to an opposition between 'articulation' and 'preconstruction'. 
Intradiscourse refers, in the first instance, to a series of intra-text 
phenomena of cross-reference between lexical items. These items are 
brought together or linearised, they are articulated, and such 
articulation has generally been explained in stylistic or psychological 
terms; their coherence is viewed as explicable in terms of 'thoughts' or 
lideas, 65 that govern the choice of substitutions, equivalences and so on, 
actually made in the utterance or text. For Pecheux, however, the whole 
problem of intradiscourse is to be viewed as considerably more complex. 
Articulation,, to put the point as simply as possible, is always 
articulation of a present lexical item (word, symbol, concept) with a pre- 
existent or anterior 'given'. The connection made - the thought or idea - 
will elaborate a property of the anterior item or, to utilise the 
idiom of 
discourse analysis, the articulation is embedded in previous statements, 
within and without the text, upon 
the basis of their assumed, recognised or 
known characteristics and connotations. Articulation, 
in other words, is 
to be understood as a primarily 
discursive (intra-linguistic) process, but 
as one which implies org 
better, presupposes, an anterior, referential 
-------------------- 
[651 C. f. Benveniste, op. cit., n. 28. 
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(ex tr a-tex tual/ex tr a-lingui stic) 
66 
axis of language - that of the 
pregiven or preconstructed character of the items which the given text 
actually chooses (seldom fortuitously) to link. The category of 
preconstruction thus refers to the manner in which the semantic material 
of the utterance, or the statements and propositions implied by 
articulation, are in large measure predetermined or given by processes 
external to the text in question. That which is known or disputable about 
an object, in the various domains of its usage, is the precondition for, or 
the presupposition of, the coherence of any subsequent articulations. The 
preconstructed is the 'modality of the filling of the places of arguments 
in a predicate, the condition of the formation of the statement 167 to 
which it needs to be added that the relationship between articulation and 
preconstruction is best viewed as one of potential opposition or 
disjunction rather than one of straightforward incorporation or 
resemblance. In which context,, Pecheux comments that 'there is a 
separation,, distance or discrepancy in the sentence between what is 
thought before, elsewhere or independently and what is contained in the 
global assertion of the sentence'. He concludes more broadly and 
interestingly that the material cause of the 'effect of meaning' resides in 
the lassymetrically discrepant relationship between two "domains of 
thought". such that one element from one irrupts in an element of the other 
in the form of what we have called the preconstructed, i. e. as if that 
element were already there. t68 
Two features of the analysis may usefully be elaborated; the first 
concerning the manner in which interdiscourse governs or shapes the 
'preconstructions' mobilised and articulated in intradiscourse, the second 
concerning Pecheux's more contentious analysis of the manner in which the 
Isubject form of discourse' necessarily leads intradiscourse to 'simulate' 
-------------------- 
[661 The distinction between discursive and referential axes is taken from C. Metz: 
ind Cinema op. cit. PP-183-191. The most obvious species of 
linguistic reference is indexical designation, where an understanding of an 
utterance necessitates information about the situation or context of its 
enunciation. 
[671 M. Pecheux op. cit. p. 83- 
[681 Ibid. 64. 
183 
69 
or interdiscourse. Interdiscourse may be defined as the social order 
legitimate hierarchy of discursive formations; 70 it refers, for Pecheux, to 
the sense in which 'every discursive formation ... is dependent on "the 
complex whole in dominance" of discursive formations', 71 and is, in the 
last analysis, to be understood as itself the expression of a specific 
hegemony, or of the ideological order of a given society in a particular 
e poc h. Interdiscourse is thus to be seen as a category of mediation 
between ideology and the specific, historically localised, text. Pecheux's 
point, however, is more general. Inter -disc our se; the relationships of 
inclusion and exclusion,, of competition and collaboration, between 
different discursive formations (Law, Politics, Ethic s. Religion, 
Psychiatry and so on); is to be understood as the material source of the 
evident or transparent meanings (preconstructions) and articulations of 
the discursive formation. In negative terms, firstly, the concept of 
i nterdiscourse is an attack upon positivist72 and other conceptions of the 
autonomy or internal development of disciplines and their illusion of 
self-identity of subject-matter, language and meaning. More than that, 
however, the concept of interdiscourse and all that it implies, attempts a 
positive and substantive elaboration of the concrete linguistic 
mechanisms that lead to what Volosinov was more boldly prepared to refer 
to as the 'ideological saturation' of the word. It is here that attention 
is to be focused upon the category of the subject - the imaginary 
conception of an individual ego or author as the sole explanation of the 
form that the text takes. Initially, the issue is far from novel; what is 
involved is a sharp movement away from traditional conceptions of meaning 
as intentionality, and from their correlative, the traditionally 
unmediated relation of subject (author /speaking subject) to universal 
(logic/the internal development of concepts). Meaning is to be viewed, 
-------------------- 
[691 Simulation refers to the process of hypothetical identification wherein one 
element or discourse acts or is articulated 'as if I, respectively, it shared 
the properties of another element, or is reducible to another discourse. C. f. 
M. Pecheux op. cit. pp. 50-51,57-58. 
1701 C. f. G. Therborn op. cit. pp. 81-87; M. Foucault op. cit. ch. 5. 
1711 M. Pecheux op. cit. P-113. 
1721 For the sake of completeness, positivism may here be defined as any neo- 
Kantian kind of pure logic, which grants validity to an autonomous method and 
its objectifications, which is "positive" in the general sense of suppressing 
the social and historical preconditions of its own possibility. G. Rose: 
ology (1981 ) Athlone Press P. 32. 
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rather, as soc io-hi stor ic al. as the end-produ( 
relationships and organisational forms of language 
particular discursive formations. In Pecheux's 
discourse requires the extensive development of 
subjective,, theory of subjectivity and so also of 
had already outlined the general requirements of a 
semantics, makes the point more eloquently; 
2t or effect of the 
use within and between 
terms, the theory of 
a non-formalist, non- 
meaning. Bakhtin, who 
materialist concept of 
no living word relates to its object in a singular way: between the 
word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there 
exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same 
object,, the same theme ... Indeed any concrete discourse (utterance) 
finds the object at which it is directed already ... overlain with 
qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value. 
73 
6.2.4 Discourse and ideolog 
While the broad terms of the alternative concept of meaning have 
already been discussed, the specific terminology which Pecheux, in common 
with other recent theories of discourse and discursive processes, 
74 
advances as adequate for expressing the overall coherence of the 'complex 
whole' of dominant discourse, necessitates a number of comments. The 
prevalent term is that of the subject and of the subject-form of discourse 
- from the description of the text, indeed, to the definition of ideology 
as the human condition, it is the category of the subject that reappears 
and pervades each and every level of analysis. The point may be explained, 
initially, as a negative one; if the characteristic or dominant ideology of 
contemporary social relations within Western economies is still that of 
liberal individualism, then it would be surprising at the very least if 
such individualism were not reflected in the content and form of the 
various analytic levels mapped out by the concept of discourse analysis. 
More pertinently, if the theory of discourse is concerned to account 
for 
the 'complex whole in dominance' of discursive formations as a dialectic of 
-------------------- 
1731 Bakhtin op. cit. p. 276, c: f. also 400-401; for a useful commentary upon the 
relation of Bakhtin to post-structuralism generally, c. 
f. T. Eagleton: 
Wittgenstein's Friends (1982) 135 New Left Review 64. 
1741 To the works already cited I would add reference to: F Jameson: The Political 
Unconscious (1980) Cornell U. P.; and to J. Culler: On DeconstrucEion (1983) 
R. K9_. P _c_F_-3 and bibliography. 
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intradiscourse, interdiscourse and ideology, the question is clearly 
raised as to the form or structuration (the coherence) of such a 
dialectic. The answer to that question, though it is a partial one as yet 
lacking any fully satisfactory positive elaboration, is one most 
frequently drawn from the work of L. Althusser in terms of a conception of 
ideology as that element or feature of social structure i4hich consistently 
reproduces and shapes the forms of human subjectivity at all levels of 
social interaction. 75 Thus, for Althusser, 'no human, i. e., soc ial 
individual, can be the agent of a practice if he does not take the form of 
a subject. The subjec t- form" is actually the historical form of 
existence of every individual, of every agent of social practices.. 176 In 
less all-embracing terms, it may at least be suggested that specific 
ideologies at specific times,, variously shape, qualify and delimit the 
roles, perceptions and possibilities of the individual's relation both to 
him or her self and to social life. The point to be made in terms of 
traditional linguistics and its concept of the text, is that the 
substantive character of the subject form of ideology is realised in the 
continual legislation of the autonomy of the individual speaker and of the 
author of the text. It is worth citing Pecheux at some length: 
000 the operation of ideology 
in general as the interpellation of 
individuals as subjects (and specifically as subjects of their 
discourse) is realised through the complex of ideological formations 
(and specifically through the interdiscourse imbricated in them) and 
supplies 'each subject with his reality' as a system of evident truths 
and significations perceived - accepted - suffered. By saying that 
the ego, i. e., the imaginary in the subject (the place in which is 
constructed for the subject his imaginary relationship to reality), - 
cannot recognise its subordination, its subjection, ... because this 
subordination-subjection is realised precisely in the subject in the 
form of autonom ,I am appealing 
to the socio-historical process by 
which the subject-effect effect is constituted - reproduced as an 
interior without an exterior, and by the determination of the real 
( ex ter ior ) .. and of 
interdiscourse as the real (exterior). 
77 
-------------------- 
1751 It is no part of my intention to enter a discussion of ideology as such. 
The 
relevant texts on this point are L. Althusser: 
Lenin and Philosoph op. cit. 
pp. 121 - 173; L. Althusser: 
Essays in Self Criticism (19-77 London P-33-39; to 
which may be added the useful 
discussions in G. Therborn op. cit., and in 
J. Larrain: The Concept of Ideolog (1979) Hutchinson pp-154-164 and passim. 
1761 L. Althusser: Essays p. 95. 
1771 M. Pecheux op. cit. p. 114. C. f. J. Lacan: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of 
psychw! ýýsiS (1977) Hogarth Press p. 188. 
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To interpolate somewhat in the interests of clarity, the subject form of 
discourse and its concepts of autonomy, of author and of speaker, are 
ideological precisely insofar as they function to exclude any concrete or 
empirical analysis of the socio-historical environment which both shapes 
the 'interior' or self conceptionof the individual and equally provides 
the explanation of the actual content of intradiscourse. In short, the 
ideological category of the subject is to be viewed as an abstraction 
defined in terms of general or universal properties; most notably, in the 
present context, those of the semantics of intentionality, of the 
unmediated relation of subject to meaning. On the one hand, the subject in 
and of discourse is by definition unique, in that it is its own cause or 
responsibility -a self-presence possessed of a metaphysical freedom of 
self-determination, which freedom, in the last analysis of individualist 
ideology, alone accounts for the differentiation and separation, or 
singularity of the subject. 78 In this aspect, the category of the subject 
implies a concept of meaning as a more or less direct79 phenomenon of 
self-expression, and equally presupposes an instrumental perspective upon 
communication viewed, at its best, as the neutral medium of semantic 
exchange between subjectivities or 'minds', those of author and reader, 
speaker and hearer. While it might be legitimately imagined that the 
concept of communication as variously conceived - as speech act, 
enunciation, performance and so on - implied a certain rhetorical or 
dialogic valence to language, such a possibility is. foreclosed by the 
other aspect of the subject, its universality. 
Whatever the idiosyncracies of agency - and they are many - all 
subjects are alike in being subjects. The uniqueness of the subject 
logically implies its formal universality. The ideological- oppositional 
couplet of 'interior' and 'exterior' adverted to by Pecheux, marks the 
c har ac ter i stic relationship of subject to universal, within which 
relationship both subject and meaning escape from history, or more 
-------------------- 
1781 For a comparable discussion c. f. J. Derrida: Positions (1981) Athlone Press 
pp. 17-36. 
1791 C. f. J. L. Austin: How to do things with words (1962) Clarendon, and the various 
later elaborations -within the philosophy of language do of course distinguish 
the phases of intention and reception (for instance, utterer's meaning, 
meaning of the 'uttering' and utterance meaning) but the distinctions are 
analytic and certainly yield no ground to any concept of the historicity of 
the utter anc e. 
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accurately, fail to break out of the circle of the subject form of 
ideology. To summarise the issue in the bluntest of terms, the concept of 
the subject, if taken seriously or literally, implies a myriad and chaotic 
world of unique and free linguistic agents, all equally possessed* of the 
power to join the anarchy of speech. Within such a problematic, the 
defining characteristic of meaning (as opposed to linguistic value) will 
be that it cannot be systematised to any greater degree than can the 
notional uses of freedom. Saussure, of course, regarded the task as a 
hopeless one - speech was not to be the object of scientific study. Later 
endeavours to surmount the problem have tended to straightforwardly 
invert it and, as was argued earlier, have tended to attach themselves to 
those aspects of the subject form that are abstract and universal. 
Structural linguistics is translated into a structural semantics in which 
a series of essentially binary oppositions are put forward as explanations 
of the laws governing meaning potential. As a number of linguists have 
argued, and most clearly in relation to Jakobson's opposition of a 
metaphoric to a metonymic pole of meaning, the generality of such schemata 
- they are indeed frequently and explicitly presented as bearing an 
anthropological or lomni-historicall status - is their greatest 
weakness. 
80 Any given instance of language use is likely to display a 
plurality of different semantic features whose hybrid character and 
specificity are likely to underline the purely normative heuristic value 
of distant universal semantic imperatives or prescriptions. In short, the 
form of meaning can never be either verified or falsified. 
There is, however, a final more concrete issue at stake. All the 
theorists of discourse analysis so far considered8l consistently argue 
that objectivist and universalising tendencies within the spectrum of 
linguistics (Saussure/Benveniste), logico-linguistics 
(Wittgenstein/Frege) and structural semantics (Jakobson/Greimas) are best 
understood as representative or symptomatic of a 
highly specific 
ideological effect. The simplest explanation is also the earliest; 
Volosinov postulates a volitional strategy on the part of 
the ruling 
-------------------- 
[80] C. f. particularly P. Ricoeur op. cit. PP.. 174-185; C. Metz op. cit. PP-174-193- 
[81] C. f. particularly: V. Volosinov op. cit. pp. 23-25,77-83; M. 
Bakhtin op. cit. 
pp. 271-39 288,305-7,367; 
M. Pecheux op. cit. pp. 110-129. For a general 
overviewc. f. M. Gurevitch et al. 
(eds. ) op. cit. ch-3 esp. pp. 69-88. 
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class, whereby 'it strives to impart a supraclass, eternal character to the 
ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inwards the struggle between 
, 82 social value judgments which occur in it, to make the sign uniaccentual. 
A more developed and sophisticated, non-conspiratorial, position is to be 
found in the work of Bakhtin, and is indeed inherent in his conception of 
'the dialogic orientation of disqourse'83 as being the essential property 
of any discourse. More explicitly, the dialogic orientation of discourse 
is to be understood in terms of a dual aspect. There is firstly the 
dialogic orientation of lintra-languagel, by which highly proleptic term 
Bakhtin refers to the fact that language pre-exists the subject to the 
effect that both word and object are always already overlain with previous 
dialogues - utterances, meanings, genres and so on. The second aspect to 
dialogue is termed the 'internal dialogism' of the word - the word is 
actively shaped by interaction and by its orientation towards the 
listener. 84 To the two faces of the dialogic orientation of the word, can 
be counterposed, respectively, the historical and the sociological facets 
of meaning to the universalist conceptions of unitary languages and 
univocal meanings. First, and with characteristic precision in his 
selection of examples, Bakhtin argues: 
Aristotelian poetics,, the poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the 
medieval Church, of "the one language of truth", the Cartesian 
poetics of neo-classicism, the abstract grammatical universalism of 
Liebniz (the idea of a "universal grammar"), Humboldt's insistence on 
the concrete - all these, whatever their differences in nuance, give 
expression to the same centripetal forces in socio-linguistic and 
ideological life; they serve one and the same project of centralising 
and unifying the European languages. 
What is at issue, I believe, is a seminal attempt to provide a political 
history of the stratification of national languages and of the actual 
struggles, of the unities and conflicts, that constitute the 
heteroglot 
reality and social life of discourse. In which respect, 
it is worth 
-------------------- 
[821 V. Volosinov op. cit. p. 23- 
1831 M. Bakhtin op. c it. p. 278 ff 
[841 'The word is born in dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word 
is 
shaped by dialogic interaction with an alien word 
that is already in the 
object. A word forms a concept of 
its own object in a dialogic way. But this 
does not exhaust the internal dialogism of the word ... every word 
is directed 
towards an answer and cannot escape the profound influenc-e of 
the answering 
word it anticipates. 
I M. Bakhtin op. cit. p. 279-280. 
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invoking the continuation of the passage already cited: 
The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over others, the 
supplanting of languages, their enslavement, the process of 
illuminating them with the True Word, the incorporation of barbarians 
and lower social strata into a unitary language of culture and truth, 
the canonisation of ideological systems, philology with its methods 
of studying and teaching dead languages, languages that were by that 
very fact "unities", Indo-European linguistics with its focus of 
attention, directed away from language plurality to a simple proto- 
language - all this determined the content and power of the category 85 
of "unitary language". 
Elsewhere, Bakhtin further specifies the ideological role of the idea of a 
unitary language and its directly intentional view of semantics, in terms 
of a hierarchical and Ptolemaic conception of the linguistic world, 'from 
whose point of view other languages are perceived as objects that are in 
no way its equal. 
86 The Ptolemaic perception of language is expressive of 
an absolutism that acknowledges only one language as the sole verbal and 
semantic centre of the ideological world; it is languge as myth, as an 
absolute form of thought'87 in which word and concrete ideological meaning 
are fused or canonically bonded. 
To translate the latter point into the more mundane terminology of 
contemporary discourse analysis, it is probably safest to follow Pecheux, 
and to argue that one feature of the subject form of discourse is that of 
its tendency to universalise (naturalise) historically spec if ic, 
ideological meanings and accents. In the first instance, the argument is 
a negative one. In creating and imposing a reality for the subject, the 
universalising tendency of the subject form of ideology perpetuates a 
miscognition in the simple sense that it obscures or occludes the actual 
determinations that have created the pl ace, role and freedom that the 
subject occupi es. More interestingly, however, the 
form of this 
miscognition is that of the preconstructed, as a positive, 
imaginary, 
consensus. Ideology, in other words, replaces 
the empirical 
determinations of the subject with a series of speculative, general truths 
[851 Ibid. 271. 
[861 Ibid. 288. 
rn, 7'1 Tl-%iri q66--ý67. 
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which, in terms of Pecheux's topology of discourse, become: 
Simultaneously "what everyone knows", i. e., the thought contents of 
the "universal subject", support of identification, and what everyone 
in a given "situation", can see and hear, in the form of the evident 
facts of the "situational context". In the same way, 
-articulation corresponds both to "as I have said" (intradiscursive reminder), "as 
everyone knows" (return of the universal in the subject)and "as 
everyone can see" (implicit universality of every "human" situation). 
In short, every subject is subjected in the universal as an 88 irreplaceable singular .. 
Self-identification in the form of autonomy - as speaking subject, speech 
act, enunciation and so on - together with the terms or meaning of such 
self-identity - as the logic of propositions or some other variant of 
speculative consensus - are both alike interior to the subject form of 
discourse. More schematically, intra-discourse absorbs interdiscourse 
and systematises, in the notions of the unificatory consciousness and the 
freedom of self-expression as unmediated interiority, precisely those 
exterior determinations of interdisourse which constitute the discursive 
formation as a pre-given or transparent system of utterances, forms, 
sequences and relations of paraphrase generally, which provide the subject 
as agent wi th its content. 'Every di sc our sel , remarks Bakhtin 
correctively, 'has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there are no 
words with meanings shared by all, no words belonging to no-one Who 
speaks and under what conditions they speak: this is what determines the 
word's actual meaning. All direct meanings and direct expressions are 
f al se. 
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The questions raised, in short, are those which I initially formulated 
in the narrower terms of the institutional isation of discourses and 
meanings, their restricted appropriation, which was in turn to be analysed 
according to a background plan of the socio-political hierarchies and 
divisions which order the discursive whole. It is now possible to take 
the issue further. In a terminology most often associated with the work 
of Foucault, power underpins and is expressed in the order of discourse, in 
the form of 'networks' of established or 'true' meanings. Truth itself is 
[881 M. Pecheux op. cit. p. 121. 
[891 M. Bakhtin op. cit. p. 401. 
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to be comprehended as the attribution of social value to specific 
discourses and meanings: 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of the 
multiple forms of constraint ... Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 90 
Legal discourse, as I shall detail subsequently, is wholly imbricated 
within the interrelationships of power and truth or knowledge. Even in 
terms of its self-articulation, legal discourse is paradigmatic ally 
concerned with truth, both in terms of evidence or verification, and also, 
more generally, in terms of the definition or delimitation of power and 
powers in the discourse of the rights, duties, capacities and procedural 
forms generally of both public and private law. 
[go] M. Foucault: Power/Knowledge (1980) Harvester at P-131. 
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LAW AS SOCIAL DISCOURSE II; LEGAL DISCOURSE 
7.1 LEGAL DISCOURSE 
My concern in what follows is to frame, to outline and exemplify, the 
general characteristics of a concept of legal discourse or, in the terms 
of the pr ec eding c ha pter a materialist rhetoric of 1 aw. 
Substantantively, my procedure, one which I will by and large assume to be 
self-explanatory, will be that of translating the topology of discourse 
already proposed, into a schematic account of legal discourse. There are, 
however, two preliminary points to be made, both o f which may broadly be 
said to concern the scope and potential development of what is admittedly 
a nascent discipline. 
7.1.1 The Underdevelopment of a Discipline. 
The first point is a simple, negative, qualification to the concept of 
legal discourse to be proposed. It is not a concept of law. In one sense, 
of course, the specific object of a concept of legal discourse is 
precisely the discursive dimension of law, the definite bodies of 
discourse and discursive . effects through which legal institutions work. 
In that sense, the study of law as discourse is only--ever a partial 
analysis of law; it would be erroneous in the extreme to suppose that the 
entire ambit of legislation, legal institutions and juridical practice 
could, in their entirety, be reduced to an analysis of discourse. 
There is 
also, however, a point of substance at issue. Formalistic, and 
indeed 
naturalistic, legal philosophies, have consistently endeavoured 
to define 
law in terms of a common or single essence or content of the legal sphere, 
or of legality as such. 
Law is reduced, in other words, to a 'unitary 
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necessity or cause" which exists outside it, in the form of an a priori 
reason, a concept of nature and of natural rights, or indeed a view of 
economic causality. As Paul Hirst has argued, I laws have no necessary 
unity of content, form or function outside of that derived from the 
legislative processes and legal apparatuses. Laws can be divergent and 
inconsistent in form and function and remain laws., 2 More simply, law is a 
social practice formally tied to particular institutions or apparatuses 
and primarily,, though by no means exclusively, defined by its use of 
particular types of discourse. To which it may be added that the refusal 
to allow any intrinsic or essentialist definition of law opens the way to 
a view of law as a process or set of processes, and consequently also, as a 
discourse which is inevitably answerable or responsible, like any other 
discourse, for its place and role within the political and sexual 
commitments of its times. In short, law and legal texts are to be treated 
as accessible and as committed, precisely because they are in themselves 
contingent rather than universal - even if their historical variability is 
limited - and because the social or cultural value attributed to legal 
discourse changes - albeit slowly. 
The second point is closely related to the first, and may usefully take 
the somewhat lengthier form of a comment upon the general characteristics 
of those few studies that have explicitly attempted an analysis of law as 
3 a species of discourse. The general point to be made concerns the fact 
that, while the studies in question provide a considerable amount of 
material of incidental interest to the analysis of law as social 
b4 discourse , they are uniformly to be differentiated from the instant study 
Ell The terminology is that of P. Hirst: On 'Law and Ideology (1979) MacMillan 
pp. 106-122 and Appendix 1. 
[21 Ibid. pp. 111-112. 
131 Most notably, in the present context, F. Burton and P. Carlen: Official 
Discourse (1979) R. K. P. ch. 4 & 5, & passim. B. Edelman: Ownership of the Image 
(1979T-R. K. P. PP. 19-35,109-113. A. J. Greimas: Semiotiques et Sciences 
Sociales (1976) Paris pp. 79-128. J. Lenoble et F. Ost: Droit, Mythe et Raison 
ý-1981) Bruxelles pp. 81-120. Other studies of specific aspects of legal 
language, analysed from a sociolinguistic or loosely discursive perspective, 
include J. M. Atkinson and P. Drew: Order in Court; the organisation of verbal 
interaction in judicial settings (1979) MacMillan/SSRC. P. Carlen: 
Magistrates Courts (1976) M. Robertson. W. O'Barr: Linguistic Evidence (1982) 
ca em c ressi-. W'. L. Bennett and M. S. Feldman: Reconstructing Rea in the A ý`-; -J-Hic- -P 
Courtroom (1981) Tavistock. 
[41 Such material will, of course, be referred to in the course of my own 
presentation. 
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in terms of divergent motive. Each of the studies in turn, though 
obviously for very different reasons, is primarily less concerned with any 
systematic description of law as a discourse, than with the elaboration of 
a set of extrinsic criteria to which legal discourse may be reduced. Thus, 
to take the most obvious example first, Bernard Edelman's elaborate and 
frequently highly perceptive account of legal discourse, is nonetheless 
best understood - in its own terms - as being concerned with legal 
discourse as an object of study only insofar as it expresses fundamental 
economic relations. I This is because the juridical categories, just as 
much as the categories of bourgeois political economy, are forms of 
thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a 
definite, historically determined mode of production, viz. the production 
of commodities., 
5 For Edelman, then, legal discourse only has an identity 
as a function of economic relations, and as 'a discourse of the privative 
appropriation of nature in its historico-social combinative., 
6 The 
discursive processes, in other words, which actually make up 'juridical 
ideology' are not an object of interest or analysis in their own right, 
they are all and equally reducible to the capacity of the private 
ownership of property and its expression in the jurisprudential rights of 
the legal subject. 
The remarkable and in many ways seminal work of Lenoble and Ost of the 
University of Brussells, to take another extreme example, moves in an 
opposite direction. Their concern with legal discourse is grounded in an 
attempt to construct a transcendental model of legal discourse as 
mythology (mytho-logic). 
7 Making a highly erudite use of recent, 
-------------------- 
151 Edelman op. cit. p. 26. 
[61 Ibid. p. 27- 
171 Lenoble & Ost op. cit. pp. 8-9, 'Mytho-logic' refers to the 
dependence of the 
order of logic upon the order of the 
imaginary and I denotes the closure of 
rational thought by virtue of its inscription 
in a horizon overdetermined by 
belief. Such belief acts as a reservoir of sacrosanct significations and 
produces the closure of discourse: 
dogma and, in the best cases, the ideal. 
This universe of phantasm is the source of 
juridical rational isations 
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anarchistic, developments within Freudian psychoanalyis8, they counterpose 
determinate (formal) models of logic and of legal logic to a transcendent 
model of a mytho-logic which, in turn, is utilised to explain the 
traditional philosophical and practical antagonisms both within legal 
theory and legal decision making practices themselves. Both the latter 
categories are to be viewed as more or less direct expressions of certain 
basic beliefs or articles of faith, whose impulse is to be found in the 
realm of the logic of myth. In many respects their study is both 
fascinating and successful - there are considerable advantages to be 
gained from the analysis of law as myth, or as a circular logic, to which 
advantages I will return - but the myth is also a social and historical 
practice, and our knowledge of the discursive dimensions of such a 
practice is not greatly enhanced by its immediate displacement in favour 
of an account of the 'meta-juridical' or the transcendental, internally co- 
ordinated, logic of myth. 
In structure at least, Greimas' brief adventure into the territory of 
legal analysis is not dissimilar to the more elaborate and more critical 
work of Lenoble and Ost. Just as the latter authors, implicitly at least, 
reduce legal discourse to an instance of a 'mytho-logic' of a transcendent, 
anthropological status; Greimas is primarily concerned, in an analysis of 
one particular legal text (a codification of French commercial law 
concerning the formation of companies), with the exemplification of a 
structural model of semantic analysis within a novel domaid. Irrespective 
-------------------- 
181 Ibid. PP-3-14,219-294; for a useful summary see Ph. Gerard: Compte Rendu 
(1982) Revue Interdisciplinaire D'Etudes Jur idique 181-192. The 
psychoanalytic model used is that of G. Deleuze & F. Guattari: Anti-Oedipus 
(1977) Viking Press. As to their character isation of their methodology, it 
clearly takes its inspiration as much from Hegel as from any more substantive 
concern with the historical development of particular mythologies. 
Specifically, the study is mhematised according to a tripartite division: 
the function of-judgment and mytho-logical rationality; juridical logic and 
mytho-logical rationality; the philosophy of law and mytho-logical 
rationality. These three developments must be represented as three 
concentric circles whose centre is occupied by the theme of mytho-logic; or, 
even better, the link between the three should be conceived as a spiralling 
movement, I (Ibid p. 10-11) within which, significantly enough, judicial 
practice acts as the periphery, as the broadest and most opaque circle, while 
the philosophy of law is conceived as the central circle 'closest to the 
mytho-logical core. ' 
[91 A. J. Greimas op. cit. p-79: I Our pursuit, over a number of years, of a method 
(semiotic) of semantic analysis would have failed if its procedures were not 
applicable to the elucidation of any discourse; if the models proposed were 
not capable of providing an account of the modes of production, of existence 
and of functioning of any text whatsoever. 
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of arguments concerning the value or potential of structural semantic 
methodology itself'o, the account actually provided of the legal text in 
question, manages no more than a brief comment upon the peculiarities of 
the legal lexicon, before it unleashes itself upon an analysis of the 
grammatical and narrative quadrants which will delimit the logical 
possibilities (the empty slots) of the discourse contained therein, for 
all time and for all purposes. From the perspective of legal theory, 
Greimas succeeds in introducing explicit concepts of semiotic code and of 
deep semantic structure, as a means of sophisticated entrenchment or 
further refinement of a view of the systemic determination" of legal 
language which I have earlier argued to be already implicit within the 
philosophy of legal positivism. 
Suffice it to say that the value of this study is intrinsic to the 
linguistic refinements which it introduces into an analysis of legal 
discourse which does not in any way challenge the positivistic self- 
definition of the specificity of legal language as a systemic, self- 
referential, order of conventional and explicit legal norms. Thus, to take 
one key example, in discussing the nature of juridical practice, 'the 
production of law, of novel legal rules and significations, 112 the validity 
of the legal-linguistic developments involved will determine their 
content, their content being in major part implicit or given within the 
structure of the legal grammar itself. Very loosely, the distinctive 
feature of legal language, for Greimas, is that it is a language of 
verification, taking the form, in practice, of an explicit set of rules for 
the construction of valid or 'verified' legal enunciations. For all its 
linguistic and graphic sophistication, Greimas' analysis of legal grammar 
-------------------- 
1101 C. f. F. Jameson: The Political Unconscious (1981) Methuen pp. 46-49,121-127, 
for a particular1y- acute account of the inadequacies of such a methodology. 
For a briefer and less effective treatment, c. f. J. Larrain: The Concept of 
Ideolog op. cit. PP-132-140. J. Culler: Structuralist Poetics (1975) R. K. P. 
provi es an account of Greimas' earlier work. 
[111 C. f. Greimas op. cit pp. 88-90. Greimas here argues that the code (in its 
linguistic sense) 
ýhich underpins the grammar of legal discourse is 
I implicit' within the discourse itself. Its explanation is conducted in terms 
very similar to Kelsen's account of the necessarily logical character of the 
transcendental pressuposition of legal systems' as such; it has the form of a 
fiat, the I ensemble of juridical ennunciations could not exist except by 
vIT-Eue of an original performative act', which takes the 
form of an 
loriginaryl constitutional promulgation endowing the system of juridical 
grammar with its validity. 
[121 Ibid. pp. 90-94, at p. 91. 
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adds nothing of substance to the commonplaces of legal Positivism, beyond 
the addition of a further layer of descriptive metalanguage. The peculiar 
feature of legal discourse is that it 'transforms' or 'translates' 
(corrects and verifies) ordinary language and ordinary meanings into the 
closed code of the legal system. The crucial question of how this process 
takes place, with what content and to what effect, is answered by stating 
(repeating) that the rules of the legal grammatical code are implicit 
within 'practical jurisprudence', which requires the conformity of 
judicial utterances to the law in force13. 
In each of the cases reviewed, the omission to be singled out and 
emphasised in the present context is that of the failure to provide a 
substantive analysis of the discursive processes through which the 
categories of the 'economic', the mytho-logicall or the 'semantic structure' 
are realised or have their effect. Certainly the studies in question map 
out the generic contours which are seen to structure (in the main part 
functionally) the effects of the specific text, but they simultaneously 
omit to analyse the moment or instance of discourse itself, as that 
complex and historical mechanism whereby the utterance or text adopts or, 
better, constitutes, a practice and position (social, political and 
ideological) within the stratified whole of an existent language system. 
What prevents the development of such an analysis, of course, is not simply 
the absence of the requisite concept of discursive process, but the more 
general propensity of analysts of legal discourse to adopt, either 
explicitly or tacitly, a thoroughly structuralist concept of linguistic 
analysis. As I argued earlier, the adoption of a formalistic account of 
the language system is always prone to lead to a similarly motivated 
concept of discourse. I shall illustrate the point in some detail by 
turning to my final example, the study of 'Official Discourse' by Burton 
and Carlen, a work which in certain of its other features, provides an 
admirable if difficult introduction to some important sociological 
features of legal discourse. 
-------------------- 
1131 Ibid. p-92- 
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The specific difficulty which I wish to address14 concerns the 
distinction and opposition between linguistic system and linguistic 
practice, and may be posed in terms of the relationship of intradiscourse 
to interdiscourse. To begin with however, it needs to be briefly restated 
that discourse analysis is born of the belief that linguistic practice is 
the primary category in the resolution of the traditional opposition 
between language system and language use. Further, linguistic practice is 
central to the understanding of the dual existence of the language system, 
its virtual or normative systematisation (vocabulary, syntax, phonology) 
and its actual existence (its historicity and stratification). Suffice it 
to say that a concrete analysis and criticism of the ýiscursive processes 
and semantic problems inherent in any given linguistic practice entails an 
analysis of the interrelationships of linguistic practice and linguistic 
system,, in terms of both the normative dimension of the linguistic system 
and in terms of the historicity of the actually existent language system. 
An analyis of discourse which fails to account for the full linguistic 
complexity of language as the interdependent whole of system, existence 
and use, is likely to drastically oversimplify or overgeneralise its 
description of the relationship of intradiscourse to interdiscourse. 
More concretely, Burton and Carlen begin this aspect of their study 
with the laudably motivated proposal that discourse analysis requires a 
'non-normative and unpossessed (i. e. non-subjective) character isation of 
meaning. 115Their intention, in brief, is to adopt a methodology of 
discourse analysis which will be capable of explaining the semantics of 
the text in terms of the collective constraints and dialogic. or rhetorical 
16 
conditions under which it was produced. Difficulties arise, however, at 
the point when they endeavour to specify the linguistic basis or 
textual 
realisation of the 'extra-discursive' constraints which govern 
the meaning 
of the instance of discourse. Reformulating the traditional 
linguistic 
opposition of system to use, in terms of order to anarchy, 
they explicitly 
-------------------- 
[141 1 shall not here rehearse the broader criticisms of the style and methodology 
of the study which I have detailed elsewhere; see, 
P. Goodrich: Review (1982) 
10 Int. Journal of the Sociology of Law 448; P. Goodrich: Antinomies of 
Legal 
Theory (1983) 3 Legal Studies 1. 
[151 F. Burton & P. Carlen, op. cit. p. 27- 
[161 Ibid. pp. 16-23. 
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reject the concept of a language system and argue that 'discourse analysis 
can be thought without the law of rule (norm)i. 17 They later state that 'in 
our analysis ... the concepts of metaphor and paradigmatic ity, and 
metonymy and syntagmaticity, specify the discursive effectivities of the 
extra-discursive Ildesirell 18 producing the meaning of the text. In all 
probability the two statements are irreconcilable, at least in so far as 
the latter concepts referred to only bear a meaning or have a use by 
virtue of their prior inscription within rhetoric and linguistics. 19 
More sympathetically, however, Burton and Carlen are merely guilty of 
an enthusiastic overstatement of an intention to utilise a method of 
analysis which was pioneered by Jakobson and which superimposes the 
rhetorical terms of metaphor and metonymy onto the linguistic terms of 
paradigm and syntagm. Although their references are almost exclusively to 
secondary sourceS20' their definition of the categories concerned bears a 
close resemblance to Jakobson's. In the first instance, in principle at 
least, paradigm and syntagm appear to refer to textual (intradiscursive) 
21 linguistic mechanisms of selection and combination. Metaphor and 
metonymy, on the other hand, are essentially secondary processes 
(inter discursive); as in classical rhetoric, they correspond to relations 
of similarity and contiguity within the broader, referential, ambit or 
axis of the text. While it seems clear that Burton and Carlen at least 
imply a distinction of the sort outlined - paradigm and syntagm are seen 
as effects of code and syntax, metaphor and metonymy as semantic effects 
1171 Ibid. p. 28. 
1181 Ibid. P-30. 
1191 C. Metz op. cit. pP-152-153 comments most appbsitely with respect to current 
usages of those terminologies (metonymy, syntagrn and so on): I But as soon as 
you try to take it a bit further, you come up against the fact that in their 
respective areas of origin each of these notions has a fairly complex past of 
its own; and so, getting to grips with anything more than insubstantial 
cliches or fashionable catchphrases - since a concept always goes back to the 
place of its elaboration in the history of knowledge even, and especially if 
it is to be carried over to another field - requires some degree of willingness 
to work back through the problems, not to remain trapped in a position which 
knows nothing of its antecedents. ' 
[201 With the exception of a brief discussion of Saussure: Course in General 
Linguistics (1974) London. No great degree of eluc-idation is provided by 
ýEFeir own explanation of their method: I By a series of metaphoric and 
metonymic transpositions, we have been able to use in our analysis of official 
government publications some of the concepts which Saussure used in his 
investigations of linguistic signs. I F. Burton & P. Carlen op. cit. p. 28. 
[211 Ibid. at P-31,95-6,103-104. 
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of the orientation of the discourse to the extra-discursive - it is 
equally clear that they are quite oblivious to the linguistic and semantic 
difficulties inherent in such a reductive, binary, schema. The 
difficulties may be summarised in terms firstly of the coherence of the 
schema itself, and, secondly, in terms of the potential and limitations of 
its application. 
A lengthy tradition of structurally oriented linguistic analysis has 
made use of variously formulated versions of the Saussurian opposition 
between 'associative' and I syntagmatic I relations. 22The key to the 
distinction lies in the fact that it refers to two ways of arranging signs 
- by combination and selection - which are intrinsic to the language 
system or code. The opposition, according to Saussure, concerns the 
functioning of language, or the characteristics of the sign, as such - its 
linearity and forms of differentiation - and is profoundly semiological 
(semiotic). Jakobson does not challenge the structural, semiotic, 
character of this distinction or supposed law, but projects it onto the 
divisions of rhetoric and suggests that the figures of metaphor and 
metonymy correspond to, and are determined by, the principles (linguistic) 
of combination/contiguity, and selection/substitution. While the 
semiotic character of the metonymic pole of the opposition is reasonably 
self-evident - it is stated to be straightforwardly a question of 
syntactic fact - the metaphoric pole is also, for Jakobson, a 
feature of 
the semiotic code: I Let us, within the framework of synchronic 
linguistics, examine ... the 
difference between syntax and semantics. 
Language entailý. two axes. Syntax is concerned with the axis of 
concatenation, semantics with the axis of substitution. ' 
23 The rhetorical 
duality of metaphor and metonymy, in other words, corresponds 
to or 
represents, the duality of semantics and syntax within a structured, 
semiotic whole. 
-------------------- 
[221 F. de Saussure op. cit. pp. 123 ff. L. Hjemslev: PrOlegomena to a 
Theory of 
Language (1961) Wisconcin, distinguishes between relations 
'in-T-sentia and 
rel'; R-ions in praesentia; A. Martinet: 
Elements of General Linguistics T-1964) 
London, between the now standard terms of paradigm and syntagm. 
[231 R. Jakobson: Selected Writings !1 (1971) The Hague, 
Mouton 567,565. 
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There are a number of interesting questions to be raised as to the 
linguistic and rhetorical viability of the latter opposition, the final 
product or achievement of Jakobson's structuralist zeal. On the one hand, 
it would appear implausible to regard all forms and levels of metonymic 
contiguity as syntactic; where contiguity/ metonymy is lodged at the level 
of relations between referents rather than signifieds, it involves a 
contingent, real, relation rather than any necessary syntactic liaisons. 
In the case of synechdoche (the part for the whole; e. g. crown for 
monarch), contiguity is but one aspect of a rhetorical figure which may 
equally be based upon relations of identification or symbolism which are 
largely metaphorical. On the other hand, the restriction of semantics to 
metaphor, conceived as substitution, is arguably both too narrow and too 
vague. It unduly limits semantics to selection between entities 
associated in the code, while at the same time it is arguably too broad in 
that it subsumes under the single figure of metaphor a wide variety of 
heterogeneous operations of substitution and selection at the various 
levels of the code, as lexis, grammar, metalanguage and semiotic system 
generally. The crucial point, however, is that the binary distinction 
between metonymy and metaphor is only made possible in Jakobson's work, by 
virtue of the privileging of semiotics over semantics and, more 
specifically, it results in the omission of any adequate concept of 
discourse. The structural linguistic basis of the series of oppositions 
elaborated, is nowhere clearer than in Jakobson's attempts to apply these 
model polarities to the domains of art, poetry, film and 
psychoanalysis. 
24Faced with specific texts or instances of discourse, 
Jakobson provides a comprehensive analysis of the wholly formal aspects to 
their linguistic patterning as texts (literal or metaphoric) and then 
provides a generic label which classifies a text, genre or non-linguistic 
(but language-like) sign systemg as evincing a preference for one or other 
type of r hetor ic al /semantic arrangement. Poetic realism, for instance, is 
predominantly metonymic; romanticism and symbolism are metaphoric. The 
-------------------- 
[241 R. Jakobson & M. Halle: The Fundamentals of Language (1956) The Hague, Mouton 
pp. 90-96. R. Jakobson: Linguistics and Poetic-s; R. 
Jakobson & C. Levi-Strauss: 
Charles Baudelaire's 'Les Chats'; both in R. & F. de George 
(eds): The 
Structuralists (1972) Anchor pp. 95-120,124-146. For an extensive treatment 
of E-he problems of treating cinema technique as a 
language, c. f. C. Metz: Film 
Languag (1974) Oxford. 
202 
epic novel is metonymic; the comedy metaphoric. The examples could be 
multiplied, but the essential point is unaltered; the duality of syntax and 
semantics renders the analysis of intradiscourse far too narrow - it is to 
be treated as a question of linguistic functions only - and the analysis 
of the interdiscursive (or principally rhetorical) features of the text so 
broad as to be virtually non-existent - they are to comprehended and 
subsumed under one of two rhetorical effects. 
While it might be possible to defend Jakobson's analysis on the grounds 
that the discourses he actually analysed were primarily aesthetic25, no 
such defence is available for the study of legal discourse. Burton and 
Carlen dramatically effect an inversion of Jakobson's methodology. 
Having, at the outset, jettisoned the concept of linguistic system 
altogether (and so presumably those of vocabulary and of syntax as well) 
they concentrate their attention wholly upon the rhetorical labels of 
metaphor and metonymy, to which the axes of paradigm and syntagm are 
unexplained parallels. Despite general statements of intention to the 
contrary26, there is little evidence in the textual analyses which they 
provide, to suggest that they view intradiscourse as anything more than a 
series of functionally explicable inter disc ur sive, rhetorical, effects. 
The rhetorical categories (and so semantic axis of language) are primary, 
in other words, and are projected, in precise antithesis of Jakobson's 
procedure, onto a corresponding opposition of paradigm and syntagm, which 
are in turn enigmatically defined as 'the immediate ecosystemic 
constituents of a discourse's global (semantic) structure., 
27 More 
concretely, their analysis displays the following (metonymic) order of 
progression. A very useful analysis of the material place and role of law 
within the state apparatus as a whole, ends with the tabulation of the 
socio-political functions which Official Discourse is to perform: the 
functions of incorporation (the production of information utilisable for 
purposes of social control), legitimacy 
(the refutation of subversive 
interpretations of breakdowns of law and order) and, finally, confidence 
(the reaffirmation of images of the state's administrative rationality and 
-------------------- 
[251 For a conviming rejection of such a hypothetical 
defence, c. f. R. Fowler: 
Literature as Social Discourse op. cit. pp. 129-141. 
[261 F. Burton and P. Carlen op. cit. PP. 31,51-52,89. 
[271 Ibid. P. 30. 
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democratic legal ity). 28Ther e follows a brief chapter on the specificity of 
legal discourse; its ability to fulfill its functions by virtue of a 
unitary - though theoretically incoherent - set of epistemological 
guarantees of its own truth and justification; the 'judicial stare. 29The 
authority of state and law are discursively maintained in legal texts by 
the combination and conflation, within the 'judicial stare', of empiricism 
(the reliance upon the unmediated facts of legal experience) and 
rationalism (the dogmatic privileging of the normative content of legal 
concepts). The judicial stare is the key then, to the analysis which is 
subsequently provided of judicial and official discourses on breakdowns 
of law and order. It is the dogmatic precondition both of the narrative 
structure of the discourse and is also its normative guarantee of 
objectivity. 
30It is the epistemological sovereignty of the judge (as 
author), which alone explains the stylistic and discursive processes of 
the discourses analysed. 
The study proceeds, in other words, from a very creditable sociological 
elaboration of the institutional site of legal discourse,, to' an 
elaboration of certain interdiscursive properties and constraints 
contained within the unitary discursive function of the judicial stare. 
The level of analysis is explained as being that of 'modes of knowing', of 
the elaboration of the discursive conditions of a statements' possibility, 
but neither the substantive categories used (empiricism, rationalism, 
positivism and so on) nor the few analytic conclusions reached, differ in 
any significant respect from the traditional concerns of epistemology. 
Their concern is not with the language of the reports, nor do they provide 
any analysis of the discursive processes which realise, linguistically or 
intradiscursively, the socio-political motives of the legal form. 
Official Discourse is rather analysed from a perspective lodged at the 
level of interdiscourse, which is in turn conceived, 
first, as a technique 
or mode of knowing (empiricism), and, second, as a rhetoric or 
logic 
(rationalism) of justification. Towards the end of 






P. 51 - 
[291 Ibid. p. 69,57-58. 
1301 Ibid. p. 69. 
1311 Ibid. pp. 95-113. 
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true, the linguistic terminology or generalised labels of paradigm and 
syntagm, metaphor and metonymy, are briefly re-introduced as a means of 
characterising the essentially interdiscursive ordering of concepts 
within the texts analysed, but the use of such labels is itself 
metaphor ic al or rhetorical (figurative) rather than linguistic or 
intradiscursive. 32Nowhere in the study is a single metaphor or metonymy 
actually analysed or explained in its singular linguistic existence; nor, 
in terms of paradigms and syntagms, is any specific lexical or syntactic 
feature of the texts isolated or reviewed. Far from providing an analysis 
of discourse and discursive processes as forms of language use or 
linguistic practice,, Burton and Carlen conceive of discourse analysis as a 
somewhat ill-specified set of generic oppositions within interdiscourse 
which somehow allow the analyst access to the 'deep structure' or semantic 
presuppositions (ideological universals) of a series of texts which 
apparently lack any coherent or relevent - mediating - linguistic surface. 
Put somewhat differently, the most immediate difficulty with the study 
is that it attempts to do too much too rapidly. To a degree, it specifies 
the semantic effects of a discourse but it omits to evidence how those 
effects are achieved; it analyses the ideological dimensions of a 
discursive practice but refuses to regard the practice itself as a 
coherent or intelligible object of study, the practice is treated as being 
predetermined, or predestined to be no other than it is. In summary, I 
will argue that the analysis provided is both too easy and, in a more 
profound sense, contradictory. In the first place, legal and official 
discourse are conceived as ideological state apparatuses whose function 
is solely and simply - perhaps conspiratorially - 
that of appropriating 
and integrating material social and institutional conflicts 
(breakdowns 
of law and order), into the dominant paradigm of 
liberal democratic 
consensus. Creditably enough, discourse 
is thus to be viewed as a 
33 
dialogic and rhetorical act of semantic appropriation , although, 
significantly enough, this is a point of principle and 
is not based on any 
-------------------- 
1321 Ibid. e. g. PP. 116-118. The end product of the analysis 
is that of inserting 
descriptions of epistemological operations - common sense, 
judicial 
satisfaction, empiricist subjectivism, positivist 
empiricism, natural 
r eason, and so on - into the ar gumentative contex 
t of the tex ts r eviewed. 
1331 Ibid. p. 45. 
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sociolingui3t. ic account of the actual register or audience of the tex', -, 3 
under discussion. It is precisely because the discourses in question are 
to be viewed as simple effects of a series of essentialL., "y unitary, 
overarching, ideological motives or functions, that they can be so swiftly 
and simply described or dismissed as no more than semantic 'celebrations' 
of certain already known ideals or images (illusions) of how society and 
. 
34 the individual work In this aspect the analysis of judLcial discourse 
provided is relatively unsurprising in all but its language, and may be 
reformulated jurisprudentially as follows. Legal discourse is 
argumentative rather than necessary or scientific. In any given instance, 
the predominant ideological characteristic of legal argument is the 
highly selective manner in which it 'particularisest35 or translates a 
series of sociological relations and conflicts into a narrow set of 
legally relevant facts or issues. As a number of studies have argued36, 
this particular isation or decontextualisation of legal discourse is its 
. most significant ideological hallmark: concrete social relationships and 
real (social) people are transmogrified into the abstractly free and equal 
legal subjects of the legal code. Burton and Carlens' contribution to 
this analysis is that of displaying, though not explaining, ', -. he extent to 
which this ideology of legal subjectivity and linter-individuall 
relationships penetrates the interdiscourse of the law: the meaning of a 
legal text is to be understood in terms of its imposition of an idealised 
order, or series of semantic preconstructions, onto a set of material 
issue s and social conflicts which have in turn to be rewritten as the 
interrelationships of a series of individuals as legal subjects. 
Responsibility - praise and blame, innocence and guilt - can 
thus be 
distributed between the subjects of the legal text without threatening the 
social order or collective relations that produced these individuals and 
their conflicts. 
While I have undoubtedly omitted a number of the details and 
refinements of the study, there is nothing 
in the analysis of legal 
-------------------- 
1341 Ibid. p. 95. 
1351 C-f- W-Mu"PhY and R. Rawlings op. cit. pp. 618-623. 
1361 E. g. Z. Bankowski & G. Mungham: images of Law 
(1976) R. K. P.; T. Mathieson: Law, 
Societ tion op. cit.; R. M. Unger: Law 
in Modern Society ffg76ý 
Free Press. 
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narrative37 or of discursive sele--tion38whi-ch could alter the level of 
descriptive abstraction at which the work is situated. The $oint remains 
throughout that the concept of legal discourse being put forward by Burton 
and Carlen is really no more than an analysis of a specific feature of an 
ideology - which ideology is itself conceived as a series of functions 
producing homogeneous effects. While their analysis does usefully 
illustrate the fact that ideology is primarily a discursive process, the 
analysis of the discourses themselves is epistemological and prescriptive: 
by adopting certain 'positions', by assuming certain idealised meanings, 
and by accepting certain correlative 'guarantees of objectivity', the legal 
discourse successfully negotiates a task of diffusing threats to order and 
consensus. More broadly, the discourse responds according to a very 
narrowly conceived set of imperatives to the extra-discursive functions 
it is to fulfill. Discourse is in that sense dialogic, but at the same 
time the actual character and means of the dialogue whereby the discourse 
achieves its functions as effects are implicitly homogeneous and are 
certainly unanalysed. If the term discourse is to avoid becoming no more 
than a catchphrase for the textual character of ideology, it is 
indisputably necessary to examine how it works as discourse, as a 
linguistic practice or as the taking up of a position in language. By 
failing to analyse the specific dialogic features and the actual language 
of the reports, and by ignoring the lexical and syntactic features of 
legal discourse, a great deal of the credibility of the study is, 
unfortunately, lost. On the one hand, there is a contradiction inherent in 
stating that discourse itself is necessarily dialogic if no attempt 
is 
made to analyse or exemplify the specific and linguistic forms of 
that 
dialogue. It is insufficient to assume that because a discourse has 
certain semantic effects, or responds to certain extra-discursive 
requirements, that the language of such discourse must necessarily 
and 
uniformly comply with the tasks-or functions 
it is set. It is a gross 
oversimplification to suppose that 
because it is possible to define a 
correlation between the extra-discursive origin of 
a discourse and the 
'preferred reading' or semantic product of 
the discourse as realised, that 
-------------------- 
1371 op. c it. pp. 95-103. 
1381 Ibid. pp. 69-77. 
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the intervening medium - language as intradiscourse - is self-evident and 
unproblematic, without recalcitrance and without oppositional tendencies 
of its own. 
The point is an important one because what is at stake is not only the 
adequacy or otherwise of a description of the politics of legal 
intradiscourse but also the coherence and credibility of that entire array 
of substantive jurisprudential techniques and categories that serve 
precisely (as metalanguage or hermeneutic) to maintain the accepted and 
wholly antithetical account of the unity and closure of legal discourse. 
A critical concept of legal discourse, such as that proposed by Burton and 
Carlen, is too easy or insufficiently critical if it is simply prepared to 
rest at the level of ideology as interdiscourse. In reviewing no more 
than the effects of a discourse in the generalised terms of metaphoric and 
metonymic strategies, it fails to account for the actual reception or 
'reading' of legal texts within the legal institution itself. It assumes, 
upon the basis of an unargued, structural, conception of semantics, that 
certain of the key meanings and strategies of the texts will necessarily 
force the the various audiences of the law to passively accept the 
ideology that the text presupposes and repeats. The point is that legal 
discourse is considerably more complex and multifaceted than its 
description as a set of partially substantiated semantic effects allows. 
It has its own history, its own interpretative techniques and its own 
metalanguage of methodology; it is contradictory, in other words, to 
suppose that the dialogic nature of legal discourse is solely a 
feature of 
its explicit semantic presuppositions and choices alone, without at 
the 
same time showing that legal language in its entirety 
is embedded in the 
history of its institutional i sation and in the complex 
interrelations of 
various languages, multiple audiences and 
frequently divergent 
communicative and practical effects. Legal 
language, I shall argue, is not 
purely and simply the malleable or 
transparent instrument of ideological 
purposes. 
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7.1.2 Legal Intradiscourse 
I have argued in the foregoing section that an adequate account of 
legal discourse and of legal linguistic practice more generally, requires 
a recognition of the complexity and diversity of legal institutional 
pr ac tic e. Further, I have argued that it is both undesirable and 
erroneous to define law in terms of a unity - discursive or other - and 
that such an argument applies with equal force both to traditional 
metaphysics of natural law and legal positivism, as well as to more recent 
structuralist elaborations. As regards the latter theories, the tendency 
to adopt a Imacrosociologicall or structural definition of law as, for 
instance,, the exercise of power, the dominant ideology or as the fetishism 
of commodities, is peculiarly damning to the radical purposes or 
alternative politics that generally underpin such analyses. The major 
problem is, I believe, that of a tendency to focus upon certain specific 
features of legal regulation and upon highly specific bodies of law, and 
then to generalise these local facets of, for instance, criminal law, 
property law or contract law, into an overarching theory of law as a 
form. 39At all events, the extent, scope and discrepancies of legal 
regulation lend admirable support to the view that one of the attractive 
features of a concept of legal discourse is precisely its avoidance of the 
problem of the form of law, and its selection of a somewhat narrower object 
of study, that of law as a language and as communication. Even so, it is 
necessary to recognise the wealth and diversity of the various legal 
genres,, and to cautiously admit that it may be problematic to generalise 
too rapidly from specific features of legal discourse, a theory of legal 
language as suc h. For that reason, together with more pragmatic 
limitations to the scope of the present study, I must needs stress that the 
following is only a preliminary analysis, an attempt to characterise and 
exemplify in a schematic fashion certain of the peculiarities of legal 
discourse without in any way claiming to be comprehensive or complete. 
a) Institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of legal discourse 
is a multifaceted problem and raises a diversity of issues, ranging from 




questions of a sociological and socio-linguistic character, to questions 
of a properly rhetorical and semantic nature, which problems cross-cut the 
distinction earlier made between intradiscourse and inter d isnntirstp- 
Although I shall return subsequently to certain of the issues raised, the 
primary interest of the institutional isation of legal discourse is to be 
treated as of a straightforwardly sociological nature: what are the key 
features to the institutions to which legal discourse is most closely 
tied, and how do those institutions ensure the 'social authorisation' of 
that discourse ? 
In a generic sense, the problem is a familiar one. It is a commonplace 
of positivistic legal analysis that law is a social and institutional 
f ac t. Within the positivist analysis, of course, the question is rapidly 
subverted into an elaboration of the hierarchical normative and 
-ual conventional status of law, and neither the social nor the fact 
character of its institutional isation is long retained. It remains the 
case, however, that positivist analysis implies a substantive, 
institutional aspect to what is generally termed the 'concretisation, 
40 of 
legal norms. Faced with the basic question of the validity or legality of 
a specific discursive practice - the issuing, for of a ruling or 
court order - the analysis of the normative presuppositions of such a 
concrete norm also en"tails reference back to an institutional hierarchy of 
socially authorised or 'recognised' legal usages - texts, conventions arid 
principles associated with specific social bodies. In other words, 
positivist analysis may be capable of reformulating the problems of 
institutional isation in a normative terminology but it cannot wholly 
exclude them. More than that, however, the characteristic effect of 
the 
description of legal institutions in terms of conventions and norms 
is 
that of creating an image of legal discourse as 
being tied to institutions 
that are autonomous and impartial, by virtue of 
their internally defined, 
hierarchical, normative self-regulation. In the 
first instance, then, we 
may borrow fr om the work of 
the rhetoricians and regard the 
'identification' of certain texts with an autonomous 
body of institutional 
practices as an activity of an obviously symbolic 
nature: 
-------------------- 
[401 H. Kelsen: General Theorv of Law and State 
(1945) Harvard p. 216 ff. 
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we are clearly in the region of rhetoric when considering the 
identifications whereby a specialised activity makes one a 
participant in some social or economic class. "Belonging" in this 
sense is clearly rhetorical ... the very stress (within legal 
education) upon the pure autonomy of such activities is a roundabout 
way of identification with a privileged class, serving as a -kind of 41 social insignia promising preferment. 
The sociological point is that legal discourse is embedded, in a highly 
specialised and self-conscious way, in institutions of a high social 
status and prominence, to which access or professional entry is severely 
restricted. The most immediate phenomenon of 'recognition' of legality is 
in no sense intrinsic to the legal order -a matter of the 'internal 
attitude' of officials of the legal system - but straightforwardly 
ex tr insic. Legal discourse is socially and institutionally authorised - 
affirmed, legitimated and sanctioned - by a wide variety of highly visible 
organisational and socio-linguistic insignia of hierarchy, status, power 
and wealth. It is, in an altogether familiar sense, the ritual trappings 
of the law - its theatrical institutional settings, 
42the 
elitist character 
of its Personnel, 
43and the extent of its power to punish, 
44 that initially 
differentiate the legal institution and its discourse from the closely 
related domains of political,, religious and ethical discourses. 
If there is a unity to the institutional isation of legal discourse, it 
is not a unity based upon any autonomy from socio-political and 
ideological affinities 
45but 
rather, the precise opposite, a paradigmatic 
unity of an ideologically saturated, elitist, professional practice. To 
fully substantiate such a broad characterisation would, of course, 
necessitate an extensive sociological analysis considerably beyond 
the 
-------------------- 
[411 K. Burke: A Rhetoric of Motives (1969) Univ. of California Press pp. 27-28; 
c. f. also J. Lenoble et F. Ost op. cit. P-83 where they comment 
that I Legality 
would be nothing if it were not supported by a network of 
institutions, a 
tradition of ideas which always encloses and delineates the 
domain within 
which legal discourse can exercise its textual practice. 
1 
[421 C. f. e. g. P. Carlen: ce op. cit. pp. - 
18-38; T. Mathieson 
op. cit. pp. 77-111. 
[431 C. f. e. g. J. A. G. Gr if f ith: The Politic s of the Judic 
iary (1981 ) Fontana pp. 17- 
39; A. Patterson: Judges, A Political Elite ? (1974) B. J. L. S. 118. 
[441 D. Garland & P. Young: The Power to Punish (1983) Heinemann esp. ch. 
1&9. 
[451 P. Carlen: On Rights and Powers, in D. Garland & P. 
Young (eds): The Power to 
Punish (1983) Heinemann. I am tempted to extend 
the rather apposite 
formulation: I The judiciary are only independent 
in one sense: they are 
independent of democratic control and review. 
' 
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scope of the present work. Certain features of this unity of legal 
institutional i sation, may, however, be singled out: its educational, 
methodological and imperative aspects in particular have, in differing 
ways, frequently been ignored by sociologists unfamiliar with the more 
bizarre and esoteric features of legal pedagogy and legal practice. Posed 
in terms of the social organisation of a discourse, the control over the 
selection and distribution of a knowledge, legal education is clearly an 
important facet to the highly restrictive process of institutional isation. 
Entry into law school, the predominant mode of access to the legal 
profession, is, of course, itself a highly competitive process, which, in 
the wider context of educational succ ess and failure46, already lends an 
element of uniformity to the group of future professionals. Mor e 
importantly, entry into law school is the start of an extremely lengthy 
process of socialisation into the techniques and languages of an 
authoritarian hierarchy: 
This training is a major factor in the hierarchical life of the 
(law). It encodes the message of the legitimacy of the whole system 
into the smallest details of personal style, daily routine, gesture, 
tone ... and expression -a plethora of p's and q's for everyone to 
mind. Partly these will serve as a language - 'a way for the young 
lawyer to convey that she knows what the rules of the game are and 
intends to play them. What's going on is partly a matter of ritual 
oaths and affirmations ... and partly it is a substantive matter of 
value. Hierarchical behaviour will come to express and realise the 
hierarchical selves of people who were initially only wearers of 
masks. 
47 
Law school is, of course, only a preliminary stage, preparatory to later, 
-------------------- 
[461 For critical evaluations of the sociolinguistic and broad class contours of 
educational smcess and failure, viewed in the overall terms of 
socialisation, c. f. M. A. K. Halliday: Language as Social Semiotic (1978) 
Arnold ch-3 & 5. Also, B. Bernstein (ed): Class, Codes and Control vol. 2. 
(1973) R. K. P. M. F. D. Young (ed): Knowledge and Control (1971) Collier 
MacMillan Pt. I. 
[471 D. Kairys (ed): The Politics of Law (1982) Pantheon at p. 53. C. f. also, 
R. M. Unger: The Critical Legal Studies Movement, op. cit. pp. 666-670: 1 the 
real message of the (legal) curriculum is the (teaching) that a mixture of 
low-level skills and high-grade sophistic techniques of argumentative 
manipulation is all there is - all there is and can be - to legal analysis and, 
by implication, to the many methods by which professional expertise 
influences the exercise of state power ... The shared lesson 
(of legal 
teaching) is that the order of thought and society is contingent and yet for 
all practical purposes untransformable. They preach an inward distance from a 
reality whose yoke, according to them, cannot be broken. They distract people 
by enticing them into a hierarchy of smart alecks. I 
(p. 669) 
212 
more specific, stages of professional training which culminate with entry 
into the most tightly knit form of socialisation of all, the legal system 
itself. At each stage it is the self-evident authority of the law and of 
the various levels of the legal hierarchy which is to be inculcated as an 
assumption underlying the interactions and self-presentation of the 
institution as a whole. Mathieson, for instance, usefully isolates five 
features contributing to the hegemony and authority of the legal 
super str uc tur e. 
4 8The impression of independence or freedom of action and 
judgment in all contexts, including those where the reality of the context 
is that of adjustment to external material circumstances. The formality, 
ritual and pomposity of professional interaction and procedure. The 
sophistication and elegance of legal communication, the restricted and 
controlled character of its rhetorical settings. The stress laid upon the 
unity of the system and finally, and corr-elatively, the restriction of 
conflict within the system to conflict over norms and words rather than 
interests or motives, conflict of an anodyne kind which will ideally take 
the form of disagreement over legal relevance and the legal meaning of 
terms of art. 
To formulate the point more broadly, in terms of legal discourse, it is 
a question of a socially institutional ised set of restrictions or 
limitations upon who may speak, how much may be said and upon what topic 
and in what contexts. In one aspect, the entire process of socialisation 
into the legal institution is a question of learning deference and 
obedience, a question of explicit and implicit education into the 
requisite modes of interaction - the forms, procedures and 
languages - of 
the different levels, functions and topics of the legal system. Very 
broadly; constitutional conventions, the doctrine of 
the separation of 
powers, the ideal of the rule of 
law and later developments and 
elaborations of the concept of natural 
justice, together with the obvious 
features of adversarial trial and criminal and civil 
laws of contempt of 
court (particularly rules relating 
to the reporting of matters sub 
-------------------- 
[481 T. Mathieson op-cit. pp. 89-111. 
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judice)4 9all, in different ways, institutional ise restrictions upon who 
may speak and the scope and topics that their discourse is entitled to. 
To such very generalised restrictions must be added the far more detailed 
rules of legal methodology in relation to the hierarchy of legal texts. 
Rules of statutory interpretation and the doctrine of precedent, together 
with the much more detailed and generally less than explicit features of 
the 'legal art' of interpretation and argumentation within specific legal 
disciplines or bodies of law ( the role and status, for instance, of Equity 
or of specific principles, presumptions, customs and maxims), together 
combine to determine an institutional and discursive hierarchy of 
authorisation over who may think and speak and what may be thought or said. 
The apparently determinate ordering of legal texts according to an 
institutional ised, social ontology of sources of law, shields legal 
discourse from the potential threat of having to justify the form and 
content of the exercise and administration of power in terms of any 
discourse other than the traditional, patriarchal, and essentially a 
priori or given, legitimation internal to the legal hierarchy itself. The 
pr imar y pr oc edur e for suc h legitimation i S, as stated, the 
institutional ised restriction of authorised texts, which is combined with 
interpretative procedures which generally ensure that the only valid 
enunciation, apart from that of the authorised text, takes the form of 
exegesis,, commentary and reinterpretation - all of which may be 
generically described as forms of citation and repetition; the law is said, 
remains said, and remains to be said. 
,. 
I have so far focussed upon educational and methodological features of 
institutional i sation that fall within the general ambit of an ideological 
and symbol ic manipulation, the organisation of consent and the 
internalisation of hierarchy or repression. Such processes certainly 
carry with them a number of highly structured ceremonial, ritual and 
discursive procedures of affirmation and sanction, but it remains finally 
-------------------- 
[491 The Contempt of Court Act 1981 ss. 1-7 provides a somewhat confused schema of 
a 'strict liability' rule which now governs statutory contempts of court. By 
s. 6, however, the common law rules of contempt are retained as intentional 
contempts, requiring proof of mens rea. The common law rules remain a powerful 
instrument for control of media reporting and criticism of the court, while, 
in more direct terms, the common law offence of I contempt in the face of the 
court I remains (subject to s. 12) to deal with those who scandalise 
the court 
ii, L2-sý - 
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to comment briefly upon the most basic and in many ways most obvious facet 
of legal institutional isation, the imperative character of the legal 
system and so also of its discourse. In its most explicit and fundamental 
expression, law is the monopoly and codification of authorised and 
organised public violence. Violence and terror are a primary feature of 
the legal institution and of the social experience of it: 
not merely because (they) remain in reserve, coming into the open 
only in critical situations. State monopolised physical violence 
permanently underlies the techniques of power and the mechanisms of 
of consent: it is inscribed in the web of disciplinary and ideological devices, and even when not directly exercised, it shapes 
the materiality of the social body upon which domination is brought 
to bear. 50 
The efficacy of law, in other words, is never that of pure discourse, the 
spoken word and the issuing of rules alone. It presupposes organised 
force and mechanisms of fear whose real basis far exceeds the bounds of 
the specifically legal institutions of the contemporary nation state, 
whose potential and capacity for violence and the monopoly of war, raises 
the spectre,, the possibility, not merely of political and racial genocide, 
but also of the destruction of the species. 
b) Lexicon and syntax. The institutional reality to which legal 
discourse is tied, is of a more than purely sociological interest alone. 
It also bears clear implications for the analysis of law as a form of 
communication with a specific discursive content. In the general terms of 
law as a structure of communication or as a specialised rhetoric5l, two 
features of its institutional isation would appear- to be of especial 
importance. First, the unity of the legal system which, in sociological 
terms, refers to a complex of features already outlined; primarily the 
limitation of legal discourse to a restricted set of hierarchically 
-------------------- 
1501 N. Poulantzas: State, Power, Socialism (1978) London p. 81. The point is also 
made less directly in F. Burton and P. Carlen op. cit. ch. 4 and pp. 78-85. 
1511 1 am consciously avoiding use of the term 'code' in its technical meaning, 
because of its semiotic derivation, although I am aware that certain recent 
elaborations, notably those of R. Barthes and of U. Eco, come close to the 
position here adopted; namely, that the code is socially produced for specific 
purposes of communicational and instrumental function. C. f. U. Eco: A Theory 
of Semiotics (1979) Indiana U. P. Ch. 2. esp. PP. 139-151; & pp. 276-314. 
R. Barthes: S/Z (1975) London. 
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defined speakers, together with the internal shielding or valorisation of 
specific lauthorised' texts and the strictly delimited rhetorical Settings 
of legal communication and contact with the non-legal world. Combinedq 
these features describe a tightly knit hegemony or pr oc ess of 
institutional isation and of socialisation in which the authority of law is 
an unchallenged precondition of interaction and self-presentation; it 
constitutes a paradigm of normal knowledge which emphasises, within the 
social practice of the institution, the essentially scientific or 
inexorably logical character of legal validity and of legal practice 
generally. To take the point further, the social organisation of legal 
discourse lends itself powerfully to the production of an apparently 
specialised discipline and discourse; a discourse which is context 
independent; monologic rather than dialogic; distanced and obscure in the 
sense of being presented as alien, both sociolinguistically and 
practically, from the commitments and values of the heteroglot social life 
which is the actual, material, context of legal control. It is indeed the 
latter mentioned heteroglossia of value and social division against which 
legal discourse and legal language continually fights to establish itself; 
law is in many ways defined as a specialised discipline, precisely by its 
constant, centripetal, endeavour to maintain itself by differentiation and 
by exclusion of the discourses and languages which surround it. 
The precision of legal intradiscourse which I will analyse below, or 
the highly determinate (relexicalised) character of its vocabulary and 
syntax is not, as positivism, and legal analysis generally, argue, simply 
and necessarily a feature of the casuistic and constrained interpretative 
procedures of a normative legal code; nor is it merely a precondition of 
the logical elaboration of novel concrete norms. It is also a declaration 
of a unitary language and of a monologic (closed) discourse; a 
justification in itself for the exclusion of dialogue or of the refusal to 
admit any (semantic) intertextuality which might challenge the legal use 
of a stratified and value laden, existent, language system. On the one 
hand, the self presentation of legal language as unitary, and the 
correlative exclusion of dialogue from a rhetoric or discourse crucially 
concerned to express and convey authority, creates the social image of a 
language which is, familiarly enough, putatively rational and universal, a 
science - precise, certain, predictable, repetitious and also and 
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importantly, alien to any specific context. As communication, the 
monologic character of legal discourse suggests that, exactly in 
proportion to its unity and authority, its artistic status, it will act 
functionally as a species of non-communication, as occlusive and opaque, 
to the myriad of other languages and discourses within the society it 
regulates. It is not merely or simply that the specialisation of legal 
discourse, in all but its most general forms of prohibition and 
specification, is impenetrable to those outwith the incestuous verbalism 
of the legal code,, but further, that the very social organisation and form 
of that discourse powerfully' justifies - by means of linguistic and 
discursive exclusiom, by means of distance and non-communication - the 
actual hierarchy and the specific content and functions of the semantic 
(social, political and ideological) choices which that discourse expresses 
and per petuates. 
521t is precisely by avoiding or excluding the semantic 
implications of its own institutional isation, communicative forms and 
language, and by treating legal problems as problems of syntax or of a 
lexico-grammatical kind, that the law manages and controls the 
individual's place - the hierarchy of social and political relations - 
while apparently doing no more than prohibiting and facilitating certain 
generic and inherently uncontr over sial, legally specific, activities and 
functions. 
Recalling the earlier char ac ter i sat ion of communication, as 
communication between hierarchically organised individuals in concrete 
social settings, I have so far proposed the importance of viewing legal 
discourse as being tied to specific social institutions and have suggested 
that those institutions imply or explain certain of the general features 
of legal language and discourse as expressed in the commonplaces of legal 
positivism. To analyse the point in its linguistic detail also requires 
recollection of the entailments of the definition of communicaion. 
Briefly, I am concerned with a view of linguistic structure which treats 
it as embedded in, and motivated by, the social and inter-personal needs it 
-------------------- 
1521 For a general character isation c. f. N. Poulantzas op. cit. at pp. 89-90: ' No- 
one should be ignorant of the law - that is the fundamental maxim of the modern 
juridical system, in which no-one but State representatives are able to know 
the law. This knowledge required of every citizen is not even a special 
subject of study at school, as if everything were done to 
keep him in ignorarr-e 
of what he is supposedly obliged to know. 
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is to perform. I All parts of language are functional in this sense ... Tt 
follows for the analysis of discourse that any choice of words and 
syntactic constructions can have some significance assigned to it., 53 In 
the present context,, the point, in principle, is that of evidencing the 
semantic effects bound up with legal intradiscourse, the legal lexicon and 
syntax, and of further analysing what, within the recent discipline of 
communication studies54, are termed the control of topic and production of 
preferred readings, which such a lexicogrammatical system will tend to 
represent. 
The general features of the legal lexicon have already been commented 
upon. To learn the law is in large measure to learn a highly technical and 
frequently archaic vocabulary, a professional argot which makes frequent 
lexical use of specialised legal meanings (relexicalisations), medieval 
English (aforesaid, witnesseth, etc) and French (chose in action, demurrer, 
fee simple, etc) as well as a pervasive use of Latin. That legal 
vocabulary and the syntactic forms tied to it, are a peculiarly specific 
stratification of linguistic heteroglossia can hardly be doubted. In this 
respect the status of legal language in many ways replicates the 
relationship of Latin to the vernacular national languages of the Middle 
Ages, and it is, I believe, useful to pursue the analogy, and to 
characterise legal intradiscourse not only in terms of communication and 
non-communication, but also in terms of a cross-cutting distinction 
between authority and persuasion. The authority of legal language is its 
-------------------- 
1531 R. Fowler: Literature as Social Discourse op. cit. pp. 28 ff. C. f. also 
M. Bakhtin op. cit. at p. 284 I Style organically contains within itself indices 
that reach outside itself, a correspondence of its own elements and the 
elements of an alien context. The internal politics of style (how the elements 
are put together) is determined by-its external politics (its relationship to 
alien discourse) . Discourse lives, as 
it were, on the boundary between its own 
context and another, alien, context. 1 
[541 C. f. H. Davies & P. Walton (eds) : Language, Image, Media op. cit. esp. ch-3,5 & 
14. It should here be noted that a relatively sh rtlived tradition of 
conversational analysis, ethnomethodology, was in many ways the precursor of 
contemporary communication studies. In a frequently uncritical and 
linguistically ill-specified manner, ethnomethodology attempted to analyse 
the highly selective discursive forms of the social - though more frequently 
individual - constructions of reality or order. 
C. f. e. g. H. Garfinkel: 
Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967) Prentice Hall; H. Sacks, in D. Sudnow: 
Studies _iHn--Social-Tniteraction (1972) N. York PP-31-74. Certain of the concepts 
and methods dev d in the e frequently entertaining studies; 
the notions 
of indexicality, turn-taking in conversation, societal 
membership 
categorisations; have been taken up in a rather 
limited context in M. Atkinson 
& P. Drew: Order in Court op. cit. and applied in desultory 
fashion to the 
language of trials. 
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predominant formal characteristic, and the initial question to be posed is 
that of the lexical and syntactic forms which, viewed as vehicles of 
expression or of meaning, combine to construct a sociolinguistic belief 
system of extreme social significance. 
In the first instance,, legal language, as a professional stratification 
of language, is marked by the precision of its lexicalisation. As a facet 
of the surfacestructure of legal language, it is obviously not possible 
to provide anything approaching a comprehensive account of legal 
vocabulary. The significance of a specialised vocabulary lies in. its 
expressive and intentional dimensions, its implications in respect of 
classification, coherence and articulation. The linguistic phenenomena 
referred to are obviously lexical and syntactic (lexicogrammatical) but 
it is nonetheless helpful to begin by attempting to clarify certain 
lexical characteristics. To the commonplace that law is differentiated by 
the arcane nature of its vocabulary, it can immediately be added that such 
differentiation takes a linguistically specific form. Indeed, in this 
respect it may be observed that whereas most professional vocabularies 
are, in their surface structure at least, of a strongly denotative 
character and, as with those of medicine, psychiatry, business or 
education, tend to be subsumed under the classification and relational 
taxonomies of extra-linguistic, real, processes, the legal vocabulary may 
be defined as predominantly rhetorical. It is a system of superimposition 
or of connotation in the sense first defined by Hjemslev55 . and 
subsequently developed by R. Barthes. 
56jIf it is the level of expression 
that is a language in its own right, we are confronting a connotative 
language. Connotation is in fact found ... when the signifying element 
is 
the actual utilisation of a given language., 
57Barthes, of course, greatly 
extends the significance of connotation by viewing it as a 
level or plane 
of language, aligned directly with rhetorical and 
ideological functions. 
For the present, however, I would wish to limit my remarks 
to viewing the 
legal vocabulary as a primarily symbolic lexicon which places great 
stress 
upon the legal signifier or legal word as an entity 
in itself, as a 
-------------------- 
[551 L. Hjemslev: prolegomena op. cit. ch. 2. 
[561 R. Barthes: Elements of Semiol (1967) Cape pp. 89-95. 
157] T. Todorov & O. Dw-rot op. cit. p. 21. 
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paramount terminology by virtue of its membership of a lexical and 
connotative system rather than by virtue of any simple denotation; it is a 
vocabulary of possibilities purportedly comprising a comprehensive system 
of meanings that are internal or latent within the lexicon itself. 
In the terminology of legal positivism, the legal definition of words, 
and legal language generally, are to be seen as self or auto-referential, 
the internal discourse or monologue of a metaphysics. This, we are told, 
is a feature of the normative character of the legal system. What I am 
concerned to argue here is that, in the first instance, this characteristic 
of legal language is a product of a specific form of lexicalisation. I 
will later argue, that far from being a simple and impartial facet of 
normativity as such, this lexical and syntactic feature of legality bears 
specific semantic overtones and performs a complex of socially and 
ideologically significant functions. For the moment, the basis of legal 
lexicalisation can be viewed best in terms of its historical and 
stratifying dimensions. To begin with, it hardly needs to be stressed 
that the law is the language of time honoured tradition. In at least two 
senses, the law is already 'written'; it has its primary basis in custom, 
and its vocabulary is correspondingly governed by doctrines of memory, 
recognition and usage, defined in turn by reference to extensive and 
obscure etymologies, inert and calcified meanings and procedures, and 
finally an epistemology, in the last resort, of 'sources' of law in which 
words are transmitted by a dogmatics of quotation, reference, citation and 
specialised and restricted commentary: 
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make 
it our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have 
to persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already 
attached to it. The authorative word is located in a distanced zone, 
organic, ally connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically 
higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers. Its authority 
was already acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse. It 
is given (it sounds) in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. 
Its language is a special (as it were, hieratic) language. It can be 
profaned. It is akin to taboo, i. e., a name that must not 




1581 M. Bakhtin op. cit. P-342. 
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The thematic of authoritative discourse clearly transcends the domain of 
lexicon and syntax; the functions of distance and indivisibility (the 
fusion of word and authority) are also interdiscursive and ideological, 
but they equally provide an orientation for the analysis of 
intradiscourse. The features of intradiscourse most closely 
corresponding to and facilitating the authoritative functions, may be 
summarised, I shall argue, in terms of three aspects; those of a generic 
and intentional vocabulary (lexicalisation/relexicalisation), abstraction 
or generalisation. (nominalisation/articulation) and finally surface 
narrative structure and character isation (modal ity/tr ansiti vity). 
59 
If the generic character of the legal vocabulary is a distinctive and 
important feature of the language of the law, it is for the reason that it 
facilitates a number of significant syntactic and semantic operations. 
Prior to examining such operations, however, it is worth stressing the 
character of the lexicon as a system of a predominantly connotative kind. 
Looking, for instance, to the vocabulary of the law of contract, it is, in 
the first instance, to be characterised as a series of very broad and very 
loose terms of art - the categories of intention, agreement, consideration, 
privity, express and implied terms, mistake, misrepresentation, breach and 
so on. Each of the terms is generic and acts as the centre of a 
prescriptive, connotative, field of systemic associations and rules which 
will frequently belie, in part or in whole, the specific definition of the 
term itself. To use only the most commonplace of examples, intention and 
agreement have a very precarious and frequently fictional life in view of 
the development of contradictory supervening categories of normative 
1presumptions as to intention', 'unfair terms', 'economic duress' and so on. 
Similarly 'promissory estoppel', 'privityl and 'adequacy' in fact, severely 
limit the scope of the doctrine of consideration. The examples could 
be 
multiplied and detailed - the contemporary development of 
the law of 
negligence, the administrative concept of natural 
justiCe or the 
interpretation of the Race Relations Acts providing good examples - 
but 
the lexical point concerns the fact that the words at 
issue bear no very 
-------------------- 
1591 1 am here making use of a much more general set of 
linguistic categories 
elaborated in R. Fowler: Literature as 
Social Di-scourse op. cit. pp. 24-46; 
R. Fowler et al. (eds. ): Language and ontrol o cit. ch. 
2,6,7, & 10; G. Kress 
& B. Hodge: Language as IdeoVý--'ýglW-8) R. K. P. Ch. 4,6,7. 
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clear meaning; they are generic and subject to contradiction, exception 
and limitation, as well as to extension, multiplication and 
relexicalisation generally, as and when occasion requires. Far from being 
bound by any extra-linguistic content or denotative meaning, the terms are 
connotative and symbolic: they lend themselves to an obfuscating, 
rhetorical or symbolic usage, to figurative and analogical manipulations 
within which their actual meaning or referent is obscure. In any given 
instance the mobilisation of the vocabulary of contract is both a semantic 
and symbolic adventure in its own right, and equally the beginning of a 
professional or judicial utterance which is predominantly defined by the 
latitude or freedom which it allows the authorised speaker. Lacking any 
clear denotation, the legal lexicon facilitates the directly intentional 
possibilities of the language it uses, its concrete instancing is 
intentionally rather than lexically determined. In short, it offers its 
authorised users the greatest possible scope or power of judgment, of 
relexicalisation and of assimilation of situation and of other languages 
and vocabularies. The authority of the law, its power to directly 
determine meaning, might be said to rest, in this respect, upon a wholly 
lateral use of a symbolic vocabulary. 
Vocabulary also implies certain syntactic forms. While it is tempting 
to associate the legal lexicon directly with certain argumentative and 
persuasive forms; for instance, with the metaphoric use of language, which 
in one famous example illuminatingly defined a trade unions' 'threat' to 
break a contract as an act of physical violence in its own right, directed 
presumably towards the material fabric. of the social contract60 ; it would 
be incorrect to wholly omit reference to, and discussion of, the mediation 
of vocabulary and semantics through syntax. The legal vocabulary, as a 
dictionary of apparently precise, generic and symbolic words, is closely 
tied to a syntax of generalisation; of nonagentive 
--------- ---------- 
[601 Rookes v Barnard (1964) 1 A. E. R. p. 400 A-D, 405-406 E-H, A-E. 
[611 The nonagentive passive form inverts the order of the direct declaritive 
sentence and deletes its subject. It is the syntactic paradigm of 
distancing, 
from the simple replacement of I by you (generic), we, the law and so on, to 
more elaborate formulations in which an impersonal pronoun 
becomes the 
subject-agent of a process. See, also, D. Crystal & D. Davy: 
Investigations of 
EnElish Style (1969) Indiana U. P. c h. 2. 
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pas sives'61 nominal i sat ions (frequently po stmod ifi ed or 
62 r elex ic al ised), thematisations63 and automatic figurative 
register s'64whose overall tendency is that of establishing distance, 
impersonality and the possibility of rapid generalisation or exit from a 
concrete and unique instance of material conflict or dispute, to the 
universals of a normative rhetoric. The syntax of generalisation deletes 
the context and specific identity of the agents of the processes described 
and judged, and assumes a straightforward,, unproblematic, continuity 
between concrete instance and abstract norm. I shall take an example from 
a case in which Lord Diplock is endeavouring to relexicalise breaches of 
contract into a vocabulary of primary, general secondary and anticipatory 
secondary obligations. Thus, for instance,, I the secondary obligation on 
the part of the contract breaker to which it gives rise by implication of 
the common law is to pay monetary compensation to the other party. 165The 
key nominal is 'obligation'. It is derived from someone or some group 
being obliged to do something; in this instance, the contract breaker 
(object) is obliged (process) by the common law (agent) to pay 
compensation (instrument). I shall comment briefly upon both the form and 
the content of this fairly typical syntactic construction. Although the 
statement is intended to explain and control specific behaviour, it lacks 
any directive speech act. Rather than regulating in a direct way, the 
stylistic impersonality of the utterance controls by means of attitude, it 
depicts a depersonalised state of affairs in which the significant 
syntactic constructions are nominalisation and passivisation; there is no 
explicit command structure, no request or imperative from a speaker to an 
-------------------- 
[621 Nominalisations are a specific form of nonagentive passive. A process, or 
verbal action, is expressed by a noun rather than a verb and assumes the 
identity of the participants in the process or action; e. g. obligation, 
declaration, termination and so on, where the specific identity of the 
entities or persons acting is only, at best, analytically recoverable. 
Synechdochic and metonymic reification are further variants of a similar 
syntactic process, e. g. Court for judge, Law for Court and 
Parliament for 
Statute etc, c. f. P. J. Jalbert, in Language, Image, Media op. cit. pp. 
288-290. 
[631 Thematisation; again a form of passivisation and objectification where the 
nominal designating the object is placed 
in the position of theme, the 
position normally associated with the agent. 
The noun-phrase is shifted to 
first place in the sentence. 
[641 Automatic figurative register (metaphor) refers to a more general process of 
distancing, the speaker/author avoids direct formulation 
by reverting to 
standardised descriptions or utterances or, more 
directly, uses quotation or 
citation from authority to distance self and utterance 
from discourse. 
[651 photo Production v Securicor (1980) 1 A. E. R. 556, at pp. 
556-557. 
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addressee, but rather, a familiar legal objectification of behaviour which 
generalises beyond the context and institutional isation of the utterance. 
In so far as the multiplication of obligations constitutes a series of 
interpersonal regulations, they are euphemised or obscured, in that their 
objectification renders who is doing what to whom, somewhat less than 
66 immediately apparent , although in the context of the example given, the 
su jects of the utterance are easily recoverable. 
What is interesting about the surface structure described and briefly 
exemplified is that it facilitates particular forms of legitimation. In 
the first instance, what is involved is a specific form of articulation 
which lends itself to unimpeded generalisation. Particular noun-clauses 
will introduce preconstructions which can then be elaborated and extended 
through relexicalisation and other processes of appropriation, 
assimilation and accenting of the professionally shared language. 
I mper sonality or objectif ic ati on operate through stereotypes and 
typifications or, in the terms of the rhetoric of persuasion, membership 
categorisations and identifications. Bakhtin singles out a process of 
'pseudo-objective motivationv67 common to authoritarian discourses, which 
process refers to modality and to attribution of qualities or 
character isation. Again, what is here significant is the interactive 
dimension of the surface text, although the processes in question clearly 
imply more substantial, semantic, operations. Modality; modal auxiliaries 
(might, could, can, etc), adjectives expressing certainty or uncertainty 
(possible, likely, certain etc), verbs expressing mental and logical 
processes (seems that, thinks that, feels that and etc); is a key feature 
to the legal text and, as has been recognised68 , the prevalent forms of 
modality within legal texts are imperative and axiomatic. I Gives rise by 
-------------------- 
[661 R. Fowler et al. (eds. ) op. cit. p. 41 remarks upon the formality, ritual and 
impenetrability which is frequently associated with a heavily nominalised 
style. The impersonality generates an unquestionable authority: I This 
is 
style as censorship ... although 
it is quite frank about the authority it 
claims, the style itself allows the details of the exercise of the mechanisms 
of control to be obscured, mystified. ' 
[671 M. Bakhtin op. cit. pp-305-308. 
[681 C. F. particularly W. Murphy & R. Rawlings op. cit. pp. 
634-651 - their examples 
being assertion, repetition and inadequate motivation generally. 
See also, 
R. B. Ferguson: The Horowitz Thesis and Common Law Discourse in England 
(1982) 
oxford Journal of Legal Studies pp. 42-46.; and F. Burton & P. Carlen op. cit. 
pp. 104-107. 
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implication of the common law', for example, expresses an unproblematic, 
nonagentive, certainty. A prior discourse is articulated to cohere the 
instant utterance and will find ' pseudo-objective' expression elsewhere in 
the text in corresponding subord inate conjunctions and link words (thus, 
because, for the reason that) as well as in words used to maintain logical 
sequence (therefore, consequently, etc). 
Finally, particular forms of modality and of agency, are associated 
with spec if ic c har ac ter i sations and stereotypes mobilised in the 
instancing of discourse through surface narrative structure. 
69Certain 
roles and participants are systematically associated with specific kinds 
of process and actioh. Particular vocabularies and markers increase 
status or remove legitimacy, in which respect,, I can think of no better 
example than that of the description of rioting in the spring of 1981 in 
Lord Scarman's Report on the Brixton disorders. 
70The narrative sequence of 
the report systematically opposes a vocabulary and syntax of rationality 
in the narration of police activityj to a syntax of emotion and 
irrationality when the actions of 'blacks' are reported. The police 'take 
decisions' (para-3-18), 'properly and reasonably' reach a viewpoint, 
'exercise judgment' (para. 3.23), 'see dangers' (para-3.26), 'make imaginative 
innovations' 'establish liaison' (para. 4.17), have 'good intentions and 
efforts' (para. 4.43. ) and are generally characterised throughout in terms 
of objective 'behaviour' (para. 4.64). Blacks, on the other hand, are 'driven 
by despair', feel and 'have feelings' (para. 2-35), have a 'sense of 
rejection' and of 'insecurity' par a. 2-36), are subject to 
'rapidly 
circulating rumours' (para-3-19), are 'distrustful', limaginel and 
have 
'popular attitudes and beliefs' (para-3.24. ), are 'hostile' and 
'suspicious' 
(para. 4.17), 'shipwreck' liaison, suffer 'storms of distrust' which reach 
Igaleforcel (para. 4.43) and bare 'beliefs', 'images' and 'myths' 
(para. 4.64). 
In short, an unshakeable standard of rationality grounds 
the purposive 
action of the police, while the very 
language and narrative form of the 
black actions are embedded in a lexicon and modality of 
exclusion, of 
-------------------- 
[691 R. Fowler et al. (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 120-131; R. Fowler op. cit. ch. 
2 appendix 
B. H. Davis & P. Walton (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 40-43. 
1701 Cmnd. 8247. See also A. Norrie: Freewill, Determinism and 
Criminal Justice 
0 (1983) 3 Legal Studies 60. M. Barker & A. Beezer: The Language of 
Racism (1983) 
Int. Socialism 108. J. Wren-Lewis: The Story of a 
Riot (1982) Screen 
Edxation 15. 
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collective emotional myths generated by a life lived on the streets 
( par a. 2.1 1 ). 
The Scarman Report is clearly an extreme example and is of a quasi- 
judicial status. 71It does, howeverg provide a very precise illustration of 
the manner in which a linguistic analysis of intradiscourse or surface 
text, can evidence, at the primary level of lexicogrammatical system, the 
typical features of the language of control. A series of features of 
vocabulary and syntax can be elicited from the particular text and 
analysed in terms of the rhetoric or discourses which they imply and 
facilitate. Rather than starting from an analysis of ideology and then 
reading the structural categories of legal ideology into the legal text; 
it is more consistent, more accessible and less arbitrary to commence with 
the text itself, and to analyse the specific linguistic devices whereby 
choices,, readings and meanings are engendered72. 
7.1.3 Legal Interdiscourse 
The distinction between intradiscourse and interdiscourse is analytic 
rather than substantive; it concerns levels of analysis rather than levels 
of the text, although a useful distinction can be made between the self- 
articulation of a discourse (ego-discourse) and the relationship of a 
discourse to other, competing and non-competing, discourses (alter- 
discourse). 73While legal intradiscourse is primarily to be understood as a 
-------------------- 
1711 In legal terminology, of course, it is 'extra-judicial' 
1721 C. f. H. Davis & P. Walton (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 95-99 where C. L. Lerman usefully 
analyses 'dominant discourses' into four thematic processes of topic 
transformat7ion. Although she does not distinguish intradiscourse from 
interdiscourse, the mechanisms and effects classified are primarily those of 
textual self-articulations, viewed rhetorically as a process of topic 
transformation. The themes and devices which she singles out are: 
fragmentation of topic (particular isation/decontextualisation) ,a process of linguistic and semantic exclusion; institutional isation, according to a 
network of I loyalties' ,a process of inclusion and statement of the norm; identifications, the rhetoric of consensus, which is again, in the first 
instance, lexical and syntactic (it considers lexicalisation, implicatures, 
personal pronouns, modality and so on); finally, the power to define, the 
analysis of 'speech forms' which suppress discussion and replace it with 
statements of moral judgment, the 'ritual soliloquy' which facilitates 
protection of a 'closed discourse system' (p. 99). See R. Fowler et al. (eds. ) 
for a similar. though broader, analysis, pp. 198-213. 
1731 1 am here somewhat misusing a distinction made by G. Therborn op. cit. pp. 27- 
29, between ego-ideologies and alter -ideologies. E. g. ' Male chauvinist 
sexist ideology should be seen as both an ego-ideology of maleness and an 
alter-ideology of femaleness. I (p. 28). 
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process of the textual self-definition of legality in terms of a unitary 
and exclusive language, legal interdiscourse specifies the hierarchical 
relationship - the relations of inclusion and exclusion - between law, 
other discourses, and the social whole. The two faces of legal discourse 
are closely related; they share the same semantic motives and the same 
institutional characteristics and if they are to be consistently 
differentiated it is not because of any intrinsic separation of self and 
other to legal discourse, but rather because of a methodological and 
stylistic intention to analyse both the monologic and the dialogic 
dimensions of the discourse in question. 
In describing the institutional and semantic implications of legal 
intradiscourse, I laid stress upon a number of general features of the 
self-presentation, or image of a language, which that discourse is likely 
to represent. The authority and distance, as well as the predominantly 
monologic and alienating facets of the law's self-articulation, were 
emphasised as essential characteristics of the internal definition of a 
unitary language. Such characteristics, of course, also bear a wealth of 
dialogic or rhetorical implications. The image of authority and of 
distance, for instance, is both a mechanism for excluding challenges to 
-o legal language, and also a specific strategy or manner of relationship t 
other discourses and audiences. The authoritative, unitary, language s 
not only a means of presenting a discourse as a species of science. or 
'thing in itself' - that is, as an alien and reified use of words - 
but also 
a rhetorical play, in that a language of authority is also, of itself, a 
particular strategy of persuasion. It is a dialogic form which endeavours 
to predetermine the conditions and contexts of its reception. In what 
follows, I shall be principally concerned with the semantics of this 
oblique form of dialogue, with the interdLscursive appropriation of 
meaning which attempts to exclude from the ambit of legal authority 
the 
possibility of alternative meanings and other 
discourses. As the term 
appropriation implies, the primary issue in relation 
to the law's own 
definition of itself as a unitary language, is that of a rhetoric 
of 
'inclusion'. or of identification: that is, of a stratification of 
language 
which is of sufficient social power 
to intentionally determine khe 
language and discourses exterior to 
it. By surbordinating surrounding 
discourses to the authority of legal semantics, 
legal interdiscourse will 
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also exclude and stigmatise - define Out - all such discourses as are 
inherently recalcitrant to the basic belief system and preconstructions 
of legal language74. 
To recall the topology of section II, law constitutes a discursive 
formation, a site of reformulation and paraphrase which defines both the 
'already asserted' and the lassertable' (transparencies of meaning) as well 
as an exterior, a relationship of exclusion towards differently oriented 
paraphrases and accents within or produced by other discourses. The point 
is made more concretely by Bakhtin in a series of comments upon the 
semantics of professional languages and their spec if ic powers of 
appropriation: 
What is important here is the intentional dimensions, that is, the 
denotative and expressive dimensions of the "shared" language's 
stratification. It is in fact not the neutral linguistic components 
of language being stratified and differentiated, but rather a 
situation in which the intentional possibilities of a language are 
being expropriated: these possibilities are realised in specific 
directions, filled with specific content, they are made concrete, 
particular, and are permeated with concrete value judgments ... Every 
socially significant verbal performance has the ability ... to infect with its own intention certain aspects of language that had 
been affected by its semantic nuances and specific axiological 
overtones; thus, it can create slogan-words, curse words, praise words 
and so forth. 75 
It is my hope that the analysis of legal intradiscourse has moved some way 
towards describing the form that such semantic appropriation is likely to 
take, and it remains therefore to analyse the broad contours of its 
content. 
a) Sovereign and subject. The categories of sovereign and subject are 
intrinsic to legal discourse and have long been recognised within 
jurisprudence as essential features of legal semantics. Theories of law, 
-------------------- 
1741 F. Burton & P. Carlen op. cit. make the point well in relation to the Official 
Discourses analysed; I The main problem for Official Discourse on law and 
order is that all problems have to be discussed in terms of an ideal of 
distributive justice which cannot admit to the material conditions which 
render that ideal impossible. A discourse has to be 
developed which will both 
pre-empt and foreclose any theory within which questions could 
be posed which 
might destroy the pre-givens of that discourse; 
I (at p. 95). 
1751 M. Bakhtin op, cit. pp. 289-290. 
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from Hobbes to Austin and, to a lesser degree, Kelsen, have frequently been 
theories of sovereignty (defined either literally or metaphorically) and 
have viewed the specificity of the legal in terms of a sovereign power to 
command the subjects of a legal system. On the other hand, a slightly 
different emphasis can be found within certain naturalistic and analytic 
accounts of law, wherein legal subjectivity and subjective rights define 
the legal form of human relation and to varying extents endow it with an 
ethical value. The two categories are not mutually exclusive, to a great 
extent they imply each other as the twin poles within a hierarchy of 
command or authority. 76The sovereign power of a legal system both creates, 
and enables the creation, of subjective rights and duties, while, at the 
same time, sovereignty - be it legislative or judicial - is itself 
frequently seen to be itself restricted and legitimated by being, both 
directly and indirectly, the subject of rights and duties and the 
recipient or nodal point of a subjective right. Very broadly, the 
concepts of legal order and of the rule of law, have generally been 
formulated in such a manner as to encapsulate not merely the normative but 
equally, the underlying ethic al connotations of the restraint of 
sovereignty in terms of subjective right and particularly the generalised 
right to fair and impartial trial, as an equal before the law, in its 
various legislative, administrative and substantive contexts. 
In view of the fact that the concept of legal discourse is not, and 
should not attempt to be, a theory of law,, but is rather concerned with the 
preconstruction and production of legal meaning, it is fortunately 
unnecessary to enter in any depth into the various debates over the 
correct denotation of the terms sovereign and subject or subjection as 
definitions of the intrinsically legal. It is sufficient to recognise 
that legal theory and legal practice have consistently and with reason - 
though with differing ethical stress or motive - utilised these categories 
as integral features of the description and analysis of 
legal relations. 
For the sake of clarity it should also be noted that critical 
theories of 
law and attacks upon the liberal concept of 
legal order have also 
-------------------- 
176] For a recent analysis, c. f. D. N. MacCormick: Legal 
Right and Social Democracy 
(1982) Oxford ch. 1, or , for a more critical 
ad-count, H. A. Unger: n Modern 
societ op. cit. pp. 106-181. 
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generally accepted the centrality of the concepts of sovereign and 
subjection. At their best, the critiques of legal order have concentrated 
upon the historical relativity of the liberal notions of the freedom and 
equality of legal subjects and the correlative notions of the impartiality 
or generality of legal rules and their application. Viewed historically, 
it has been forcefully argued that the norms of the legal order have a 
specific, hierarchically based, genesis, and that the ideals of freedom and 
equality to which the concept of the legal subject is ineluctably bound, 
have never and can never be realised within the context of the liberal 
77 
state. Other, reductionist, critiques, have taken the issue much further 
and have argued that legal subjectivity is the passive reflection or 
effect of economic value, and that law in its complex entirety can be 
explained as the direct expression of an historically specific economic 
form78. 
While it would seem incontestable that aspects of the content of law 
are only explicable in terms of their expression of economic relations - 
the conflicting interests of labour and capital, and the formation of 
antagonistic class positions - the more general reduction of law to a 
model of the circulation of commodities is less warranted. At all events, 
whether or not the legal subject is the direct expression of the commodity 
form, the relation of subject and sovereign within legal discourse is a 
more specific problem. What is at issue in the analysis of legal 
interdiscourse is not, I would argue, a question of cause and effect, nor 
of function and determination, but rather of the preconstructions and 
impositions of meaning (the creation of a world of 'things', of evident 
f ac ts and delimitations of possibility) whereby legal discourse 
differentiates itself from other discourses and discursive formations, and 
defines itself as a political practice in endeavouring to control its 
users and reception, its relation to the various codes and contexts of 
its 
audiences. In terms then of interdiscourse, meaning, and control over 
meaning, are to be viewed as processes or networks of semantic relation, 
rather than being simplified, for whatever reason, 
into a substantive 
-------------------- 
1771 C. f. T. Mathieson op. cit. pp. 140-145; N. Poulantzas op. cit. pp. 
86-92. 
1781 E. B. Pashukanis: Law and Marxism (1978) London PP-109-134; 
B. Edelman op. cit. 
ch. l. A useful an5-1-ys-is of this 
debate is found in M. Foucault: Power/ 
Knowledge op. cit. PP. 78-133. 
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concept of politico-juridical power as a one to one relationship between a 
sovereign and subject wherein power emanates, as of right, from a point 
exterior and 'above' to an instance of control or coercion 'below'. I The 
analysis, made in terms of power,, must not assume that the sovereignty of 
the state, the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are 
given at the outset, these are only the terminal forms that power 
takes., 79Power, in Foucault's analysis, is to be distinguished from the 
juridical concept of sovereignty as the necessary form and legitimacy of 
control; it is to be understood as an interlinked set of 'conditions of 
possibility': 
Power's condition of possibility ... must not be sought in the 
primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of 
sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; 
it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of 
their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter 
are always local and unstable ... One needs to be nominalistic .. 
power is not an institution and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. 
80 In short, power is to be identified as a specific relationship, an 
historical and local process or inequality tied to the particular spheres 
or domains of its usage and the resistance that suc h exercise 
engender S. 
8 'Similarly there is no singular form or discourse of power; I to 
be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between dominant discourse 
and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that 
can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we 
1791 M. Foucault: The History of Sexualit (1981) Pelican Books p. 92 
[801 Ibid. P-93 ff. For a useful summary c. f. H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow: M. Fomault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982) Harvester pp. 71-78,184-2 
also C. Gordon: Other inquisitions (1979) 6 I&C 23-44. 
[811 A point which needs to be emphasised because of the tenderr-y of critical 
theories of law to accept the view that legal power is a unitary form of 
domination, and so to discount the extent to which specific areas of legal 
domination act against or limit the dominant form and interests of legal 
power. The problem is aiways specific and it is necessary to analyse the 
content of substantive areas of legal regulation - welfare rights, consumer 
protection, administrative self-regulation and so on, as well as, 
antithetically, the development of informal justice systems - 
to establish 
the precise effectivity of oppositional or progressive movements within the 
law. C. f. P. Hirst: Law, Socialism and Rights, in P. Carlen & M. Collison (eds): 
Radical Issues in Criminology (1981) M. Robertson pp. 58-105. On informal 
justice, c. f. e. g. S. Henry: Private Justice (1984) R. K. P. 
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must reconstruct 182 
Two points of spec if ic interest for the analysis of legal 
interdiscourse follow from the critique of sovereignty and of the theory 
of power provided by Foucault. The initial point is a negative one. It 
reinforces the earlier argument against the essentialist view that legal 
discourse is reducible to any one set of unitary ethical, normative or 
ideological features. It is necessary, in othet- words, to distinguish the 
rhetoric of legal interdiscourse, that of a systemic coherence, from the 
related though independent problem of a substantive semantics of the 
content of actually existent legal discourses. On the positive side, the 
denial of any singular liberal or critical theory of legal discourse, 
allows for the elaboration of a more fecund set of substantive hypotheses 
concerning the construction (as well as preconstruction) of meaning 
within historically particular legal texts and discourses. The specific 
differentiating features of legal interdiscourse are to be located by 
reference to a series of characteristic linguistic and semantic 
techniques or mechanisms which work precisely to perpetuate the social 
image or rhetoric of an authorised discourse, a univocal and closed 
control of meaning, which is persuasive in large measure by virtue of the 
success with which it systematically denies or excludes its 
inter tex tuality, its embeddedness or imbrication within surrounding 
discourses and socio-political practices. Authoritarian, distanced and 
closed; legal discourse, the language of an objectifying and reifying use 
of legal words, emanates towards linguistic heteroglossia in the form of a 
Ptolemaic linguistic consciousness which acknowledges only its own 
hegemony of a single and unitary language, the myth of the fusion of word 
and meaning, which will come as rhetorical hero - as axiom and judge - and 
as nemesis - as dispersion - for 
the socio-political diversity of speech 
and meaning. This general semantic motivation of legal 
interdiscourse is 
variously present in the discursive processes of 
legal practice. It is to 
be characterised differently according to the 
differing discourses with 
which legal discipline interacts, and 
it is best understood in terms of a 
variety of relations of discursive inclusion and exclusion, 
and in terms 
-------------------- 
[821 M. Fowault loc. cit. P. 100 ff. 
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consequently of the differing substantive character isations and contents 
of legal subjectivity within the various branches of the law. 
To relate the above reservations to an active understanding of legal 
semantics is to realise that the prevalent forms of legal expression - the 
processes of instancing/inscribing legal discourse in terms of 
sovereignty and subjectification are best formulated critically as a wide 
variety of complementary justificatory and persuasive techniques of both 
explicit and tacit argumentation. Thus I would argue that, far from being 
the singular ideological dynamic or form of legal legitimation, 
sovereignty is rather to be understood as a semantic principle, as a 
residue term for a wide variety of semantic (connotative) fields. Even in 
the general terms of constitutional principle, sovereignty refers to a 
disparate group of generally applicable justificatory norms concerning 
the separation of powers, the role of different institutions within the 
framework of the legal system and the validity or legality of a variety of 
interpretative and loosely hermeneutic devices and desires within the 
normative body of legal rules. More specifically and critically, 
sovereignty may be regarded not simply as a general, unifying, category of 
legal regulation but as a series of techniques and meanings within legal 
interdiscourse. Viewing sovereignty as a diffuse yet generally available 
rhetoric raises the question, in other words, of its actual usage in the 
instancing of legal discourse or the application of general norms. in 
textual terms, the role of sovereignty can be formulated as a mobile set of 
axiomatic meanings resident within the hierarchy of legal dialogue. For 
instance, sovereignty designates both the overall, assumed, legitimacy and 
authority of legal language - the adequacy of its normative depiction of 
what is socially, economically and politically possible - and also refers 
to the actual hierarchy of speaking subjects, utterances and audiences of 
the legal text as a narrative and as a judgment. 
That sovereignty is multiple means that the latter mentioned, plural, 
sovereignties of the legal text are quite as 
important, as specific 
principles for privileging the legal, as any general, unifying 
denotation. 
To borrow again from the Dialogic Imagination83, a work of 
inexhaustible 
-------------------- 
1831 M. Bakhtin op. cit. PP. 336-342. 
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suggestion, the actual meaning, and equally the persuasive content, of the 
specific discourse is manifested in the internal dialogue of the text, in 
the first instance, in the relations of inferiority and superiority which 
it constructs between the various languages,, the socially significant and 
insignificant speaking subjects, around whose utterances the 
communicative potential of the text c irc ul ates. 84Al though there are 
numerous discrepancies in actual usage, legal discourse as authoritative 
discourse is pre-eminently represented as a language of the past, a 
philological unity from which meaning is produced through recollection 
and through the privilege accorded to pre-existent sovereignties. There 
is the sovereign, linear,, continuity of legislative intention over time 
(univocality); the general sovereignty of past decisions and of specific 
judges; the hierarchy of privilege between the various courts and more 
pragmatically, the dominance of legal discourse and language over all 
other, non-legal, discourses, utterances and speaking subjects. In one 
sense legal interdiscourse operates as a monologic development of 
meanings conceived as things, as the reified produce of abstract states of 
affairs which are cited, repeated and commented upon because of their 
axiomatic status in relation to other contexts, codes and subjects. 
Sovereignty, however, is never something in itself. It is both a 
relation and a process directed towards the contemporary instance of 
regulation and the audience that such regulation implies. Remaining, 
however, within the legal text and the politics of its interpretation, the 
objectification of legal meaning within the authority of its language, is 
replicated in the subjectification of its spheres of application. 
Although the opposition has been somewhat overplayed and overemphasised, 
the relation of sovereign and subject can nonetheless be usefully 
redefined as a discursive process introducing and instancing substantive 
legal meanings by virtue of an opposition between objectification 
(unity/universality) and subjectification (dispersion/singularity), 
inclusion and a correlative process of explicit and tacit exclusion. 
on 
-------------------- 
[841 For a useful analysis of related points in the context of courtroom 
language, 
c. f. W. O'Barr: Linguistic Evidence op. cit. pp61-93 where 
he broadly 
elaborates a model o linguistic 
Ttrategies and inequalities of power between 
speakers in terms of socially significant and 
legally significant styles of 
oral presentation. 
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the one hand, I have argued, there is the social language of the law, a 
concrete sociolinguistic belief system and semantic field which defines a 
distinct identity for itself in the form of its notional or abstract 
unity, its rhetorical status. Within the textual development of this 
legal image of a language, the predominant figure is that of sovereignty, 
the image of the legal speaking subject represented in the authorial 
discourse of judgment, a discourse which characterises the legal speech as 
the intentional and logical manipulation of an ahistorical set of 
peculiarly legal meanings both recalled from 'a disciplinary past 
constituting a set of sacrosanct utterances, and written into the present 
or, better, rewriting the present to conform to the dictates of the 
authorial legal intention as medium and giver of the instant text. Not 
only is legal meaning given according to the principle of authorial 
sovereignty, the law made flesh, but more importantly the image of a 
narrowly judicial discourse incarnating legal reason by formulation, 
analysis and interpretation of a wide variety of precedent discourses also 
determines the image and content of the legal and socio-political meanings 
that are admitted and incorporated into the law. The sovereignty of 
legislation and of the interpretative legal discourses is equally 
grounded in a religious and ethical concept of freedom, a freedom of 
choice and moral autonomy, most generally formalised in the principles of 
Equity. 85Just as religious discourse is founded upon the precept that God 
made 'man' and the word in 'his' own image, legal discourse has tended to 
presuppose that the law makes the individual according to the model of 
sovereign discourse, namely as a similarly formal or artificial unity; as 
an independent,, responsible and active speaking subject. The ethical 
image of speaking person or of a unitary and unique subjectivity pervades 
substantive legal discourse; legal inquiry and evaluation devolve around 
fundamental categories of speaking person as intentional author, as 
conscience (innocence, guilt and mens rea of the inner word), repentance 
(free admission or voluntary confession of wrongdoing), 
truth and 
-------------------- 
[851 C. f. J. Lenoble et F. Ost op-cit. pp. 115 - 120 for an incisive analysis of the 
inherent contradiction between the Kantian methodology 
implicit in the 
systemic, deductive, conception of legal reason and 
the principles of Equity 
conceived as the individualised treatment of particular cases. 
C. f. also 
D. N. MacCormick: Formal Justice and the form of legal argument 
in Etudes de 
Log que Juridique (1976) Bruxelles p. 110 et seq. 
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falsehood, as well as the capacity of being liable and not liable, having a 
right to vote and so on throughout the entire domain of substantive 
powers, subjective rights and their exercise. The discourse of the 
ethical and legal human being carries an inordinate weight within the 
constructions of legal interdiscourse - challenges to subjective 
authorship, provocations of it, interpretations and assessments of it, 
interventions establishing the boundaries, forms and implications of its 
exercise and activity, the juxtaposing of various wills and divergent 
discourses, are all essential to the interpretation of testimony, 
declarations, contracts, legal documents and other forms of legally 
recognised utterance. After the event, the law arrives to reconstruct the 
discourse of others - after it has been uttered, after the context of its 
uttering has become cold or alien to its author - and endows it with 
significance, relevance and meaning, superficially if not always wholly 
determined according to the various formal procedural and evidential 
techniques developed specifically for establishing authenticity and 
degrees of veracity, as well as according to the substantive hermeneutic 
techniques which enable the imputation of intentions and the more general 
elaboration of legally implied meanings, narratives and discourses. 
While the content or legal definition of subjective rights and legal 
statuses varies widely; companies cannot make wills, private citizens 
cannot declare war and so on; the interdiscursive mechanisms of 
subjectification bear a broad similarity of a compositional, stylistic and 
semantic kind. Specifically at the level of interdiscourse, the semantic 
preconditions of legal discourse, the legal world view, may be summarised 
in terms of procedures of individual isation and generalisation - both 
narrative and justificatory - which work to manipulate and transpose 
existent human beings and groups - the diffuse, complex and changing, 
biographical and social entitips of motivated interaction - into the 
ethical and political - rhetorical - subjects of legal rationality and 
formal justice. In broader terms, the legal use of language rewrites the 
individual, as it rewrites speech, in terms of a notional and static unity 
of reasoned intentions. It does so for the purposes of a 
legal 
cbaracterisation of personality as responsibility, whose 
most basic 
precondition is generally though not unambiguously, 
the utopian liberal 
conception of an ethical and legal order, cohesion and 
consensus in which 
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the individual is compelled to choose to accept the roles and rules of a 
profoundly inegalitarian and frequently irrational political game - the 
name under which analytic, legal philosophy suppresses the realms of actual 
experience and of the socio-economic determinations of individual actions. 
In the last instance, in other words,, the legal subject has very little 
choice; the law endeavours to condemn its subjects to choose, at best, 
between joining the ranks of a society for which they are not in fact 
responsible or destroying themselves, rhetorically if not always 
literally, in the authentic pursuit of fundamental social change. 
In conclusion, the dialogic and persuasive features of the legal text 
are to be viewed in terms of the preconstruction and construction of the 
unitary and notionally coherent legal personalities which constitute and 
instance the hierarchy of sovereign and subject within the legal text. 
The meanings attached to this dialogue are primarily ethical and, in the 
formal sense of rights, political. They include, in other words, the 
reasons and intentions that are of interest to the legal discourse and 
doctrine of responsibility, excuse and choice, and generally exclude any 
such arguments as could disassociate or ambiguate the actual relation of 
the individual to its acts or deeds. Returning to the example used 
earlier of Lord Scarman's Report of the Brixton riots, the paradigm form of 
legal justice is made peculiarly clear. I commented earlier upon the 
hierarchically differentiated status of the two main participants in the 
riots, the police and the blacks, in terms of vocabulary and syntax used, 
respectively, to include and to exclude the groups in question from the 
realm of social rationality and consensual identification as 
legally 
conceived. The various linguistic mechanisms used to charac-terise 
the 
social significance of the subjects involved in the riots 
is only fully 
co-ordinated, however, when the legal meaning and responsibilities of 
the 
situation are explicitly stated. The information, 
both general and 
specific, as to the causes of the riots, 
depicts the general social 
conditions which prompted or precipitated them, 
in the bleak but familiar 
ter ms of unemployment, discrimination, poor 
housing, deprived 
environmental conditions and lack of adequate or 
relevant educational 
provision. At one point Lord Scarman even remarks 
that where 'deprivation 
and frustration exist on the scale to 
be found among young black people of 
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Brixton, the probability of disorder must ... be strong. t86We ar e 
informed in the same paragraph, however, that such general determinations 
are not to be understood as causes of the disorder for legal purposes. 
The social conditions described are only conditions, they do not I provide 
an excuse for disorder. They cannot justify attacks upon the police in 
the streets, arson or riot. All those who in the course of the disorders 
000 engaged in violence were guilty of grave criminal offences, which 
society, if it is to survive, cannot condone. Sympathy for and 
understanding of, the plight of young black people are no reason for 
releasing young black people from the responsibilities for public order 
which they share with the rest of us. 
87The 
character isation of the 
conditions and relative status of the actors constitutes the persuasive 
context for the introduction of the univocal legal meaning of their 
actions, those of the blacks are inexcusable, while those of society, its 
police and the law are, in their most basic substratum, inviolable. 
I 
b) Semantic appropriation. I have defined the general conditions of 
legal interdiscourse in terms of a notional system of authority - of 
sovereignty and legitimate authorship - which both assumes and produces 
subjects and their rights. Legal method, legal interests and legal 
relevancies are largely to be found and defined in terms of their 
insistence upon discursive schemata and analyses which are structured by 
the isolated unity of human acts and their subsequent categorial or 
normative qualification. Human personality becomes an apparently 
external and formal device, which supposedly incidental and unwitting 
textual creature the law utilises-. for its own purposes, for its self- 
evident representations- of 'crime', texchangel, 'rectitude' and so on 
without, save in certain exceptional and arguably anomalous 
-------------------- 
[861 Lord Scarman op. cit. para. 2.38. 
[871 Ibid. par. 2-31. 
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circumstanceS88, being required to explicitly relate either the law itself 
to the actual political life of its rhetoricians, or the acts of its 
subjects to the life - the fears, desires and needs - or actual conditions 
- influences, constraints or determinations - that form its material 
context. The image of legal interdiscourse is that of the production and 
circulation of meaning between social and political amnesiacs who would 
prefer that the painful task of reconstructing the real worl. d that has 
been forgotten were never undertaken. The archaic and crude psychology of 
the law not only nails the law to individual acts, but further, continually 
emphasises the ethical, political and metaphysical freedom of such 
ac ti on s. While it would be tempting to pursue the soc i al and 
psychoanalytic dimensions of this process of repression89, a more 
accessible procedure is that of elaborating its interdiscursive 
implications. 
The interdiscursive rhetoric of sovereignty and power, of rights and 
duties, is the discourse of power in a dual sense. On the one hand it 
presupposes the semantic constant of the ethical and political discourse 
of liberal individualism, of freedom, equality and consensus as the 
inherent features of the unsystematised and unexamined social relations 
with which legal discipline operates. On the other hand these 
preconstructions of legal interdiscourse emerge in the legal text as 
powerful devices for excluding and obscuring alternative or oppositional 
readings and meanings of concrete decisions, or instances of regulation. 
It is precisely the assumed universality of the rhetorical categories that 
implies their ethical and political desirability while at the same time 
allowing their highly refined manipulation within a normative 
--------- ---------- 
[881 Exceptions being, the concept of duress in penal law, e. g. Lypch v D. P. P. 
(1975) A. C. 653; the concept of undue influence, and the recently developea 
concept of economic duress in Contract law, e. g. Unviverse Tankships o 
Monrovia v I. T. F. (1982) 2 W. L. R. 803 - though in contract, it is the unlawful 
character 6177-Fe compulsion rather than the motive of acceptance 
that is 
stressed. The law of Torts falls between the two, in that malicious motive 
founds the basis of the tort of malicious prosecution (c. f. Glinski v ýbIver 
(1962) A. C. 726) and overrides the defence of qualified privilege in 
defamation actions (Horrocks v Lowe (1975) A. C. 135). Otherwise motive 
is 
purportedly irrelevaE-t- to tortious actions 
(Allen v Flood (1898) A. C. 1 ) 
although it is now generally recognised that 
it plays some role, albeit 
confused, in nuisance actions and in the tort of conspiracy. 
1891 C. f. J. Lenoble et F. Ost op. cit.; M. Pecheux op. cilt.. pp. 123-126,216-218; 
J. Lacan: Ecrits (1977) Tavistock ch. 3&9; R. Jacoby* 
Social Amnesia (1975) 
Harvester pp. 119-151. 
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justificatory argument to obscure the conditions and actual circumstances 
of their application. They enable the appropriation of concrete meanings, 
in the form of the institutional isation of generalised control by means of 
attitudes and norms that never expose themselves to the threat of a 
detailed examination of the concrete motives and circumstances of their 
application. The point may usefully be developed by means of 
exemplification, for which purpose I shall examine in some detail the 
recent case of Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council9o, 
a contentious yet apparently unanimous decision within administrative law. 
The broad contours, if not the details of the dispute can be summarised 
succinctly from the judgment of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal. 9'In 
pursuance of an election manifesto, headed 'Socialist Policy for the 
G. L. C. 1, which 'promised' and 'committed' the Labour Party to reduce fares on 
London's public transport services by 25%, the Labour Party, upon election 
to a 'small majority' of seats, acted to implement the cuts. It did so by 
ordering the London Transport Executive to reduce fares by 25% and 
thereby, we are informed, presented the travelling public with a 'gift' of 
'millions of pounds' but simultaneously incurred the 'displeasure' of the 
'ratepayers' by virtue of the the subsidy of 69. million pounds needed to 
fund the 'gift'. The necessary financing was to be raised by a 
supplementary precept or rate which the London Boroughs 'most reluctantly' 
obeyed. More accurately, one specific London Borough, Bromley, evidenced 
reluctance and 'challenged' the validity of the precept. It might be 
noted, incidentally, at this stage, that we are nowhere informed that 
Bromley, a Conservative controlled Borough, is geographically located 
outside the principal London Transport networks and so obtained little 
direct benefit from the fares reduction, and consequently had an 
exceptional if not unique motive of self-interest for their reluctance to 
pay the precept. A final, somewhat ambiguous, feature of the case, was 
the 
Conservative Government's withdrawal of the rate support grant, a measure 
intended to penalise overspending Councils and resulting in an additional 
-------------------- 
[901 (1982) 1 A. E. R. 129. 
[911 Ibid. 131-132. My discussion of the asserted 'facts' Of the case will 
concentrate on the judgments of the Court of Appeal where 
the depiction of the 
circumstances of the case is most detailed and strident. 
The House of Lords 
was able, by and large, to assume knowledge of 
the facts as stated in the Court 
of Appeal, and so concentrated upon the putatively separate 
issues of law. 
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50 million pounds to the cost of the transport subsidy, which additional 
cost was also to be raised by supplementary rate, and was, according to the 
judgments, quite unforeseen by the G. L. C. 
I shall observe briefly that the language of this introduction or 
character isation of the case is already highly illuminating. As a 
putatively impartial description of the facts of the dispute, it is a 
failure. As an emotive stylistic character isation of the parties to the 
dispute and a preliminary evaluation of their actions, its highly 
selective use of apparently descriptive terms is of extreme 
intradiscursive and semantic relevance,, it signals ahead or prepares the 
reader for the outcome which will later be reached. Of especial 
importance, of course, is the use of the word 'gift' to describe the effect 
of the fares out, its connotations being anthropological or festive rather 
than economic. In combination with the other qualificatory factual and 
evaluative terms, it persuasively prejudges key aspects of the later 
discussion. It should also be noted that in terms of information conveyed 
the details provided are uneven and very limited. Nor do the subsequent 
judgments provide any more explicit particulars as to who precisely is 
affected, in what ways, and by what decisions; aside from general and 
unsubstantiated disavowal of the 'propriety', 'fairness' or political 
'merits' of the policy decision, the contextualising details of the case 
are assumed as summarily stated. Thus, Watkins L. J. deems it fit to 
preface a remarkably bizarre and unargued judgment with the assertion, in 
his first sentence, that he has 'no doubt whatsoever that the large 
reduction of fares 'arose out of a hasty, ill- considered, unlawful and 
arbitrary use of power', and continues that I the ratepayers of this great 
city, who are unlikely to gain anything from it (many will in fact be at a 
loss), will bear the costs of what seems to many to have been an astounding 
decision. 192just as Lord Denning omits to detail which London Boroughs 
were reluctant to pay the supplementary precept and why, 
Lord Justice 
Watkins fails to elaborate either on who was 'astounded' by a decision 
which had been well publicised as a feature of an election campaign or why 
they chose to be so astounded. Of the other prefatory remarks, 
I will 
-------------------- 
[921 Ibid. 149. 
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merely note Lord Diplock's formulation that ' all Your Lordships are 
concerned with is the legality of" that decision: was it within the limited 
powers that Parliament has conferred by statute upon the G. L. V93Needless 
to say, it is precisely the broad or limited scope of the powers conferred 
which is the legal issue at stake in the case. 
The omission of any detailed analysis of the relations - socio-economic 
and political - between the various, homogeneously conceived, actors in 
the dispute, and the replacement of descriptions by rhetorically 
significant assumptions, will transpire to be crucial to the language and 
reasoning of the decisions. Before analysing the legal details of the 
judgments, which details take the form of a broad series of loosely --o- 
ordinated remarks as to the meaning of various passages and terms in the 
Transport (London) Act 1969, certain other, seemingly incidental, 
peculiarities deserve comment. In the broad terms of administrative law, 
the case concerns the general, and indeed superbly vague, principle of 
'reasonableness' 
, whose definition, as a doctrinal restriction upon the 
exercise of statutory powers, has remained largely unchanged since the 
17th century. Powers must be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and in 
good faith; or alternatively, they must not be exercised unreasonably, 
arbitrarily or f anc i ful ly. To these self-identical or tautological 
propositions one can only add descriptions of cases in which powers have 
been held to have been utilised either reasonably or unreasonably. 
Although the analogy would appear to be a precarious one, both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords referred to the decisions of Roberts v 
Hopwood 94 and Prescott v Birmingham Corporation95 and succeeded in 
eliciting from these arguably somewhat notorious decisions, general 
support or authority for the view that principles of 'socialistic 
philanthropy' or of 'feminist ambition' are 'eccentric' and 'unreasonable's 
and from the second authority, the more relevant assertion that 
'benevolent' or 'philanthropic' behaviour will not satisfy the fiduciary 
duty of a statutory authority to run transport services upon commercial 
lines found to be implicit in a 1930 statutory provision authorising the 
-------------------- 
1931 Ibid. 159. 
[941 (1925) A. C. 578. 
[951 (1954) 3 A. E. R. 698. 
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charging of such fares I as they may think fiti. 96The Prescott decision 
concerned the granting of free travel to old-age pensioners, and while 
that decision clearly suggested a particular attitude towards provision 
of transport services, the instant decision concerned radically different 
circumstances and distinct statutory provisions. In view of the general 
agreement in the instant decision that it was the provisions of the 1969 
Act that determined the outcome, the analogical relevance, both factual 
and legal, of the precedent decisions and the use of the phrase 'ordinary 
business principles', is ill-specified in the judgments, and largely 
ob sc ur e. Again, the reference to the earlier authorities briefly adverted 
to early in the judgments, is of a rhetorical or persuasive value - it 
suggests an amorphous background legality to the decision - but is not of 
any more specific or logical instrumentality. 
Of an altogether greater significance with regard to the instancing of 
the G. L. C. case is the politically curious view which the judgments took 
with regard to the respective rights of ratepayers, the travelling public 
and the electorate in the erstwhile democracy of local government. The 
issue is a complex and important one and will be discussed in greater 
detail in relation to the term 'economic' below. For the moment, I would 
merely note the view expressed that an election manifesto is not binding. 
To regard an election result as giving a mandate to fulfil a spec if ic 
promise or as creating a commitment, come what may, was, for Lord Denning, 
'a complete misconception. ' He continued to state I very few of the 
electorate read the manifesto in full. A goodly number only know of it 
from what they rea, d in the newspapers or hear on television. Many know 
nothing whatever of what it contains. When they come to the polling booth 
none of them vote for the manifesto ... they vote 
for a party and not a 
manifesto. I Slightly further on, the reader is informed that I when the 
party gets into power, it should consider any proposal or promise afresh, 
on its merits, without any feeling of being obliged to honour 
it or being 
committed to it. t970ther judges were less ebullient 
in their language but 
fully agreed both that the electorate was only one of 
the groups to be 
considered in the implementation of policy, and secondly 
that extensive 
- ------------------ 
[961 Ibid. 706-707. 
[971 (1982) 1 A. E. R. p. 135. 
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consideration should be given to ratepayers as a separate category, many 
of whom cannot vote. The duty owed to the electorate emerges as 
promissory and indirect, while the duty owed to ratepayers is direct and 
proprietary and would, on occasion, appear to override the electorate's 
policy preferences. The crucial question, of course, is that of the 
circumstances and reasons which will create a paramount duty to the 
ratepayers, a question which only becomes fully obscured when the 
provisions of the Act itself come under discussion. 
I do not intend to deal with the numerous arguments concerning 
different aspects of the Act in any detail. As Lord Diplock expressed it, 
the language of the Act is sometimes 'opaque and elliptical', it 'lacks 
clarityl, and is on occasion lbaffling'. 
98Nowhere is the lack of clarity 
more evident than in the sections dealing with the discretionary powers of 
the G. L. C. Under section 1a general duty is specified in terms of 
policies aimed to develop and encourage measures which will promote the 
provision of I integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities for 
Greater London. By section 3 the G. L. C. is empowered to make grants to 
the L. T. E. 'for any purpose 1, in relation to meeting the I needs I of 
Greater London. By section 11 (3) alterations in fare arrangements may be 
to achieve I any object of general policy specified by the council. I 
have already indicated the view that the powers granted by the Act as a 
whole were seen to be broad, in the sense that the language of their 
expression was frequently indeterminate. The Act confers 'a large degree 
of autonomy'. 
991t 
allows the implementation of general public policies, and 
at several points the judges were concerned to stress that 
I discussion at 
the political level' as to the extent and manner of 
financing public 
transport I as a social service I by means of subsidies, and with a view 
to 
best meeting 'needs', was of 'considerable relevance 
to a proper 
understanding of the language of the Act"00. 
Elsewhere the court ' must 
10 
recognise that such debate exists 
Aside from an incidental and brief 
quotation from the Labour Party manifesto, 
mentioning how I better 
-------------------- 
[981 Ibid. 160; see also Lord Wilberforce at p. 154. 
[991 Lord Diplock, ibid. 158. 
[1001 Ibid. 164. 
[1011 Ibid. 157. 
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services, less congestion, better housing, more jobs, and a safer, cleaner 
environment 1102 were benefits directly and indirectly related to the 
transport subsidy, the case is remarkable for its utter refusal to 
consider arguments and calculations as to the costs and benefits, the 
effects, of the transport subsidy. On the other hand, the case is even 
more remarkable for the unargued and uncalculated assumptions which it 
makes precisely as to what the costs and benefits of the G. L. C. actions 
were. They did so primarily in the form of discussions as to the meaning 
of the words teconomy' and 'economic' in various sections of the Act. 
The semantic appropriation of the term economic was one of the 
principal achievements of the decision as a whole. The process of 
institutio nal i sing an acceptable 'legal' meaning was marked by a superb 
diversity of discursive strategies. Again, it must be stres sed that the 
context of this lexical and semantic appropriation was that of the general 
admission of the vagueness and indeterminacy of the Act and of the word 
economic. It was stated that the legislature itself had in all 
probabilit y failed to resolve the political controversy sur rounding the 
meaning of the word economic at the time of passing the Act. 
103The Court 
was forced to construct its own meaning for the term. A wid e variety of 
approaches emerged. For Lord Scarman, the term I economic ... has several 
meanings. They include both those for which the appellants contend and 
that for which Bromley contend. 
104 He concludes that it means both 'cost- 
effective' and that the burden on the ratepayers be avoided or diminished 
1 so far as it is practicable to do so. 
105The G. L. C. has a right under 
the Act to subsidise the travelling public, if London's transport 
'needs' 
indicate that it should do so. In the event, however, the G. L. C. acted 
I impr ac tic ably' and 'uneconomic ally', 1policy preference' wrongfully 
displaced 'economic necessity'. 
106At this point I shall merely note the 
apparent mutual exclusion of the categories of 
the economic and policy. 
-------------------- 
1021 Ibid. 132. 
11031 Ibid. 158. 
[1041 Ibid. 174. Lord Scarman comments, it is a very useful word: chameleon-like, 
taking its colour from its surroundings. 
11051 Ibid. 174. 
[1061 Ibid. 177. 
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For Lord Wilberforce,, the word economic is vaguel although it 
eventually transpires to mean that transport services should be run on 
'business-like or economic lines', but, paradoxically, this did not mean 
that it was required to make 'or try to make, a profitt. 107, t is to be 
understood rather, in terms of the dual duty owed to the travelling public 
and the ratepayers, to exclude all non-economic arguments and 
considerations. Before analysing what these exclusively economic 
considerations actually are, I shall briefly advert to the equally broad 
elucidations provided by the Court of Appeal. For Lord Denning, the 25% 
reduction in fares was quite simply Ia completely uneconomic propcsition 
done for political motives, for which there is no warrant .. ' The duty of 
the G. L. C. was to charge ratepayers what was 'reasonable and no more', a 
duty to be balanced with a 'conflicting' duty owed to the travelling 
public, by taking into account I all relevant considerations ... on either 
side. They must not be influenced by irrelevant consider ations. -They must 
hold the balance fairly and reasonably. 1081n the event the G. L. C. had 
given undue weight to their 'arbitrary' manifesto commitment, and had been 
less than fair to the ratepayers. Somewhat curiously, Lord Denning 
explained that he saw no difference 'between abolishing fares altogether 
-o the and cutting them by one-half or one-quarter 1, they are all gifts I. 
travelling public wholly devoid of 'financial rationality' - 'why not 20% 
or 30% or even 50%1.109Penultimately, Lord Justice Oliver adds to the view 
that economic means breaking even I so far as is practicable 1, the view 
that general policy objectives cannot I be an object arbitrarily selected 
by the G. L. C. for reasons which have nothing to do with the functions which 
it is required to perform ... It must 
be an object of general pol icy .. 
for the promotion of an integrated, efficien*t and economic transport 
system. Lord Justice Watkins writes of a 'total disregard' for the 
interests of the ratepayers of Bromley I and every other 
borough of' 
London 1. Running the transport system on other than 'business' l1nes 








11081 Ibid. 134-135. 
[1091 Ibid. 135. 
[1101 Ibid. 139; 141. 
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It is the tacit content and motivations underlying the actual 
application of their Lordships' very general and frequently wholly 
ambiguous formulations of the law that is the key point of interest. 
First, however, a brief comment upon the general interdiscursive form of 
the argument. In reaching their conclusions, the judges utilise many of 
the standard preconstructions of the discursive formation as a whole. 
(i) The sovereignty of legal discourse is not only expressed tacitly in 
the axiomatic character of much of the argument and its manipulation of 
evaluative epithets, but also explicitly in the assertion of the 
independence of the legal issues from the political debates and 
controversies. The law lords are not concerned with the evaluation of the 
political or general policy dimensions of the G. L. C. decision. The 
language of the text, however, would appear to indicate the precise 
opposite. The rea sonableness of the G. L. C. 's substantive decision is a 
constant object of ethically imbricated comments, their duty to the 
electorate is analysed in some detail and legally circumscribed, and the 
meaning of the term economic is considered specifically in relation to 
general transport policies that range from the arbitrary and socialistic 
to the business-like and fair. (ii) A subsidiary device, is the 
reiteration at various points of the 'artistic' character of legal 
reasoning. The issues to be decided are technical and verbal, they 
concern the syntax and construction of a specific statute. Again, however, 
the general evidence discussed in the judgments evidences the necessary 
interrelation of syntax and semantics. Any of a number of conclusions can 
be reached upon the wording of the Act itself, and the Act is vague and 
baffling (if somewhat less so than the judgments) and must be construed 
purposively, in its context and with reference to I all the relevant 
considerations '. (iii) Finally, the instancing of the 
discourse with 
regard to the subjective rights and duties at issue. The 
dispute does not 
concern the socio-economic and political relations actually appertaining 
between different social groups or classs. These are 
indeed never 
discussed. What is at issue is the relation between and relative weight 
0 of three sets of abstract and in this 
instance, we are told, conflicting 
rights and duties. The electorate, 
the travelling public and the 
ratepayers are the actors, listed 
in the ascending order of their actual 
importance, in this epic struggle to tame power 
by law. Again, the issue 
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is purportedly legal and SO isolated from other discourses and from the 
realm of actual interests and their interrelationships. '7he rights and 
duties involved are statutory and notional, their agents, are similarly 
c ontex t- independent legal subjects - empty discursive spaces which the 
judgments provide with morally and rhetorically significant contents. 
Suffice it to say that the generality of the formal arguments and the 
ambiguity of the norms or rules to be applied within the space of 
interdiscourse effectively permit the Court to institutional i se or 
appropriate any of a large number of meanings to resolve the case. One 
could indeed plausibly argue that the normative resolution to the dispute 
is of little or no relevance or pertinence to the actual decision 'upon the 
facts' - it would always have been possible, in terms of the latitude 
normatively available, to decide and justify a decision for either of the 
parties to the dispute. The question which arises, in other words, is that 
of why the case was decided - on its facts - in favour of the Bromley 
Counc il. There is, of course, no single answer available to this question. 
A number of different reasons and rulings could plausibly be extracted 
from the case"' although the predominant issue is probably correctly 
posed as being the meaning of the word economic. Devoid of any adequate 
dictionary definition, the term was to be appropriated in its various 
linguistic contexts. These in turn proved inadequate and it was deemed 
necessary to analyse, very briefly, certain of the economic relations 
actually involved in the case. At no point in the case, however, was any 
attempt made to prove that the actual logic or actual effects of the 
G. L. C. 's decision were uneconomic'. The inflated circulation of terms of 
moral condemnation within the judgments was not matched by any comparable 
analysis of what would have been the economically rational way to run 
London Transport. As one commentator has it, I nobody who had read 
anything at all on the economics of public transport would have concluded 
that the economically rational way to run London Transport was 
by trying 
as hard as one could to make revenue meet costs. 1112 Upon even 
the most 
elementary comprehension of economics, it is clear that there are numerous 
-------------------- 
111 The str ongest of whic h ar e pr obabl y the pr oc edur al ar guments, al 
though itis 
impossible to view them as wholly isolated from the 
broader issues. 
[1121 P. M. Morriss: Should we subsidise Public Transport 
? (1983) 54 Political 
Quarterly 392, at 398. 
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plausible economic arguments in support of subsidies, and further, that in 
terms of an overall analysis of cost-benefit'13 it would be highly unwise 
to suppose that one could characterise the costs and the benefits of the 
G. L. C. fare subsidy in the manner in which the House of Lords appeared to. 
In the course of a number of general assertions, the Law Lords appear to 
view the economics of subsidy in the highly simplistic terms of a 
straightforward, short-term, detriment to all ratepayers and a direct, 
gratuitous, benefit to the travelling public. As this view is frequently 
crucial to the reasoning of the judgments, its details deserve comment. 
It excludes from the outset, the possibility of a- short term loss 
producing a long term benefit in the form, for instance, of a restructuring 
and reversal of the decline of inner city transport systems by means of 
incentives to use public rather than private transport. The short term 
loss is paramount, and their Lordships deem it to fall exclusively upon 
the ratepayers. Forty percent or less of ratepayers use the public 
transport facilities; sixty percent neither vote nor travel on the 
transport services. The latter are apparently the real losers and, by 
implication, receive no benefit for their losses. A moments reflection 
suggests that this is not as obviously true as it seems. Two categories 
of economic argument would appear to support an opposite conclusion, 
without entailing any technical economic concepts whatsoever. There are, 
firstly, arguments based upon benefits to non-consumers. Tr anspor tation 
facilities affect non-travellers in a variety of ways. These side-effects 
(externalities) may be beneficial or harmful but presumably it is 
permissible to assume that where the positive externalities are valued 
higher than the size of the subsidy, the beneficiaries of these side- 
effects will be prepared to pay for them in the form of rates. The 
decision in the G. L. C. case made great play upon the hardship caused to 
companies and businesses by the fare subsidy. Two side-effects of 
the 
subsidy are directly relevant to such an argument. 
First, a cheap and 
efficient transport service will benefit businesses and 
traders in the 
-------------------- 
11131 Several recent studies have suggested 
that on a cost benefit analysis, 
subsidies of urban public transport are 
justified/economic. '". f. S. Glaister : 
Fundamentals of Transport Economics (1981 
) Blackwell pp. 86-91; A. Grey: Urban 
Farý`sPolicy 1975 Saxon Hous ch. ; C. A. Nash: 
---conomics of Public Transpor 
T1-9-M Longmans ch. 2. 
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centre of cities, insofar as most people who travel to city centre shops do 
so by public transport. 114 Further, social and recreational stimulus to the 
city centre will benefit other firms. There is no reason why those 
affected should not tontribute to the cost of these benefits. Mor e 
marginally, there is also the benefit of creating employment, which was 
specifically stressed in the Labour Party manifesto. go too was a reverse 
argument concerning the removal of unwanted externalities - that the 
environmentally and socially harmful side-effects of private transport: 
noise, pollution, death, injury, congestion, and the costs of remedying 
these negative externalities, would be reduced by the subsidy. The issues 
involved are directly economic, yet the Law Lords denied the possibility 
of making these decisions (to purchase desired goods) upon grounds which 
they alleged to be economic. 
The arguments mentioned are, of course, no more than a few, simplified, 
instances of possible economic analyses of the actual costs and benefits 
of the decision to subsidise London Transport. Of the more technical 
concepts relevant, that of 'option value' (consumption without purchase) 
most clearly supports the previous list of benefits to non-users . Ver y 
briefly, the existence of a service is often of financial benefit to non- 
user s. In the case of transport, financial calculations as to the 
purchase or maintenance of other forms of transport can be directly 
affected by the existence of alternatives providing an option in the event 
of the breakdown, failure or future and unforseen exigencies affecting the 
primary choice of transport. The financial value of having the option to 
use something is its option value, and while it may be hard to measure, 
there is no categorical reason for refusing to approximate a sum 
by way of 
taxation or rates. An analogous argument can be made with respect 
to 
those who benefit directly from subsidies - the 
travelling public - in 
terms of 'consumers' surplus', the extra benefit of 
the subsidy to actual 
consumers, calculated upon the basis of 
the financial value consumers 
place u pon the services over and above 
the sum that they pay. If the 
overall surplus for consumers and producers 
taken together, exceeds loss, 
then it is economic to subsidise costs 
that cannot be met out of revenue. 
-------------------- 
El 141 P. Morriss op. cit. P. 394. 
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Finally, the actual motive or reason for the G. L. C. subsidy in its 
original form probably approximates to a very basic theorem of welfare 
economics, marginal cost pricing - pricing according to the extra cost of 
providing a specific unit of service, once the capital and other costs of 
establishing a service have been met. The marginal cost of providing an 
additional unit of transport - carrying an extra passenger -js likely to 
be relatively low. Pricing at this level will not cover costs, but it is 
equally arguably an economically more efficient and desirable use of 
resources than raising prices. 
7.2 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, I am not concerned to argue anything more than that the 
above concepts and analyses are relevant - they are all economic arguments 
pertinent to the reasonableness of providing a subsidy. It may well be 
that the economic arguments against subsidies are more persuasive than 
those in its favour, or that non-economic arguments could conclusively 
override the economic arguments. My point is more general. The meaning 
of the word economic is dependent upon its discursive context, and the Law 
Lords, in assuming that it was inherently uneconomic to subsidise London 
Transport, wholly exclude from consideration precisely those economic 
concepts and analyses which could have thrown some light upon the decision 
they were reviewing. In the last analysis, the patterns of 
interdiscursive meaning evidenced in the judgments analysed are, I would 
suggest, typical of the general form of legal justificatory argument. It 
is only by critically analysing the details of the language and discursive 
processes inherent within the legal text, that the preconstructions, 
preferred meanings, rhetorical and ideological dimensions generally of 
legal discourse can be rationally challenged within the legal institution 
itself. In reading the law, it is constantly necessary to remember the 
compositional, stylistic and semantic mechanisms which allow legal 
discourse to deny its historical and social genesis. It is necessary to 
examine the silences, absences and empirical potential of 
the le. cal text, 
and to dwell upon the means by which it appropriates 
the meaning of other 
discourses and of social relations themselves, while specifically 
denying 
25) 1 
that it is doing so. It is, in short, politically necessa,,, y to take 
seriously the character of law as a social discourse. 
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CONCLUSION; LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PRACTICE 
Surprise at resistance: because we see through a thing we think that 
in future it will be unable to offer us any resistance whatsoever - 
and we ar e surprised at finding that we are able to see through it, 
and yet unable to run through it. This foolish sensation and 
surprise are similar to the sensation which a fly experiences before 
a window pane. 
1 
In the final analysis I suspect that the major obstacle in the path of 
the development of an adequately critical and transformative rhetoric of 
law is not so much one of intellectual coherence as of academic and 
institutional politics. For all its obviousness, the displacement of the 
exegetical tradition of jurisprudence and the concurrent elaboration of a 
concept of legal discourse -a deviant theory of the legal text and of its 
reading or reception - faces debilitating rhetorical problems of its own: 
to diagnose an illness is merely the precondition to the possibility of a 
c ur e. In the ensuing analysis I will briefly recapitulate the substantive 
goals of the theory of law as social discourse and the institutional 
opposition to them, and will then proceed to tabulate the various contexts 
within which this account of legal language and of law as communication 
may contribute - as one aspect among many - to the furtherance of what has 
2 
come to be known as the critical legal studies movement. 
In the first instance, the concept of legal discourse is a methodology 
for the reading of legal 
rhetorical functions of 
texts which places the communicative or 
law within their institutional and 
sociolinguistic contexts. As against the dominant view of legal language 
as a discrete and unitary genre of written authorities constituting a 
-------------------- 
Ell F. Nietzsche: The Dawn of Day (1903) London, aphorism 444. 
[21 For diverse formulations of this movement, see, D. Kairys (ed. ): The Politics 
of Law (1982) New York: R. M. Unger: The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement (19837 
96 H rvard Law Review 563. See also, F. Burton and P. 
Carlen: Official 
Discourse (1979) R. K. P., PP-119-139; B. Edelman: Ownership of the Image 
(1979) 
R. K. P., pp. 21-2b, 109-112; T. Mathieson: Law, Society and 
Political Action 
(1980) Academic Press, passim. 
253 
grammar or code, which, if correctly attributed and interpreted, forms a 
series of necessary truths, an Oppositional, contingent, reading is 
suggested. It is argued first that the dominant paradigm of legal 
language and legal text cannot account for the semantic content of the 
legal text. as judgment or linguistic practice - the diversity of meanings 
and usages which are actually realised. It is further claimed that a 
critically adequate reading of the law should take account of the various 
levels of law as social discourse, as a series of institutional functions 
and rhetorical effects, a project which requires reading within the legal 
text precisely those facets or meanings of legal regulation and discipline 
which its self-protective doctrines of unity, coherence and univocality 
have traditionally endeavoured to exclude. For precisely this reason, the 
legal text should be read linguistically in terms of a theory of 
deconstruction, that is in terms of the order of discourse or social and 
political context which it systematically endeavours to deny or obscure: 
an adequate account of the legal text would read it in terms of an 
'outside' (hors-texte) which is present, even if it is presented as an 
absence, by omission. At this point, however, where the positive discourse 
of the law is reconstructed the project of such a reading faces the 
formidable opposition of what may be termed the legal institutions 
fresistance to theory': its privileging of the grammatical or logical 
decoding of the text and its simultaneous resistance to the rhetorical or 
tropological indetermination which can be revealed in any verbal event, 
its denial of the properly semantic dimension of any linguistic practice. 
In explicitly political terms the various doctrinal representations of 
the coded unit y of jurisprudence and of the univocality of 
legal language 
constitute an institutional programme or strategy of 
furtherance of legal 
professonalism and its inherent belief in the 
discrete, distinctive and 
expert character of legal practice as an elite occupation. 
By contrast, 
the analysis of law as social discourse would 
imply, at the very least, a 
different, less specific character to professional expertise 
in law: to 
view the legal text as an historically and rhetorically 
organised 
construct implies the continuity of 
legal doctrine with other modes of 
normative argument and equally the 
inseparability of legal institutional 
practice and experience from other 
branches of government and political 
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3 administration. 
Resistance to theory has several further connotations. If theory in 
its broadest sense may be characterised as openness to context, dialectic 
or dialogue, then legal doctrine is the antithesis of theory and may be 
represented as the most stringent of contemporary closures of knowledge, 
as a disciplinary mythology seeking to canonically bind legal sign to 
legal meaning in a series of fixed and intransigent equations. While even 
the most marginal practical knowledge of the law will tend to create an 
awareness of the frequently equivocal nature of the bond between sign and 
meaning, such an awareness has seldom been given any coherent theoretical 
expression and still less any adequate political representation. It is 
first the case that legal doctrine, as an objective idealism, is least of 
all concerned with practical knowledge, a fact which is well reflected in 
the further observation that in chronological terms too, practical 
knowledge comes second to the theoretical construction of the correct 
institutional meaning of law. It is only after the 'cognitive' object of 
legal science has been fully stated - as system of norms, rules or 
institutional conventions - that the more liberally orientated versions 
of j urisprudence will condescend to acknowledge the complementary yet 
subordinate dimensions of the anthropological, historical and 
sociological study of law. These disciplines are not philosophical, but 
for all their inadequacies they may occasionally throw empirical light 
upon certain of the more curious features of the normative order. 
Similarly, it is only after socialisation into the singular dimension of 
legal discipline, has been achieved, it is only after the stringent corpus 
of exegetical or 'expository jurisprudence has been inculcated and 
assimilated, examined and absorbed, that sufficient distance has been 
achieved to make practical knowledge of the law in its conventional sense 
(as knowledge of procedure and proof) possible. 
It is indeed in relation to legal pedagogy that the method of reading 
legal texts here proposed is at its most radical and is most likely to be 
-------------------- 
131 R. M. Unger (1983) OP-cit-, pp. 666-670; D. Kairys (1982) op. cit., ch. 3; 
J. Lenoble et F. Ost: Droit, Mythe et Raison (1980). Bruxelles, part III; also, 
P. de Mann: Resistanc-e to Theory (1983Y 6-3 Yale Frenc-h Studies 3; M. Riffaterre 
(ed. ): Languages of Knowledge and of Inquir (1982) Columbia U. P. 
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4 unequivocally resisted. To begin with, the very existence of a legal 
system as a system is, more than anything else, the product of educational 
pr ac tic e. From the founding of the law school at Bologna to the 
contemporary proliferation of law schools, the Western legal tradition has 
consistently placed the task of the systematic conceptual elaboration and 
justification of the legal order in the hands of the university. The 
discipline of law as a science, as a compreh ensively textual discipline, is 
not a product of philosophical research nor of professional or practical 
knowledge, it is fundamentally no more than a pedagogy - an authoritarian 
mode of teaching. For all the dubious conceptual sophistication that 
jurisprudence as philosophy of law has acquired over the past centuries, 
it remains a peripheral discipline parasitic upon the substantive 
jurisprudence of legal educational pr ac tic e. It is precisely as 
educational practice that the unity of law takes its most concrete form in 
the territory of the text and the systematic commentary of the text-book. 
That is where the law is to be found and it merely needs to be learned and 
applied, in which respect it is interesting to observe that for the law 
teacher the second order of rationalisation represented by positivist 
philosophy of law is to be viewed as a somewhat irrelevant body of 
knowledge which, on the periphery of legal studies, either repeats what is 
already (intuitively) known and practiced or indulges in a primarily 
aesthetic abstraction of little instrumental value. Substantive 
jurisprudence is conceived as an a-theoretical enterprise - its theory is 
organic, self-evident and largely commonsensical. In such a context, the 
proposal of a rhetoric of law-which poses the question of the legal text 
and of its reading as explicitly theoretical and practical problems has 
both an immediate and radical relevance of a kind to which jurisprudence 
as philosophy of law has not traditionally aspired. What it requires is 
the reversal of the prior order of precedence and privilege, the re- 
reading of the law and the rewriting of the legal textbook in the space 
opened by the concept of law as social discourse. In the terminology of 
the previous chapter, the language and text of the law must be studied not 
simply as a discrete logic of intradiscourse but as an accumulation and 
crystallisation of interdiscursive meanings. In this aspect, the proposal 
-------------------- 
[41 F. Burton and P. Carlen (1979), pp-133-136; T. Mathieson: The 
Politics of 
Abolition (1974) Martin Robertson, pp. 11-28. 
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of a rhetoric of law is not, however, intended as a contribution to the 
doctrinal debate as to the abstractly 'correct' theory of law, adjudication 
or interpretation. Rather its value is practical, if it is to make a 
contribution it will be as a specific methodology of legal study and as a 
reformulation of the appropriate mode of legal education, which allows 
for, and allows for the reality of, oppositional readings of legal texts. 
In an endeavour to provide a more systematic account of the broader 
implications of (and likely resistances to) this project, I shall proceed 
to examine certain of the contexts within which the rhetoric of law is to 
be located. 
. 8.1 THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
Contemporary developments within the materialist theory of ideology 
have tended to distinguish two aspects of the concept of ideology. 5 One 
meaning of ideology is specific and negative; it refers to a system of 
ideas which falsely represents or mystifies individual and collective 
relations to the material conditions of existence. To analyse ideology in 
this sense is both to attempt to expose or unmask the process and 
organisation of forms of consciousness in discourse, and simultaneously to 
propose the possibility of alternative forms of practice in relation to 
materiality - to the structural conditions of community or collectivity 
seen from the perspective of their transformation. In this latter aspect, 
ideology gains a broader positive connotation. Ideology may here be 
viewed as a programme or strategy in relation to the terms of social life. 
Ideology represents - although frequently in an unconscious form -a set 
of unrealised ideals as to the nature of collective existence, a. 
prospective agenda predicating and limiting general attitudes, 
prescribing and enforcing ways of life or modes of being. Tt should 
finally be observed that in both aspects, ideology is primarily a form of 
social organisation, a collective practice and mode of belonging. Tt is 
only secondarily or peripherally that ideology can be taken to mean 3 set 
of mental representations. 
-------------------- 
151 Particularly, G. Therborn: The Ideology of Power and the Power of 1ýeoýogy 
(1980) London; F. Jameson: -TFF-751itical Unconscious ý1967-70-rnell U. F., 
ch. 6; R. Debray: Critique of Political Reason Md3) London. 
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The latter point is of peculiar importance in relation to the analysis 
of the ideological dimension of law. It may be noted firstly that ilý is 
precisely the organisational capacity of an ideology whi-ý2h is its most 
enduring and socially resilient feature. The critique of ideology has -311 
too often taken an idealist form - that of the denunciation of false ideas. 
Denunciation is inadequate to practice, it is no more than therpeutic -Ind 
as has been aptly commented by one of the morý- controversial ideologists 
of the left: 'Specialists have torn all the ideological systems to shr2ds, 
laid bare all the shameful messianisms and exposed all the nonsensp to 
pitiless ridicule - yet "ideology" buries its philosophical gravediggers 
one after the other. 
() It is tempting to draw an analogy with thp 
'intimidating endurance' of positivist jurisprudence, its ability to 
deflect its detractors, provided that it is understood that it is not 
simply the philosophical doctrine but equally the orcranisational practi"ýe 
from which and to which that philosophy leads that is the object of 
cr itique. It is imperative that in its negative aspect the critique of 
-ion of legal doctrine to the re- legal ideology moves beyond denunciat n 
reading of substantive law in the light of theory. It is legal practice C1 0 
after all that is ultimately the object of the critique of legal ideology 
and in one suitably strident account it is legal practice that must 'make 
amends'. To make amends is to provide an analysis of the history of the 
legal institution and of its functions, an analysis of the categories, 
discourse and doctrine within which the legal institution has developed 
and takes its effect: 
It (is) necessary to set about the task of deciphering rulings and 
sentences. It is necessar y to take seriously t h"e juridical 
categories, the discrepant reasoni ngs of jurists, the technical 
formulas of the courts, and the false r igour of doctrine. Taking, 
them seriously does not mean taking the. m for what they claim to 
be. 
It means taking them for what they are in their necessary 
functioning. 7 
To see through ., in somethinC7 other words, 
is not to pass through it. 
is T, 
not the theory but rather it is the practice 
by which critical legal 
studies will eventually be judged. 
-------------------- 
r6l RI. Debray (1983) Op-cit., P-116- L 
171 B. Edelman (1979)-. op. cit., p. 22 
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Which last point raises the question of the broader, positi. ve, 
dimension to legal ideology and its comparison with the ideological role 
of the oppositional reading of law. The positive dimension of legal 
ideology is generally formulated in terms of the ideal of the rule of law 
and the concept of legal right, ideals which have been the object of a 
considerable amount of frequently ill-tempered deb2te. 9 Provided, however, 
that ideology is understood as organisational practice and as -, Icde of 
belonging, it is I belive arguable that these categories or ideals do not 
have any inherent or intrinsic meaning beyond that of their rhetorical 
effect within specific discursive contexts. The issue is not that of 
whether an ideal such as that of the rule of law can contribute to the 
abstract elaboration of a socialist order or to the concept of the good 
life generally but is rather that of whether the essentially theological 
role of that concept can be di spl ac ed or secularised within an 
oppositional ideology of critical legal studies and critical leg-. il 
practice. The legal institution still awaits the 'twilight of the idols' 
and for the secularisation of the law to be possible requires that the 
goals of its proponents be rhetorically effective. Whatever the form that 
the new organisational goals may take - be it those of socialist legality, 
popular justice, informal law or communitarian anarchism - they are never 
completely justified in theory alone. On the one hand they represent 
incomolete alternatives, competing strategic goals which are 
progressively constituted by practical realisation. On the other 
hand 
they comprise a vocabulary and syntax, a language of opposition, a 
language 
which is urgently needed in the context of increasingly conser. vative 
ideologies of law and order in the political sphere. Ttis pr -ý-- 
i sel y 
rhetorically effective goals that socialists require, and where 
better to 
start than with the notion of a law that could actually 
be understood? ýt 
the same time some partial answer might be provided 
to the question which, 
in its most concrete form, asks why one should 
be an activist when it is 
'icallY 
more normal, acceptable and profitable 




L81A useful guide 
to some of these issuý, s is provided 
by, L. K. Bank 
Anarchism, Marxism and The Critique of Law 
in D. Suc7, ý-, rman (el' 
Tdeology and the State (199) Academic 
Press. See also, P. '-'-r n r'. 
". Collison (eds. ): Radical Tssues in Criminology 
(1-, ý90) '%Dobertson, ch. 4; 
.......... 1111ý'ý: ................ ... g. T, ýI '', U1 1 1411el -1 1P........... 
"'sh (1933) Heinemann; ., mpbell: D. Garland and P. Your 
Left and Rights (19,93) Lt-n-Jon. 
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introverted, or at best, complacently hedonistic. 
8.2 THE CONTEXT OF THEORY 
I have argued that there is no adequate theory of law. Certainly the 
legal institution itself does not make great use of theory. Substantive 
jurisprudence is a matter of legal technique, a question of reading and 
teaching the law in terms of vague and dubious notions of interpretation 
and analogy, authority and precedent. Jurisprudence as philosophy of law 
is also somewhat resistant to theory. It has tended to operate upon the 
model of a philosophy of science and to rationalise the products of its 
science's practice, legal discipline, into a grammar of law or hierarchy of 
legal validity. It has by and large been able to assume the determiracy 
of law and the value of its practical functions and has concentrated upon 
the logical presuppositions that make law as a coherent system of rules - 
as a set of unproblematic institutional facts - possible. 
9 The question 
posed is that of how genuine knowledge of the law is possible -a question 
which is posed within the Neo-Kantian tradition of philosophical 
positivism and its philosophy of science, a question which seeks the 
foundations of knowledge and endeavours to systematically justify a 
particular order of discourse by arming it with the coercive rhetoric of 
universals, of necessity, logic, objectivity and truth. 
Positivist philosophy of law has hitherto been a closed discourse, 
consumed by the circular endeavour of providing an epistemology of law it 
has been self-absorbed in the attempt to construct law as an 
'object of 
cognition', as a 'thought' process, and has arrogantly or absent-mindedly 
assumed that the world will come to respond to the 
dictates of this 
particular thought pr oc ess. It has str aightforwardly 
ignored the 
possibility that the project it outlines - that of working 
backwards from 
the law as it is 'given' to the normative procedures 
that guarantee its 
feasible or desirable project for a Igivenness' - is not the only . 
philosophy of law. The ideological grounding of 
the positivist project is 
-------------------- 
[91 For a strident statement of this form of 
jurisprudence, see, D. N. '-I, ýcCormick: 
Contemporary Legral Philosophy (1983) 10 Journal of 
Law and Society 1. 
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ultimately to be found in the value that it attributes to a social order 
based upon hierarchy (the sources of law) and authority (adjudication) as 
the meaning of order. The choice to pursue that project is a political 
one. Tn theoretical terms it privileges epistemology and subord'nates 
ontology, it favours knowledge as the study of ideal states of affairs and 
dismisses the historical and social construction of being. Tn the 17ist 
instance that order of precedence is one of political preference, it is 3 
defence of faith in large measure based upon the confusion of linguistic 
with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism. 
The present study has argued that legal theory begins by throwing the 
possibilty and status of law into question. What is in issue in a 
rhetoric of law is precisely the modalities of the production and 
reception of law as legal meaning. Rather than attempting to construct a 
grammar or indeed a semiotic which would justify abstract claims to 
knowledge of legal norms, the study of law as social discourse conceives 
law to be pre-eminently a practical category, a mode of social being and 
belonging which largely lacks justification. To view law as primarily an 
ontological, practical, category, is to refer philosophy of law to the 
study of law in terms of social ontology, that is to its existence as 
social practice - to the influence it actually exerts, to the functions 
it 
performs and to the meaning effects it realises. 
10 
It may be noted finally that the latter, somewhat abstractly 
formulated, point has considerable implications with regard to , 
he 
development of a critical leg. al studies. Its implications are 
best stated 
in terms of the need to read law dialectically, that is 
in terms of the 
functions it performs within a complex political and social 
totality. 
Rather than reading the law according to its internally 
defined criteria 
of validity - which in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence generally means its 
mental reflection in the cerebra of 
legal officials and its 
intradiscursive assertions of meaning, 
the law should be defined as 
primarily constituted by the connections 
between prý3'ýtict: the 
-hat the internal 
social whole. There is no guarantee, 
in other words, t 0 
-------------------- 
[101 See, G. Lukacs: The Ontologiy of Social Being 
(1978) Merlin, vol. 3: usefully 
commented upon in Cs. V, E! ii 
.... An Anaiysis of Lukacs Ontology (1981) 0 Tnt. 
journal of Sociology of Law 159. 
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cr iter i: 3 of legal ity in any sense r ef lec t the ac tual pr ac tic es (f or mal 9nd 
informal) of the legal institution and legal actors. Nor is there any 
overriding reason to suppose that the textual discipline of the law is 
best read in its own terms. On the contrary, the analysis of law as a 
rhetoric clearly indicates that the law is not a uniquely privileaDed 
discourse. Its specialism is in many aspects arbitrary, in the sense that, 
like any other discourse, the predominant modality of its production and 
reception is inter discursive. The legal text as discourse is comprised of 
the network of its relations to other discourses, its dialogic, 
intertextual, functions and effects. Tt has been the object of this study 
to argue that the appropriate mode for the study of this discourse is, in 
the most serious of senses, interdisciplinary. In view of the potential 
for and indeed the history of misinterpretations of this point, it 
deserves emphasis. 
" The interdisciplinary study of law is the correlate 
of a conception of legal expertise and practice which aligns and 
articulates specialism in legal discourse with knowledge and experience 
of other disciplines and practices. The purpose of this interdisciplinary 
study would not be that of juxtaposing legal knowledge with that of other, 
essentially separate, knowledges (pluridisciplinary), nor would it be that 
of absorbing other disciplines or sciences into legal ex per ti se 
(transdisciplinary) for the purposes of providing a further technical 
dimension of legitimation to legal discourse. The interdisciplin, 3ry 
study of law is aimed rather at breaking down the closure of 
legal 
discourse and at critically articulating the internal relationships 
it 
constructs with other discourses. An interdisciplinary philosophy of 
law 
does not exist to make the legal text speak in a monologic and univorýal 
way, it exists to analyse the interdiscursive status of 
legal texts and to 
conduct a critical and constructive 
dialogue with the law. 
-------------------- 
[111 See particularly, F. Ost: Questions methodologiques 
a propos de. la recherc're 
inter disc ipl inaire en droit (19,91) 
6 Fevue InterdisCiplinalre 
jur id i que 2. 
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